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This thesis analyses the interactions between politics, institutions, and policy 
outcomes using a political agency framework with incomplete information. After an 
introductory chapter, we develop a political agency model that is consistent with the 
empirical evidence on politically-induced fiscal cycles, and especially budget deficit 
cycles. We find that electoral concerns create, on average, a rising budget deficit prior 
to elections. The net welfare effect of elections is ambiguous: although they give rise 
to a deficit bias, they increase the quality of office-holders. The next chapter uses this 
microfounded model to study the incentive and welfare effects that the imposition of 
fiscal constraints has on policy makers' decision to create excessive deficits. Three 
types of constraints are investigated: deficit ceilings, a Golden Rule of public invest- 
ment, and a balanced-budget rule. We find that constraints are effective in reducing 
excessive budget deficits - although at the expense of unconstrained instruments. 
Only one can yield higher welfare than the fully discretionary case. No appropriately 
designed fiscal constraint can achieve the first-best. 
In Chapter 4, we show that two key results in the political agency literature are 
not robust. The first is that a cutoff rule followed by voters in re-electing an incum- 
bent always motivates the latter. The second is that this cutoff rule is an optimal 
incentive mechanism. Under symmetric incomplete information, the first result can 
be reversed since elections can reduce the experimentation effect of office-holders (i. e. 
the incentive to raise effort so that performance becomes a more accurate signal of 
ability). This reduction may more than offset the positive effect of elections on ef- 
fort. When incentives to stand for office are modelled, result two can be overturned 
since a revealing equilibrium at the candidate entry stage can always be designed. 
This screens out low-ability citizens from policy making and therefore eliminates the 
adverse selection problem. If this latter is more important than moral hazard issues, 
the cutoff rule at the policy stage is no longer an optimal mechanism. 
In Chapter 5, we investigate in more details whether relevant (private) information 
about citizens' competence in political office (ability, honesty, etc. ) can be revealed 
by their entry and campaign expenditure decisions. We find that this depends on 
whether voters and candidates have common or conflicting interests; only in the 
former case can entry be revealing in equilibrium. We apply these results to Rogoff's 
(1990) Political Budget Cycles model, allowing for candidate entry: as interests are 
common, low-ability candidates are screened out at the entry stage, and so there is 
no signalling via fiscal policy. In a variant of the Rogoff model where citizens differ 
in honesty, rather than ability, interests are conflicting, and so the political budget 
cycle can persist in equilibrium. The final chapter concludes the thesis. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis analyses the role that incompleteness of information among agents has on 
economic policy outcomes. We focus on a specific type of relationship among agents, 
namely agency (principal-agent) relationships that arise in public policy making; In 
particular, policy decisions being undertaken by elected governments. Using this 
political agency framework, we investigate the interactions between politics, institu- 
tions, and policy outcomes. We use the term "institutions" to refer to mechanisms 
that limit the discretion that policy makers have in office. The policy outcomes we 
analyse deal with fiscal policy and public good provision. 
In Section 1.1 we outline the salient features that, we argue, models aiming to 
analyse decision making by elected officials should include. Section 1.2 briefly presents 
the remaining chapters of the thesis. We highlight the motivation for those chapters, 
the methodology chosen, and the results obtained. 
12 
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1.1 Political Agency in Representative Democra- 
cies 
1.1.1 Representative Democracy 
A political agency framework is a natural starting point to analyse policy outcomes. 
Indeed, in democratic regimes, by far the most common form of public policy making 
is one where citizens delegate their decision making power to an elected government, 
i. e. a regime of representative democracy. ' This delegation of power gives rise to 
a principal-agent relationship with voters as the principal and the government (or 
elected representative(s)) as the agent. 
Although the use of a principal-agent framework to analyse policy outcomes has 
been extensively used in the political economy literature (e. g. Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; 
Alesina, 1987 for rational expectations based models), it is only recently that repre- 
sentative democracy has been properly modelled, in the sense that a citizen's decision 
to stand for office and to become a candidate is endogenised (Osborne and Slivinski, 
1996; and Besley and Coate, 1997). Prior to these "citizen-candidate" models, 2 polit- 
ical economy models incorporated a "political" dimension by introducing an election 
at the end of a period in office. The analysis of the game between an office-holding 
politician and voters centered on the effects of this end-of-term election. However, 
absent the recent citizen-candidate models, in this political economy literature it is 
1 Direct democracy in which citizens vote directly on policy issues is another alternative, although 
not very often used in the real world. Referenda, and petitions are other means of decision making. 
These do not give rise to a delegation of power and to the concomitant agency relationship that a 
representative democracy creates. However, these alternative schemes are, for obvious reasons (e. g. 
cumbersomeness, cost, time requirements, etc. ), best suited to limited and specific cases of public 
policy issues. 
2As these models have been labelled by Osborne and Slivinski (1996). 
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always assumed that the first-period office-holder is exogenously drawn (sometimes 
from the citizenry, sometimes from a different set), i. e. these political economy games 
always start with an exogenously given office-holder in the first period. 
1.1.2 Incomplete Information in Agency Relationships 
As is generally the case in any agency context, incompleteness of information is perva- 
sive: players have differing degrees of information on variables that have an important 
bearing on the relationship. As is well known from the literature on information and 
contracts (e. g. Salanie's 1997 book), incompleteness of information among players has 
an important bearing on the outcome and efficiency obtained out of the relationship. 3 
1.1.3 Political Agency: Specificities and Early Contributions 
The study of political agency relationships is relatively recent and not extensive - at 
least compared to the agency literature that focuses on the theory of the firm. Al- 
though research on agency issues within a firm has implications for the understanding 
and analysis of political agency problems, it is well known that agency relationships 
in government differ along key specific features from the traditional agency problems 
within a firm. The most distinctive characteristic is that monetary rewards, which 
form a crucial part of incentive schemes within a firm (e. g. bonuses, stock options), 
are usually very low-powered in government. ' Government officials, for the most 
3This literature historically focused on agency issues within the context of the firm. Hence, 
problems such as that of selecting and motivating workers, managers, inducing them not to shirk, 
to select efficient projects have been the focus of extensive studies. Recent surveys of these issues 
can be found, for instance, in Gibbons and Waldman (1999) and Prendergast (1999). 
'An important rationale for the widespread use of low-powered incentives in the public sector 
is related to the difficulty in assessing (in a timely manner) the quality of the output produced. 
As Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) have shown, when agents have to perform several tasks and 
that some of these tasks are unobservable and substitutes, then low-powered incentives are more 
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part, receive a fixed pay package. Their monetary reward is therefore not related to 
their performance on the job, or the performance of their department (Wilson, 1989; 
Dixit, 2000). An important question in political theory is therefore how citizens can 
induce their elected representatives to perform diligently once in office since standard 
incentives schemes are not present in the public sector. 
This important question, was first analysed formally by Barro (1973). In this 
seminal paper, Barro asked how citizens could control (in the sense of limiting rent 
seeking activities) office-holding politicians. In Barro's model, politicians suffer from 
a moral hazard problem since, once in office, they can "steal" rent from tax revenues. 
As Barro showed, this moral hazard problem can be attenuated by retrospective 
voting from the part of citizens. Politicians that seek to retain office can therefore 
be motivated not to extract maximum rent by the (credible) threat of not being 
re-elected if they do so. 5 One limitation of Barro's paper was the assumption that 
full information exists among politicians and voters. In particular, this implies that 
voters can perfectly and accurately observe, prior to voting, whether and how much 
politicians have stolen. This is a strong assumption, and one which has important 
consequences for Barro's conclusion. The introduction of imperfect information into 
efficient as far as the principal is concerned. For instance, providing high monetary rewards for 
the production of a good might induce the agent to neglect quality if this latter is not measurable 
(or only after some delay), or the provision of high monetary rewards to perform one task might 
induce the agent to neglect other tasks which are less rewarded or/and less easily measurable by the 
principal. Examples related to this factor abound in the public service. Indeed, a common criticism 
of the recent introduction of performance targets by the Labour government of Tony Blair for the 
public sector is that they induce civil servants to neglect tasks that are not part of the target or 
create perverse incentives; e. g. targets on reducing the waiting list for hospital admissions is said to 
have sharply increased the time patients have before seeing a specialist doctor (which can then put 
them on the hospital waiting list), and also is said to induce hospital doctors to often give priority 
to quickly treatable patients since this reduces the waiting list (The Economist, February 2001) 
'In fact, in Barro's model, since the actions of office-holders are always observable (full informa- 
tion is assumed), and if office-holders are infinitely lived, office-holders can always be induced to 
take efficient actions provided discounting is sufficiently low (by a simple folk theorem argument). 
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political agency models only started more than a decade later with an article by 
Ferejohn (1986). Again, the focus is on a moral hazard problem, i. e. the idea is 
that, left to his own devices, an office-holder would rather pursue activities from 
which he can obtain greater utility rather than pursue those that maximize voters' 
welfare. However, instead of focusing on rent stealing (as Barro did), Ferejohn focuses 
on labour supply by office-holders. The key novelty of Ferejohn's model however 
is the introduction of incomplete (asymmetric) information among the two parties: 
politicians know perfectly if and how much labour they supplied in office - the 
production of public good requires labour input from the office-holding politician - 
but voters do not (politicians labour supply is their private information). In this 
(more realistic) context, Ferejohn shows that, in equilibrium, voters follow a cutoff 
rule by voting for the incumbent only if his observed performance does not fall below 
a certain level, and the office-holder chooses effort so that performance remains just at 
the cutoff. So, office-holder effort is higher than it would be without elections. Thus, 
even under asymmetric information, electoral control of the incumbent by voters is 
still present. 
A different approach - and with a different focus - to introducing 
imperfect infor- 
mation into a political agency model was pioneered by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and 
Rogoff (1990). Aiming to explain, in a rational expectations environment, the ob- 
served occurrence of politically-induced business cycles in taxes, government spending 
and money growth (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988), and in government taxes and expendi- 
tures (Rogoff, 1990), Rogoff and Sibert developed an asymmetric information political 
agency model based, not on a moral hazard, but on an adverse selection problem lead- 
ing to a signalling game. In their model, the political cycle is driven by temporary 
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information asymmetries regarding the ability of office-holders in managing public 
affairs (ability is temporarily the private information of the office-holder). More 
specifically, Rogoff (1990) shows that, in order to increase her re-election probability, 
an office-holder of high-ability will distort fiscal policy instruments ahead of elections 
so as to signal to the electorate that she is indeed a high-ability leader. 6 We should 
note that a forerunner to the Rogoff and Sibert (1988) explanation of the political 
business cycles can be found in Backus and Driffill (1985). Indeed, as Backus and 
Driffill point out, their Barro-Gordon (1983) type model shows that political busi- 
ness cycles can still arise when agents are fully rational (yet imperfectly informed). 
This improves upon the political business cycles model of Nordhaus (1975) in which 
citizens are assumed to be myopic. The Backus and Driffill model, similar to the 
Rogoff and Sibert model, is also based on asymmetric information on the type of the 
office-holder. 7 One limitation of the Backus and Driffill early rational-expectations 
based "political budget cycles" model is that it does not introduce elections explicitly. 
1.2 Political Agency Models: Applications and Ro- 
bustness 
1.2.1 On Politics, Budget Deficits, and Fiscal Constraints 
Given the state of the literature briefly described above, ' in this thesis we focus on two 
issues. In a first part of the thesis (Chapters 2 and 3), we are interested in analysing 
6Rogoff and Sibert (1988) derive similar result in a less microfounded model but with many 
ability types. 
'The two types of government refer to a different loss function for each type. One type is 
(infinitely) inflation averse (the "hard-nosed" type), while the other type (the "wet" type) tolerates 
some positive inflation rate. 
8A more detailed review of the appropriate literature follows in each of the subsequent chapters. 
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the effect that fiscal constraints have on policy outcomes via the constraints they 
impose on policy makers. Recently several such fiscal constraints on sovereign states 
have been introduced around the world. Examples include the European Monetary 
Union's Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and its forerunner, the Maastricht Treaty. 
These set strict ceilings on budget deficits and public debt that a country can have. 
The SGP imposes some fines (which can amount to 0.5 per cent of GDP) on countries 
that do not abide by these ceilings. Another recent example is the United Kingdom 
and its Code for Fiscal Stability, introduced in 1997 by the new Labour government 
of Tony Blair. This Code introduces a "Golden Rule" for public investment whereby 
the government can issue new debt only to finance public investment, and not public 
consumption expenditures. Finally, a recurrent debate in the United States of Amer- 
ica has been over whether to introduce a balanced-budget constraint on the Federal 
government. 9 So far, the US Congress has always rejected these proposals. One com- 
mon motivation for introducing these fiscal restraints is that barring these, politically 
motivated office-holders suffer from a "deficit bias", i. e. for electoral purposes, they 
are keener to increase government expenditure than they are to raise taxes (Alesina 
and Perotti, 1995a). The net effect is a tendency for a budget deficit to emerge. 
Limiting the discretionary fiscal power of politicians in office is therefore advocated 
as a natural solution to counter politicians' incentives (Alesina and Perotti, 1996). 
In Chapter 2, we develop a theoretical model that can allow us to analyse the 
effect of fiscal constraints in an environment where the government (office-holder) is 
politically motivated. 10 Given this, our aim is to develop a model that is consistent 
9Balanced-budget rules already exist for numerous States in the US, but so far no such rules 
exist at the Federal level. 
'°The motivation of the office-holder is to stay in office as long as possible since holding office 
provides the politician added utility compared to other citizens. 
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with the empirical evidence on politically-induced fiscal cycles, and especially budget 
deficit cycles. After reviewing the existing literature, we argue that the Equilibrium 
Political Budget Cycles model of Rogoff (1990) is the most appropriate starting point. 
However, in Rogoff's model it is assumed that the budget is balanced in every period. 
Thus, although a politically-induced cycle is shown to arise even with rational agents, 
this cycle cannot lead to a budget deficit. In Chapter 2, we therefore extend Rogoff's 
model by allowing office-holders to finance government expenditures by issuing debt. 
Strategic deficit financing can therefore arise. Through a signalling effect, we find 
that electoral concerns create, on average, a rising budget deficit prior to elections, 
the so-called "deficit bias". The net welfare effect of elections is ambiguous: although 
they give rise to a deficit bias, they increase the quality of office-holders by enabling 
society to fire low-ability incumbents. This trade-off has important implications for 
the design of fiscal institutions aimed at curbing policy makers' bias towards deficit 
financing and political cycles. 
In Chapter 3, building on the model of Chapter 2, we study the incentive and 
welfare effects that the imposition of constitutional fiscal constraints has on the en- 
dogenous decision of politically motivated policy makers to create excessive deficits. 
The novelty and main achievement of this chapter is to provide a (qualified) rationale 
for fiscal constraints based on a one country, microfounded model. This avoids one 
important drawback of the (small) literature: namely the use of ad hoc assumptions 
that totally drive the results regarding the desirability of fiscal constraints. It also 
enables us to make a case for fiscal constraints without the recourse to a public fi- 
nance argument regarding fiscal externalities in a multi-country currency union. Our 
main motivation for avoiding this argument is that, except for European Monetary 
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Union countries, all the fiscal constraints recently introduced or discussed are not 
motivated by this argument (e. g. New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the US Federal 
government). Also, contrarily to the (few) existing formal studies, we undertake a 
comparative analysis of various fiscal constraints. We focus on three widely known 
type of constraints: deficit ceilings (qualitatively similar to those of the Stability and 
Growth Pact), a Golden Rule of public investment (as recently introduced in the 
United Kingdom's Code for Fiscal Stability), and a balanced-budget rule (following 
the US proposals). We find that constraints are effective in reducing excessive budget 
deficits. However, when the fiscal constraints do not apply to all fiscal instruments 
available to office-holders, then, a substitution effect arises, whereby politicians use 
unconstrained instruments to signal to the electorate enhanced managerial ability. 
Comparing the three types of fiscal constraints, we find that only one can yield a 
higher welfare than the status quo (i. e. where full discretion on fiscal policy is left to 
the office-holder). Finally, we investigate whether we can design a fiscal constraint 
that would be "optimal", in the sense that it would eliminate the electorally-induced 
deficit bias highlighted in Chapter 2. We find that no appropriately designed fiscal 
constraint can achieve the first-best but that the deficit bias can be eliminated. 
1.2.2 A Robustness Check on the Political Agency Literature 
In a second part of the thesis (Chapters 4 and 5), we aim to test the robustness of the 
existing results based on political agency models. As this field is relatively recent, im- 
portant assumptions have been made and results obtained given these assumptions. 
However, alternative, and equally realistic, assumptions can also be made. For in- 
stance, the implications of alternative information structures have not yet been fully 
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investigated: full information has been studied since Barro (1973), and asymmetric 
information since Ferejohn (1986), but another type of incomplete information has 
been underinvestigated, namely symmetric incomplete information. Also, as the po- 
litical agency literature that followed Ferejohn's article showed, although Ferejohn's 
modelling is simple and very tractable, it suffers from unattractive features. For in- 
stance, as Ferejohn himself recognizes (see p10 of his paper) his analysis relies on the 
assumption that an official may stay in office for ever (no term limits). 11 With term 
limits, incumbents can never be induced to supply more than their myopic level of 
effort in the final period, and an "unravelling" argument then shows that incumbents 
can then never be induced to supply more than their myopic level of effort in any 
period of office. Extensions of Ferejohn's model by Austen-Smith and Banks (1989), 
Banks and Sundaram (1993,1998), aim to offer solutions to the limits of Ferejohn's 
analysis. We aim to test the robustness of these models. 
In particular, in Chapter 4, we analyse the incentives that politicians face while 
in office, and the incentives they face to stand for office, in a "career-concerns" model 
of the Holmstrom (1982/1999) type. In this model, agents are heterogeneous, and 
their efforts if in office are unobservable. One contribution of the chapter is to extend 
the career-concerns literature to the case of elected policy makers. Another is that 
we are able to analyse the effect of candidate entry and elections separately, on equi- 
librium effort, and on quality of the office-holder, and on voter utility given various 
informational structures. Specifically, we analyse the effects of full information (as a 
benchmark), of asymmetric information, and of symmetric incomplete information. 
A key finding is that the efficiency of democracy relative to dictatorship12 depends 
"With term limits, Ferejohn's model can only exhibit electoral control in equilibrium if voters 
can precommit to a cutoff rule, a rather unattractive assumption. 
12 Where "dictatorship" refers to a regime in which the incumbent is randomly selected in the first 
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on the information structure assumed. In particular, if (potential) office-holders are 
initially uninformed about their own abilities (symmetric incomplete information), 
effort and voter welfare may be higher with dictatorship, but this cannot happen 
if agents are informed about their own abilities, whether this information is private 
or public information. That dictatorship (or bureaucratic appointment) can Pareto 
dominate a democratic regime is a new result in the political agency literature. So 
far, democracy has always been shown to reduce agency problems (e. g. limit rent 
extraction, increase effort on the job) thanks to the "electoral control" that elec- 
tions offer to voters. We show that this seemingly robust result is in fact due to 
a specific modelling assumption regarding the information structure. The intuition 
for our surprising result in the symmetric information case is that, if office-holder's 
effort and ability interact in the "production function" that determines performance 
in office, then an office-holder has an incentive to experiment, i. e. raise effort so that 
performance becomes a more accurate signal of her ability. Elections reduce the ex- 
perimentation effect. This is because experimentation is about incurring a short-term 
cost (higher effort) with the view of obtaining a better information in the future and 
therefore higher utility in the future. However, since an office-holder facing an elec- 
tion has a positive probability of not being re-elected and therefore of not reaping 
the future benefits of costly experimentation, she will not experiment has much has 
in the case when she has a long-term contract (which is the case under bureaucratic 
appointment/dictatorship). We can show that the reduction in this experimentation 
effect may more than offset the positive "career concerns" effect13 of elections on 
period of the game and stays in office until the end of the game (in period two). In Chapter 4, we 
interchangeably call this regime a "dictatorship" or an "appointment" (of a bureaucrat) regime. 
"Whereby office-holders increase effort so as to increase their visible performance measure so as 
to increase their re-election prospects. 
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effort. Moreover, when this occurs, appointment of officials may Pareto-dominate 
elections. 
As described earlier in this Introduction, an important recent development in the 
political agency literature has been the modelling of representative democracy (Os- 
borne and Slivinski, 1996; and Besley and Coate, 1997). Although numerous studies 
have extended the Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) ap- 
proaches to a more general environment (e. g. Besley and Coate (1998) extended 
their earlier static representative democracy model to a dynamic framework), no re- 
search exist on the implications of representative democracy in an environment with 
incomplete (asymmetric) information. Indeed both Besley and Coate (1997) and Os- 
borne and Slivinski (1996) assume full information in their models. In Chapter 5, we 
analyse the role that incomplete information can have in this recent line of research. 
Besley and Coate (1997) state in their conclusion that this line of research is an im- 
portant issue. In particular, in Chapter 5, we investigate whether relevant (private) 
information about citizens' competence in political office (ability, honesty, etc. ) can 
be revealed by their entry and campaign expenditure decisions. We find that this de- 
pends on whether voters and candidates have common or conflicting interests; only in 
the former case can entry be revealing in equilibrium. Our finding that representative 
democracy can lead to a screening out of undesirable candidates as far as citizens is 
concerned is, we believe, an important and general result that has implications for 
several (seemingly) different literatures. To illustrate our findings, we apply these 
results to Rogoff's seminal (1990) model of the political budget cycle, allowing for 
candidate entry, as well as elections. As interests are common in Rogoff's original 
model, low-ability candidates are screened out at the entry stage, and so there is no 
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signalling via fiscal policy (i. e. no "political budget cycle"). In a variant of the Rogoff 
model where citizens differ in honesty, rather than ability, interests are conflicting, 
and so the political budget cycle can persist in equilibrium. Another well known 
literature to which we could have directly applied our results is the macroeconomics 
literature with asymmetric information that arose in the 1980s (e. g. the early survey 
by Driffill, 1988; and Drazen, 2000a, for further developments). In this Barro-Gordon 
based literature, an inflation bias can arise if citizens (wage setters) are imperfectly 
informed about the loss function of a government (i. e. whether the government is 
"wet" in that it tolerates inflation, or "hard nosed" in that it always pursues a zero 
inflation policy - Backus and Driffill, 1985). In these (signalling) games, as in the 
Rogoff (1990) model, the first-period policy maker is randomly selected and his type 
(which is his private information) affects the utility of all citizens. We conjecture that 
allowing for candidate entry in, e. g. the signalling model of Vickers (1986), 14 would 
eliminate the (welfare reducing) inflation bias that arises because of an assumed pool- 
ing of types in the first-period of the game. Other literatures to which our results 
would apply are discussed in the conclusion of Chapter 5. 
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. 
"The models of Vickers (1986) or Rogoff (1987) are technically very close to the Rogoff (1990) 
model that we analyse, hence our conjecture. 
Part I 
The Politics of Budget Deficits and 
Fiscal Constraints 
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Chapter 2 
The Politics of Budget Deficits and 
Fiscal Cycles: Theory and Evidence 
Reconciled 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the 1970s, many countries have experienced persistent budget deficits leading 
to sizeable national debt. Numerous empirical studies have shown that these deficits 
are difficult to reconcile with neoclassical models of fiscal policy such as the one of 
Barro (1979). However, these same studies' find that political factors are impor- 
tant determinants of fiscal policy outcomes and especially budget deficits. Two main 
political channels have been emphasized in the literature: "partisan"2 and "oppor- 
'Recent surveys of this empirical literature can be found in Alesina and Perotti (1995a), and the 
books by Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) and by Drazen (2000a). Drazen's book offers a more 
impartial critical view of the literature. 
2This terminology follows from Hibbs (1977), and subsequently from Alesina (1987) in a rational 
expectations environment. 
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tunistic" behaviour. Partisan behaviour arises because different policy makers have 
different ideologies and, when elected, choose macro-economic policies according to 
their preferences and those of the electorate they represent. Opportunistic behaviour 
on the other hand occurs because political leaders care about being re-elected and 
manipulate policies to maximize their probability of staying in power. 3 
Despite strong supportive and recent empirical evidence (discussed in Section 
2.2) that office-motivation leads to distorted fiscal policy, the theoretical political 
economy literature concerned with budget deficits and fiscal cycles has concentrated 
mostly on partisan models. In particular, no opportunistic model featuring both 
endogenous re-election and public debt accumulation exists. A model including both 
these features is however necessary to address important policy issues such as the 
comparative analysis of fiscal constraints (both vis 6 vis other fiscal constraints and 
vis ä vis the no constraint case). Such constraints, aimed to a great extent at curbing 
politically-induced budget deficits, have recently been introduced in New Zealand, 
the United Kingdom, and European Monetary Union. The United States Congress 
has repeatedly discussed the pros and cons of introducing a balanced-budget rules at 
the Federal level. Many such fiscal constraints exist in federal states (e. g. the US, 
Germany, etc. ). As shown in practice, fiscal constraints come in various forms (e. g. 
balanced-budget rules, ceilings on part or all of the budget, etc. ). For a meaningful 
positive comparative analysis of fiscal constraints, a microfounded model is desirable. 
Furthermore, this model should be based on opportunistic behaviour (since empirical 
3Politicians can be opportunistic for two reasons. Either because they value holding office per 
se (e. g. for the prestige it confers), or because they value the economic rents they can extract 
once in office. We shall refer to the former case as "office-seeking" politicians, and to the latter 
case as "rent-seeking" politicians. Throughout the chapter (and most of the thesis), we focus on 
office-seeking politicians. Persson and Tabellini (2000) study extensively the case of rent-seeking 
politicians. 
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evidence point to the significance of this channel in affecting budget deficits and fiscal 
cycles), and office-seeking politicians should endogenously adjust their fiscal policy 
to the institutional environment they face. 
In this chapter we aim to bridge the gap in the literature mentioned above, i. e. we 
construct a political agency model that allows both endogenous re-election probabil- 
ities and public debt accumulation. The model closest to our aim is the Equilibrium 
Political Budget Cycles model of Rogoff (1990). This microfounded political agency 
model does feature endogenous re-election probabilities but it otherwise assumes an 
atemporal fiscal policy game. In this chapter, we therefore use the Rogoff model 
as a baseline framework and extend it by allowing debt financing of government ex- 
penditures. The model is a two-period signalling model in which the first-period 
office-holder is seeking re-election for another term. Office-holders can be of varying 
ability in producing public goods (either high- or low-ability types). Ability is an 
agent's (temporary) private information. In equilibrium, in order to increase their re- 
election probabilities, high-ability incumbents signal to the electorate their enhanced 
ability by distorting fiscal policy ahead of elections. 4 Because office-holders can now 
use debt strategically rather than run balanced-budgets as in Rogoff's original model, 
we find the following new results. 
First, a political fiscal cycle emerges, and this political cycle gives rise to a deficit 
bias, i. e. electoral concerns induce high-ability incumbents to increase the budget 
deficit ahead of elections compared to periods in which they do not face elections. 
Hence, on average, fiscal policy is looser prior to elections (larger budget deficits), 
'For simplicity our model (as does Rogoff's 1990 model) deals with only two types of policy 
makers. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) study the case of a large number of different types. They show 
that all but the lowest ability policy maker distort policy in equilibrium (because of signalling). 
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and tighter afterwards (reduction in the budget deficit). This electoral budget deficit 
cycle is consistent with empirical evidence. 
Second, even though high-ability incumbents exhibit a deficit bias ahead of elec- 
tions, we show that these high-type leaders create smaller ex post (cost-adjusted) 
budget deficits while providing more public goods than low-ability leaders. Although 
the result that a competent policy maker creates a smaller budget deficit than a less 
able office-holder is intuitive, we should note that, in the context of an opportunistic 
model ä la Rogoff, our result might seem surprising and even counter-intuitive. In- 
deed, in Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990) and in the literature that follows, ' a 
high-ability office-holder is shown to increase government expenditures and decrease 
taxes ahead of elections. All these models assume that the government balances its 
budget in each period; nevertheless, they might give the impression that the fiscal 
policy stance of a competent policy maker is looser than that of a less able policy 
maker. Indeed, as already mentioned, we do find that high-type leaders increase the 
budget deficit ahead of elections compared to non-election periods. However, we show 
that even though electoral considerations induce high-ability office-holders to increase 
the budget deficit ahead of elections, this higher deficit does not exceed the budget 
deficit (in a cost-adjusted measure) that low-ability incumbents generate. The intu- 
ition for this result is that high-ability incumbents can use their ability advantage to 
lower the cost of public expenditures and therefore lower the budget deficit. 
Third, despite the fact that elections give rise to a budget deficit bias (which 
is distortionary), the net welfare effect of elections is ambiguous since they enable 
citizens to fire low-ability office-holders in the first period of the game so that the 
SGonzalez (1999) and Drazen (2000b) are recent extensions of Rogoff (1990). 
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expected quality of the office-holder is higher than under a mechanism whereby, e. g., 
policy making is delegated to bureaucrats with full tenure. 
Finally, a trade-off between low budget deficits and efficiency is highlighted: high- 
type leaders create lower (cost-adjusted) budget deficits than low-type incumbents 
but these competent leaders pursue distortionary (cf. signalling) policies. This trade- 
off points to interesting welfare issues regarding the design of fiscal institutions aimed 
at curbing politically-induced budget deficits. Hence, the model provides a natural 
framework to study recent institutional changes in the domain of fiscal policy such 
as the fiscal constraints adopted in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the Eu- 
ropean Monetary Union countries (Chapter 4 deals with these issues). We also find 
a new result regarding Ricardian Equivalence in asymmetric information, represen- 
tative agent models. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2 we briefly review the 
empirical literature and expose a gap in the theoretical literature. In Section 2.3, 
we develop a political fiscal cycle model with deficit financing based on a political 
channel consistent with the empirical evidence on fiscal policy. Finally, in Section 2.4 
we conclude on this chapter. 
2.2 The Literature on Budget Deficits And Fiscal 
Cycles 
2.2.1 From The Empirical Evidence... 
Empirical studies reveal that opportunistic behaviour is an important and significant 
determinant of fiscal policy. For instance, early and influential studies such as Frey 
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and Schneider (1978) find that pre-electoral opportunistic behaviour is more acute the 
less popular the incumbent is. An electoral cycle is also found by Bizer and Durlauf 
(1990) in their study of US tax behaviour. Lockwood et al. (1996), and Alesina et 
al. (1997) find evidence of an electoral cycle on all fiscal instruments they analyse. 
More recently, using recent econometric techniques and "natural experiments" or 
control groups, recent studies have solved the econometric issues that often limited 
the robustness of many prior studies, and still found opportunistic behaviour to sig- 
nificantly affect fiscal policy. These studies include Besley and Case (1995a, b), Levitt 
and Snyder (1997) and Shi and Svensson (2001). We review these important studies 
in turn. 
First, the Besley and Case studies. In a series of papers, Besley and Case (1995a, b) 
empirically tested key predictions of office-motivated political economy models (e. g. 
Austin-Smith and Banks, 1989; Banks and Sundaram, 1993; Rogoff, 1990). In Besley 
and Case (1995a), the authors analyse the behaviour of US governors from 1950 to 
1986 in the fiscal policy area. Political agency models predict that office-holders that 
can run for re-elections will, on average, strategically (e. g. for signalling purposes) 
distort fiscal policy ahead of elections. On the other hand, office-holders that do not 
face elections set fiscal policy based on purely economic conditions. In the US, some 
States' constitutions impose some maximum term limit to governors, others do not. 
This constitutional variation across States enables Besley and Case to test whether 
strategic fiscal manipulation occurs or not, as political agency models predict (i. e. a 
natural control group exists so that identification problems are avoided). The results 
of Besley and Case support such models: they find evidence that taxes and govern- 
ment spending do respond to a binding term limit (when the governor is a Democrat). 
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More specifically, a political fiscal cycle exists in which taxes are lowered prior to elec- 
tions and raised afterwards. In Besley and Case (1995b), the authors again test a 
political agency model such as Banks and Sundaram (1993) or Rogoff (1990) but ex- 
tended to a model with multiple fiscal/political jurisdictions. As a result, assuming 
jurisdictions face correlated shocks, voters can infer their office-holder's ability or per- 
formance by observing their relative performance (as in Holmstrom, 1982). Besley 
and Case again find support for the theoretical models: tax changes appear to be 
a significant determinant of governors' electoral success or failure. Governors whose 
tax increases are out of line with other States' increases are penalised at the polling 
booth. 
Second, the Levitt and Snyder (1997) study. Levitt and Snyder demonstrate that 
the previously inconclusive evidence on opportunistic behaviour is due to a substantial 
omitted-variable bias (i. e. that incumbents' spending spree is likely to be related to 
their perception of their future electoral vulnerability). After controlling for this 
bias in their empirical analysis of US Congressional elections, Levitt and Snyder find 
strong and convincing evidence that rising government expenditures ahead of elections 
benefits incumbents (it helps incumbents win votes). An additional $100 per capita 
in spending increases the incumbent's share of votes by 2%. Specifically, Levitt 
and Snyder find that "high-variation" programs6 are positively related to election 
outcomes. These evidence lend support to opportunistic models and in particular 
to that of Rogoff (1990). In his survey of 25 years of research on Political Business 
Cycles, Drazen (2000b) argues that opportunistic models and especially the Rogoff 
6 "High-variation" programs, despite being a small part of the overall programs, are programs 
that target specific constituencies and are more amenable to political manipulation because of their 
discretionary nature. They are the types of programs that opportunistic models refer to. 
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and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) models are best suited in explaining politically- 
induced business cycles. 
Finally, and most recently, the Shi and Svensson (2001) study. The econometric 
strength of the Shi and Svensson study is the use of dynamic panel data techniques 
to identify opportunistic political behaviour. In a comprehensive empirical study 
covering 123 developed and developing countries over 21 years, Shi and Svensson 
(2001) find significant and robust evidence of a political budget cycle consistent with 
the predictions of Rogoff's (1990) model. Specifically, Shi and Svensson find that 
spending increases ahead of elections while taxes fall. This leads to a larger deficits 
in election years (a politically-induced deficit bias). Their result is robust to the 
introduction of many other variables including measures of political polarization and 
fragmentation (which they find not to be significant). 
For completeness, we should also note that the latest empirical evidence tend to 
show that variables indicative of partisan behaviour are not a robust predictor of fiscal 
policy instruments and outcomes (political party dummies are generally found to have 
a statistically insignificant effect on budget deficit variables). Lack of partisan effect 
can be found, for instance, in multi-country panel data studies undertaken by Alesina 
and Perotti (1995b), Alesina et al. (1997), by Kontopoulos and Perotti (1997), and 
by Levitt and Snyder (1997). For example, even Alesina et. al. (1997) conclude from 
their empirical analysis of OECD countries that opportunistic models give better 
predictions on policy instruments than partisan models do. These predictions hold 
after controlling for standard control variables and even for the effects of institutional 
differences among countries (e. g. government fragmentation and budget procedures).? 
'On the other hand, as noted by Alesina et al. (1997), partisan models are better in predicting 
outcomes (growth, unemployment, inflation). Although, in a more refined partisan model, Lockwood 
The Literature on Budget Deficits And Fiscal Cycles 34 
Lockwood et al. (1996) find weak evidence in favour of partisan effects in UK fiscal 
policy. Given that these authors chose to analyse the UK precisely because of its clear 
partisan division over fiscal policy -a clear case of ex ante sample selection bias - the 
fact that only weak evidence of partisan behaviour can be found tends to confirms 
the results of multi-country panel data studies. 
2.2.2 ... To The Theoretical Gap 
Although empirical studies do find a significant relationship between office-motivated 
policy makers and fiscal policy outcomes and in particular the occurrence of budget 
deficits, no theoretical model which could account for these phenomena exists. 8 
Indeed, opportunistic models featuring both public debt accumulation and en- 
dogenous re-election probabilities do not exist. ' For instance, in Cukierman and 
Meltzer's (1986a) early contribution, a generic policy instrument is used to represent 
government's actions. Therefore this cannot give any predictions on specific fiscal in- 
struments and politically-induced fiscal cycles. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff 
(1990) have a model with endogenous re-election probabilities but public debt is not 
introduced (and their models do not include any other state variable). The budget 
et al. (1996) show that such models can be reconciled with the empirical literature. This stems from 
the fact that they have an hybrid model (semi-partisan, semi-opportunistic). Indeed, their model 
produces "an electoral cycle which is very similar to the one generated by Rogoff-type electoral 
manipulation". 
8Models pertaining to explain fiscal deficits that are politically-induced but arising for reasons 
other than because of partisan or opportunistic behaviour exist. These include models based on 
the idea of "fiscal illusion", models of intergenerational redistribution, of distributional conflict, of 
geographically dispersed interests, and of budgetary institutions. See Alesina and Perotti (1995a) 
for an early survey of the literature, and Drazen (2000a) for more recent developments. 
9We only review the formal literature that assumes agents form rational expectations. Key 
references that do not make this assumption (i. e. that assumes adaptive expectations) but that 
focus on the occurrence of political business cycles include Nordhaus (1975) and Tufte (1978). 
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is balanced in every period in these two models. 1° Hence, budget deficits cannot be 
studied. l l 
In a recent related paper, Lizzeri (1999) presents a model with opportunistic/office 
motivated candidates in which voters are homogenous. Budget deficits are due to the 
fact that candidates use debt as a tool of redistributive politics. Borrowing enables 
candidates to better target their promises to groups of voters and increase their 
election prospects. Unlike the Rational Political Budget Cycles models (Rogoff and 
Sibert, 1988, and the subsequent literature), Lizzeri assumes that candidates can 
commit to their pre-election promises. If candidates were allowed to renege on their 
electoral promises, it is not clear whether there would be a reason for budget deficits to 
arise in Lizzeri's model. Indeed, promises to tax one (small) group of citizens in order 
to redistribute the proceeds to a (larger) group of citizens would not sway voters in 
favour of a candidate making such non credible promises. Casual observation indeed 
reveals that electoral promises (e. g. "read my lips"! ) are often not kept once the 
candidate has been elected. In this chapter, for lack of an explicit modelling of the 
commitment technology, we will maintain the Rogoff and Sibert (1988) assumption 
'()Note that in the model of Rogoff and Sibert, a (small) intra-period budget deficit is possible: 
the government sets taxes and government expenditures at the beginning of the period; any shortfall 
in the budget is balanced at the end of the period by (distortionary) seigniorage revenue. 
11 Since writing this chapter, a recent paper by Shi and Svensson (2001) has been written. Although 
the main focus of Shi and Svensson is empirical (they aim to test for the presence or not of political 
budget cycles), they also develop a simple model that is consistent with their empirical results 
(described in Section 2.2.1). Their aim is related to Rogoff's (1990) model but their modelling 
approach differs (in simplifying ways). First, Shi and Svensson focus on a moral hazard rather than 
an adverse selection agency problem. Second, they assume symmetric incomplete information rather 
than asymmetric information (no signalling activity therefore takes place). Third, they also allow 
for public debt to be issued. The focus on moral hazard and symmetric incomplete information 
simplifies greatly the analysis. Their model gives similar predictions as ours. However, given that 
the underlying problem is different, our models have different implications for both positive and 
normative analysis. Whether moral hazard or adverse selection problems is more acute in policy 
making is hard to determine. Our models are therefore useful complements in that we should be 
more confident about the robustness a theoretical predictions if they are obtained using different 
modelling assumptions. 
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that pre-election pledges are not credible. 
By contrast to the office-motivated literature, numerous models exist in which par- 
tisan policy makers can manipulate public debt/budget deficits ahead of elections, 
sometimes leading to increased re-election probabilities. Key papers include Persson 
and Svensson (1989), Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Tabellini and Alesina (1990) and 
Aghion and Bolton (1990). 12 Given that the theoretical underpinnings of ideology 
is not yet very well understood in economics, economists have introduced partisan 
biases in different ways, and the arbitrary choice along which voters' preferences are 
assumed to differ critically drives the predicted behaviour of public debt. This is 
clearly an important limitation of these theories since these often lead to contradict- 
ing predictions. For instance, Alesina and Tabellini's model predicts a deficit bias 
irrespective of the party in power. In contrast, Persson and Svensson's model predicts 
that right-wing governments run budget deficits and left-wing governments run sur- 
pluses. Aghion and Bolton's model does not predict, in general, debt accumulation 
before elections, rather, in some cases, debt under-accumulation. Lockwood et al. 
(1996) have conjectured that the same problem of debt under-accumulation before 
elections would arise if, in Alesina and Tabellini's model, parties also have different 
preferences regarding the level of public spending. Alesina et al. (1997) also reach 
the same conclusion, namely that the fiscal implications of partisan models are not 
clear cut. Overall, these models do predict that left-wing governments are keener on 
spending but, at the same time, they are also less averse to tax increases. It is thus 
12 More recent contributions include Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1994) who build a model with 
endogenous re-election probabilities, and Lockwood et al. (1996) who construct a mixed partisan 
and opportunistic policy makers model but in which re-election probabilities are assumed to be 
exogenous. Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1997) study the effect of re-election concerns on the decision to 
undertake public investment projects (they assume that information is incomplete but symmetric 
among citizens and politicians).. 
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difficult to find consistent predictions on budget deficits. 
This lack of theoretical robustness is also reflected in the empirical literature, 
perhaps indicating that there are indeed several ways of being partisan and that 
empirical studies should try to identify each possible ways separately. 
In a recent related paper, Velasco (2000) focuses on voter (ex ante) heterogeneity 
and in particular on a dynamic "common pool" problem. Velasco highlights the role 
that fragmented fiscal policy making can play in creating a "deficit bias". This is 
because government resources are the common property of a large number of fiscal 
authorities. His model does not include elections. As argued by Lizzeri (1999), "it 
is not clear whether debt accumulation would obtain in Velasco's model if elections 
took place". 
We now turn to our model. We build on the model of Rogoff (1990) for three 
main reasons. First, this model imposes the most realistic assumptions with regards 
to the type of asymmetric information assumed (Drazen, 2000a, b). Furthermore, it 
does not require the assumption that a commitment technology exists for candidates' 
pre-electoral promises. Second, it has recently received further empirical support (e. g. 
Besley and Case, 1995a, b; Levitt and Snyder, 1997; Shi and Svensson, 2001). Finally, 
its microfounded nature makes it an appropriate model given that we want to be 
able to tackle positive and normative welfare issues (such as the analysis of fiscal 
constraints). 
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2.3 Equilibrium Political Fiscal Cycles 
2.3.1 The Model 
This section extends the seminal Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles model of Rogoff 
(1990). The novelty is the introduction of public debt as a state variable. Adding 
debt as a state variable noticeably complicates the analysis. We therefore simplify 
Rogoff's model by having a two-period game instead of two-period game repeated over 
an infinite horizon. This also enables us to greatly simplify the stochastic structure 
of the game. 13 
Preferences of a Representative Citizen 
The (small and open) economy, which evolves over two time periods, t=1,2, consists 
of a large number N of (ex ante) identical rational and forward looking citizens (with 
#N =n> 3) who maximize their expected utility. The representative citizen's 
utility is: 
U= [u (Cl) 91) + 711 + [u (c2,92) +v (k2)} (2.1) 
where ct is a representative citizen's consumption of the private good at period t 
(t = 1,2), gt is government spending on goods and services per capita (i. e. the public 
"consumption" good) at period t, and k2 is public "investment" per capita. u and 'i' 
are both strictly concave functions, with ul, u2i v' > 0.14 77 is a random shock that 
captures the personal characteristics of the incumbent leader which are not related to 
her ability to manage the public good production function; for example, her "looks" . 
13The two-period structure is not critical to our results and is common in the literature (Drazen, 
2000b, also uses a two-period version of the Rogoff model). 
"In addition to the usual Inada conditions, it is also assumed that limk .ov (k) _ -co. 
This 
condition is sufficient to ensure an interior solution in the asymmetric information case. 
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This shock is experienced by each citizen i. Each q is a continuously distributed i. i. d. 
random variable on [-f, ý], with if and rý independent for all i j. We assume that 
r, is only revealed at the end of a pre-electoral period (i. e. just before citizens vote, 
but after the incumbent has set her fiscal policy). As a result, incumbents do not 
condition their fiscal policy on the "looks" shock. " 
Technology 
The budget constraint of the representative citizen for period 1 and 2 respectively is: 
cl+b=y-rr1 (2.2) 
and 
C2 =y- 72 + rb (2.3) 
where, y is the exogenous, per period, endowment of a non-storable good. r is equal to 
one plus the interest rate (assumed constant1e and not taxed). b denotes government 
debt issued at the beginning of period 1.17 -rt are taxes in period t (t = 1,2). 
The government budget constraint (which is also the public good production func- 
tion) for period 1 and 2 respectively is given by: 
g, + k2 = T1 +0+b-f (T1) (2.4) 
15Note that q does not drive any of our results. This shock is introduced by Rogoff (1990) for 
purely technical reasons: it enables the use of refinements of the equilibrium concept in Section 
2.3.5 so that all pooling equilibria can be eliminated using the "intuitive criterion" of Cho and 
Kreps (1987). 
16This follows from our assumption of a small an open economy. Shi and Svensson (2001) in a 
related political agency model (but focusing on moral hazard with a symmetric incomplete infor- 
mation framework) also assume a small and open economy and the resulting fixed interest rate on 
public debt. 
17Given our small economy assumption, we should take into account the fact that domestic resi- 
dents need not purchase all public debt, i. e. we could allow government debt to be held partly by 
domestic residents and by foreigners, so that only a fraction of b would be held by domestic citizens. 
This however does not change our results and would unnecessarily burden the model with more 
variables. We therefore simplify the notation by assuming that all public debt is held domestically. 
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and 
92 = T2 +0- rb -f (T2) (2.5) 
where 0 measures the ability of the office-holder in transforming the private good 
(tax revenue) into public goods. Citizens' competency to manage the public good 
production function can be of two types: either they have a high competency level 
(OH), or a low competency level (OL) (i. e. 0E {OH) OL}), where p- Pr(O = BH) 
(1 - p) - Pr(O = OL), and 9H > OL > 0. So, the ability types of the citizens are 
indexed by aE {H, L}. To simplify the analysis, we assume that an individual's 
competency is constant for the two periods of the game. Competency is a leader's 
individual characteristic. From the public good production functions (2.4) and (2.5), 
we can see that the more competent the leader (i. e. the higher 0) , the 
less funds are 
necessary for a given level of public goods. 
We assume that the game starts with no inherited debt or assets. In the second 
and last period, the government repays its total debt (principal and interest) issued 
in the first period and cannot issue debt. 18 
Note that equations (2.4) and (2.5) contain af(. ) function. This function rep- 
resents the distortionary costs of taxation (e. g. because of tax collection costs). We 
assume that f'(. ) > 0, f"(. ) >0 and f' (0) = 0. Distortionary taxes are introduced 
so as to avoid the Ricardian Equivalence proposition (otherwise 71 and b are not 
uniquely determined, only the sum of the two is). That we need to introduce dis- 
tortionary taxes into our model seems surprising at first: as will become apparent, 
the model has asymmetric information and the incumbent leader manipulates fiscal 
18We assume that the government cannot default on its debt -a realistic assumption in the context 
of developing countries. 
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instruments (including taxes and debt) for signalling purposes. We shall prove later 
in the chapter that this is indeed the case (see Proposition 2.4). As in Rogoff (1990), 
another important element to notice in (2.4) is that public investment has a one- 
period production lag. Thus public investment decided in period 1 becomes visible 
and productive in period 2. In the final period, there is no public investment. 19 
Leader's Utility Function 
Candidates are randomly drawn from the pool of citizens. When one citizen is elected, 
because of the prestige of being in charge of the country's public resources the leader 
receives an "ego rent" R per period in office. 20 This private utility from holding office 
cumulates with the (social) utility that all citizens derive from the consumption of 
private and public goods. Hence, the incumbent leader's expected utility is: 
El (U) + 7rR (2.6) 
where U is given by (2.1). El denotes expectations based on the incumbent's infor- 
mation set at period 1,21 and it is the incumbent's period 1 estimate of her probability 
of being in office in period 2; it is endogenously determined by the incumbent and is 
a function of her first-period fiscal policy. 7r is derived at a later stage. 
Information Structure and Timing of Events 
Elections are held at the end of the first period. The opposition candidate is drawn 
at random from the rest of the population. In period 1 the incumbent observes 0 and 
19Note that we maintain a time subscript on k so as to emphasize the crucial timing assumption 
of public investment. 
2°Throughout Chapters 2 and 3, R denotes the office-holder's ego rent, and r denotes the interest 
rate on public debt. 
21 Throughout Chapters 2 and 3, a "0" superscript refers to the opponent candidate; a "I" refers 
to the incumbent. 
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sets gl, irl, b and k2 (without knowing qI and i°). Voters observe gl, T1, b, 77',, q' and 
then vote (voters do not observe 0 contemporaneously, only with a one period lag). 
There is asymmetric information between the incumbent and voters in that voters can 
only make inferences about the ability of the incumbent given their observed fiscal 
variables. The uncertainty concerning 0 translates directly into uncertainty about k2 
(k2 "hides" 0: voters only observe, via the government's budget constraint (2.4), the 
sum of k2 + B, not the individual components of this sum). In period 2 the winner of 
the period 1 election takes office for the remaining period of the game. 
The representative citizen votes for the incumbent (A = 1) if her expected utility 
under the incumbent is as great as or equal to that under the opponent. If not she 
votes for the opponent (A = 0), i. e.: 
A1_J1 if EP 
(U2) > EP (U20) (2.7) 
0 otherwise 
EP refers to expectations based on the public's information (P) set at period 1. U2' 
(U°) denotes the utility of the representative citizen if the period 1 incumbent (I) 
policy maker is in office in period 2 (if the opponent (0) candidate is in office in 
period 2). 
Figure 2.1 below summarises the timing of events. In particular, attention is 
paid to the information structure of the game with both visible (above the horizontal 
line) and (yet) invisible (below the horizontal line) variables being highlighted. The 
invisible variables (as of period one) are of two types: those that are invisible to 
voters (i. e. 0 and k2) and the one (i. e. q) which is unknown to the incumbent at the 
time when she must set fiscal policy in the first period. 
Note that the asymmetries of information assumed are quite realistic (see also 
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Drazen (2000a, b) on this point). The composition of government spending and espe- 
cially the composition between current (visible prior to voting) public consumption 
and future (invisible prior to voting) public investment is an area where incumbent 
governments can realistically be assumed to have an informational advantage. Public 
investment, for instance, include such "intangible" and contingent elements as off- 
budget loans guarantees. Implicit guarantees aimed at maintaining the stability of 
the financial sector can be thought of such an "invisible as of period t" investment 
(or lack of). Only in period t+1 will voters, for instance, know whether the pub- 
lic finances will have to put up a safety plan to rescue ailing financial institutions. 
Such examples abound: Japan (1990s), South Korea (1997 onwards), the US Savings 
and Loans (mid 1980s, early 90s), Scandinavian countries (early 1990s), France with 
Credit Lyonnais, are all examples where multi-billion dollar rescue packages have 
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been needed and could, arguably, have been attenuated or prevented by adequate 
"invisible" investment in improved prudential regulation and supervision. 
2.3.2 Equilibrium Under Full Information and Under a So- 
cial Planner 
To gain intuition, we first analyse the equilibrium outcome if voters could observe k2 
prior to voting in period 1. In this case, the incumbent's decision problem is equivalent 
to maximizing the welfare of the representative agent as voters can observe 0 with 
certainty prior to voting. We need to solve the game backwards. 
In the second period, the problem is to max u(c2i 92) s. t. (2.3), (2.5) and c2,92 > T2, c2,92 
0, which, after direct substitution, gives the indirect utility function: 
max J(b, B) -u(y-T2+rb, rr2+B-rb- f (r2)) (2.8) 
T2 
The first-order conditions for an interior solution (which stems from the Inada 
conditions on u) imply: 
uc(c2192) _11-f (r2)] us(c2792) (2.9) 
where uc (ug) refers to the derivative of u(.,. ) with respect to the first (second) 
argument. Equation (2.9) defines r2 as a function of b and 0, i. e. r* =G (b, 0) , and 
with normal goods Gb(. ) > 0, GB(. ) < 0. Using the envelope theorem on (2.8), we 
have: 
dJ(b, 0) 
db - 
ucr - ugr = -rf' 
(T2) Ug(C2, g2) <0 
and, with distortionary taxes: 
dJ(b, 0) 
>o dB 
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The intuition is that an increase in debt in the first period requires higher taxes in 
the second period. These taxes however are distortionary. 
In the first period, the office-holder's problem is to max u(cl, gl) + v(k2) + 
Ti, ci, gi, b, k2 
J (b, 0) s. t. (2.2), (2.4) and k2i c1, gl > 0. After substitution, this is equivalent to 
the following problem: 
Tma 6W 
(g1, T1, b, 0) =u(y-T1-b, gl)+v[r1+0-gl+b- f (T1)]+J(b, 0) (2.10) 
subject to gl, T1, b, y- 7-1 - b, r1 +0- gl +b-f (Ti) > 0. 
We know from the Inada conditions on u and v that this problem has an interior 
solution in g1, T1 and b, i. e. the non-negativity constraints do not bind on these 
variables. Thus: 
uc = (1 - f'(T1))v' (71 > 0) (2.11) 
u9 = v' (gl > 0) (2.12) 
U, = v' -r f' (r2) u9(c2,92) (b > 0) (2.13) 
or: 
u, = u, + rf' 72) u9(c2792) = us(c1191) = VI (2.14) 
There exists a unique [gi (B), Ti (B), b* (9)] which satisfies (2.11)-(2.13) and that is a 
global maximum. 22 (u and v are strictly concave and the constraint set is convex ; 
distortionary taxes allow us to determine separately rl and b rather than the sum of 
the two). With normal goods ci(0), gi(9), and k2(0) are increasing in 0, and c2(0), 
and g2 *(0) are increasing in B, 7-2 *(0) is decreasing in 0. 
22Throughout Chapters 2 and 3, a star superscript refers to the equilibrium obtained under full 
information. 
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We can note that a policy maker will choose an interior solution for taxes in both 
periods. The intuition is the following. Suppose that we had 7-1 = 0. Then, given the 
assumed distortionary loss function (convex and tangent at the origin), a marginal 
increase in rrl imposes a zero deadweight loss, but if b is reduced, r2 is also reduced 
and so is the associated positive second-period deadweight loss. First-period taxes 
therefore cannot be equal to zero. The policy maker will choose 7r1 and b so as to 
equate their marginal costs ([1 - f' (7-1)]-1 and r f' (T2) u9(c2i g2) respectively). The 
same argument applies to second-period taxes. 
The equilibrium under full information is represented in Figure 2.2. A high- 
ability incumbent's equilibrium is represented by point H. A low-ability incumbent 
is represented by point L. We have gH > gL, TH < TL, bH < bL (where, to simplify 
the notation when both a time index and an ability index occur, we drop the time 
index on g1 and T1; i. e. g1, H = gH > g1, L = g'L, T1, H = TH < TI ,L= TL. 
We continue 
with this simplification for t=1 variables for the rest of Chapters 2 and 3; for t=2 
variables we keep to time index so that no confusion should be possible). 
Rom (2.7), we know that, at the end of period one, the incumbent leader is re-elected 
1) if: 
EP [W* (61)] - EP [w*(00)] + TI - Ti0 >0 (2.15) 
where W* denotes the utility of the representative citizen under full information (and 
W,, denotes the utility of the representative citizen under full information when the 
office-holder is of ability aE {H, L}). Under full information, with voters observing 0 
and given that 0 is constant in both periods, it is easy to find the public's expectations 
for the incumbent: 
EP [W*(91)] WI = W. *, (2.16) 
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with aE {H, L}. Voters however do not have information on the opponent's compe- 
tency: since the opponent has not produced public goods, voters cannot observe or 
infer 0 from (2.4); thus: 
Ei [W*(0°)] = W° = PWH + (1 - p) WL* (2.17) 
Clearly, WI > Wo if the incumbent I is a type-H, and Wo > W, if I is a type-L 
(for p< 1), i. e. a competent incumbent is preferred over an unknown opponent who 
herself is preferred over an incompetent incumbent. 
2.3.3 Benchmark: The Appointment Case 
Before analysing the asymmetric information case and the resulting fiscal policy, we 
need to have a benchmark that can enable us to identify politically-induced fiscal 
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cycles and excessive deficits. A natural benchmark in our model is when fiscal policy 
is delegated to an appointed bureaucrat: i. e. the bureaucrat has a long-term contract 
(for the two periods of the game) and cannot be fired so that electoral considerations 
are not present. In this case, the appointee sets fiscal policy purely based on economic 
criteria. 
As any other citizen, potential bureaucrats have varying degree of ability in man- 
aging the public good production function. Given that there is no shock to the econ- 
omy the bureaucrat sets fiscal policy in period 1 for the two periods of the model. 
The objective of a bureaucrat is to maximize her expected utility which is analogous 
to (2.6) except that there is no election uncertainty (i. e. 7r = 1). The solution to this 
problem is the same as the solution to an opportunistic incumbent under full infor- 
mation. It is given by (2.11)-(2.14). Note however that the equilibrium fiscal policy 
in the appointment case is unchanged whether there is an asymmetry of information 
between incumbents and voters or not. Thus, in terms of Figure 2.2, the equilibrium 
outcome of a high-ability (low-ability) appointed bureaucrat is given by point H (L), 
so that 9g > gL, TH < TL, bH < bL. 
We now return to the analysis of the effects of elections. 
2.3.4 Asymmetric Information and Elections 
We analyse the more realistic case where the public cannot observe k2 and therefore 
B until period 2 but can form "beliefs" about 0 given observations on gl, r1i and b. 
These are parameterized as p(gl, rrl, b) where p is the probability weight that the 
public attaches to 0= 9H. 
Equilibrium Political Fiscal Cycles 49 
As in the full information case, we need to solve the game backwards. In the final 
period, the incumbent has no incentive to engineer a fiscal cycle. Hence EP [J (0)] = 
EP [J* (0)] regardless of the citizen who wins the election. 
In period one, we know from (2.15)-(2.17) that the incumbent is re-elected (A = 1) 
if 
W1-Wo+1I-110>0 (2.18) 
where WI= pWH + (1 - p)WL and Wo = pWH + (1 - p) WL . 
Although the office-holder does not know 71, -770 prior to setting her election-year 
fiscal policy, for any choice of (gl, T1, b), she can infer p(gl, 7-1, b) and thus calculate 
the probability that qI - 7° is high enough for her to win, i. e. 
7r [P(9i, Ti, b)] = EI (A 19i, Ti, b) (2.19) 
= 1-F[W°-WI] 
=1-F [(pWH + (1 - p)WL) - (PWH + (1 - P)WL)] 
where F is the probability distribution of qI - qO. A competent incumbent is able 
to signal her competency. This stems from the fact that an incompetent leader, who 
cares about the mix of consumption and investment, is more limited in the extent to 
which she can distort fiscal policy. 
Using equations (2.1), (2.2)-(2.6), (2.10), and (2.19), the incumbent's maximiza- 
tion problem is: 
max Z [gl, rrl, b, p(gl, ri, b), O'] subject to: (2.20) 91, T1, b 
g1, i-i, b, y-T1-b, 7r1+0'-g1+b-f(T1), y- i- (b, 0')+rb, and r (b, 01)+ 
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BI -rb- f(T2(b, Bl))>0. 
where Z0, ]= A'7 [ (9i, Ti, b)] +W (gl, Ti, b, BI) (2.21) 
DI - R+ WI - W° (2.22) 
OI is the incumbent's surplus from winning. It consists of the ego rent for the post- 
election period R, and the amount by which the representative citizen's expected 
utility is higher when the incumbent wins over her opponent. It is assumed that 
AL >0 (which requires ego rents to be sufficiently high). 
The objective function of a competent incumbent differs from that of an incom- 
petent leader in two respects. First, expected social welfare (and the value of being 
re-elected) is higher if a competent incumbent wins over an unknown candidate. Sec- 
ond, for any (gi, -r1, b), a high-type leader invests 6H - BL more units into k2 than a 
low-type incumbent. A high-type can therefore cut back on government investment 
at lower marginal cost than a low-type; the signalling cost is lower for a competent 
incumbent. 
To solve the model under asymmetric information, our equilibrium concept is 
Sequential Equilibrium. 
Sequential Equilibria 
We have a multidimensional signalling problem in which gl, T1, b act as signals of the 
incumbent's (contemporaneously) unobserved competency. Usually, using sequential 
equilibrium as a notion of equilibrium leads to a great multiplicity of equilibria. These 
are of two kinds: separating equilibria, in which a competent incumbent successfully 
signals her competency (i. e. (gL, TL, bL) (gH) TH, bH)); and pooling equilibria, in 
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which both types behave similarly so that voters are unable to differentiate them prior 
to elections (i. e. (gL , TL, 
bL) _ (gx) -rH, bH)). In order to obtain a unique equilibrium 
(which is a separating equilibrium), two standard refinements of the equilibrium con- 
cept will be used. We restrict our attention to equilibria under pure strategies as 
existence of equilibrium is not a problem in this model. 
Definition 2.1. (Sequential Equilibrium). Let (gi 
, rr{, 
b') describe a strategy for the 
incumbent, and let A= rp(gl, -r1, b), raj - 77 0] describe a belief for voters. The pair 
((gi, Ti, V), A) describes a sequential equilibrium if., 
(a) voters set A according to (2.18); 
(b) the incumbent chooses (g(, 7-i, bl) according to (2.20); 
(c) voters beliefs are Bayes consistent. 23 
Separating Equilibria 
In any separating equilibrium, a low-ability leader must choose her full information 
fiscal policy: 24 (gL) TLS bL) _ [g , TL, 
bL] 
Assumption 2.1. We first assume that "off the equilibrium path" beliefs of voters 
are givenby P(9i, Ti, b) =0 V(g1, Ti, 
b) (gH) TH, bH). 
In this case, a low-type will not benefit by mimicking a high-type as long as (gH, TH, bH) E 
23That is, if (gf, T[,, bL) # (gy, TH, by), then p(gL. TL,, bL) =0 and p(gy, TH, bH) = T. If 
(9L, TL, bL) = (9H, TH bH), then P(9L, TL, bL) = P(9H, TH, bH) = P- 
24 Since otherwise Z {gL, TL, bt, p (gl, TL, bL) , 
9L} -Z (gL, TL, bL) >0 which is inconsistent with 
(9L) TL, bL) maximizing (2.20). 
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A ("no-imitation" constraint), where: 
A {(91, ri, b) 1 Z(91, T1, b, 1, OL) -Z 
[gL, TL, b* , 
O, BL} < O} (2.23) 
For a separating equilibrium, it is also necessary that (gH, TH, bH) E8 (i. e. "willingness- 
to-separate" condition), where: 
B= {(gl, Ti, b) 1 Z(9i, Ti, b, 1, OH) -Z [gH, TH, bir, 0, OH] > 0} (2.24) 
In Figure 2.2, point L corresponds to (g*, iri, b*). Set A consists of the points outside 
the dashed circle. Note that any point within the disc would be preferred to point L, 
if by choosing such a point a low-type could fool the public about her true type. Point 
H corresponds to (g* , TH, 
bH) 
. 
Because all goods are normal, H must lie south-east 
of L in the (b, gl) planes, south in the (b, T1) plane, and east in the (7-1, g1) plane. 
H could either lie within or outside the dashed disc. It is more likely to be within 
the disc the larger the ego rent R, the smaller BH - BL, and the lower the variance of 
77 I -71°. The large solid ellipses in the planes (T1, gl), (b, gl), and (b, Tl) represent the 
13 set. The shaded region represents 8nA. As is usual with sequential equilibria, we 
have a great multiplicity of separating equilibrium strategies for a high competency 
leader. 
Proposition 2.1. (beliefs). The set of all separating equilibria is nonempty and is 
characterized by (gL, TL, bL) = (gi, TL, b* ), and (gg, rH, bH) E 13 nA 
The proofs of all propositions (unless they are straightforward) are relegated to Ap- 
pendix A. 
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Undominated Separating Equilibria 
Following Cho and Kreps (1987), we can reduce the multiplicity of equilibria by 
requiring that rational voters will not play dominated strategies. This enables us 
to eliminate all but one of the separating equilibria. Formally, a point (gl, T1i b) is 
dominated for an incumbent I, if: 
Z [9i(BI ), Ti(BI ), b*(el ), 0, OI1 - Z(9i, Tip bý 1,01) >0 (2.25) 
Equation (2.25) says that choosing the full information triplet (gi (0'), 'r (BI ), b*(BI )), 
even in the case where voters assign a zero probability to the incumbent being of 
type H, yields the incumbent a strictly higher utility than in the case where the 
incumbent chooses any triplet (gl, T1, b) and has voters attaching a probability of one 
to the incumbent's type being high. 
In Figure 2.2, all points outside the dashed circle are dominated for a low-type, 
and all points outside the solid circle are dominated for a high-type. Hence, the set 
of points which are dominated for the low but not for the high-type is where 8 (1 A. 
To rule out dominated equilibria, we introduce the refinement that: 
Assumption 2.2. "Off the equilibrium path" are given by p=1 d(gl, T1, b) E ßf1A 
and not just at (gH, TH, bH). 
This refinement on voters' beliefs is plausible given that a low-type will not benefit 
from choosing gl, rrl, b such that (gl, Tl, b) E 13 n A. With this minimal degree of 
sophistication, a high-ability office-holder is free to choose the separating strategy 
which entails the least distortions. We shall say that voters have sophisticated beliefs 
when these are set according to Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2. Thus, in an undominated 
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separating equilibrium, (2.20) holds if (9H! TH, bH) solves: 
max W (gl, T1, b, OH) (2.26) 
gi, Tl, b 
subject to gl, 7-1, b, y- -rl - b, 71 + °H - gl +b-f (rrl) ,y- T2 
(b, OH) + rb, 
T2 (b, OH) + OH - rb - ,f 
(T2 (b, OH» ! 0, and (9i, Ti, b) E A. 
As shown in the proof of Proposition 2.2, the first-order condition to problem 
(2.26) is given by 
[1 
- 
f' (T1)]-1 uc(cl, 91) = uc(cl, 91) + rf' (r2) u9(C2,92) = us(cl, 91) < v'(k2) (2.27) 
From the above relationship, we can implicitly define the government's income expan- 
sion path b=0 (gl), which passes through points L and H in Figure 2.2. (. ) <0 
since we have normal goods. The unique undominated equilibrium is given by point 
Hs in Figure 2.2.21 At this point, given that we have normal goods, 9H8 > gx, 
TH < TH, bHs < bH and k2, Hs < k2 H. 
The following Proposition summarises our solution to problem (2.26). 
Proposition 2.2. (Undominated Separating Equilibrium) Assume sophisticated 
beliefs (Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2). Then there exists a unique (undominated) sepa- 
rating equilibrium, and in this equilibrium the high-ability office-holder distorts fiscal 
policy ahead of election so as to signal his enhanced ability to the electorate; thus 
9H8 > gH, TH9 < TH, bHs < bH and k2, H8 < k2, H (Cf. (2.27)). The low type 
incumbent pursues his full information strategy gL, TL, bL (cf. (2.14)). 
where the subscript H9 (H) refers to the high-type's strategy in the undominated 
25 The superscript "s" denotes the signalling equilibrium for the high-type leader. 
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separating equilibrium (full information or appointment equilibria), and L refers to 
the low-type's strategy in all cases (these points are represented in Figure 2.2). 
Pooling Equilibria 
The above refinement is not necessarily sufficient to rule out all pooling equilibria. 26 
In order to do so, we further refine the equilibrium concept by using Cho and Kreps' 
(1987) "Intuitive Criterion" which states that an equilibrium {(gL, 'rL, bL), (gH, TH, bH)} 
is unintuitive if there exists a point (gl, T1i b) such that: 
Z (g1, T1, b, 11 OH) -Z 
[9H, TH, bH, P (gH, TH, bH) , 
OH] >0 (2.28) 
and Z (9i, Tl, b, 1, BL) -Z 
[9L, TL, bL, P (9L, TL, bL) i 
BL] <0 (2.29) 
Proposition 2.3. All pooling equilibria are unintuitive. 
One can easily confirm that the unique undominated separating equilibrium is an 
intuitive equilibrium (i. e. not unintuitive). Therefore the only sequential equilibrium 
that survives our refinements is the undominated separating equilibrium of Proposi- 
tion 2.2. 
Ricardian Equivalence 
An interesting result of our model concerns the R. icardian Equivalence proposition 
(Barro, 1974). It can be seen from (2.27) in the case where distortionary taxes are 
26For example, if p is large enough, then (gL, TL, bL) = (gH, TH, bH) 
(g* , r* , 
bjq) =p can be an undominated pooling equilibrium. 
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set to zero. It is summarized in the following proposition: 
Proposition 2.4. (Ricardian Equivalence). For a given type of incumbent, if f (7.1) = 
f (r2) = 0,7-1+b =6 (where 6 is a constant) is uniquely determined, but there exists 
a continuum of equilibria regarding the composition of the financing mix: r1 + b. 
Proposition 2.4 states that without distortionary taxes, even though we have a 
signalling model in which public debt and taxes are used strategically by the incum- 
bent policy maker for electoral purposes, the financing decision of the government is 
irrelevant, that is, the Ricardian Equivalence proposition (Barro, 1974) holds. 
2.3.5 Political Fiscal Cycles and Welfare 
We are now able to analyse the welfare and fiscal effects that arise because of the 
electoral motivations of office-motivated incumbents. Let us call the undominated 
separating equilibria obtained in Proposition 2.2 (points L and Hs in Figure 2.2) 
the "electoral equilibrium" of the game, as opposed to the "appointment equilibrium" 
obtained in Section 2.3.3 (Benchmark case) represented by points L and H in Figure 
2.2. Also let us define an electoral fiscal cycle as: 
Definition 2.2. (Electoral fiscal cycle) A (type contingent) electoral fiscal cycle 
is the difference between the value of a variable in the "electoral equilibrium" and 
the value of the same variable in the "appointment equilibrium". These values are 
computed for a given type of incumbent. 
Also, note that given the technology available for the production of public goods, 
two notions of the budget deficit exist. First, the "visible"/ex ante deficit (gl - 7-1 + 
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f (rl)) which is observed contemporaneously. Second, the "true"/ex post budget 
deficit (gl - 71 +f (irl) - 0) which is only observed in the second period and which 
takes into account the true cost of providing public goods. 
We can now summarize, in the next two Propositions, our results regarding the 
effects of electoral considerations in setting fiscal policy ("electoral equilibrium") as 
opposed to purely economic-based fiscal policy ("appointment equilibrium"). 
Proposition 2.5. (Level effects). (i) Individual equilibrium fiscal variables across 
types and equilibria are such that: gH8 > gH > gL, 7H9 < TH < TLS bH9 < bH < bL 
and k2, L < k2, Hs < k2, Hs; (ii) The equilibrium budget deficit (both ex ante and ex 
post) created by a high-ability appointed bureaucrat is lower than the one created 
by either a low-ability bureaucrat or a high-ability politician (e. g. 9H - TH +f (TH) 
< gH9 - 7'H8 +f (TH9), and gH - TH +f 
(TH) < gL - TL +f 
(TL))- 
Let us now compare the appointment and the electoral cases in terms of quality 
of the office-holder. First, note that generally, the probability that an institution 
(election or long-term appointment) will select a high-type office-holder will depend 
on nH =# {i EN (Bi = °H }, the number of citizens who are high-ability types. Of 
course, ex ante, PH is a random variable, as it is determined by the realizations of 
the O. So, when comparing institutions, it is more appropriate to use the expected 
value of this variable, as, following Buchanan, choice between constitutions should 
be thought of as taking place behind a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" (Dixit, 1996). 
As nH is binomially distributed, (nH N B(n, p)), it is straightforward to calculate27 
27The expected value of nH is np, and that of nH is np(1 - p) + n2p2. Also, the probability 
that a citizen selected at random is high-type is nH/n, and E(nH/n) = p. Next, conditional on 
nH, the probability that a high-type is selected for office in the second period in the electoral case 
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that (i) the expected probability that a high-type is in office in either period with 
appointment is E(nH/n) = p; (ii) the expected probability that a high-type is selected 
for office in the first (respectively second) period in the electoral case is p (respectively 
p+ p(1 - p)). So, we can summarise: 
Proposition 2.6. (Deficit bias versus quality of office-holders). With an electorally- 
concerned office-holder, the expected budget deficit (both ex ante and ex post) is 
higher than under an appointed bureaucrat (i. e. gi - re +f (Ti) > gi - ri +f (7-a) 
and gi - 7-1 e+0+f (Ti) > gi - Ti +0+f (rri )). However, in the appointment case, a 
high-ability type is selected in both periods with expected probability p<1, while in 
the electoral case, a high-ability type is selected in the first period with probability 
p and in the second with probability p+ p(1 - p). 
where a "e" ("a") superscript refers to the expected value (prior to the beginning 
of the game) of a variable in the "election equilibrium", e. g. V- pbHI + (1 - p)bL 
("appointment equilibrium", e. g. ba - pbH + (1 - p)bL), and 0- PBH + (1 - p)OL. 
The proof of Proposition 2.5 follows directly from the comparison of the fiscal out- 
comes in Proposition 2.2 and in (2.11)-(2.14) ; that of Proposition 2.6 follows directly 
from Proposition 2.5 and the paragraph preceding Proposition 2.6. 
The above two Propositions show that an electorally-motivated policy maker, 
compared to an appointed office-holder, distorts fiscal policy ahead of elections. An 
electoral fiscal cycle arises. Income receipts (71, b) and public investment (k2) are 
suboptimally low while government consumption expenditures (gl) are suboptimally 
high. As a result, on average, an electoral cycle emerges in budget deficits: even 
is, ML + (1- ML) the expected value of which, after some calculation, turns out to be p+ p(1- p) 
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though a low-ability incumbent does not create an electoral cycle, a high-ability office- 
motivated incumbent creates a higher budget deficit than a non-politically motivated 
leader of similar ability. Note that although the fiscal policy of a high-ability office- 
motivated leader is distorted towards a deficit bias because of his re-election concerns, 
signalling is "efficient" in the sense that no reallocation of expenditures between 
private and government consumption can yield voters higher welfare. 
An important trade-off as far as designing an optimal fiscal constitution is con- 
cerned therefore emerges. On the one hand, in expected values, elections lead to a 
deficit bias whereby the budget deficit is higher than in the appointment case (ceteris 
paribus, this signalling activity is welfare reducing). On the other hand, elections en- 
able society to fire low-ability office-holders in the first period of the game so that the 
expected quality of the office-holder is higher under the electoral case than under the 
appointment case. The net welfare effect of elections is therefore ambiguous. Elec- 
tions are more likely to increase welfare the larger the competency difference between 
the two possible types (OH - OL), 28 and the smaller the ego rent (R). 
Finally, note that from part (ii) of Proposition 2.5, we know that the budget deficit 
created by a high-ability bureaucrat is lower than the one created by either a low- 
ability bureaucrat or a high-ability politician. 29 However, a much more interesting 
comparison as far as budget deficits is concerned is between the high- and low-ability 
office-holders in the electoral case. We know that elections induce the high-type to 
increase his budget deficit; is this election-induced deficit high enough so that society 
would be better-off (in terms of welfare or in terms of absolute deficit levels) with a 
"Indeed, the larger BH - OL, the more acute the adverse selection problem becomes. In this 
case, election gives citizens the option to dismiss badly performing (and therefore low ability) office- 
holders. This option becomes more valuable the larger the ability spread. 
29Throughout the thesis we label as a politician an office-holder that faces elections. 
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low-ability leader? The next Proposition addresses this issue. 
Proposition 2.7. For sufficiently high levels of "ego rent" (R), in the electoral 
(undominated separating) equilibria, a high-ability incumbent creates a smaller ex 
post (true) budget deficit than a low-ability incumbent (i. e. gj s -THs -OH+ f (THS) < 
gL - TL - 
BL +f (TL))- 
Although Proposition 2.7 is intuitive, we should note that, in the context of an 
opportunistic model ä la Rogoff, our result might seem surprising and even counter- 
intuitive. Indeed, in Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990) and in the literature that 
follows, 30 a high-ability office-holder is shown to increase government expenditures 
and decrease taxes ahead of elections. All these models assume that the government 
balances its budget in each period. However, they might give the impression that the 
fiscal policy stance of a competent policy maker is looser than that of a less able policy 
maker. Indeed, from Proposition 2.5, we know that both budget deficit measures of 
a high-type leader increase in the electoral equilibrium (leading to a deficit bias) 
compared to the appointment equilibrium. What Proposition 2.7 reveals is that, 
even though electoral considerations induce high-ability office-holders to increase the 
budget deficit ahead of elections, this higher deficit nevertheless does not exceed the 
(true) deficit that low-ability incumbents generate. The intuition for this result is that 
high-ability incumbents can use their ability advantage to lower the cost of public 
expenditures and therefore lower the budget deficit. 
30 Gonzalez (1999) and Drazen (2000b) are recent extensions of Rogoff (1990). 
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In this chapter, we have first briefly reviewed the empirical literature on the po- 
litical determinants of budget deficits and fiscal cycles. The literature reveals that 
electoral effects are important and significant determinants of such outcomes. These 
empirical results have recently been corroborated by advanced econometric studies, 
thereby vindicating the opportunistic channel in fiscal policy. 31 Despite these strong 
supporting empirical evidence, no theoretical model featuring office-motivated in- 
cumbents exists in which the government's set of fiscal instrument (which is used 
to endogenously increase the incumbent's re-election probability) include public debt. 
Important topical policy issues related to the interaction between politics and the 
occurrence of fiscal deficits cannot therefore be analysed based on a microfounded 
model whose political channel is supported by empirical evidence. The political bias 
towards deficit financing is however worrisome enough that numerous countries are 
introducing constitutional rules to curb these excesses (e. g. The Stability and Growth 
Pact for European Monetary Union countries, the Code for Fiscal Stability for the 
United Kingdom, etc. ). Without a theoretical model that is consistent with the em- 
pirical channel that has been found to be a significant determinant of budget deficits 
and fiscal cycles, economic analyses of the recent constitutional changes would remain 
unsatisfactory. 
The main achievement of this chapter is the construction of an opportunistic 
model with public debt as a state variable. This exercise, not only fills an important 
gap in the theoretical literature, but given the empirical evidence it also provides an 
31 It also transpired that the other main political motive (namely partisan behaviour), does not 
seem to be a robust predictor of fiscal outcomes. 
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appropriate framework with which to address issues related to politically-generated 
excessive deficits. 
Our model gives the following new predictions. First, on average, an electoral 
fiscal cycle arises. This cycle exists in all fiscal instruments, and in particular in the 
budget deficit: on average, elections give rise to a deterioration of the budget deficit 
(specifically, the pre-election period exhibits a deterioration of the deficit, while the 
post-election period is characterized by an improvement in the deficit). Second, we 
find that more competent policy makers run lower (ex post) budget deficits than less 
able office-holders. This result is intuitive, yet, in the context of opportunistic mod- 
els, it might seem surprising. Indeed in these (balanced budget) models high-ability 
leaders increase government expenditures and reduce taxes ahead of elections, poten- 
tially giving the impression that if one were to allow for debt financing of government 
expenditures, high-type leaders would be the one creating high deficit levels. In this 
chapter we have indeed shown that high-ability leaders, because of their signalling 
strategy, do create politically-induced "excessive" deficits (or deficit bias) ("exces- 
sive" in the sense that this high-ability incumbent would run a lower budget deficit 
should she face no election). However, even though this "excessive" deficit arises, 
because high-ability leaders have an advantage in producing public goods at a lower 
cost, their budget deficit levels still remain below that of lower ability incumbents. 
Third, we highlight a fundamental trade-off between the efficiency gain arising from 
the possibility of firing low-type office-holders during the election, and the efficiency 
cost that elections create via signalling in the pre-electoral period and the associated 
rising budget deficit. Therefore, the net welfare effect of elections is ambiguous. We 
have also established that asymmetric information and signalling are not sufficient to 
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break the Ricardian Equivalence proposition. 
Given the trade-off highlighted in this chapter, the model can be used to investi- 
gate the welfare and (endogenous) incentive effects of alternative institutional designs 
aimed at curbing the welfare reducing electoral cycles. The next chapter tackles these 
issues. 
Chapter 3 
The Effects of Fiscal Constraints on 
Sovereign States: Applications to 
EMU, the UK, and the US. 
3.1 Introduction 
"In practical terms, the [Stability and Growth] Pact can be seen as a 
device aimed at securing respect of the Treaty, i. e., that excessive govern- 
ment deficits are indeed avoided. " 
Antonio Jose Cabral (1997)1 
(European Commission, DGII) 
"Just as we cannot be sure that announcing a low-calorie diet for a 
person suffering from obesity will lead that person to eat less, there is no 
guarantee that governments will be able to control their deficit excesses by 
simply being told to borrow less" 
Robert P. Inman (1996) 
'In von Hagen (1997) "A Stability Pact for Europe", Zentrum für Europäische Integrations- 
forschung, Bonn, ZEI Policy Paper B97-01. 
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Will the Stability and Growth Pact signed in Amsterdam on 18 June 1997 really 
avoid excessive government deficits within the European Monetary Union, as the 
first quote claim it will, or is further analysis warranted as the second quote hints at? 
More generally, are fiscal constraints effective in reaching their designed goal (which 
is to prevent or reduce "excessive" deficits once we recognise that policy makers differ 
from benevolent social planners), and are such constraints an efficient way of reaching 
such a goal? These are the issues we investigate in this chapter. 
The imposition of fiscal constraints at the sovereign level is a new and growing 
phenomenon. Countries that have recently introduced fiscal restraints include New 
Zealand ("Fiscal Responsibility Act", 1994), the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
countries ( "Stability and Growth Pact", 1997), and the United Kingdom ( "Code for 
Fiscal Stability", 1997). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the United States Congress 
has discussed the pros and cons of introducing a balanced-budget rule at the federal 
level, so far rejecting this idea. A common argument in favour of fiscal constraints 
is that they prevent politically motivated policy makers from creating "excessive" 
deficits such as those that have arisen since the 1970s in most OECD economies. 
Ample empirical evidence indeed show that such deficits are well explained by polit- 
ical variables (Alesina et al. 1997 ; Persson and Tabellini, 1998). Despite the recent 
trend towards the adoption of fiscal constraints in practice, the evidence from the eco- 
nomics literature regarding their desirability is still open. Key questions still need to 
be addressed, such as (i) whether constitutional fiscal restraints on sovereign govern- 
ments fulfil their aim, (ii) whether fiscal constraints are welfare increasing, and (iii) 
whether fiscal constraints are efficient. In this chapter we shed some light on these 
questions by analysing three specific fiscal constraints, namely those introduced and 
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considered by the European Monetary Union (EMU), the United States of America 
and United Kingdom (EMU member countries face specific fiscal ceilings on budget 
deficits and guidelines on public debt accumulation; The UK has a "Golden Rule" 
of public investment; The US proposed to introduce a balanced-budget rule at the 
federal level). ' Following this positive analysis of these three widely publicised fis- 
cal constraints, we ask a normative question using the same theoretical framework, 
namely whether an "optimal" fiscal constraints can be designed. ' 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2, we review the liter- 
ature on the pros and cons of fiscal constraints both from an empirical and theoretical 
point of view. Some shortcomings are highlighted. In the light of these latter, we 
argue that the model we developed in Chapter 2 is ideally suited to analyse the issues 
we are interested in: it allows us to study, from a microfounded model, the endoge- 
nous response of policy makers to a new fiscal regime. Hence, the backbone model we 
use in this chapter is the one developed in Chapter 2. Before turning to the formal 
analysis of the effects of fiscal constraints, we describe in details (in Section 3.4) the 
three specific rules that we shall be investigating. As will transpire, the model of 
Chapter 2 is ideally suited to analyse and contrast the effects of these different con- 
straints as the model is flexible enough to differentiate between public consumption 
and investment. These differences between different components of public expendi- 
tures are at the very heart of various types of fiscal constraints actually implemented 
around the world. In Section 3.5, we formally analyse the effectiveness and welfare 
2Throughout the chapter we therefore often refer to the different types of constraints by their 
country of adoption even though slight differences exist between our theoretical exercise and the 
constraints adopted. 
3 As will later be detailed, we shall say that a fiscal constraint is optimal if it eliminates politically- 
induced budget deficits (which we classify as "excessive" deficits) and if it also leads to a first-best 
allocation. Our definition is therefore fairly restrictive. 
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effects of various constitutional fiscal constraints on sovereign states. We find that 
all the existing fiscal constraints studied do fulfil their goal of reducing "excessive" 
budget deficits, though some constraints induce policy makers to substitute restricted 
for unrestricted fiscal instrument (Section 3.5.2). In Section 3.5.3, we Pareto rank the 
three fiscal constraints vis-ä-vis one another and vis-ä-vis the status quo (i. e. no fiscal 
constraint, and full fiscal discretion to office-holders). Only one of the constraint (the 
Golden Rule) can yield higher welfare than the status quo. An important achieve- 
ment of this chapter is therefore to provide a rationale for the introduction of fiscal 
constraints at a national level in a one country, microfounded model. As detailed 
in the next section, the (limited) existing formal literature on fiscal constraints finds 
such constraints to be desirable either because of fiscal externalities in multi-country 
models with a single monetary authority/ currency (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1997; 
Chari and Kehoe, 1998), or because ad hoc assumptions such as government myopia 
are imposed (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1999; Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999). In Section 
3.5.4 we show that it is not possible to design an "optimal" fiscal constraint (i. e. 
one that eliminates all inefficiencies in the economy) in the set of standard fiscal 
constraints. We conclude this chapter in Section 3.6. 
3.2 The Literature on Fiscal Constraints 
The desirability or not of fiscal constraints is a perennial issue in the economics 
literature. For instance, as early as 1939, Musgrave argued against the introduction 
of a Capital Budget at the federal level for the US. 4 The debate as been a recurrent 
4A capital budget which contains only public capital expenditures, requires the existence of dual 
budgets: a capital budget and a current budget (which contains only non-capital expenditures). 
In practice, the distinction between capital and current items is often blurred so much so that 
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issue in the United States, where states have various degree of fiscal constraints 
(e. g. Poterba, 1994), and where fiscal restraints on the federal budget are frequently 
discussed. Most recently, the debate on the pros and cons of fiscal constraints has 
received new attention because of the imposition of fiscal constraints for countries 
aiming to join the European Monetary Union (those constraints were set out in 
the Maastricht Treaty, 1992), and for countries that have joined the Euro zone. `` 
Thus, most of the latest literature on sovereign-based fiscal constraints focuses on 
fiscal constraints with a view to EMU. A significant part of this literature takes a 
"transatlantic perspective" and draws from the US states' experience with varying 
degree of fiscal constraints to offer some lights on the effects of introducing fiscal 
constraints on EMU countries. 
3.2.1 The Arguments Against Fiscal Constraints 
Mainstream textbook economic theories all agree that fiscal constraints are detrimen- 
tal. This conclusion can be reached either from neoclassical models of fiscal policy 
(e. g. Barro, 1979) which advocate the use of tax smoothing over the business cycle, 
or from Keynesian models which advocate the use of counter-cyclical fiscal policy. 
For instance, Musgrave (1963) argues that fiscal constraints and in particular dual 
budgets (current and capital budgets) are undesirable at the national level since fiscal 
policy is required for stabilization purposes. Arguments from the optimum currency 
area literature also reach the same conclusion given that fiscal constraints limit fiscal 
accounting measures differ among US states for the treatment of certain items (see Poterba, 1995, 
footnote 2 for further details and references). 
SThe constraints for EMU members are detailed in the Stability and Growth Pact signed in 
Amsterdam in 1997; these constraints are very similar to those of its predecessor, the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
The Literature on Fiscal Constraints 69 
policy precisely when such a policy has a more prominent role to play as an ad- 
justment mechanism (Masson and Melitz, 1991). Fiscal constraints, and especially 
balanced-budget rules, have also been criticized for amplifying the business cycle since 
they stimulate aggregate demand during expansionary periods through tax cuts and 
higher public expenditures, and they reduce demand in recessionary periods via a cor- 
responding fiscal contraction. These features of balanced-budget rules would occur 
not only is a traditional Keynesian IS-LM model, but also in a neoclassical growth 
model (for instance, King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) find that, in a real business 
cycle model, a government that follows a balanced-budget rule and that finances gov- 
ernment expenditures with income taxes would increase the amplitude of the business 
cycle). Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997) find that balanced-budget rules can lead to 
another source of instability. Using a standard neoclassical growth model they show 
that such rules can "make expectations of higher tax rates self-fulfilling if the fis- 
cal authority relies heavily on changes in labour income taxes to eliminate short-run 
fiscal imbalances. " Calibrations of their model on parameters and income tax rates 
consistent with the US economy and other G7 countries show that indeterminacy 
indeed arises. 
In terms of actual implementation, the choice of a specific ceiling level (e. g. as is 
the case for the Maastricht fiscal criteria and EMU's Stability and Growth Pact (SGP 
thereafter)) has been criticized for its arbitrariness (Buiter et al., 1993). Although in 
the context of a monetary union, fears of a debt bail-out and/or of pressure from fiscal 
authorities onto the central bank, have been advanced as arguments in favour of fiscal 
constraints (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998, and the literature therein), Von Hagen 
and Eichengreen (1996) argue that, in EMU, such fiscal constraints are redundant 
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because each European Union (EU) country still control the majority of its own 
taxes. Taxes can be increased should financial difficulties arise in one country. The 
possibility of a bail-out' is non-existent, and as a result, so is the rational for fiscal 
constraints. Von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996) add that the procedure is in fact 
more than redundant for if countries cannot use the tax-smoothing and automatic 
fiscal stabilizers because of the binding restraint, they will pressure for the EU to 
perform such a role. The end result being a rise in EU's indebtedness and a real 
possibility of pressures being put on the European Central Bank. 
One of the (implicit) assumption that is retained throughout the above models is 
that policy makers are benevolent social planners. Indeed, in these models, should 
budget deficits arise they are optimal (e. g. Barro, 1979). However, the fiscal history 
of most OECD countries since the 1970s cannot easily be reconciled with optimal tax 
setting by a social planner (Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen, 1997). Hence, although 
the above models argue that fiscal constraints should not imposed on governments, 
given that these models do not take into account the reasons that led to the need for 
restraints on policy makers' discretionary fiscal policies to be adopted (the observed 
deficit bias in policy making), the robustness of their conclusion is open to question. 
3.2.2 The Rationale For Adopting Fiscal Constraints 
As pointed out by Musgrave (1997) there is a "sensible case for balanced budgets 
as a matter of fiscal discipline. The beneficiaries of public services should pay and 
not burden future generations". In earlier work, Musgrave (1963) also argued that 
dual budgets, i. e. separating current and capital expenditures, are desirable at the 
6This possibility has often been advanced as a rationale for adopting fiscal restraints in order to 
prevent the fiscal authorities from putting pressure on the common central bank. 
The Literature on Fiscal Constraints 71 
state and local level since at this level of authority fiscal policy is not responsible for 
stabilisation policy. 7 A same argument, namely that fiscal constraints are desirable at 
the state but not at the federal level is also expressed by Alesina and Perotti (1996). 
Aside from fiscal stabilisation issues (or lack of), various distortions or external- 
ities have been shown to provide a rationale for adopting fiscal constraints. Politics 
and policy making are one of the major motivation. As pointed out in Chapter 2, 
robust empirical evidence highlight the importance of political variables in explaining 
budget deficits (see also the evidenced gathered by Alesina et al, 1997). In parallel 
to these empirical evidence, numerous theoretical models can explain why political 
considerations create a bias towards deficit financing in fiscal policy. Persson and 
Svensson (1989), Aghion and Bolton (1990), Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Tabellini 
and Alesina (1990) are among the early influential models featuring agents with ra- 
tional expectations; Velasco (2000) is a recent interesting paper pertaining to explain 
the rising public debt levels that occurred since the 1970s. Despite a plethora of the- 
oretical and empirical evidence pointing to a robust link between politics and budget 
deficits, and the widely proclaimed aim that constitutional fiscal constraints are in- 
troduced in countries as a mean to reduce "excessive" budget deficits, there is only a 
limited economics literature that analyses the effects of fiscal constraints taking into 
account the political environment (that creates the need for these constraints to be 
imposed). 
Of the few formal models that have analysed the interaction between politically 
motivated office-holders and fiscal constraints, the consensus result is that fiscal con- 
straints can eliminate the politically-induced deficit bias. These models also show 
7Musgrave however opposes the idea of a dual budget at the federal level on fiscal stabilisation 
grounds. 
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that this reduction of the political bias is welfare increasing. 
For instance, Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999), extending the Alesina and Tabellini 
(1987) framework (itself based upon Barro and Gordon, 1983) to public debt accu- 
mulation and politically motivated governments, show that a monetary union leads 
to higher public debt than what would obtain in a national environment. The intu- 
ition of their result is that within a monetary union the credibility of the common 
central bank is like a public good. A free rider problem occurs: each individual fiscal 
authority has less incentive (in terms of inflation) to reduce debt. 8 If policy makers 
have a higher discount rate than society, this higher level of debt leads to excessive 
debt accumulation and reduces welfare. The authors show that debt ceilings reduce 
excessive debt and enable the common central bank to focus on price stability. In a 
companion model, Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997) show that in the presence of po- 
litical distortions (meaning in their paper that policy makers have a higher discount 
rate than society), an optimally designed "Rogoff-conservative" (Rogoff, 1985) and 
independent central bank needs to be supplemented with a public debt ceiling in or- 
der to achieve the first best. Agell et. al. (1996), building on the time-inconsistency 
literature, develop a small open economy model in which the government can use 
both exchange rate and fiscal policy to affect output and employment. They find 
that the equilibrium under discretion is characterized by both an inflationary and 
a public debt bias. Delegating monetary policy to a supra-national authority solves 
the inflation bias but might exacerbates the debt accumulation bias. Binding fiscal 
constraints might help solve this bias. Canzoneri and Diba (1996), using the recent 
theory of fiscal determination of the price level, find that the deficit criterion (not the 
8The effect of a single player's fiscal stance is 1/n that of the union; with n being the number of 
equal sized union members. 
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debt criterion) of the SGP is necessary to guarantee the "functional" independence 
of the European Central Bank. Without it the ECB would not be capable of con- 
trolling the price level, even if it were politically independent and had a mandate for 
price stability. For McKinnon (1997), the ceilings of the SGP are useful in that they 
will foster collective fiscal retrenchment. Without the Pact, no European government 
can curtail the welfare state without being voted out of office. Another argument in 
favour of fiscal restraints is that, by imposing fiscal retrenchment, they will enable 
automatic fiscal stabilizers to regain effectiveness. 9 
Fiscal constraints have also been motivated in relation to price stability and the 
maintenance of a truly independent central bank. For instance, they can eliminate 
free rider problems (leading to an inflationary bias) in a monetary union with in- 
dependent fiscal authorities when the central bank is unable to pre-commit (Chari 
and Kehoe, 1998); they can enable an independent central bank to retain complete 
control over the determination of the price level (Canzoneri and Diba, 1996); they 
can reduce the risks and consequences of public debt crises, and they can reduce the 
potential inflationary consequences of high public debt levels (see Gerlach's comments 
of Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998). More generally, fiscal constraints can safeguard 
the credibility of the central bank in a monetary union by acting as an incentive 
device for fiscal discipline (Artis and Winkler, 1998). Imposing fiscal constraints can 
also be seen as a partial substitute for policy coordination among EMU countries. 
Finally, in a paper closest to our motivation, Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) analyse 
9See Cotis et al. (1997) for empirical evidence of reduced effectiveness of fiscal policy, and 
automatic stabilizers in particular, in France during the 1990s; See Sutherland (1997) for a theoretical 
explanation of the underlying mechanism; and Masson (1996) for a general point. Hairault et al. 
(1997) collect several papers on the role of built-in stabilizers over the business cycle. 
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the SGP using a "partisan" model. They find that short-sighted governments10 fail 
to fully internalise the inflationary consequences of their debt policies in a monetary 
union. This leads to excessive debt accumulation. The public debt constraint of the 
SGP and the associated fine provide the right mechanism to correct the debt bias. An 
unpleasant characteristic of their constraint is that it requires "a huge penalty for debt 
in the first period and a huge subsidy in the second period" (p. 23). 11 Clearly, this is 
unsatisfactory for the SGP does not (a) allow for subsidies, and, more importantly, 
(b) an important time-lag (compared to elections span) exists between the occurrence 
of an "excessive" deficit and the subsequent fine which renders their necessary first- 
period fine impossible. The real features of the SGP, in their model, cannot prevent 
excessive debt accumulation, on the contrary they worsen debt accumulation. 
To conclude, we have shown that the few formal models providing a rationale for 
fiscal constraints rely either on (i) ad hoc assumptions to drive their key results (these 
models are not microfounded but based on a Barro and Gordon (1983) framework), 
or (ii) rely on multi-country models with fiscal externalities and a common currency. 
The former type of models include Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997) and Beetsma and 
Uhlig (1999): Their result is driven by their assumption that citizens and government 
have a different discount factor (the government being assumed to be more myopic). 
However, it is not clear from their model what could motivate this assumption. In- 
deed, since governments are motivated by partisan behaviour, whether in or out of 
office, it would seem that they should have the same time preference for public goods 
as the citizens that support them/they represent. Without an endogenous derivation 
")Meaning, in their model, that governments have (by assumption) a higher discount factor than 
society. 
11 They have a two-period, two-party model in which one party is in office in the first period and 
is reelected with an exogenous probability 0<p<1. 
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of this key political distortion, the robustness of these models is questionable. The 
latter type of models include Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997) and Chari and Kehoe 
(1998). Another limitation of some of these studies is that the political channel that 
is assumed to give rise to budget deficits (i. e. partisan behaviour) does not find 
much support in the empirical literature (c. f. Section 2.2). Furthermore, as argued 
in Chapter 2, there are many ways a government can be partisan (a point also made 
by Persson and Tabellini, 2000), 12 and the different ways this behaviour is modelled 
leads to opposite predictions. 
3.2.3 Empirical Evidence 
Until recently, constitutional fiscal constraints were virtually nonexistent for sovereign 
states. Direct empirical studies were therefore impossible. However, as already men- 
tioned, statutory or constitutional fiscal restraints do however exist on subnational 
entities in federal states. In part motivated by the prospects of the introduction of 
fiscal constraints in Europe, a growing empirical literature has focused on the US 
states so as to assess the effects of fiscal constraints. States in the US are especially 
suited to empirical investigation since all but one State (Vermont) have fiscal re- 
straints, and, more interestingly, States have varying degree of fiscal stringency being 
imposed on them (see ACIR, 1987, for a classification of the degree of stringency of 
fiscal constraints for each US state). This provides sufficient variability in the data 
for meaningful econometric studies of the effect of fiscal restraints to be undertaken. 
The consensus from these studies based on state-based fiscal constraints (and not 
12 So far it is not well understood in economics why individuals have different ideology. As a result, 
no microfounded model explaining partisan behaviour endogenously exists. The political economy 
literature has therefore analysed the effects of introducing partisan behaviour by assuming, in an 
arbitrary way, differing preferences among agents. 
The Literature on Fiscal Constraints 76 
national fiscal constraints) is that fiscal restraints, provided they are carefully de- 
signed, are effective. For instance, Alt and Lowry (1994), Poterba (1994), Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen (1995), and Bohn and Inman (1996) all find strong evidence that 
the more stringent the fiscal constraints, the lower the average fiscal deficits, and the 
quicker incumbents react to adverse shocks (by cutting spending and not by raising 
taxes 13). A more detailed investigation by Bohn and Inman (1996) reveals that these 
results hold when the restraints apply to end-of-year budgets (not to prospective 
ones), when they are constitutionally grounded (not statutory), and enforced by an 
independent body (not a politically appointed one). " Alesina and Bayoumi (1996) 
have an even stronger result: besides from being effective in enforcing fiscal discipline 
in US states, balanced-budget rules have no costs in terms in increased state out- 
put variability. This runs counter to the standard argument that a trade-off exists 
between the benefits of rules and those of discretion. This finding is controversial. 
Bohn and Inman (1996) find mixed support for it (depending on the cyclical indicator 
used), while Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1994) find that fiscal restraints limit the use 
of fiscal stabilizers. A partial explanation of Alesina and Bayoumi's result is that, as 
Bayoumi and Masson (1995) point out, US states do rely to a large extent on the 
federal government budget in smoothing out negative shocks (specifically, stabilisa- 
tion flows amount to 31 cents in the dollar). " In his analysis of the effects of Capital 
Budgets and of a Pay As You Go (PAYG) capital finance rule for public investment 
13The study by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995) finds, in contrast to these other studies, that 
the adjustment comes from increased revenues not from reduced spendings. 
14See Bohn and Inman (1996) and Inman (1996) for an extensive and critical review of the 
empirical literature. 
15The Alesina and Bayoumi result could therefore potentially suffers from an omitted variable 
bias. An important issue for their analysis is whether transfers from the federal budget are larger 
the more stringent the index fiscal of fiscal controls. If this were the case, this would imply that 
citizens in states with the most stringent fiscal restraints are de facto being subsidised by the federal 
budget and therefore being subsidised by citizens from states with less restrictive fiscal constraints. 
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in US states, Poterba (1995) finds the following results. First, states with capital 
budgets exhibit higher levels of capital spending (by approximately one third com- 
pared to states that do not have capital budgets). Second, the PAYG rule (whereby 
the state cannot borrow to finance public investment) is correlated with lower levels 
of public capital (by about 20 percent). Poterba (1995) also finds no evidence that 
capital budgets affect the level of non-capital spending, while he finds that a PAYG 
finance rule does have a negative effect on non-capital spending (states with such a 
rule spend 11 percent less on non-capital projects than states without such a rule). 
This latter effect is consistent with a model of intertemporal government finance. 
Poterba's results are robust to the introduction of political ideology variables. 
A different type of test of the effectiveness of fiscal restraints can be found in 
Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999). The authors study the impact that spending limits 
set by finance ministers on spending ministers have on fiscal outcomes in a group 
of industrialized countries. They find that spending limits do seem to affect fiscal 
outcomes but they also highlight that this result is not robust. 
Finally, another approach has been undertaken by Kopits and Symansky (1998). 
The authors analyse the effects of several types of fiscal rules (including the pro- 
posed US balanced-budget rules and EMU's SGP constraints) in MULTIMOD, the 
International Monetary Fund's multi-country econometric model. They do so using 
stochastic simulations of the model, which gives a more robust conclusion regarding 
the effect of fiscal constraints when the economy is subject to a multitude of (histori- 
cal) shocks. Overall, they find that the constraints studied (slightly) increase output 
and price variability (their welfare metrics). The authors also review the major fiscal 
policy rules in existence. 
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Although the above studies tend to a common result, care must be exercised in 
drawing inferences from these for several reasons. First, as shown in an important 
empirical study of US states by von Hagen (1991), incumbent office-holders consis- 
tently bypass balanced-budget rules or public debt ceilings by using of balance sheet 
debt and by using "creative accounting". Such practices have been common place 
among EU countries in their attempt to meet the Maastricht fiscal criteria. " These 
practices have also been observed in the US following the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
(federal) Deficit Control Act of 1985. The deficit targets were first met both via the 
sale of governments assets and by moving expenditures "off -balance sheet". Such a 
strategy eventually reached its limits. The targets then had to be adjusted upwards 
each time they became binding. The von Hagen finding has important implication for 
empirical studies of the effectiveness of fiscal constraints. For instance, this reveals a 
potential weakness of Kopits of Symansky's (1998) study. Indeed, it reveals that the 
reaction function of policy makers is affected by the new fiscal regime. The Lucas 
critique could be a problem. A second warning is that caution has to be exercised by 
drawing inferences from constraints on subnational authorities. Corsetti and Roubini 
(1996) argue that the supply and demand side macroeconomic effects of imposing 
fiscal rules at the federal level in the US would, during a recession, be much larger 
than those that currently exist at the states level (because the states' budget only 
account for a small share of the state income compared to the federal government's 
"They range from one off lump sum "transfers" from publicly-owned companies towards state 
budget (e. g. the FRF30bn, representing 10 per cent of the annual budget deficit, that France 
Telecom's pension fund had to transfer to the national budget in 1997), to Italy's one-off repayable 
Euro-tax, or to the temptation by the German government to revalue the Bundesbank's gold stock 
(and thereafter to transfer part of the book-keeping profits to the government's budget). Indeed, 
both the Bundesbank and the German government's own council of economic advisers (the "five 
wise men") have critisised the government for undertaking "creative accounting" (The Economist, 
14-20 February 1998). Use of off -budget expenditures, of privatisation receipts, and takeover of 
pension funds, are among the other accounting "tricks" used to satisfy the Maastricht criteria. 
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with respect to the US GNP). Hence, we cannot be certain that the fiscal policies of 
state governments that are subject to fiscal constraints would be a good predictor of 
fiscal policies at the federal level should one introduce similar fiscal constraints. 
To conclude our literature review, empirical studies - based on sub-national data 
- reveal two main points. First, fiscal constraints are effective in reducing budget 
deficits. Second, policy makers, despite abiding to the letter of the constitutional 
constraints, do not abide to its spirit: attempts to bypass the constraints are consis- 
tently found. Because the inference are drawn on sub-national data, they can only 
be indicative. 
In the light of our analysis of the literature and the caveats highlighted, we inves- 
tigate the effects of fiscal constraints using a theoretical framework. More specifically 
we do so using a political economy model in which excessive deficits arise endogenously 
because of "opportunistic" behaviour. Within this class of model, the Equilibrium 
Political Budget Cycle model of Rogoff (1990) extended in Chapter 2 to allow for 
deficit financing is the most appropriate for our purpose. A key advantage of this 
model is its microfounded nature. As we showed in Chapter 2, this model gives rise 
to endogenous budget deficit and fiscal cycles which is related to a microfounded 
political distortion. These features enable us to avoid the limitations of ad hoc mod- 
els. Furthermore, we study fiscal constraints in a one country model so that we do 
not rely on multi-jurisdictions fiscal externalities are a rational for fiscal constraints. 
Most countries that have introduced or considered introducing fiscal constraints at 
a national level are not part of a common monetary union (e. g. New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom, the US Federal budget). Hence, whether a case can be made for 
fiscal constraints without recourse to the fiscal externality argument is clearly an 
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important issue. 
3.3 Equilibrium Political Fiscal Cycles 
In this chapter we shall be using as a backbone the model of the previous chapter. 
However, once we study fiscal constraints, the tractability of the model is seriously 
impaired. Thus, to improve tractability, we simplify the model of Chapter 2 by 
assuming that second period taxes are non-distortionary. This simplification leads to 
a corner solution in -rl in Section 3.3 but it does not modify the qualitative results 
of the analysis of the various fiscal constraints. As we saw in Chapter 2, allowing for 
distortionary taxes in both periods leads to an interior solution for 'r1. Concretely, 
our simplification is that we set f (T2) =0 in equation (2.5). As a result, the second- 
period government's budget constraint becomes 
92 =T2+B -rb (3.1) 
Apart from the above equation, the structure of the model is exactly the same as in 
Section 2.3.1. 
In the next sub-sections we briefly highlight the changes implied by setting second 
period distortionary taxes to zero. This proves helpful for our analysis of the effect 
of fiscal constraints in Section 3.5. 
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3.3.1 Equilibrium Under Full Information and a Social Plan- 
ner 
As indicated, Section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2 carries over to this chapter except for equation 
(2.5). From Section 2.3.2, it is easy to see that with f(72) = 0, the equilibrium 
solution to the incumbent's problem becomes: 
uc = ug = vI , where 
I has ability aE {H, L} , and r1 =0 
(3.2) 
Hence, the type-contingent equilibria obtained with opportunistic leaders in the 
no-election case are such that: gH = 9H > 9L = 9L, TH =TH= TL =TL=0, 
bH = bH < bL = bL, where a "hat" over a variable refers to the value attained under 
a social planner equilibrium. These equilibria are represented in Figure 3.1.17 
3.3.2 Equilibrium Under Asymmetric Information 
Given the technology available for the production of public goods, two notions of the 
budget deficit exist. First, the "visible"/ex ante deficit (gl - Tl +f (T1)) which is 
observed contemporaneously. Second, the "true"/ ex post budget deficit (gl - Ti - 
B+f (Ti)) which is only observed in the second period and which takes into account 
the true cost of providing public goods. In Proposition 2.7 (Chapter 2) we proved 
that, for high levels of "ego rents" (R), and sufficiently small competency differences 
(9H - BL), gH - THO +f (THS) - 6H < gL - TL +f (TL) - OL in the undominated 
separating equilibria. That is, competent incumbents ran lower "true "/ex post current 
budget deficits than incompetent incumbents. Figure 3.2 shows the different levels of 
17Recall that, with distortionary taxes in both periods, we have 0< TH = TH < TL = TL. This 
can be seen in Figure 2.2, Chapter 2. 
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Figure 3.1 Equilibria for the Low- and High-Type Incumbents when f (T2) =0 
b, 
>> 
b1 "no-imitation" constraint 
i 
AnB 
B set: "willingness to separate" constraint 
budget deficits that obtains depending on the type of the office-holder. 
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3.4 Constitutional Fiscal Constraints: Description 
Using the (slightly simplified) model of the previous chapter, we can now turn to 
the analysis of the effects of various types of fiscal restraints aimed at preventing 
"excessive" deficits. First, we describe in details the three specific type of constraints 
we investigate. These are the EMU's Stability and Growth Pact, the UK's Code 
For Fiscal Stability and a proposed US's Balanced-Budget rule. Although specific, 
undertaking a comparative analysis of these three rules is interesting in that each of 
these constraints tackles the problem of "excessive" deficit bias differently. 
T' LH Hs gi 
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Figure 3.2 Ranking of Budget Deficits by Types of Policy Makers 
Ex ante/visible budget deficits: d= gl - zi +f (ti) 
o dL =dL dy=d dH, +00 
excessive deficit (def 3.2 ) 
Ex post/true budget deficits: 
d=a-t1-e+f (Ll) 
A 
o d-=dy dH, dL =dL +°° 
excessivedefirit (deJ 3.2) 
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3.4.1 The European Monetary Union's Stability and Growth 
Pact 
The Stability and Growth Pact (1997, Amsterdam Summit) requires that the budget 
deficits to GDP ratio of each EMU member country do not exceed three per cent, 
and also recommends that the debt-to-GDP ratio should not exceed 60 per cent. If 
the budget deficit-to-GDP ceiling is not respected, a fine of up to 0.5 per cent of 
GDP might be imposed on the profligate country. The fine is far from automatic. It 
is the eventual outcome of a long lasting process (See European Commission, 1997, 
for full text of the Pact, and Artis and Winkler, 1998, for a summary). Missing the 
debt-to-GDP guideline does not incur a potential pecuniary fine. However, a country 
missing the recommended debt-GDP target might incur a political or credibility cost 
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for national governments (Kopits and Symansky, 1998). Mathematically, the SGP 
fines have the following properties: 
Budget deficit fine = max {4B 'ý (gl - T1 -0+f (T1) -d , 0} 
Public debt fine = max {WD u (b - bý , 0} 
where d and b represent respectively the maximum budget deficit-to-GDP ratio and 
public debt-to-GDP ratio allowed. 0< TB "<1 and 0< T` ý` represent the fine 
resulting from "excessive" budget deficit (B subscript) and public debt (D subscript) 
respectively. The WB u fine starts at 0.2 per cent of GDP. Every 1 percentage point 
of deficit in excess of the threshold leads to a further 0.1 per cent of GDP fine, up to 
a maximum fine of 0.5 per cent (European Commission, 1997). 
Two important features of our mathematical representation of the SGP fines are 
worth explaining. First, we assume that the constraint refers to the consumption com- 
ponent of government expenditure. The SGP indeed explicitly allows for a correction 
of the budget deficit in the case of public investment (see Maastricht Treaty, Article 
104. c. 3). Second, the budget deficit is gauged from its "true" measure. This is the 
natural measure to take given that, in the case of the SGP, the fine is imposed after a 
lapse of time sufficiently long (i. e. two years) for all uncertainty on a state's national 
accounts to have disappeared. Importantly, we can also note that we preserved the 
"kink" of the penalty structure. This is not the case in the model of Beetsma and 
Uhlig (1999) whose aim is also to analyse the effects of the SGP. These authors model 
the SGP penalties as a linear function of the entire range of debt choices, thereby 
producing the possibility of subsidies for countries running non-excessive deficits. As 
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noted by Beetsma and Uhlig, it turns out that the optimal SGP that they propose 
requires a "huge subsidy in the second period" of their model! 
The timing of events is the same as in Chapter 2. The only difference is that in 
deciding on fiscal policy the incumbent also needs to take into account the fine that 
will occur should deficits exceed the thresholds. 18 Thus, the effect of the SGP fines 
is to modify the second-period government budget constraint (equation 3.1) in the 
following way: 
g2=T2+0-rb-max{WB u(gi--rl-B+f(ýrl)-d), 0}-max{ D'ý(b-b), 0} 
The fines are imposed in the second period of the game. This is in accordance with 
the timing structure of the SGP fines. 
3.4.2 The United Kingdom's Code For Fiscal Stability 
The United Kingdom recently introduced a "golden rule" of public sector borrowing 
- i. e. the proposition that, over the business cycle, government borrowing should 
not exceed government (net) capital formation ("A Code for Fiscal Stability", HM 
Treasury, 1997). 
Buiter (1998) analyses the UK constraint and argues that the golden rule is both 
unnecessary and undesirable and that it "could also induce a misplaced sense of com- 
placency about the accumulation of public investment-related public debt". Buiter's 
analysis focuses on accounting identities. We take a different approach: we study the 
UK constraint from an incentive viewpoint, recognizing that a main purpose of the 
"Given that the model does not include stochastic macroeconomics shocks, when fiscal profligacy 
occurs it can not result from "exceptional" circumstances (these would give a waiver to countries - 
see European Commission, 1997), and according to the SGP, is subject to a fine. 
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constraint is to introduce some checks and balances on policy makers discretionary 
policies. The Code (which is part of a code of good practice is not constitution- 
ally grounded) acts as an incentive device for incumbent governments to present an 
ex ante consumption balanced budget. Any ex ante imbalance in this budget can 
be thought of as carrying an electoral cost. The Golden Rule implies the following 
constraint structure: 
Constraint = max 
{IF" (gl 
- T1 +f 
('rl)), 0} 
where ß"1C represents the cost (e. g. political, credibility, etc. ) resulting from an 
unbalanced current budget. Wuk >0 and Wuk is also "sufficiently" large so that 
the government has an incentive to separate its consumption-related budget from its 
investment-related budget. " 
3.4.3 The United States' Balanced-Budget Rule Proposal 
Several proposals have been discussed in the US. Congress on whether or not to adopt 
a balanced-budget rule at the Federal level (1982,1995,1997). The proposals have 
so far always been rejected. 
A "typical" balanced-budget rule has the following characteristics. Ex ante, the 
government has to present to the Congress a budget which is balanced. Ex post, 
if the budget is unbalanced, the government must bridge any shortfall in revenues 
"The Code also includes a guideline stipulating that the public debt-to-GDP ratio should not 
exceed 40 percent. We abstract from this constraint for two reasons. First, this constraint is not a 
much publicised part of the Code, therefore its effectiveness is doubtful given that the cost of not 
respecting a constraint is a political or credibility cost. Second, we want to analyse the effect of a 
Golden Rule of public investment on its own ; the effects of public debt ceilings can be seen from 
the analysis of the SGP. 
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during the following budget. In our model this implies the following timing of events: 
at time t=0, the incumbent must present a "visible" balanced budget. The rest of 
the timing is the same as in Chapter 2, except that, when the first-period budget 
outcome realizes, any imbalance in the budget has to be rectified in the period-two 
budget. 
The balanced-budget rule has the following penalty structure (for period 1 and 2 
respectively): 
"Visible"/ex ante constraint = max {'i' (gl - -r1 +f (Ti)) , O} 
"True" /ex post constraint = max { W23 (gl - T1 -0+f 
(T 
1)) 1 
0} 
Iis, 'I23 represent the first and second-period fines. 'P = 1, and W23 >1 so that any 
deficit in a given period is fully compensated in the next period, possibly at a penalty 
rate. Note that we assume that the constraints refer to the current budget. This 
assumption is motivated partly by our model (if k2 is included in the constraint, no 
informational asymmetry is possible), and partly by the fact that numerous balanced- 
budget constraints at the State level do exclude public investment. 
3.5 Constitutional Fiscal Constraints: Analysis 
Before turning to the analysis of fiscal constraints, we first need to define what con- 
stitutes an "excessive" deficit. In our model two definitions are possible. 
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Definition 3.1. (Incompetency-generated deficits). A deficit is "excessive" when it 
is higher than the one that the high-competency leader would have chosen. 
Definition 3.2. (Politically-generated deficits). A deficit is "excessive" when the 
deficit obtained by an opportunistic leader is higher than the one that a social planner 
(of the same type as the incumbent) would have chosen. 
Definition 3.1 focuses on absolute deficit levels. The rationale for this definition (not 
modelled in this chapter) is that high absolute deficits are undesirable. Eichengreen 
and Wyplosz (1998), in their analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact, provide an 
overview of the reasons why high deficits are to be avoided (e. g. because of financial 
stability issues). The importance and identification of the welfare costs of high deficits 
is a controversial issue in the literature (Buiter and Sibert, 1998 ; Eichengreen and 
Wyplosz, 1998). Definition 3.2 focuses on efficiency issues. Fiscal constraints, using 
this definition, aim to target and reduce inefficiencies and therefore to increase welfare. 
It should be clear from our model (e. g. Figure 3.2) that, using Definition 3.1, 
if fiscal ceilings are effective in reducing the incompetency-generated deficits this is 
welfare reducing: the incompetent leader pursues an efficient policy given her ability. 
Nevertheless, given that the absolute deficit level is the one that is referred to when 
governments introduce fiscal constraints and that this is also the one that is the 
focus of attention in the economics literature, we shall analyse the effects of fiscal 
constraints using this definition in the next section (Section 3.5.2). In Section 3.5.3, 
using Definition 3.2, we focus on the welfare effect of the different fiscal constraints. 
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3.5.2 Fiscal Constraints and Incompetency-Generated "Ex- 
cessive" Deficits 
The three type of constraints are, mathematically, not so different from one another. 
In order to save space, and save repeating very similar analysis, we study one of them 
in details and give the end results for the two others. We focus on the SGP as our 
"benchmark". 
The Stability and Growth Pact as a "Benchmark" 
As already stated, Proposition 2.7 of Chapter 2 shows that a competent incumbent's 
fiscal policy leads to a lower debt accumulation and a lower "true" /ex post budget 
deficit than an incompetent incumbent. This "true" budget deficit is the basis for 
the enactment of fines in Pact. Depending on the level of the deficit ceilings, nine 
possible cases can occur in our model: one or both constraints can bind on one type 
of agents, on both, or on none. If fiscal constraints are aimed at reducing the absolute 
deficit levels (Definition 3.1), fiscal ceilings are most effective when they bind on the 
incompetent leader. Therefore, we study the equilibrium strategies in this case. 
Proposition 3.1. There exists a budget deficit ceiling and a public debt ceiling 
where, in equilibrium, only the incompetent incumbent (who generates "excessive" 
deficits) is constrained by both ceilings. 
We conjecture that this Proposition is true and we later check that it indeed holds. 20 
The decision problem under full information is type contingent. 
20i. e. that ggem,. - THemu - 0H +f 
(THemu) < d, and 6H, -- <b in the undominated separating 
equilibrium. 
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Equilibrium Strategy of the Low-Type Leader 
Repeating the analysis as in Section 2.3.2 but for the inclusion of the fiscal constraints, 
we find that the low-type pursues her full information strategy which is given by (see 
Appendix B6): 
_ 
pemu JI = 2G Xpemu ji =+ pemuji - v/ (3.3) lJcBL 9- BLcD L= L 
Comparing the fiscal policy of a low-type leader when both fiscal constraints are 
binding (equation (3.3)) with the case when no fiscal constraints exist (equation 
(3.2)), we can notice that first-period taxes increase (we have an interior solution for 
T1), that government consumption and investment, along with public debt decrease, 
i. e. TLemu > TL = 0, gLemu < gL, bLemu =b< bL, and k2, Lemu < k2 jam. 
To gain intuition for the above result, we can first analyse the case where only 
the public debt ceiling is binding. In this case, the terms in WB " in equation (3.3) 
disappear. Because the low-type leader faces a fine due to "excessive" public debt 
accumulation, she trades-off the deadweight loss due to first-period taxes with the 
fine that results in the second period. This induces her to lower b and increase r1 (up 
to the point where the deadweight loss due to first-period taxes equates the marginal 
cost of the debt-related fine, i. e. where f'vL = TD UJL). Because we have normal 
goods the low-type office-holder reduces the supply of public goods whose relative 
price has increased. Therefore both gl and k2 are reduced compared to the case 
were no fiscal restraints exist. Similarly, when only the budget deficit ceiling binds 
(the term in JD u disappears in (3.3)), the low-type trades-off the fine that results 
from high gl and low r1with the distortionary cost of taxes. With normal goods, the 
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incumbent is induced to increase first-period taxes and public debt, and to decrease 
government expenditures. 
Equilibrium Strategy of the High-Type Leader 
The fiscal constraints of the SGP changes the analysis of Section 2.3.4 in a straight- 
forward way, we therefore turn directly to the following propositions: 
Proposition 3.2. The set of all separating equilibria is nonempty and is character- 
ized by (gL, TL, bL) = (gL, TL, bL), and (9H, TH, bH) EBn A"' 
where A"' replaces the A set (cf. (2.23)), and we have 
** emu emu **( emu emu 
Aemu (91T 
1b 
I 7i(91T1b 1 BL ) 91 
(BL) ýD 
, 
ýB ))T1 BLý ýD 
> 
ýD 1' 1< 
0} s >> brr e q1emu q1emu 0e J LI D'D 1> >L 
Comparison of the Aemu and A sets reveals that AQ7'U is a subset of A so that an 
incompetent incumbent is willing to further distort fiscal policy to convince voters 
that she is a high-type when she faces a binding public debt constraint. 
Proposition 3.3. There exists a unique undominated separating equilibrium, and 
in this equilibrium (1 - f')-1 u, -A (1 - \)-1 B uJL = Ug -A (1 - A)-1 QB "J'L = 
uý +A (1 - A)-1 TD'''u Ji < vi for a high-type. 
A>0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the Ae"` set constraint. 
Thus, as can be seen in Figure 3.3, with normal goods the unique undominated 
separating equilibria is given by point Hemu, where gHemu < gHe ,T Hemu > TH9 , 
bHemu < bHa 
, 
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Figure 3.3 The Effects of the SGP Constraints on Equilibria 
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We can now prove Proposition 3.1 by using the following proposition (which par- 
allels Proposition 2.7). 
Proposition 3.4. In the unique undominated separating equilibrium gHemu -THemu - 
°H +f (T Hemu) < 9g11 -T HJ - 
°H + 
.f 
(T 
He) < t: , and 
bgemu <b jie < b. 
The fiscal restraints of the SGP therefore induce the incompetent incumbent to 
reallocate both her financing mix and her expenditure decisions so as to reduce "ex- 
cessive" public debt accumulation and "excessive" budget deficits (both ex post and 
ex ante). As a result the competent leader can also reduce both public debt issues 
and the budget deficit because less signalling needs to be undertaken to separate 
from a low-type leader. 
i' LH Hs g1 
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Results for the UK and US Cases 
We know that in equilibrium all incumbents run a budget deficit (cf. Section 3.3). By 
requiring budgets to be balanced, the UK and US constraints therefore bind on all 
incumbents. The method to solve for the equilibrium strategies for the UK and US 
constraints is the same as for the SGP. A key difference is that because constraints 
bind on both types of incumbents, the B set of Chapter 2 (cf. (2.24)) is changed to 
ßU9 , 3"s is a subset of 8: the willingness to separate from high-type incumbents is 
reduced because of binding constraints. By analogy to the proof of Proposition 3.2, 
it is easy to prove that A"3 fl 13'us is non-empty (and similarly for the UK case). We 
therefore directly turn to the following Proposition: 
Proposition 3.5. (Balanced-Budget rule). A unique undorninated separating equi- 
Librium exists. In this equilibrium the high-type signals; her strategy is given by 
[(1 
- 
f') (1 +T i9)]-1 uc -'23 
(1 + J13)-1 ýI = (1 + wry' u9 - 
T28 (1 +JI 
uc < v''1; the low-type pursues her full information strategy: [(1 - f') (1 + IFis)]-1 uc- 
q, "3 (1 +W)' J' +Ius lu -ýyus 1+4Jus)-1 J, =u =21 L= 
(1 
1) 9 2( 1L c- L" 
As can be seen by comparing the UK and US constraints, the Golden Rule of 
public investment approach of the UK is similar to the ex ante balanced-budget 
requirement of the US. Mathematically, the UK constraint is therefore a special case 
of the US balanced-budget rule ('I = 0, Wis = Wuk) Hence, we have the following 
proposition. 21 
Proposition 3.6. (Golden Rule). A unique undominated separating equilibrium 
21The proof is omitted: it is the same as that Proposition 3.5 in the special case where Weg = 0, 
q, ua = Quk 1 
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exists. In this equilibrium the high-type signals; her strategy is given by [(1 - f') 
(1 +I k)]-1u, = (1 + qj"k) -1 Ug = uC < v'I (so that 1uk = f'(1 - f')-1); the 
low-type pursues her full information strategy which is: [(1 - f') (1 + qj"k)ý 
1 u, 
_ (1+Wuk)-1 u9 =uc =v' 
The intuition for the above two Propositions is best understood by comparing the 
constrained strategies of low-type leaders in Propositions 3.5 and 3.6 with equation 
(3.2) of Section 3.3 (case were no constraints are present). We can see that in both 
cases (i. e. the Balanced-Budget Rule and the Golden Rule) incumbents now choose 
an interior solution for -rl. The reason being that policy makers are "fined" should 
they run an unbalanced current budget. To avoid this, they lower g1, increase rr1 and, 
because we have normal goods, also increase b and lower k2. 
In the UK case, we can note that two opposite effects are at play regarding 
first period tax setting: (i) the deadweight loss due to distortionary taxes (1 - f'), 
and (ii) the "fine" (W' ). Incumbents trade-off these effects. Hence, in equilibrium 
incumbents still have unbalanced budgets albeit with reduced "excessive" budget 
deficits. The higher WuA, the more compliant are leaders in balancing the current 
budget. For the US case, we also have these two opposite effects (1 -f and V's), 
plus the ex post constraint (WY23). With normal goods, this supplementary effect 
induces incumbents to further reduce public expenditures (both the consumption 
and investment parts) and to raise all revenue sources. The same qualitative effects 
also occur in the undominated equilibria. Thus the public debt level is higher under 
the UK and US constraints compared to the unconstrained case. 
Our findings for this section can be summarised in the following statement: 
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Result 3.1. The three types of fiscal constraints studied do reduce incompetency- 
generated excessive budget deficits. However, both the UK and US constraints further 
increase excessive public debt accumulation. The SGP constraints induce policy 
makers to reduce excessive public debt. 
Our result that the Golden Rule of public investment leads to rising "excessive" public 
debt supports the criticism that Buiter (1998) expressed regarding the complacency 
that such a rule creates regarding the build up of public debt. 
We now turn to the analysis of fiscal constraints using our second definition of "ex- 
cessive" deficits. This definition avoids the welfare comparison problem of Definition 
3.1. 
3.5.3 Fiscal Constraints and Politically-Generated "Exces- 
sive" Deficits 
Because Definition 3.2 focuses on efficiency, reducing politically-generated "excessive" 
deficits is directly measurable in terms of welfare. That is, the political distortion 
fiscal constraints aim to reduce is endogenous in our model. Hence, in this section 
we assess whether the three fiscal constraints can be welfare increasing compared 
to the status quo situation (no fiscal constraint and full discretion left to policy 
makers), and whether they can yield the "first-best" outcome. This first-best is 
attained when "excessive" deficits are eliminated (i. e. the budget deficit and public 
debt accumulated are the same as a social planner of the same competency level). 
For fiscal constraints to be welfare increasing they must target the source of the 
inefficiency in the economy (see Figure 3.2). The following lemma are useful to our 
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analysis. 
Lemma 3.1. Fiscal constraints reduce political inefficiencies only if they target and 
reduce the "excessive" ex ante/visible budget deficits of high-type incumbents. 
The proof follows directly from Propositions 2.5 and 2.7 of Chapter 2. Proposition 
2.5 shows that only the fiscal policy of a competent incumbent is distorted compared 
to the social planner (i. e. 9H8 % 9H > gL = 9L, Tlye = TH = TL = TL = 0, 
0< bHs < bH < bL < bL and k2, He < k2, H where a "hat" refers to the social 
planner's policy). The high-type leader creates "excessive" budget deficits, both ex 
ante and ex post. The ex ante measure of the budget deficit is higher for a high- 
than for a low-type leader. The low-type leader's policy is optimal given her ability. 
Proposition 2.7 shows that the ex post measure of the budget deficit is lower for a 
high-type than for a low-type (see Figure 3.2). Thus, for a fiscal constraint to increase 
welfare compared to the status quo it has to target the competent incumbent only, 
and more specifically her ex ante budget deficit. Q 
Lemma 3.2. Fiscal constraints targeting ex post budget deficits are welfare reducing 
compared to the status quo. 
Proof: from Proposition 2.7 we know that the ex post budget deficit of a high-type is 
lower than that of a low-type. An ex post budget deficit ceiling therefore first binds 
on the low-type whose policy is efficient. This changes the "no-imitation constraint" 
(set A) and induces the high-type to reduce the budget deficit, which is done through 
the use of second-best instruments (distortionary taxes). This reduces welfare. If the 
deficit ceiling is sufficiently low, both types are constrained. This induces the high- 
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type to reduce her "excessive" budget deficit. However, because the high-type needs 
to choose her fiscal policy within the "no-imitation constraint" and that the lower 
the deficit ceiling the smaller this set becomes, the high-type can only reduce her 
"excessive" budget deficit by choosing welfare reducing policies. Q 
Turning to the welfare effect of the fiscal constraints, we have the following results: 
Proposition 3.7. (Stability and Growth Pact). The fiscal constraints of the Pact 
cannot lead to the first-best equilibrium. They are even welfare reducing compared 
to the status quo when both the debt and budget deficit constraints bind on the 
low-type leader. 
Proof: The first part of the proof follows from Lemma 3.1 and Propositions 2.5 and 
2.7: in the Pact, the ex post budget deficit is the basis for the enactment of fines 
(see Section 3.4.1). Incompetent leaders produce higher ex post budget deficits than 
competent ones. The budget deficit constraint of the Pact therefore binds on low-type 
leaders prior to being binding on high-type leaders; any reduction in inefficiency on 
the high-type creates a new distortion on the low-type policy maker: the first-best is 
not achievable. 
Second part: we know from the previous sub-section (The Stability and Growth Pact 
as a "Benchmark") that when both the debt and budget deficit constraints are binding 
(on low-types first), this forces both types to reduce their budget deficits. As can be 
seen from Figure 3.3, because of the no-imitation constraint (A"'), the high-type 
chooses a fiscal policy which is further away from her full information equilibrium. 
Welfare is therefore lower than under the status quo. 0 
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Figure 3.4 Social Welfare With Binding Constraints on Ex-Post Budget Deficits and 
Debt 
Welfare 
ix post budget deficit 
+00 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the welfare effect of varying the ex post budget deficit ceiling 
in the SGP case (assuming that b is binding for low-type leaders). 
Proposition 3.8. (Balanced-Budget Rules). The first-best equilibrium is not at- 
tainable under a balanced-budget rule. Welfare is reduced compared to the status 
quo. 
Proof: The proof of the first sentence is immediate: the ex post constraint first binds 
on low-type leaders and forces them to distort their previously efficient fiscal policies. 
Second sentence: We know from Lemma 3.2 that an ex post budget constraint is 
welfare reducing vis-ä-vis the status quo. 22 The ex ante constraint induces incumbents 
to balance their budgets. No incumbents (even social planners) do so in equilibrium 
"Welfare is further reduced the higher the penalty for "excessive" deficits, and the lower the deficit 
ceiling. Thus the ex post SGP constraint yields higher welfare than the ex post US balanced-budget 
rule (c. f. wemu < 1, demo > 0, Tue > 1, de` > 0, d"e = 0). 
o d=d dir, d,. =dL, 
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prior to the introduction of constraints (see Figure 3.2). Thus the policy of the high 
(low) type policy maker is distorted away from an "excessive" (efficient) budget deficit 
towards an excessive budget surplus (vis ä vis a social planner). Distortionary taxes 
need to be used. Given that the penalty for an unbalanced budget is high (W 8= 1), 
the excessive budget surplus of both types will be large which is welfare reducing 
compared to the status quo. 0 
Proposition 3.9. (Golden Rule of public investment). Under a "Golden Rule": (i) 
the first-best equilibrium is not attainable; (ii) an optimal penalty (W*uI) exists such 
that welfare is higher than under the status quo; (iii) welfare is higher than under 
balanced-budget and SGP-type constraints. 
Proof: We first prove part (ii); part (iii) then follows directly since both balanced bud- 
get and SGP-type constraints yield lower welfare than the status quo (Propositions 
3.7 and 3.8); we then prove part (i). 23 
The Golden Rule is an ex ante constraint. Competent leaders run higher (and "ex- 
cessive") ex ante budget deficits compared to low-ability leaders. From an envelope 
theorem argument, for a small enough penalty (T") the welfare gain from a reduction 
of the high-type leader's distortion is larger than the (approximately zero) reduction 
in welfare due to the small distortion of the low-type's policy. As the penalty rises, the 
low-type leader's policy moves further away from the optimum which significantly de- 
creases welfare. Similarly, as the penalty rises, this first induces the high-type leader 
to reduce her "excessive" budget deficit - by using second best instruments (rrl) - but 
passed a penalty threshold, this induces the high-type to run an "excessive" budget 
23The strategies for the status quo and the Golden Rule are given in Sections 3.3 and 3.5.2 
respectively. 
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Figure 3.5 Social Welfare With Binding Constraints on Ex-Ante Budget Deficits 
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surplus which is welfare reducing. Optimality requires to set the second-best penalty 
(denoted by*"k) such that it trades-off the welfare gains from reducing the origi- 
nal distortion on the high-type, the welfare loss from the creation of distortions on 
the low-ability leader, and the distortion that balanced-budget requirements create. 
Since the optimal Golden Rule penalty trades-off several distortions it cannot achieve 
the first-best. Q 
The optimal penalty **"k is such that: gH < gH*uk < gHe, TH < TH*uk, bH > 
bH. 
uk > 
bHe, k2, H > k2 H. uk > 
kge, and 9L > 9L"uk, TL < TL*Uk, 
4< bL.,. k, 
k2. L < k2, L. uk . Figure 3.5 illustrates the welfare effect of varying the ex ante budget 
deficit ceiling in the UK and US cases. 
To conclude this section, we have shown that, of the three types of constraints 
investigated, the Golden Rule is the only one which can lead to a higher welfare level 
than the status quo - which is to leave full fiscal discretion to elected policy makers. 
0 d, =dn dH, dL =dr. 
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Nevertheless, although an optimally designed Golden Rule can raise social welfare 
compared to a full discretion case, such a constraint cannot restore the economy to 
its first-best. The next interesting question is therefore whether an "optimal"" fiscal 
constraint can be designed. We investigate this question in the next section. 
3.5.4 Designing an Optimal Fiscal Constraint 
From Lemma 3.1, to eliminate "excessive" budget deficits, an optimal constraint 
should have the following characteristics: (i) it should apply to ex ante budget deficits, 
and (ii) it should not require budgets to be balanced, that is: 
potential optimal constraint = max IT (gl - T1 +f (T1) - d) ,0}, 
d>0 (3.4) 
With such a constraint, it is possible to find a deficit ceiling (d* > 0) such that only 
high-type leaders are constrained. Furthermore, by choosing the penalty constraint 
optimally ('PH - where the H subscript indicates that only the high-type faces a 
binding constraint) it should be possible to induce the high-type incumbent to choose 
the same budget deficit as a competent social planner. 
The method to solve for the equilibrium strategies is similar to that of Section 
3.3 (or 2.3). The most notable modification from the analysis of Section 3.3 (or 2.3) 
is that the B set is replaced by ß* - {(gl, irl, b) I Z(gl, r1i b, 1, OH) -Z[gi*(OH, t'H), 
Ti*(OH, W ), b**(OH, 'H), 0, BH] > 0}. - the double star superscript refers to the full 
information equilibrium obtained subject to the new (potentially optimal) constraint. 
24 "Optimal" in the sense that it would enable the economy to reach the first best and eliminates 
"excessive" deficits. 
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It is straightforward to show, by analogy to the proof of Proposition 3.2, that the 
set of all separating equilibria is nonempty and is characterized by (gL, -rL, bL) _ 
(gL, TL, b1, ), and (gH, TH, bH) E B* n A. Note that we are now more likely to ob- 
tain a pooling equilibrium because the willingness-to-separate set for the high-type is 
reduced while the no-imitation set of the low-type is unchanged. Note also that re- 
gardless of the equilibrium strategy followed (pooling of separating), Proposition 3.11 
below always holds. Given the small changes compared to Section 3.3, we therefore 
turn directly to the following propositions: 
Proposition 3.10. Conditional on the pair (%PH, d*), for a high enough competency 
advantage and a small enough penalty (WH), a unique undominated separating equi- 
librium exists. In this equilibrium the high-type strategy is [1- f']-1u - (1 - f')[1- 
A]-1W*v' = u9 - [1- A]-1T*v' = u, < vI ; the low-type pursues her full information 
strategy which is given by (3.2). 
A>0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the A set constraint. 
Proposition 3.11. Let us define the optimal fiscal constraint as the pair (WH, d*) 
in the class of (3.4) that eliminates "excessive" budget deficits. For a high enough 
competency advantage, (i) the optimal fiscal constraint exists, (ii) it has the form: 
"Excessive" deficit penalty = max {I* (gl - Ti +f (T1) - d*) ,0}. 
where tI* = 
[, f'(l - \)Uc] 
[(1 
- fF)2vH]-1 and (S = 
dH 
= 9H - TH +f (TH) 
and (iii) it cannot achieve the first-best. 
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The proof is immediate. If 13* fl A is empty, we have a pooling equilibrium. This 
cannot be a first-best (both types distort their equilibrium policies compared to a 
social planner). It is also easy to see that if ß* fl A is nonempty so that a separating 
equilibrium exists it yields a lower welfare level (e. g. distortionary taxes need to be 
used). Q 
Comparing the equilibrium strategy of a competent leader subject to the "op- 
timal" constraint with the fiscal policy set by a competent social planner, we can 
see that by choosing the penalty optimally "excessive" budget deficits can be elim- 
inated. However, even in this case, the first-best cannot be achieved through fiscal 
constramts. 25 Note that dH > gL - TL +f (TL) = gi.. - TL +f (TL) so d* is feasible 
(it binds only on the competent leader). The equilibrium strategies are such that: 
9H`ß"` < gHs, TH < THW . 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have studied, in a microfounded, one country model, the incentive 
and welfare effects that the imposition of fiscal constraints has on the endogenous 
decision of policy makers to reduce or eliminate previously "excessive" deficits (i. e. 
deficits that occur for political reasons when office-holders have full fiscal discretion). 
25Casella (1999) argues, using a different approach than ours, that an efficient implementation of 
the fiscal constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact is possible through the use of tradable budget 
deficit permits. Such permits, analogous to tradable pollution permits, enable to set an upper limit 
on the overall fiscal deficit of the monetary union but leave markets to allocate efficiently these 
permits among countries. Our approach in this chapter differs, and in some sense complements, 
Casella's study in that we analyse whether the existing constraints, as voted and enshrined in the 
law, will achieve their goals and also whether these constraints are efficient. Casella investigates 
whether one different type of mechanism than the one already established in the SGP can efficiently 
implement the Stability and Growth Pact. 
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This comparative analysis of the endogenous response by incumbent policy makers 
to the imposition of fiscal restraints is, to the best of our knowledge, new in the 
literature. More importantly, so is our microfounded, one country analysis. 
In analysing the effects of various fiscal constraints, our first important finding is 
that a critical distinction needs to be made between constraints aimed at reducing 
absolute deficit levels, and constraints aimed at reducing politically-generated deficits. 
Indeed, a crucial point of our model is that these two notions of the budget deficit need 
not coincide. We have shown that fiscal constraints aimed at one type of deficit can 
worsen the other type of deficit. A policy implication is that societies contemplating 
introducing fiscal constraints should first identify the source of the distortion their 
countries suffer from. Depending on the distortion we have shown that some types 
of fiscal constraints are more desirable - if at all - than others. 
We also found the following results. First, when constraints are aimed at reducing 
the absolute deficit levels, we find that the three types of fiscal constraints studied do 
reduce (incompetency-generated) "excessive" budget deficits. This result should not 
be so surprising. It confirms similar results obtained by Beetsma and Uhlig (1999). 
In our model however, a crucial difference is that policy makers's fiscal policy deci- 
sion endogenously reacts to the imposition of fiscal constraints. This result is also 
consistent with empirical evidence, mainly based from studies of US States. How- 
ever, although fiscal constraints do reduce absolute deficit levels, we find that both 
a Golden Rule of public investment and a balanced-budget rule induce policy mak- 
ers to further increase the already "excessive" public debt level. This substitution 
effect from constrained to unconstrained fiscal instruments has important implica- 
tions as far as the design of fiscal constraints is concerned. Indeed, it highlights the 
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importance of having a comprehensive approach to the instruments that policy mak- 
ers can use for re-election purposes. Simply curtailing abuses on one front induces 
office-holders to substitute these instruments with other, more distortionary, instru- 
ments. Von Hagen (1991), in his empirical analysis of the effects of fiscal constraints 
in the US States, does find that such substitution effects do occur in practice. Buiter 
(1998) also argues that the UK Golden Rule could induce policy makers to be more 
complacent about public debt, an argument which as recently been voiced also by 
the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund in their year 2000 
analysis of the UK's medium term public finances. 
Second, when constraints are targeted towards curbing the politically-generated 
deficits, we find that contrarily to the results obtained when constraints target abso- 
lute deficit levels, SGP-type and balanced-budget constraints are undesirable because 
they reduce social welfare even below the case where full discretion is left to office- 
motivated leaders. This finding contrast with those obtained by Beetsma and Uhlig 
(1999). In their model a reduction in the budget deficit necessarily increases social 
welfare. Similarly, Tabellini and Alesina (1990), using a partisan model, also find 
that a balanced-budget rule is welfare increasing compared to the status quo (leaving 
full discretion to office-holders). The intuition for their result is that budget deficits 
arise because current policy makers are uncertain over the public good preferences 
of future policy makers. By running a budget deficit a government can both en- 
sure that public expenditures are spent on its preferred goods and it can also limit 
the amount of funds that a future government can spend on goods that the current 
government does not value highly. However, as shown by Peletier, Dur and Swank 
(1999), the Tabellini and Alesina result is not robust to the introduction of public 
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investment into the model. Extending the Tabellini-Alesina model to allow for public 
investment, Peletier et al. (1999) find that balanced-budget rules (i) reduces public 
investment below its optimal level, and (ii) need not be welfare increasing. 26 We find 
similar results using a different modelling framework (opportunistic rather than par- 
tisan). Since the understanding of ideology in economics is not very developed, and 
that there are many ways in which individuals can exhibit partisan behaviour, the 
political economy models featuring partisan preferences have, arbitrarily, introduced 
preference heterogeneity in different ways. As pointed out in Section 2.2, different as- 
sumptions regarding partisanship have produced opposite conclusions regarding the 
interaction between fiscal policy and political parties. 27 These modelling problems 
clearly render the robustness of results (on the desirability or not of fiscal constraints) 
based on partisan models questionable. 
Of the three types of fiscal constraints investigated, we find that the UK Golden 
Rule yields the highest welfare level and can yield higher welfare than the full dis- 
cretion case (provided the penalty for unbalanced current budgets is not too high). 
Nevertheless, welfare remains sub-optimal under the three types of fiscal constraints 
investigated. We find that a fiscal constraint that would mix elements of the UK 
Golden Rule (specifically the timing of the constraint) with the ceilings approach of 
the SGP would yield a higher welfare than the three constraints we analysed since 
it can eliminate the political distortion leading to "excessive" budget deficits. How- 
ever, even this potentially "optimal" fiscal constraint cannot achieve the first-best 
outcome. 
26These results, that balanced-budget rules negatively affect public investment, is confirmed em- 
pirically by Poterba (1995) in his analysis of capital spending in US states. 
27e. g. the contrasting results between the models of Persson and Svensson (1989), Alesina and 
Tabellini (1990), and Aghion and Bolton (1990). 
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One of the main achievement of this chapter is to provide a (qualified) rationale 
for fiscal constraints to be imposed on national governments once we recognise that 
policy makers have their own agenda. Importantly, our rationale is not based on a 
typical argument regarding negative fiscal externalities, free rider problems arising in 
multi-country monetary unions. Nor does our argument rely on exogenously imposed 
distortions. In our model, fiscal constraints can be desirable by reducing the (do- 
mestic) political fiscal cycles and budget deficits that politicians engineer to increase 
their (endogenous) probability of re-election. Widespread empirical evidence do find 
significant politically-induced cycles. Our model shows that these have a welfare cost 
which can be reduced by carefully designed fiscal constraints. 
An interesting extension of our model would be to endogenise the benefits of 
reducing "excessive" absolute deficits levels. The introduction of positive benefits 
(e. g. because of a lowering of a default probability, of a reduction of the potential 
political and fiscal pressure on an independent central bank, etc. ) would allow us to 
compare the welfare effects of fiscal constraints using Definition 3.1. 
We can also note that welfare can be increased by improving transparency with 
regard to the incumbent's competency parameter. Any action that reduces the tem- 
porary informational asymmetry between voters and the incumbent leader enables 
voters to better assess incumbents' abilities. Having transparent budget procedures 
is one of these actions. Von Hagen and Harden (1994) do find that transparent 
procedures lead to lower deficits. Transparency of the budget process coupled with 
numerous reporting procedures are among the very elements that have been pointed 
out by the European Parliament and the Commission as being key elements in the 
success of the SGP, and is a key element of the UK's Code for Fiscal Stability. This 
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is consistent with our model's welfare properties. 
Part II 
On the Robustness of the Political 
Agency Literature 
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Chapter 4 
The Career Concerns of Politicians: 
Efficiency in a Representative Democ- 
racy? 
4.1 Introduction 
During much of 1999, US President Bill Clinton was reported to be devoting an im- 
portant share of his time to prepare for his defence in the Monica Lewinsky affair. An- 
tonio Gutteres, Portugal's Prime Minister, is featured in a Portuguese satirical show 
as being too busy with his European ambitions' to have time for his national min- 
isterial duties. Countless examples abound about Members of Congress/Parliament 
being too busy with national politics to have time to devote to their local constituents. 
On a more sombre note, many "democracies" are more like "kleptocracies", where 
'Mr Gutteres is the leader of the European Socialist Movement and has been rumoured for the 
job of European Commissioner. 
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the senior members of the government use the powers of office to amass personal 
fortunes. 2 
At the heart of all these cases lies a simple moral hazard problem: once elected 
policy makers enjoy considerable autonomy in their job and, ceteris paribus, they 
dislike supplying time and effort on their job and would rather prefer to pursue 
other activities from which they can obtain greater utility (leisure, other political 
or economic activities). These pervasive problems in policy making have recently 
led economists and political scientists to apply principal-agent theory to study the 
relationship between voters and elected officials. The literature starts from the idea 
that there is a moral hazard problem between the elected official and the electorate: 
left to his own devices, the official will pursue his own interests, rather than those 
of the voters. This is modelled formally by supposing that the official can supply 
unobservable effort (Ferejohn, 1986; Austen-Smith and Banks, 1989; Banks and Sun- 
daram, 1993,1998) or has the opportunity to "steal" rent from tax revenue (Barro, 
1973; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). In this literature, two crucial modifications of the 
standard principal-agent literature are introduced. First, it is assumed that, contrary 
to the private sector, financial incentives to induce high effort are far more limited 
in public service. Indeed, unlike private employees/managers, elected officials cannot 
typically be offered monetary rewards for their performance on the job: the salaries 
of political office are usually independent of short-term performance. As a result, 
financial incentives, which form an important component of incentive mechanisms 
within a firm, are very low powered in government. 3 This leads to the second key 
2 For example, "during Mobutu's 35-year rule, Zaire had ministers and a cabinet, ministries and 
governors, officials and diplomats. These appeared to make up the structure of a government. In 
fact, they were Mobutu's personal networks, though which he stole the wealth of the Congo" The 
Economist, May 2000. 
3Within a firm, solutions to the moral hazard problem (between a manager (agent) and the firm's 
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point of the political agency literature, namely that dismissal from office (or lack of 
re-election) is costly. 4 
Under these two conditions, officials can only be motivated (to supply additional 
effort, to steal less rent, etc. ) by "career concerns", ' i. e. the fear of losing elections. 
The recent literature in this area has modelled this process formally, starting with 
the seminal work of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). This literature now com- 
prises a variety of models (discussed in more detail in the Conclusion) but with three 
apparently very robust conclusions: 
" (i) in (sequential) equilibrium, voters follow a cutoff rule, i. e. will only re-elect 
the incumbent if his observed performance is above a certain critical level; 
. (ii) the cutoff rule always motivates the office-holder (to supply more effort, or 
extract less rent); 
" (iii) that a cutoff rule is an optimal mechanism available to voters in order to 
provide incentives to office-holders. 
owners (principal)) include various incentive mechanisms ranging from promotion and demotion, 
wage changes, performance contracts (e. g. stock options, bonuses), etc. (see Prendergast, 1999, 
Murphy, 1999, Malcomson, 1999, and Gibbons and Waldam, 1999, for recent surveys). 
'In the context of a private firm, the principal-agent literature often assumes that a manager's 
wage will not be affected whether he separates from his current employer or not (e. g. Holmström, 
1999; or Fairburn and Malcomson, 2001 for recent such models). This result holds when firms operate 
in a competitive environment and the agent's performance is observable by all firms in a symmetric 
(though maybe incomplete) way. In the context of a political career, given that "employment 
opportunities" (i. e. elections) are scattered at fixed time intervals, an incumbent politician who 
is not re-elected cannot instantaneously find a similar job with another employer (i. e. another 
constituency). This is one sense in which dismissal from political office is costly compared to private 
sector jobs. 
5Career concerns refer to the fact that an agent's current actions (e. g. labour supply, effort 
on the job, firm-specific human capital accumulation, etc. ) are in part determined by taking into 
account the effect that these actions have on the agent's future career prospects even though no 
explicit incentives (e. g. performance contracts) links the two. 
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The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, we argue that conclusions (ii) and (iii) 
are in fact not robust. We shall show that these two results are critically depen- 
dent on assumptions regarding respectively the information structure of the game 
(for conclusion (ii)), and on a partial equilibrium voting game (for conclusion (iii)). 
Second, given our first result and its causes, we compare welfare of all agents in the 
economy across information structures and institutions (welfare is a function of the 
office-holder's quality and effort level). The aim of this comparative welfare analysis 
is to find conditions under which welfare is maximized. 
We present a simple two-period model of the agency problem between the elec- 
torate and the office-holder. The economy is populated by a number of citizens, who 
may vary in competence if in political office. Their performance in office is described 
by a production function that maps competence, effort, and a random shock into a 
scalar variable, the "public good". The two novel aspects that we introduce into this 
framework are the following: 
First, drawing on the work of Holmstrom (1982,1999) and Dewatripont, Je- 
witt, and Tirole (1999), we modify the information structure from one of asymmetric 
incomplete information (where individual competence is initially the private infor- 
mation of the citizen) to one of symmetric incomplete information (where, at the be- 
ginning of the game, no citizen knows his competence in producing the public good. 
Competence can only be inferred from an individual's performance in office). Since 
Holmström's celebrated (1982/1999) paper, 6 this latter informational environment 
has been the focus of a large body of theoretical work in the context of the theory of 
6In an earlier contribution, Fama (1980) also highlights the importance of career concerns in 
motivating managers. Fama, however, only sketches an analytical model, while Holmstrom provides 
a complete formalization of this effect. 
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the firm and organizations.? Recently, Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) have 
extended Holmström's model to study the incentives of government agencies' officials 
(i. e. appointed civil servants). ' By contrast, the role that career concerns have on 
elected official has been under-researched. ' These concerns however are bound to 
be especially important in politics (and in policy making in particular) compared to 
other types of labour markets that can be encountered in private or public organi- 
sations for two reasons. First, in politics more than in any other market for labour, 
the competency of potential policy makers is especially difficult to assess. Indeed, 
unless candidates already have some experience for the post they are contesting, vot- 
ers have very few benchmarks against which to evaluate the competency, adequacy 
of a candidate for a very skill-specific job. Candidates themselves can be unsure of 
their yet-to-be-tried ability in managing a large and multi-dimensional public sec- 
tor. Second, career concerns are also bound to be important in politics given the 
"winner takes all" nature of this job market. That is, should an election be lost, the 
political career of the defeated incumbent takes an abrupt dive, possibly a terminal 
'Prendergast (1999), and Gibbons and Waldman (1999) review the labour economics and indus- 
trial organisation literature that analyses the effects of career concerns within organisations. "Career 
concerns" (also called "influence") behaviour arises because of implicit incentive considerations: an 
agent tries to influence beliefs regarding her imperfectly known abilities (e. g. Holmstrom, 1999) 
or abilities of potential competitors (e. g. Carmichael, 1988). If successful, this leads to promotion 
to higher paid jobs either inside or outside the organisation. (See also the previous footnote for a 
"definition" of career concerns. ) 
'The study of incentives within the public sector is expanding rapidly. See Tirole (1994) for 
an introduction to "the internal organization of Government" (meaning non elected bureaucrats). 
Dixit (2000) is an excellent recent survey of this new field. 
'The closest model to ours is the recent career concerns model of Chapter 4.5 of Persson and 
Tabellini (2000), which also builds on Holmstrom's work, and that we saw after the first draft of this 
chapter was completed. We show in Section 4.9 that (subject to some inessential qualifications) their 
model can be considered as a special case of ours where there is no randomness in the production 
function. As a consequence, in their model, the incumbent can perfectly observe his competence at 
the end of the first period of office, and so there is no experimentation effect, which is one of the 
main topic of this chapter (and a key novelty in the literature). Our reading of their model is that it 
is intentionally kept very simple to permit an easy analysis of the way career concerns are affected 
by electoral rules. 
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one. Evidence on the prior experience of government ministers, discussed in Section 
4.2 below, indicates that both these assumptions may be (approximately) valid for 
different OECD countries. 
The second modification that we introduce to the "standard" political agency 
model aims to remedy a weakness of the existing literature on the principal-agent 
relationship between voters and office-holders, namely that the office-holders (the in- 
cumbent and challenger) are assumed to be randomly drawn from some population. 
To tackle this issue, we study democracy with endogenous (candidate) entry, where 
at the beginning of each of the two periods, any citizen can stand for election, and 
candidates are voted on by plurality rule, with the winner taking office for one period 
(becoming the office-holder). This approach combines the citizen-candidate mod- 
elling (or representative democracy) of selection of office-holders (Besley and Coate, 
1997; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996) with the principal-agent relationship between 
office-holder and voters. In order to highlight the sometimes complex mechanisms 
that give rise to our results, we contrast the case of democracy with endogenous 
candidate entry with two simpler political institutions. The first is appointment or 
delegation to an appointed bureaucrat (alternatively this environment could also be 
described as a dictatorship), where the office-holder (we shall call him/her a bureau- 
crat) is randomly selected from the population, and is in office for two periods (i. e. 
the bureaucrat is characterised by a long-term employment contract, or a tenured 
job). The second is democracy with exogenous (candidate) entry, which differs from 
the appointment/dictatorship case in that at the beginning of the second period, 
there is an election, contested by the first-period incumbent and an opponent, the 
latter randomly selected from the population, with the winner holding office for the 
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second period. In both democratic regimes, we shall denote the office-holder as a 
politician. Our main focus of attention is the representative democracy case, but the 
first two cases serve as benchmarks which allow us to study the effects of elections and 
candidate entry separately on the behaviour of the office-holder. Last but not least, 
the second case is of independent interest as it is essentially the political institution 
assumed by Ferejohn in his seminal 1986 paper and in the extensive literature that 
follows, and also by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and the subsequent rational political 
business cycle literature (RPBC). 10 
A subsidiary, yet related, objective of this chapter is to address another, related, 
weaknesses of the existing literature on the principal-agent relationship between vot- 
ers and office-holders, namely that the office-holders (the incumbent and challenger) 
have different preferences than the voters. " We address this problem by having 
the incumbent and challenger randomly selected from the same population as the 
electorate. 
Using this simple yet rich political agency setting, 12 we can show why conclusions 
(ii) and (iii) of the literature described at the beginning of the introduction are not 
robust. The intuition for our new results is easier to understand once we analyse the 
effect of the various political institutions and information structures on: 
10The relationship between this chapter and the RPBC literature is discussed later in the Intro- 
duction. 
11In Banks and Sundaram (1993,1998), the principal (voters) care about the output of the agent, 
but the agent's payoff is independent of this output. The same is true of Persson and Tabellini 
(2000), where voters care about the output of the public good, but the office-holder cares only 
about an exogenous ego-rent and the rents that he can extract from tax revenue. 
120ur model enables us to analyse three political institutions and three informational regimes (in 
order to contrast our results under our two incomplete information structures, we shall also analyse 
the model under full information as a benchmark case). 
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" (a) the effort chosen by the office-holder, conditional on his ability; 
" (b) the average ability of the office-holder; 
" (c) the welfare of citizens. 
117 
We first discuss our results on point (a). First, we find that the moral hazard 
problem due to (uncontractible) supply of effort coupled with heterogeneity of policy 
makers' abilities give rise to several strategic considerations in the choice of effort. The 
first kind of strategic behaviour, occurring only in the democratic case, is a "career 
concerns" effect. In an important contribution, Holmström (1999) showed that even 
in the absence of current monetary incentives, a manager's concerns for her future 
career influence her current effort on the job. The reason is that effort influences, 
via the observation of the manager's output, the principal's (and the manager's) 
updating of their initial beliefs about the competence of the manager, leading to 
enhanced future wage prospects. However, in our model, the "career concerns" of the 
office-holder lead to a different kind of implicit performance contract: 13 the higher 
the visible performance while in office, the higher the probability of being re-elected 
and therefore the higher the expected payoff in the future. 
A second effect is experimentation, which can arise only in the symmetric in- 
complete information case (but regardless of whether the labour market is one with 
bureaucrats or politicians). The experimentation literature initially studied the prob- 
lem of a monopolist facing an unknown demand curve. In this case, the monopolist 
131n our model, the career concerns considerations are closely related to a "tournament" effect 
(Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Green and Stokey, 1983). Elections can be seen as a tournament game 
in which citizen-candidates, once in power, compete against opponent citizens. The performance of 
the incumbent is evaluated relative to that of potential candidates. The preferred candidate wins 
and takes office, the losers receiving nothing but the utility of a representative citizen. 
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faces a trade-off between the long-term benefits that will accrue should it discover 
the true demand curve and the short-term costs that need to be incurred in order to 
experiment with different price-quantity combinations. Prescott (1972) and Gross- 
man, Kihlstrom, and Mirman (1977) are early contributions. 14 In our political agency 
model, experimentation occurs when the incumbent deviates from the myopically op- 
timal action that just maximizes the current payoff in order to improve the informa- 
tion content of his signal about his own ability, namely the output of the public good. 
We show that experimentation will occur in the first period of our two-period setting 
when the technology for producing the public good is non-additive (in the sense of 
Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole, 1999), and that when it occurs, it unambiguously 
induces the office-holder to put in more effort than the myopic level. However, the 
incentive to experiment is unambiguously higher in the appointment case, because 
the appointed bureaucrat is always the office-holder in the second period of the game, 
and so always reaps the full benefit of experimentation in the first period, whereas in 
a democratic regime, in equilibrium, the incumbent office-holder in the first period 
will lose the election in the second period with some probability. Hence, point (ii) of 
the literature (i. e. that the cutoff rule always motivates the office-holder to supply 
more effort, or extract less rent) is not robust to an informational environment that 
is symmetric and incomplete. In this case, we show that in sequential equilibrium, 
elections may demotivate: that is, the incumbent will supply less effort than without 
the "discipline" of an election. The intuition is simple. When the ability and the 
effort of the office-holder interact positively, the office-holder can learn more about 
his ability by supplying more effort (the experimentation motive). However, if he is 
14Mirman, Samuelson, and Urbano (1993) develop a tractable two-period monopolist game and 
establish conditions under which experimentation occurs. We will make use of their results. Keller 
and Rady (1999) contains recent references and a brief overview of the literature. 
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exposed to the possible future loss of office, his motive to experiment will be reduced. 
This diminution in the experimentation motive may more than offset the increase 
in effort induced by the desire to signal competence to the electorate (the career 
concerns effect). One way of interpreting the diminution is as short-termism; the 
incumbent underinvests, anticipating he will lose power (see also Besley and Coate, 
1998, for examples of this type). 
The existence of, and implications of, experimentation in a career-concerns setting 
is (as far as we know) a new finding. This is because the existing literature assumes 
either (1) that potential office-holders are already fully (privately) informed about 
their ability, as in Banks and Sundaram (1993,1998); (2) an additive technology, 
where information has no value (e. g. Fama, 1980; Holmstrom, 1999; Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1992; and Fairburn and Malcomson, 2001); (3) one period only, in which 
case information acquired currently cannot be used in the future (Dewatripont et 
al., 1999); (4) there is no noise in the production function so that incumbents can 
perfectly observe their ability from performance at the end of the first period of office 
(Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Shi and Svensson, 2001). 
An important insight from our chapter is that career concerns and experimen- 
tation, while both inducing the incumbent to increase effort, are substitutes under 
symmetric incomplete information: that is, democracy introduces career concerns, 
but also necessarily reduces the incentive to experiment. 
We now turn to discuss point (b), that is how the average ability of the office-holder 
differs, in equilibrium, by political institution. Whatever the information structure, 
democracy (of either type) performs "better" than the appointment case, because 
the electorate can "fire" low-ability office-holders at the beginning of the second 
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period. More interestingly, democracy with endogenous entry outperforms democracy 
with exogenous entry when ability is private information; in this case, there may 
be "revealing" equilibria where only high-ability candidates run for office in both 
periods. However, this perfect screening at the candidate entry stage comes at a cost; 
the incumbent office-holder is never "fired" by the electorate and so has no "career 
concerns" incentive to increase effort above the myopic level; in the terminology 
of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), the electorate loses control of the office-holder. 
Hence, conclusion (iii) of the literature (i. e. that a cutoff rule is an optimal mechanism 
available to voters in order to provide incentives to office-holders15) is not robust once 
the model is extended from a partial equilibrium electoral game (i. e. opponents are 
exogenously selected, and so is the first-period office-holder) to a general equilibrium 
electoral game (a representative democracy ä la Besley and Coate, 1997). Indeed, 
in a representative democracy, if the adverse selection problem is more acute than 
the moral hazard problem, then a cutoff rule (at the policy stage) is not an optimal 
mechanism for society. Instead, a screening of candidates at the candidacy stage is 
more efficient. We can elaborate on this point by analysing how citizens' welfare is 
affected by our various institutions (i. e. point (c) above). 
Turning to point (c), an important focus of our analysis is on the relative efficiency 
of the different institutional regimes discussed in this chapter. Our microfounded 
set-up allows us to calculate voters and office-holder utility in equilibrium. With 
asymmetric information, democracy (with or without endogenous entry) is unam- 
biguously Pareto-improving compared to dictatorship. This is because democracy is 
always more efficient at selecting high-ability office-holders and is at least as efficient 
15See Banks and Sundaram's (1998) paper on "Optimal Retention Strategy" for such a claim. 
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in inducing the office-holder to supply effort. On the other hand, when information 
is symmetric but incomplete, we show that there is also an important relationship 
between the "efficiency" of equilibrium with democracy and the presence of an ex- 
perimentation motive. Consider a constrained social planner who only knows the 
distribution of the competency variable initially (so he is only as well-informed as 
citizens), and has the same powers as citizens, i. e. can "fire" the incumbent if per- 
formance falls below some cutoff value. We say that democracy (with or without 
endogenous entry of candidates) is constrained efficient" if a constrained social plan- 
ner cannot make every citizen better-off. It turns out that (subject to a uniqueness 
condition holding) when technology is additive (so there is no experimentation mo- 
tive), the equilibrium with democracy is constrained efficient, but that this need not 
be the case with an experimentation motive. These findings relate to the old (and 
still hotly debated) issue of whether democracy is an efficient regime. For instance, 
Stigler (1972), and Wittman (1989) argue that democracy, because it ensures that 
office-holders are elected through a perfectly competitive competition for citizens' 
votes, is an efficient mechanism, as effective as economic competition. This ideal 
view of electoral competition has been challenged by models which incorporate im- 
perfections. These include a lack of ability to commit to a pre-announced political 
platform (Besley and Coate, 1998), imperfect information (Coate and Morris, 1995), 
or because pork barrel projects lead to higher political benefits (Lizzeri and Persico, 
2000). 
We should also mention that our chapter is also related to the literature on dy- 
namic moral hazard games. In this literature, it has been shown that these games 
"Of course, due to the underlying agency problem, the equilibrium outcome with democracy will 
never be first-best efficient, so that the latter is not a very interesting benchmark. 
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very quickly become analytically intractable once realistic features are accounted for 
(e. g. access to a credit market). The reason being that the initial moral hazard 
problem endogenously creates an adverse selection problem (see Salanie, 1997, for 
an overview of the literature). Interestingly, this is not the case in our model. The 
reasons are, however, specific to dynamic electoral games. First, we assume (as in 
all opportunistic models) that the benefice from holding office is constant). This is a 
realistic assumption within government but obviously less so within a firm. Second, 
the issue of whether the agent (i. e. the policy maker) has access to a credit market is 
irrelevant given that the agent is not motivated by monetary incentives but by what 
is called since Rogoff and Sibert (1988) an "ego rent". Hence, our model is a simple, 
tractable dynamic moral hazard game. 
One final point is that this chapter can be interpreted as generalizing the liter- 
ature17 on the microfoundations of the rational political business cycle (RPBC) by 
endogenising entry of candidates to election, following Besley and Coate's (1997) ap- 
proach. The RPBC literature shows that, even with rational and forward looking 
voters, political business cycles could occur because incumbent office-holders have a 
temporary informational advantage (regarding their ability) compared to voters. In 
order to reveal superior ability, an incumbent is able to use policy instruments to 
credibly signal to the electorate and therefore create a political business cycle. 18 This 
17The seminal contributions are Rogoff and Sibert (1988), and Rogoff (1990). See Alesina et 
al. (1997) and Drazen (2000a) for a textbook treatment of this vast rational expectations-based 
literature, and for a review of the empirical evidence pointing to such politically-induced business 
cycles. Chapters 2 and 3 belong to such class of models. 
"As in these papers, a political business cycle arises in our model. However, contrarily to these 
models, our cycle is robust to the removal of the ad hoc assumption that incumbent leaders are 
exogenously chosen in the first period of the game. Indeed, as shown in Chapter 5, by endogenising 
citizens' decision to stand for election or not, an optimally designed cost of electoral campaign always 
exists such that a revealing equilibrium obtains at the candidate entry stage so that no signalling 
arises while in a policy maker is in office. Hence no political business cycle. 
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extension enables us to have a general equilibrium electoral model with "opportunis- 
tic" or "office motivated" leaders, in contrast to the partial equilibrium models that 
so far exist, where the existence of an "incumbent" and "opponent" at the date of 
election is simply assumed, and their objectives exogenously specified. Apart from 
endogenising entry, we also extend this literature by allowing for unobservable effort 
by politicians, thus allowing for moral hazard. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we present some 
evidence on the prior experience of politicians. In Section 4.3, we describe the model. 
In Section 4.4 we solve the model under full information. In Sections 4.5 and 4.6 
we solve the model respectively under symmetric incomplete information, and under 
asymmetric information. Section 4.7 is devoted to a normative analysis of the model, 
while Section 4.8 investigates some extensions of the model. Finally, Section 4.9 
concludes and discusses related literature. 
4.2 Some Evidence on Prior Experience of Politi- 
cians 
Turning to empirical evidence from electoral and governments' composition data (see 
Tables in Appendix C. 4), several interesting points regarding policy makers' career 
in relation to their on-the-job experience can be observed. These confirm that closer 
attention should be devoted to the study of career concerns in politics. Tables C. 1 
and C. 2 (in Appendix C. 4) show the percentage of Cabinet Secretaries that have had 
prior Cabinet experience. The data are shown for the United States from 1789 to 
2001, and the United Kingdom from 1859 to 2001. This previous experience offers 
a yardstick against which the electorate can better evaluate the candidates' ability 
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in managing public accounts, but also it offers politicians more insights as to their 
potential ability in office. 
As can be seen from these Tables, this percentage ranges from 0.0 to 100.0 per- 
cent. Tables C. 1- C. 2 show that, beyond the much emphasized difference in political 
platforms (left- versus right-wing governments), governments are constituted of per- 
sons and these persons have different abilities. As these abilities become known while 
in office, we can see that these latter have a profound impact on a policy maker's 
career: even though a Secretary's party might be re-elected, this by no means as- 
sures him/her a seat in the new Cabinet. For instance, in the United Kingdom's 
Conservative government of Harold Macmillan (1957-63) only half the Secretaries 
had prior Cabinet experience despite being preceded by two Conservative govern- 
ments. More striking examples can be found in the United States. For his second 
mandate President Bill Clinton kept only over half of his previous team. President 
George W. Bush (senior) contained 37.5% of experienced Secretaries despite follow- 
ing Ronald Reagan's two terms in office. Herbert Hoover's Republican government 
included 30.8% of seasoned Secretaries despite coming immediately after seven years 
of Republican government under President Coolidge. The sharpest illustration of the 
role of policy makers' ability can be found in the period 1869-1881 where three con- 
secutive Republican governments hold office. President Rutherford B. Hayes' Cabinet 
contained only 11.1% of experienced Secretaries despite following eight years of Re- 
publican government. Hayes was himself replaced by another Republican President: 
James A. Garfield. Yet Garfield's Cabinet consisted, including Garfield himself, of 
strictly inexperienced Secretaries even though this government followed twelve years 
of Republican governments. 
Some Evidence on Prior Experience of Politicians 125 
Tables C. 1 - C. 2 also reveal cases where incumbent governments have been re- 
placed by a totally inexperienced team. Recent examples include the UK government 
of Tony Blair (1997- ), and the first Clinton government in 1993. This is interesting 
as it reveals that voters preferred to elect a policy maker (or team of policy makers) 
with no prior governmental experience19 rather than to re-elect the currently experi- 
enced policy maker (whose ability is revealed to the public). We can also note that 
these sweeping changes in favour of "new" policy makers in the 1990s come in the 
background of one to two decades of sharp deterioration in the fiscal stance in these 
countries (e. g. mounting public debt to GDP ratio), of "boom and bust" economic 
cycles, a forced devaluation of the British Pound and exit from the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism in the United Kingdom. A similar pattern can be noted for other "new" 
governments such as the one of Rankin Roosevelt which was elected in the midst 
of the Great Depression. In terms of our model, these observations support the fol- 
lowing interpretation: following a period of poor economic performance, above and 
beyond voters' desire to change political parties, voters insist in electing citizens with 
no senior governmental experience given that those that have this experience have 
revealed that they do not possess outstanding abilities. The election of a "new" team 
can also indicate to voters that the political party the new team belongs to offers 
a new political platform and a new management style. Possible examples of this 
include Ronald Reagan's 86.7% new team which departs from the Nixon and Ford 
governments, and J. F. Kennedy's government. 
Tables C. 3 and C. 4, contain the same data as the previous two Tables but gath- 
"This is strictly the case in British politics as the opposition party forms a Shadow Cabinet. The 
members of the Shadow Cabinet are therefore fully known before the election which enables voters 
to compare the incumbent versus the opponent's teams. 
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ered by frequency and deciles respectively. They reveal another interesting point, 
namely that the shape of the frequency distribution of the percentage of prior cabi- 
net experience strongly differs across countries. From Table C. 3, we can see that the 
British governments' distributions are skewed towards a high percentage of experi- 
enced Secretaries, while the United States exhibits a bimodal, U-shaped distribution, 
with peaks towards both extremes of the scale, the highest peak being towards the 
low end of the scale. For instance, the percentage of governments with a percentage 
share of experienced members between 0.0 and 10.0% equals 30.2% in the US and 
less than 5% in the UK. 
Table C. 4 reveals that the lowest quartile of US governments contains virtually no 
experienced Secretaries, and that the lowest half of US Cabinets contains only 18.2% 
of experienced Secretaries. This compares with 52.8% and 81.0% for the United 
Kingdom. US politics differs noticeably from UK politics as far as the selection of 
Cabinet Secretaries is concerned. A tentative explanation is that the United States 
has a federal structure with each state having a prominent say on its internal affairs 
(e. g. on fiscal policy). Prominent state policy makers can therefore obtain valuable 
experience in running large scale public accounts and therefore can learn (or receive 
a good signal) about their potential abilities on this type of job. The public can also 
learn from this experience. 
Schlesinger (1966), in his seminal study of political careers in the US from 1900 
to 1958, also finds strong supporting evidence regarding the role that career concerns 
play in politicians' career. 20 His study complements our finding at the federal level 
20Strangely enough, although there is a large literature in Political Science on the career of politi- 
cians, most of these studies have focused on legislative office holder (and especially US Congressional 
careers - e. g. Hibbing, 1991), not on executive positions. Schlesinger is a major exception. A recent 
extension of Schlesinger's work is by Black (1993). 
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in the US: Schlesinger studies political careers at the state level. 21 It is found that 
in all the offices examined, personnel change is always greater than the one due to 
party change. For instance, out of 13,735 elections, 1,938 party changes occurred, but 
more than 4,291 personnel changes took place (states which do not permit re-election 
to the office are excluded). A main conclusion of Schlesinger's study is that there is 
"evidence of extrapartisan dimensions in elections. The great variations in the degree 
of party competition among the states suggest that in those states where the range 
of competition from office to office is greatest, party labels are least important in 
affecting votes. " (Schlesinger, 1966, p. 59-60). 
Finally, a recent econometric investigation of the role that individual office-holders 
play in shaping policy (as opposed to political parties) can be found in Besley and 
Case (1995a). They test the predictions of an electoral principal-agent model under 
asymmetric information (which is similar to our Section 4.5). They draw on Banks 
and Sundaram's (1998) model (which features exogenous candidate entry). Besley 
and Case's analysis of US gubernatorial elections from 1950 to 1986 reveals that 
policy instruments do respond to a binding term limit if a Democrat governor is in 
office. As stated by Besley and Case, this is consistent with a principal-agent model 
in which incomplete information regarding the agent's (office-holder's) ability induces 
the latter to supply more effort in order to influence the principal's (voters') decision 
of whether or not to retain the agent for another period. 
To conclude this section, empirical evidence show that career concerns can signif- 
icantly distort decision making in private and public organisations. 22 Furthermore, 
2'Eight offices are studied: Governor, Senator, Lieutenant Governor, State Treasurer, State At- 
torney General, State Auditor, Secretary of State, US. Representative. 
22The empirical literature on career concerns is unfortunately far less developed that its theoretical 
counterpart. The seminal study is by Gibbons and Murphy (1992) who study CEOs compensation. 
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we argue that specific factors point towards important career concerns motivations 
in policy making. These, coupled with supportive data on policy makers' career war- 
rant a comprehensive analysis of the effect of career concerns on the conduct of public 
policy. As argued in the Introduction, by doing so, we can show that two important 
conclusions of the political agency literature are in fact not robust. We now turn to 
our model to substantiate these claims. 
4.3 The Model 
4.3.1 Overview of the Model 
Our model combines a "career concerns" model (Holmström, 1999 ; Dewatripont, 
Jewitt and Tirole, 1999) with a political economy model23 of fiscal policy (Rogoff and 
Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990), but where candidate entry is endogenous, as in Besley and 
Coate (1997). The economy is populated by a set N of citizens with #N =n>3 and 
evolves over two time periods, t=1,2. The performance of the office-holder while 
in office is measured by a scalar variable gER which we call the "public good". 
This good can only be produced by a single agent (equivalently, only one agent is 
needed to produce the good). We call this agent the "office-holder" (and, depending 
on the institution in which the office-holder operates we shall further call her either a 
"bureaucrat" or a "politician" - see Section 4.3.4 below). Neither the office-holder's 
effort nor her ability can be directly observed. So, the office-holder is in a principal- 
Brandt and Hosios (1996) analyse labour supply in rural China. Both papers find strong support 
for Holmström's theory. Gibbons and Waldman (1999) and Prendergast (1999) survey the limited 
empirical evidence. 
"These political economy models focus solely on "hidden information" problems while we con- 
sider the joint issue of "hidden actions" and information. Our model can therefore be seen as a 
generalization of this literature. 
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agent relationship with the citizens. The precise nature of this relationship depends 
on how the office-holder is selected from the set of citizens (See Section 4.3.4 below). 
4.3.2 Technology 
The ability of an office-holder iEN is measured by ai E {OH, OL}, and his effort level 
in period t is measured by ei, t E [0, oo). Following Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole 
(1999), this office-holder produces gt units of the public good, where: 
(4.1) 9t = -(O + ei, t) + 
(1 - p)O ei, t + et, t= 112 
where it E [0,1]. The more able (i. e. the higher 0) and/or the more effort supplied by 
the incumbent, the more public good is supplied. We assume that each ai is a random 
draw from a distribution that can take two values {OH, OL} , with 
BH > BL >0 and 
with probabilities p, and 1-p respectively. This draw takes place at the beginning 
of period one. So, the 9i are uncorrelated across citizens. We refer to H, L as the 
types of the citizens. 
Also, el, e2 are independently distributed random shocks. In either period, the 
office-holder has to decide on a level of effort before observing et. We assume that E has 
a continuous distribution with probability density function f, cumulative distribution 
function F, and has full support on [f, e], where e may be -oo, and e may be +oo. 
We assume that f satisfies the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Condition (MLRC) that 
f'(a)l f (a) is a continuous and decreasing function. 24 We also assume that f (E) _ 
f (E) = 0, i. e. zero density at the endpoints, and that. 
24The MLRC says that, for a given competency type, a high effort increases the probability of 
obtaining a high visible performance at least as much as it increases the probability of obtaining a 
low visible performance variable. 
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Assumption 4.0. For any e>0, there exists e', e", e" > E', such that f f'E, ý 
<1<f ell -e f(E 
It is well-known that a large number of distributions satisfy MLRC (See Milgrom, 
1981), including the Normal, and it is easy to check that if 0 is Normally distributed, 
Assumption 4.0 is also satisfied. 
Note that the general production function (4.1) encompasses two important spe- 
cial cases. The first is where y=1, in which case the technology is purely additive 
(as in Holmström's paper). The second is where u=0, in which case the technology 
is purely multiplicative (in the sense of Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole, 1999). More 
generally, the technology is a mix of additive and multiplicative. 
Our production function, plus the assumption on the support of et, of course 
implies that g can be negative, and so cannot be literally interpreted as a public good 
in a public finance model. The reason for allowing shocks et to be negative is that if 
we constrained et to be positive, i. e. by assuming the lower bound of the support of 
et to be zero, then if the incumbent observed gt < pOH, he could be sure his type was 
low. This problem of "perfect inference" would complicate the analysis considerably. 
The simplest way to model non-negativity for gt is to suppose that the random shock 
is multiplicative, i. e. 
9t = [µ(Oj + ei, t) + (1 - µ)Oiei, t] et (4.2) 
and has support [0, oo). The qualitative features of the analysis of this chapter would 
be unchanged if we worked with (4.2). 
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If iEN is an office-holder in period t, and produces gt, then ji has the following 
(lexicographic) preferences over pairs (gt, i). For a given i, j has utility linear in gt, 
i. e. ui, t = gt. If office-holders i, i' both supply amount gt, j strictly prefers (gt, i') 
to (gt, i) if i' > i. So, j cares about the level of public good provision, and the 
identity of the office-holder; i. e. voters have preferences over the "looks" of the office- 
holder. " The purpose of introducing "looks" preferences is to break ties in preferences 
over candidates that lead to multiple voting equilibria, and does not affect the main 
results. 26 If an agent iEN is an office-holder in period t, she has the following payoff; 
ui, t = gt +R+ <gc - c(ei, t) (4.3) 
Here, R+ (gt is an "ego-rent" from being in office (as in Rogoff and Sibert, 1988), 
deriving from the prestige in managing public affairs. If (>0, the ego-rent interacts 
positively with the amount of public good provided. 27 Following Rogoff and Sibert 
(1988), we assume for the moment that (=0. (the case of (>0 is discussed in Section 
4.8.1 below). Next, c(ez, t) is the cost of effort, where c(. ) is strictly increasing and 
strictly convex, and c(0) = 0, c'(0) < 1.28 For simplicity, we do not allow discounting 
25This index could refer to any visible variable that belongs to a citizen but is unrelated to her 
economic performance. For instance, her "look" as in Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990). 
That beauty is an important determinant of a person's performance in the labour market is shown 
in Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) and Biddle and Hamermesh (1998). 
26These "looks" can be dispensed with if we are only interested in analysing the appointment case 
and democracy with exogenous entry. 
270f course, C>0 could also model a public duty/altruistic motive for the office-holder, capturing 
the fact that holders of public office may feel some obligation towards the citizens they represent, 
quite independently from the discipline that elections impose. The existence of such a motive, 
often called "Public Service Motivation" (PSM) has long been recognised in the literature on public 
administration. Numerous survey-based evidence also indicate that such motivations exist (See 
Francois, 2000, for a recent economic modelling of PSM, and for a recent review of the literature). 
(>0 could also be interpreted as an endogenous part of the ego rent: the higher public output, 
the higher social welfare, and therefore the higher the popularity (hence ego rent) of the office-holder. 
28The last condition c'(0) <1 ensures that myopic effort is positive. 
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so, the present value of pay-offs for iEN is UZ = ui, l + ui, 2. 
4.3.4 Institutions 
The agent whose task it is to produce the public good (the office-holder) is selected 
in one of three ways. 
1. Representative Democracy (Democracy with Endogenous Candidate Entry) 
This institution follows Besley and Coate (1997). There is an election at the 
beginning of each of the two time periods. The first stage of an election process is 
candidate entry. Any citizen can stand for election in either of the two periods, at 
a cost of 6>0. We restrict citizens to pure-strategy entry decisions. 29 The second 
stage is plurality voting over the set of candidates. That is, every citizen has one 
vote which he must cast for one of the candidates, (we rule out abstentions), and the 
candidate with the most votes wins (given the lexicographic preferences assumed a 
voter is never indifferent between two or more candidates). We impose the restriction 
that voters vote sincerely, i. e. for their most favoured candidate. The justification 
for this, and the consequences of relaxing it, are discussed in Section 4.8.2 below. 
In the event of a tie (i. e. two or more candidates with equal numbers of votes) 
we adopt the standard tie-breaking rule that every candidate with the most votes is 
chosen with equal probability. In the event that nobody stands for election, a default 
option is selected by the constitution, which is that no public good is provided. 
This institutional arrangement is the main one studied in this chapter. It allows 
29Existence of equilibrium in this model is not a problem, and so we do not need to consider the 
extension to mixed strategies. 
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for both candidate entry and voting to be modelled in a complete way without any 
ad hoc assumptions. To bring out the (sometimes complex) effect of this institu- 
tional structure on the principal-agent relationship between the "office-holder" and 
the electorate, we consider two benchmarks. 
The first abstracts from the endogenous entry decision while allowing the elec- 
torate to "fire" bad office-holders. It also is quite close to the modelling of the electoral 
process in Rogoff and Sibert (1988), and Rogoff (1990). 
2. Partial Democracy (Democracy with Exogenous Candidate Entry) 
At the beginning of period t=1, an office-holder (we call him the incumbent) 
is selected by random draw from the set of citizens. This office-holder is in place 
during period t=1 but faces an election at the beginning of period 2. At this stage, 
an opponent is selected by random draw from the set of citizens. The citizens then 
vote on the opponent versus the incumbent, and the winner is the office-holder in 
period t=2. We require an individual rationality condition to hold, i. e. that both 
the incumbent and the opponent prefer to be in office in the relevant periods. 
The second is very simple, and abstracts from both entry of candidates and voting. 
3. Appointment of a Bureaucrat (or Dictatorship) 
At the beginning of period t=1, the office-holder is selected by random draw from 
the set of citizens, and is in place for both periods. Again, we require the individual 
rationality condition to hold that the appointee prefers to be in office than not. 
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4.3.5 Information Structures 
We consider three possible information structures in this model. The first (complete 
information) is where all citizens can observe the type of every citizen, i. e. every 
citizen knows the ability vector a= (al E {OH, BL} ) ..., an E 
{OH, OL}). This is an 
unrealistic but useful benchmark case. The second is where all citizens know nothing, 
i. e. citizens do not know their own types nor anybody else's, but all know the joint 
distribution of types (symmetric incomplete information). The third is where citizens 
do know their own types but nobody else's, but all know the joint distribution of types 
(asymmetric information). In each of these cases, it is assumed that the effort e is only 
observable by the incumbent. Because of this, the office-holder cannot be rewarded 
on the basis of e. 30 If she receives a salary, this is modelled as a component of R, the 
"ego-rent". It is also assumed that g is not verifiable, so the office-holder cannot be 
rewarded on the basis of g. This is a standard assumption in the incomplete contract 
literature. One can view g as the overall supply of public goods in a country. Writing 
contracts specifying all the characteristics of the goods (e. g. quantity, quality, time 
delivery, etc. ) is realistically not feasible (or prohibitively costly). 
4.3.6 Myopic Choice of Effort and Two Assumptions 
Consider the choice of effort by an office-holder who is in power for one period only, 
and believes he is high-ability with probability p. This office-holder solves the prob- 
30The assumption that labour contracts are incomplete for precisely the assumptions that we are 
making is standard in the labour economics literature. See, for instance, Macleod and Malcomson 
(1989) and (1998). 
The Model 
lem3' 
135 
vo (p) = max 
I P[µ(BH + e) + (1 - µ)BHe] 1 (4.4) 
e +(1-p)[µ(OL+e)+(1-µ)OLe]-c(e)+R J 
The first-order condition is 
A+ (1 - µ)(pOH + (1 - p) BL) -c (e) =0 (4.5) 
This solves to give e*(p), which we call the myopic optimal action by the office-holder, 
given a belief that he is competent with probability p. Note that if If p=1, e* (p) 
e*, for all p. 
Finally, we can define the utility of the non-office-holding citizen when both the 
citizen and the office-holder believe the office-holder to be competent with probability 
Pý 
Vc(P) = P[P(OH+e*(P))+(1-µ)exe*(P)]+(1 - P) [p(OL+e*(P))+(1-µ)OLe*(P)} (4.6) 
Some useful properties of e* and the associated value functions v0, v, are the 
following. First, it is clear from the first-order condition (4.5) that 
äe* (1 
- µ)(OH - OL) 
op ei (e. -) 
(4.7) 
So, e* is independent of p if the technology is purely additive and strictly increasing 
in p otherwise. 
Second, by direct application of the envelope theorem to (4.4), we have 
vo (P) = µ(OH - 9L) + (1 -11)(OH - OL)e*(P) (4.8) 
31Throughout this chapter, we shall use a subscript "o" to refer to the office-holder, and a subscript 
"c" to refer to citizens. 
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so vo is strictly increasing in p. By inspection of (4.7), v, is also strictly increasing 
in p. Moreover, as R>0, and by the properties of c, vo(p) > 0, and by inspection, 
Vc(P) > o. 
We can now state and discuss the only two assumptions that we require. The 
first says that the ego-rent from office is high enough that a low-type prefers to take 
office, even if he is sure that he is displacing a high-type: 
Assumption 4.1. R> max {c(e*(0)) + v, (1) - vc (0) , c(e*(1))} . 
The second assumption ensures that candidate entry costs are low enough so that 
some agent will stand for election, and high enough to deter all agents from standing 
for election: 
Assumption 4.2. 
nv0 
(1) <6< vo (1) 
4.4 Equilibrium with Full Information 
4.4.1 Appointment of a Bureaucrat 
In this case, the optimization problem of a type i policy maker over the two-period 
time horizon can be considered as two one period or myopic problems, as there is no 
state variable. So, by the analysis of Section 4.3.7, a high-type bureaucrat chooses 
action e*(1), and has utility v0(1), and a low-type appointed bureaucrat chooses 
action e*(O), and has utility v,, (0). If the bureaucrat does not take office in any 
period, the public good is not supplied, and so the dictator's payoff is zero. So, the 
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individual rationality condition that ensures that the bureaucrat prefers to take office 
is v0(1), vo(0) > 0, which certainly holds. 
4.4.2 Partial Democracy (Democracy with Exogenous En- 
try) 
In this case, we have a multi-stage game rather than a decision problem. We solve for 
the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. At the second period, if elected, a citizen 
iEN with ability ai E {BH, OL} will solve the same optimization problem as the 
appointed bureaucrat and a high-type office-holder chooses action e2 = e*(1), and 
has utility v0(1), and a low-type office-holder chooses action e2 = e*(O), and has 
utility va(0). 
The expected payoff to any citizen (except i) if citizen i wins the election is v, (1) 
if i is a high-type, and v, (0) if i is a low-type. So, moving back to the stage of the 
election, if the incumbent and the opposer have different abilities, the one with the 
higher 0 will be elected. If the incumbent and the opposer have the same abilities, 
the one with the higher "looks" characteristic is elected. Finally, in the first period, 
it is clear that the randomly selected office-holder i will behave myopically (as his 
first-period action cannot affect the second-period equilibrium). 
The individual rationality conditions are the following. First, consider the second 
period. The first case is where both incumbent and opposer are of the same ability 
type. In this case, if both are high-types, the gain to winning the election, rather 
than allowing the other to win, is v0(1) - v, (1) =R- c(e*(1)). This is positive 
by Assumption 4.1. A similar argument shows that both prefer to win if both are 
low-types. 
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If the incumbent and opposer are of different ability types, then the one of lower 
ability will only prefer to win the election if the "net" ego-rent from winning, R- 
c(e*(O)), exceeds the efficiency loss from him taking office, i. e. v, (1) - v, (0). Again, 
this holds by Assumption 4.1. Finally, in the first period R> c(e*(1)) is enough to 
ensure that the randomly selected incumbent wishes to take office. Again, this holds 
by Assumption 4.1. 
4.4.3 Representative Democracy (Democracy with Endoge- 
nous Entry) 
In this case, we have a multi-stage game of a more complex kind, as in this case, 
citizens must make entry decisions as well as effort decisions. The following result 
characterizes the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Let NH = {i jai = OH I, and 
mH = max GN . 
We now have the following result. This, and all following results, 
are proved in Appendix C if a proof is required. 
Proposition 4.1. Assume Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2. The following is the unique 
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the model in the full information case of democracy 
with endogenous entry. In period 1, only mH stands for election, and is elected. 
In period 2, again only mH stands for election, and is elected. In each period, 
mH chooses action e*(1). 
So, endogenous entry is a perfect institutional arrangement for deterring low- 
ability citizens from standing for election. 
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4.4.4 Comparing Institutions 
First, we can compare the three institutions in terms of equilibrium effort and quality 
of the office-holder. First, note that generally, the probability that any institution 
will select a high-type office-holder will depend on nH =# {i EN Jai = BH }, the 
number of citizens who are high-type. Of course, ex ante, nH is a random variable, 
as it is determined by the realizations of the O i. So, when comparing institutions, it is 
more appropriate to use the expected value of this variable, as, following Buchanan, 
choice between constitutions should be thought of as taking place behind a Rawlsian 
"veil of ignorance" (Dixit, 1996). 
As nH is binomially distributed, (nH ti B(n, p)), it is straightforward to calcu- 
late32 that (i) the expected probability that a high-type is in office in either period 
with appointment is E(nH/n) = p; (ii) the expected probability that a high-type 
is selected for office in the first (respectively second) period with exogenous entry 
democracy is p (respectively p+ p(1 - p)). Of course, the probability that a high- 
type is selected for office with endogenous entry democracy is unity in both periods. 
So, we can summarise: 
Proposition 4.2. Assume Assumptions 4.0-4.2. With complete information, actions 
(conditional on types) are the same with appointment, partial democracy (exogenous 
candidate entry), and representative democracy (endogenous candidate entry). How- 
ever, in the appointment case, a high-ability type is selected in both periods with 
32The expected value of nH is np, and that of nH is np(1 - p) + n2p2. Also, the probability that 
a citizen selected at random is high-type is nH/n, and E(nH/n) = p. Next, conditional on nH, 
the probability that a high-type is selected for office in the second period with exogenous entry 
democracy is, + (1 - li'L)-5'L the expected value of which, after some calculation, turns out to 
be p+ p(1- p). 
Equilibrium with Symmetric Incomplete Information 140 
expected probability p<1, with partial democracy, a high-ability type is selected in 
the first period with probability p and in the second with probability p+ p(1- p), and 
finally with representative democracy, a high-ability type is selected in both periods 
with probability 1. 
4.5 Equilibrium with Symmetric Incomplete In- 
formation 
In this section, we assume that citizens do not know their own types nor anybody 
else's, but all know the joint distribution of types (symmetric incomplete informa- 
tion). In a one-period version of this model, this deviation from full information 
would not be very interesting. However, as the model is dynamic, both citizens and 
the first-period office-holder may learn about the first-period office-holder's type by 
observing first-period output of the public good. This gives rise to new motives in 
choosing effort levels, experimentation and career concerns. In particular, experi- 
mentation occurs when the office-holder adjusts his first-period action away from the 
myopically optimal level in order to increase the informativeness of first-period out- 
put. Career concerns arise when an agent (here, the office-holder) exerts effort not 
just to maximize current utility but also to affect the perception that the principal 
(here, the voters) has regarding the agent's ability. 33 Experimentation occurs with 
all three institutional forms, but career concerns effects occur only with democracy. 
In a more standard labour market, this perception influences the agent's future labour market 
performance (e. g. promotions, wage increases, etc. ). Here, this perception influences the agent's 
chance of retaining office. 
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4.5.1 Appointment of a Bureaucrat 
We solve the appointee's decision problem with the usual dynamic programming 
approach. In the second period, the appointed bureaucrat faces a myopic problem, 
so chooses e2 = e* (p) where p is the bureaucrat's posterior belief that he is a high- 
ability type. The individual rationality condition for the appointee is that v0 (p) >0 
which is always satisfied. 
Now, note from (4.8) above that as long as the technology has a multiplicative 
component, i. e. p<1, his second-period payoff is strictly convex in p; 
v1 (P)=(1-µ)(9H-OL)aüe* P >0 
(4.9) 
This means that information about aE {OH, OL} obtained by Bayesian updating 
is strictly valuable. Now when updating, the bureaucrat can observe both his own 
output of the public good in the first period, gl, and his action in the first period, el. 
So, from Bayes' rule, the bureaucrat's posterior belief that he is a high-type is 
P(ei, 9i) = Pr (a = OH I el, 91) = 
P (4.10) 
where we have used the definitions 
P+ (1 - p) fL(gl, ei)/fx(9i, ei) 
fx(9i, ei) =f (9i - (1 - µ)9Hei - µ(OH + ei», 
fL(9i, el) =f (9i - (1 - µ)BLei - µ(OL + ei)) 
(4.11) 
(4.12) 
Note from (4.10) that changes in actions are informative, i. e. a change in el affects the 
posterior probability that the office-holder is competent, given output (äp(gl, el)/äe1 # 
0). So, the two well-known34 conditions for optimal experimentation are satisfied in 
34See, for instance, Proposition 1 of Mirman, Samuelson and Urbano (1993). 
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our model, i. e. the bureaucrat has an incentive to deviate from the myopic effort 
level in the first period. 
Now we go to the first-period problem for the bureaucrat. Note that for a given 
value of el, gl is a random variable with distribution function 
H(9i, ei) = PF(9i - (1 - µ)9Hei -/ (OH + ei)) + (4.13) 
(1 - P)F((9i - (1 - µ)OLei - µ(BL + ei)) 
Consequently, p(gl, el) is also a random variable, conditional on el, implying an 
expected optimized second-period payoff of E91[vo(P(el, gl))]. So, the problem for 
the appointee in the first period is 
t P[I (OH + ei) + (1 - µ)OHe1] + (1 - p) [µ(OL + el) + (1 - µ)BLel] 
1 
(4.14) max +E9, [va(P(ei, 9i))] -c (el) +RJ 
The first-order condition can be written 
(µ + (1 - µ)(POH + (1 - P) OL)I + 
öE9, {v0((el, 9i))] 
_ (ei) (4.15) Del 
The first term in the square brackets on the left-hand side is the first-period (myopic) 
gain from a small increase in effort. The second term on the left-hand side is the 
marginal experimentation benefit or cost from changing el from its myopic level 
e*(p). Let the value of el that solves (4.15) be ei . 
The question is now: what sign is the marginal experimentation term? Following 
the proof of Lemma 2 of Mirman, Samuelson and Urbano (1993) it is possible to show 
(derivation relegated to Appendix C. 3.1) that 
8E9, [v0((ei, 9i))] 
-P (1 - µ) (ex - OL) 
f 
00o 
vo (1 - P) d-- 
fH (9i, ei) dgl (4.16) ael 
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Now, from(4.9), v' >0 as long as < 1, and 
dP 
- 
p(1 - P) (4.17) 
dgl [PfH + (1 P) fL]2 
(fdf 
- 
fLfH) i0 
from the MLRC. So, we see that 
äEgý[vo(P(ei, gi))] 
>0 if µ<1 Del 
i. e. that the experimentation term is strictly positive iff the technology is partly 
multiplicative. So, the following result is immediate from the previous discussion and 
the strict concavity of c (. ): 
Proposition 4.3. (Appointment) In the second period, the appointed bureaucrat 
chooses the myopic level of effort e*(p), conditional on her posterior belief. In the 
first period, the bureaucrat will choose to experiment by choosing a higher effort than 
the myopic one, ei > e* (p), unless the technology is purely additive (p = 1), in which 
case ei = e*(p). 
4.5.2 Partial Democracy (Exogenous Candidate Entry) 
This case is more complex, as we have a game of incomplete information, where there 
is both experimentation (unless the technology is additive) and a career concerns 
(or tournament) effect. We characterise the perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of this 
game, which turn out to be unique35 except that (possibly) the incumbent may choose 
multiple actions in period 1. Suppose first that the challenger to the incumbent, 
jEN, is elected. His choice of action is eß, 2 = e*(p), because he has no additional 
35 Sufficient conditions for uniqueness are derived below. 
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information about his own competence. So, the expected utility to any member ij 
of the electorate from the opponent is v, (p). 
Now, at the time the electorate votes, every citizen has had the chance to observe 
gl, first-period public good provision. Let p be the updated belief on the part of the 
electorate, having observed g1, that the incumbent is a high-type. Now, when forming 
the posterior p, citizens rationally deduce that in the first period, the incumbent has 
taken equilibrium action ei. So, their posterior probability that the incumbent is 
competent is 
P (9i) =p (4.18) 
P+ (1 - p) [IL (9i, ei) /fx (9i, ei)] 
Note that we superscript p°(gl) to distinguish it from the incumbent's own posterior, 
which is defined in (4.10). However, note that in equilibrium, pf(gl) = p(gl, ei). 
Then the expected utility that citizens can expect from the incumbent is vc(pC(gl)). 
So, given the tie-breaking rule, all the citizens (apart possibly from the opponent), 
will vote for the incumbent when vc (p° (gl)) > vc(p). As vc is strictly increasing in 
its argument, this is equivalent to pc(gl) > p. From (4.17), (4.18), pc(g1) is strictly 
increasing in gl. Moreover, from this fact and Assumption 4.0, there exists a unique 
critical value gl such that pc(gl) = p, with p>p for gl > gl, and p<p for gl < gl. 
The conclusion is that all voters (except the incumbent) follow the following cutoff 
rule: vote for the incumbent if gl > gl, and for the opponent if gl < gl. As there 
are at least three voters by assumption, this cutoff rule determines the outcome of 
the election, i. e. how the incumbent votes is irrelevant. 
It remains to check that it is individually rational for both the incumbent and 
opponent to stand for election in this case. The net gain to winning the election for 
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the incumbent is 
OW(9i)) = vo(f(91)) - Vc(P) 
, 
(P)] + [R - c(e(Pc(9i))] , 
(Pc(9i)) - VC _ [vc 
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(4.19) 
where, in the second line, the first term in (4.19) is the net efficiency gain to the 
incumbent given that he wins rather than the opponent, and the second is the net 
ego-rent from holding office. By Assumption 4.1, this is unambiguously positive. A 
similar argument implies that the opponent also wishes to hold office. Alternatively, 
looking at the first line of (4.19), the individual rationality condition requires that 
O(X(gl)) > 0, p°(gl) > p. But from (4.19), /'(p`(gl)) = vö(p°(gl)) >0 from Section 
4.3.6. So, we only need that O(p) > 0. But by definition, O(p) =R- c(e*(p)), and 
from Assumption 4.1, this is unambiguously positive. 
So, in view of the preceding discussion, we can write the second-period equilibrium 
continuation payoff of the incumbent conditional on gl, el as: 
w(9i) ei) -{ 
v°(P(1, el)), 
if g, < 9, 
(4.20) 
So, the expected second-period continuation payoff of the incumbent, conditional on 
first-period effort only, is 
, 
(P)H ffi, el) (4.21) E91 [w (P (9i, ei))] = vc 
+f 
+oo 
vo(P(91, ei))h (9i, ei) dgl 
91 
where h (gi, el) = pfx + (1 - p) fL is the density of H from (4.13). 
Now consider the choice of first-period action for the incumbent, given his con- 
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tinuation payoff (4.21). This must solve: 
ul = max E 
P[P(OH + ei) + (1 - µ)GHei] + (1 - P) [µ(9L + el) + (1 - µ)9Le1] 
ei sl -c (el) +R+ Esc [w(P(ei, 9i))] 
} 
(4.22) 
The first-order condition can be written as 
A+ (1 - A) (POH + (1 - P) OL) + 
(9E.., Lwaelel, 9i))] 
= c' (ei) (4.23) 
After some manipulation, the third term on the left-hand side, evaluated at ei, is 
given by (derivation available in Appendix C. 3.2) 
öE9, [wDe(el, 91))] lei =P (1 - i) (OH - BL) 
fiv dgl 
(1 - P) fx (91, ei) d äP 9i 
9 
+P (1 - P) vo (P) fx (9l, ei) (4.24) 
+ [R -c (e* (p))] (-OHý9i, 
ei) ) 
\ äe1 
where 
aH(9i> ei) 
5e1 =P 
[µ + (1 - P) BH] fH (9i) ei) + (1 - P) [A + (1 - µ) BL] A (9i, ei) >0 
(4.25) 
The first term on the right-hand side represents the "experimentation" effect that we 
encountered in the appointment case. However, in this case it is clear by inspection 
that the incentive to experiment is unambiguously smaller than in the appointment 
case. The intuition is that the democratically elected office-holder only reaps the 
benefits of experimentation in the event that she is re-elected, which occurs with 
probability less than one. The second term p (1 - p) (1 - p) v. (p) fH (gl) , which 
is 
positive, is an additional incentive to experiment. 
More importantly, the last term in (4.24) is a new effect which we call the "career 
concerns" (or "tournament") effect, and is the product of two terms. The first, 
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R-c (e* (p)) is the net gain, or "prize" to winning the election when p=p. This 
term can be related to the tournament literature (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). There, 
the motivation for effort is to gain the first prize instead of the second prize. Here, 
the first prize for the incumbent is taking office (with payoff v,, (p)) and second prize 
is losing the election in which case the opponent wins, giving the incumbent v, (p). Of 
course, v,, (p) - vc(p) =R-c (e* (p)). Therefore, as in the tournament literature, a 
policy maker's effort depends on the spread between winning and losing prizes. The 
second term, - ae , 
is the increased probability of winning the "prize" due to a small 
increment in effort. So, this last term in (4.24) represents the marginal extra effort 
that the incumbent office-holder is willing to supply in order to win the election. Note 
that the last term is always strictly positive by Assumption 4.1. 
Let the level of action that solves (4.23) be denoted ei' for partial democracy 
(we shall denote equilibrium effort levels in the representative democracy case by 
RD). As the career concerns effect is always positive, then ePD > e*(p). Then we 
can summarise: 
Proposition 4.4. (Partial Democracy) In the second period, the elected official chooses 
the myopic level of effort e* (p), conditional on her posterior belief. In the first period, 
the official will choose a higher effort than the myopic one, el" > e* (p), even if the 
technology is purely additive (p = 1). 
Because this is an equilibrium action in a game, we cannot be sure that it is 
unique. Indeed in their analysis of career concerns in the labour market for bureau- 
crats, Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole showed that in the Normal-quadratic version 
of the model (e Normally distributed, c (. ) quadratic) if the technology is sufficiently 
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multiplicative, there are multiple (two) equilibrium action levels, but if the technol- 
ogy is additive, the equilibrium action is unique. We are also able to show that in the 
Normal-quadratic case, if the technology is additive, the equilibrium action is unique. 
In our model, in the additive case, from (4.24), we get 
1+ [PIH (9i, e1D) + (1 - P) fL (9i, e1D)] (R - c(e*)) = (eP') (4.26) 
where e* is the myopic optimal action in period 2 (independent of p). So, as c" > 0, 
and c'(0) < 1, a sufficient condition for uniqueness is that left-hand side of (4.26), 
viewed as a function of el, is decreasing for all el < ePD. But for this, it is sufficient 
that f'' (gl, eID) , 
fL (gl, elD) > 0, el < efD, or, more explicitly 
f' (x)>0, x<gl-BL - ei (4.27) 
This condition will be useful in what follows. We are also able to show that in the 
Normal-quadratic case, if the technology is additive, the equilibrium action is unique 
(see Appendix C. 2). 
Moreover, simulations reported in Appendix C. 2, show that for a range of pa- 
rameter values, the equilibrium action is unique even when technology is almost 
completely multiplicative (µ ý-- 0). So, when comparing institutions in Section 4.5.4, 
we will assume that ep' is unique. 
4.5.3 Representative Democracy (Endogenous Candidate En- 
try) 
Again, here we are interested in locating the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the 
model. Here, as entry is endogenous, voters' off-the-equilibrium path beliefs about 
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the types of citizens who do not enter in equilibrium are important. We will assume 
that at all information sets where k has entered, all j#k believe that k is high-ability 
with probability p, except where k is the incumbent (i. e. was elected in the previous 
period). Given that every citizen who is not the incumbent believes himself to be 
high-ability with probability p, these seem the only reasonable off-the-equilibrium 
path beliefs. 
Next, let eRD (RD stands for Representative Democracy) be the solution to 
(4.23) above, but where the ego rent R is replaced by R-ö, the "net ego rent", i. e. 
net of the cost of standing for election. Again, we will assume eRD unique, which as 
argued above, is a weak restriction in the Normal-quadratic case. The interpretation 
of eRD is that it is the first-period effort chosen by an incumbent with endogenous 
entry. Then it is clear that el < elD, as in the endogenous entry case, the "prize" 
for winning the election is reduced by the amount of the entry cost. 
We then have the following result: 
Proposition 4.5. (Representative Democracy) Assume Assump ons 4.0-4.2. Then, 
with symmetric incomplete information, there is a unique PBE with the following 
structure. In period 1, only i=n stands for election and is elected. He chooses effort 
level ef". In period 2, if gl > 1, only i=n stands for election and is elected. He 
chooses effort level e*(p(gl, ei)). If gl < gl, only i=n-1 stands for election and is 
elected. He chooses effort e* (p) . 
The intuition is that given that citizens do not know their own types, no citizen 
runs for election on the basis of her superior ability in the first period. Only the 
citizen with the best "look" stands for election and is elected: non-economic variables 
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decide which citizen becomes candidate and office-holder in the first period. In the 
second period, the incumbent is re-elected if his track record is sufficiently good, 
and anticipating this, he stands. On the other hand, if his track record is weak, he 
does not bother to stand (rationally anticipating defeat if he does), thus allowing the 
remaining citizen with the best "look" to stand and win. 
Note, however, that once in office in the first period, the incumbent's choice of 
effort is exactly the same (modulo the fact that 6 reduces the ego-rent) as in the 
simpler case of democracy with exogenous candidate entry. So, our results are robust 
to the introduction of endogenous candidate entry. 36 
4.5.4 Comparing Institutions 
We can now turn to one of the main results of this chapter, namely that the conclusion 
that the cutoff rule always motivates the office-holder to supply more effort, or extract 
less rent is not robust (c. f. point (ii) of the Introduction). In this section, we first 
show why there is a possibility that this conclusion will not hold. 37 We show this 
by comparing effort levels under appointment and democracy (whether partial or 
representative). In the final period, conditional on posterior belief about type, the 
same (inefficiently low) effort level occurs under all three institutions. The interesting 
comparison is therefore in the first period. Here, it is instructive to compare the 
incentive to raise the effort level above the myopic optimum in the representative 
3GAs shown later in this chapter (and further examined in Chapter 5) the result that partial 
democracy and representative democracy lead the same qualitative results need not be the case 
under an asymmetric information structure. This difference between the two regime has not been 
investigate in the political agency literature. 
37The proof that democracy can be less efficient than appointment in inducing effort from the 
office-holder is left for Section 4.7 (Normative Analysis section). 
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democracy case and the appointment case. The difference between this incentive is 
[R -S-c (c* (P))] 
ý- OH(e1 el)) (4.28) 
P (1 -\ P) (1 - µ) vo (P) fH (9i, ei) + (OH-0L)f9ýv""d (1-P)f r(9i, ei)dgl 
Again assuming uniqueness of e1", by the convexity of c(. ), eRD > eA if and only if 
0>0. 
Now, the first term in 0 is the "career concerns" term, and is positive. The 
second term in square brackets is the additional incentive for experimentation in the 
democratic case. Although it is not analytically possible to sign A in general, it is 
clear that when the technology is (approximately) linear i. e. A ^_J 1, the second term 
is zero (experimentation has no value), and so A>0 overall, implying eRD > eA the 
conventional result that elections motivate office-holders (this effect means that the 
electorate can maintain control of politicians once in office; Barro (1973) and Ferejohn 
(1986)). Illustrative calculations in row 1 of Table 4.1 show that when the variance 
of e is high, the career concerns effect on effort may be large. 
Our main focus of interest is to establish conditions under which elections may 
demotivate. Inspection of (4.28) indicates that this is likely to occur when the net 
ego-rent from office, R-6- c(e* (p)) is close to zero. In this case, using in the 
Normal-quadratic case, simulation results reported in Appendix C. 2 show that it 
is possible that A<0 when 0H - 0L is sufficiently large. In this case, there is 
(approximately) no "career concerns" effect under democracy, so that as long as there 
is more incentive to experiment with appointment, we will have 0<0 and hence 
eI < eA. For the Normal-quadratic case, simulation results reported in column 
1 of Table 4.1 below show that this can easily happen, and the demotivating effect 
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of elections is larger, the more multiplicative the technology is. A natural way to 
measure this is in terms of the increase relative to the myopic level of effort induced 
by either arrangement. When µ=0.75, (el RD A - e*(p))/(ej - e*(p)) -- 1, but when 
µ=0, (eRD - e*(p))/(ei - e*(p)) ^_- 5/8. Table 4.1 also shows that it is possible that 
A<0 when 0H - 0L is sufficiently large. In this case, information about 0 is valuable, 
so the bureaucrat's incentive to experiment is strong, and is much diminished by an 
electoral constraint. 
Table 4.1 Equilibrium Effort Levels eA, eRD in the Normal-Quadratic Case 
\ R-6-c(e*(p)): 50 100 e*(p) 
1.00 1.00,1.00 1.00,1.20 1.00,1.40 1.00 
0.75 4.05,4.03 4.05,4.81 4.05,5.58 4.00 
0.50 7.69,7.41 7.69,8.61 7.69,9.71 7.00 
0.25 12.08,11.22 12.08,12.19 12.08,13.00 10.00 
0.00 15.00,14.25 15.00,14.69 15.00,15.07 13.00 
9H - 6L : 
0.5 1.1250,1.1253 1.1250,1.35 1.1250,1.57 1.1250 
10 3.51,3.52 3.51,4.21 3.51,4.91 3.50 
20 6.34,6.21 6.34,7.33 6.34,8.39 6.00 
50 15.05,14.43 15.05,14.75 15.05,15.03 13.5 
Notes: When '. c is variable, other parameters are: p=0.5,0H = 25, BL = 1, Q= 100. 
When 0H - 9L is variable, other parameters are: p=0.5, µ=0.5, o= 100. 
Next, consider the expected probability (taken with respect to al E {OH, OLI, -, an E 
{OH, OL}) that the office-holder is a high-type, under any institutional arrangement. 
As in the full information case, the expected probability that the office-holder in either 
period is high-type under appointment is p, as is the probability that the office-holder 
is high-type in the first period, with democracy. In the second period, the expected 
Equilibrium with Asymmetric Information 
probability that the office-holder is high-type is 
Pr(ai = °H 191 ? 9i)(1 - H(,, ei)) + PH(9iI ei) =5>p 
So, we can summarise the discussion as follows: 
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Proposition 4.6. With symmetric incomplete information, the same (myopic) level 
of effort is chosen in all cases in the second period. In the first period, assuming a 
unique solution to (4.23), the effort level is lower with representative democracy than 
with partial democracy ( eRD < erD). This level, eRD, will be higher than in the 
appointment case, el, if the technology is linear (in which case there is no motive 
for experimentation), but it can be lower than in the appointment case if the "prize" 
R-6- c(e*(p)) is approximately zero and BH - BL is sufficiently large. 
With appointment, a high-ability type is selected in both periods with expected 
probability p<1. In both democratic cases, a high-ability type is selected in the 
first period with probability p and in the second with probability p>p. 
This raises the possibility that democracy need not be more "efficient" than ap- 
pointment, as the former, while undoubtedly raising the average quality of the second- 
period office-holder, may lower effort (relative to appointment). This is investigated 
further in Section 4.7 below. 
4.6 Equilibrium with Asymmetric Information 
We now turn to the case where the competency variable Bi is private information to 
citizen i. This is related to the set-up of Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and especially 
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Rogoff (1990) -a major difference with these models is that they do not incorporate 
a moral hazard problem since no effort has to be supplied by the office-holder. In 
these papers, office-holders have full control over g (i. e. in our notation, e= 0), and 
effort is analogous to unobservable seigniorage (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988)) or public 
investment (Rogoff, 1990). In this case, in equilibrium, the high-ability type will 
"separate" from the low-ability type, i. e. produce a different level of the public good, 
thus perfectly signalling his type to the electorate. Signalling requires him to produce 
more than the myopic level of the public good, while the low-ability type just produces 
the myopically optimal level. 
By contrast, we will find that - in the case with exogenous entry - both high 
and low-types will choose higher effort than the myopic optimum, due to career 
concerns considerations. Interestingly, when we allow endogenous candidate entry 
both "revealing" and "non revealing" equilibria at the candidate entry stage are 
possible, so that career concerns does not necessarily occur. Entry is not present in 
the RPBC literature so that only non revealing (distortionary) equilibria are possible. 
A more directly related strand of literature is the one following from Ferejohn's 
(1986) article. In particular, our model is closely related to Banks and Sundaram 
(1998). This latter model features asymmetric information between a principal (e. g. 
voters) and his agent (e. g. incumbent politician). As in our model, agents differ in 
ability and, once in office, need to supply effort to increase the utility of the principal 
(Banks and Sundaram consider the case of a multiplicative technology between ability 
and effort - as we do). The major difference between Banks and Sundaram (1998) and 
our model of this Section 4.6 is that Banks and Sundaram limit their investigation to 
the regime where the agent is exogenously given at the beginning of the game and his 
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opponent is randomly drawn (partial democracy case). Under this regime, they show 
that a cutoff strategy38 for the principal is an optimal retention strategy (conclusion 
(iii) of the literature mentioned in the Introduction). We shall prove in this section 
that this strategy need not be an optimal mechanism any more once we abandon 
the unrealistic assumption that office-holders are exogenously selected, and instead 
consider a representative democracy regime. 
4.6.1 Appointment 
In this case, the analysis is identical to that in the complete information case, as the 
office-holder has no reason to signal his ability. 
4.6.2 Partial Democracy 
In this case, we have a multi-stage game rather than a decision problem. We solve for 
the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. At the second period, if elected, a citizen 
iEN will choose e2 = e* (a2), ai E {9H, 9L}. So, the expected payoff to any citizen39 
(except i) if citizen i wins the election is v, (ai). 
Now consider the election stage. Let the incumbent and the opposer be i, j re- 
spectively. If the opposer wins, citizens k#j have play-offs 
vc(P) = PVc (OH) + (1 - P) vc (OL) (4.29) 
Now, if a citizen observes output gl by the incumbent and rationally anticipates 
equilibrium actions ei (OL), ei (OH) in the first period, his posterior belief that the 
38i. e. the incumbent keeps is job provided observable performance is above a cutoff value. 
39For this to be an equilibrium, it must also be the case that the citizen i who is elected prefers to 
be a producer rather than have no public good provided, but this follows directly from v,, (xi) > 0. 
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incumbent is competent is 
Pc (9i) =P+ (1 - P) lL (91, ei(9L)) lfx (9i, ei(OH))] 
(4.30) 
Note here that (4.30) differs from (4.10) in that in this case, the incumbent can 
condition her first-period effort level on her type (ei (ai) is the equilibrium effort level 
of type i given his known ability aE {OH, OL}). 
If the incumbent wins, citizens ki have play-offs i3( p° (gl)) . 
Assume, without 
loss of generality, that i>j. So, all citizens k i, j will vote for i if and only 
if vý (pý (gl)) > vc (p) , which 
in turns holds if and only if p' (gl) > p. So, by the 
arguments of the previous section, there exists a unique gl such that i is re-elected if 
and only if gl > jl. 
We now confirm that the incumbent i prefers to be re-elected rather than lose 
to the opponent. His payoff if re-elected is va (ai) , and his payoff if not re-elected 
is 
vc(p). As vo (OH) > vo (OL) , we require 
vo (OL) = vc (OL) +R- c(e*(OL)) > P'c (OH) + (1 - P) Vc 
(0L) (4.31) 
which clearly holds by Assumption 4.1. We also confirm that the opponent j prefers 
to be elected rather than lose to the incumbent when gl < gl. If he wins, he gets 
vo (aj) , and 
if he loses he gets i3, (P' (gl)). When gl < gl, p<p, so it is certainly 
sufficient that (4.31) also holds for the opponent. 
Now, the payoff of incumbent i at the beginning of period 2 can be written as 
4.32 ) w(a2) -{' 
c(P), 
ý 
iif 
91 ý! ji 
f 9i < 91 
So, 
Esc [w (aý)ý _{ FL (91, ße1) v. O + [1 - FL (9ý, ei)]lva(9 )) if a1 = BL 
(4.33) 
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where 
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Fk(gl, ei) =F (9i - (1 - µ)Okei - µ(O + ei», k=H, L (4.34) 
is the distribution of gl conditional on i's action and his type. So, in the first period, 
incumbent i's problem is to solve 
max {µ (Bi + ei) + (1 - p) O e1 + E91 [w (as)] +R-c (el)} (4.35) el 
The first-order condition for effort is 
µ+ (1 _ µ) O, + 
r7Ey, 
Oe 
(ai)] 
= C, (ei) (4.36) 
Now, from (4.33), it is clear that 
äE9 [w (a2)] 
__ 
J fH (9i' ei) (µ + (1 - µ) OH)(Vo(1) - vc(P)) if ai = 0H (4.37) 
äe1 1 fL (9i, ei) (µ + (1 - µ) OL)(vo(0) - vc(P))) if ai = BL 
which has the following intuitive interpretation: it is the marginal effect of an increase 
in first-period action on the probability of winning the election (first two terms), times 
the "prize" for winning (the third term v,, (ai) - vc(p)). 40 In line with our analysis 
of the case with symmetric information, we call this incentive the career concerns 
effect. By inspection, the career concerns effect is positive. That is, both types have 
a positive incentive to increase their effort above the myopic level in order to increase 
the probability of re-election. 
Note, however, it is possible to show that at the equilibrium values of el the career 
concerns effect for the high-ability type is stronger than for the low-ability type. The 
40Note that this differs from other tournament models (e. g. Lazear and Rosen, 1981) in which 
the prizes are exogenous. 
Equilibrium with Asymmetric Information 158 
argument is as follows. First, from the definition of gl as solving p°(gl) = p, and 
(4.30), we see that fH(91, ei (OH)) = fL(91, el* (OL). So, from (4.37), 
8E9, [w (BH)P 
- 
8Egi [w (OL)] 
19e, 
let=e1(BH) 
0e1 
lei=ei(ec) (4.38) 
= fH(9i, ei(OH) [(i + (1 I-1) OH)(vo(OH) - vc(P)) - (µ + (1 - µ) OL)(Vo(OL) - vc(P))I 
>0 
where the term in the square brackets is surely positive as vo(OH) > vo(BL). It follows 
directly from this that ei(OH) > ei(OL). 
Proposition 4.7. Assume Assumptions 4.0-4.2. The unique sub-game perfect has 
the following structure. At time t=1, the randomly drawn office-holder j chooses 
a higher effort level than the myopic level (because of the career concerns effect), 
i. e. ei(ai) > e*(aj), ai E {BH, OL}. Also, high-ability office-holders choose a higher 
effort level than less able incumbents, i. e. ei(OH) > ei(OL). At time t=2, (i) if 
gl > gl, the incumbent j is re-elected; (ii) if gl < gl, the randomly drawn opponent 
k is elected. The office-holder 1=j, k in t=2 chooses myopic effort e* (al), with 
e*(OH) > e*(OL). These results hold even if the technology is purely additive (µ = 1). 
We can note that our result that both the high and low-ability agents act strate- 
gically in equilibrium differs from other asymmetric information political economy 
models. In Rogoff and Sibert (1988), the lowest type does not signal, and the highest 
types do not signal much; the highest signalling incentive lies with medium ability 
agents. In Rogoff (1990), the low-type does not signal, only the high-type does. The 
results of this section are also related to Banks and Sundaram's (1998) analysis of 
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a principal's optimal retention strategy. As our next section shows, because Banks 
and Sundaram have a partial equilibrium model (in terms of selection of the agent), 
we cannot be certain that their "optimal retention strategy" is indeed optimal once 
we extend the analysis to a representative democracy regime. In fact, depending on 
parameter values, the next section of our model shows that this will not be the case 
in numerous cases (In Chapter 5 we will pursue this argument more rigorously). 
Finally, in contrast to our findings under symmetric incomplete information, we 
can note that, under asymmetric information, whether the technology is multiplica- 
tive or additive between effort and ability does not affect our qualitative results. 
4.6.3 Representative Democracy 
In this case, we can show that there are two perfect Bayesian equilibria: one where a 
citizen of either type may stand for election, and one where only high-ability citizens 
stand. 
Proposition 4.8. (Multiple Equilibria) Assume Assumptions 4.0-4.2. If vo(0) > 6, 
then there is a "non revealing" PBE with the following structure. At time t=1, only 
n stands for election, and at t=2, (i) if gl > gl, only n stands for election; (ii) if 
gl < gl, only n-1 stands for election. The only candidate is elected with probability 
1 in each case. The office-holder 1=n, n-1 in t=2 chooses action e* (xi), and the 
office-holder n in t=1 chooses action ei (xi). 
If v,, (0) <6< v0(1), then there is a "revealing" PBE with the following structure. 
At t=1,2, only some mt E NH = {i I aZ = OH} stands for election. The only 
candidate is elected with probability 1 in each case. In a revealing equilibrium, the 
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office-holder mt chooses action e*(1) in both periods. 
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Note that the "non-revealing" equilibrium is consistent with the existing RPBC 
literature and with models such as Banks and Sundaram (1998) in that, as far as 
ability is concerned, the candidate is a random draw from the population. In our 
model, of course, this is derived as an equilibrium, rather than assumed. 
More interestingly, there is another equilibrium, the "revealing" one, where can- 
didate entry is a perfect device for screening out low-ability candidates. This implies 
that there will be no distortionary signalling activity by the incumbent, in contrast 
the existing RPBC literature. However, comparing the two equilibria, we see that 
screening of candidates at the entry stage has two conflicting effects on efficiency. 
On the one hand, the average quality of the office-holder is higher in the revealing 
equilibrium. On the other, the first-period effort of the office-holder, conditional on 
type, is higher in the non-revealing equilibrium. 
4.6.4 Comparing Institutions 
Given previous results, we can now state: 
Proposition 4.9. Assume Assumptions 4.0-4.2. If a revealing equilibrium occurs 
with representative democracy, then, conditional on the type of the office-holder, the 
same level of effort is exercised in the representative democracy and the appointment 
cases (modulo 6). This level is lower, because of the lack of career concerns, than in 
the partial democracy case. When a non revealing equilibrium occurs, conditional on 
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the type of the office-holder, the same level of effort is exercised in both democratic 
cases (modulo S). This level of effort is higher than in the appointment case. 
With appointment, a high-ability type is selected in both periods with probability 
p<1. If a non-revealing equilibrium occurs with representative democracy, a high- 
ability type is selected in the first period with probability p and in the second with 
probability p>p in both democratic cases. When a revealing equilibrium occurs, a 
high-type is selected with probability 1 in both periods in a representative democracy. 
4.7 Normative Analysis 
We address two questions here, to what extent are equilibrium outcomes (effort levels 
and quality of office-holders) with democracy inefficient relative to some benchmark? 
Second, can a social planner facing the same informational constraints as citizens 
design institutions that Pareto-dominate democracy? This latter question tackles 
point (iii) raised in the introduction (i. e. the argument found in the literature41 that 
a cutoff rule is an optimal mechanism available to voters in order to provide incentives 
to office-holders). 
Following Wittman (1989), Besley and Coate (1998), we study efficiency of democ- 
racy in the Pareto sense, rather than relative to some arbitrary social welfare function 
(e. g. Benthamite) for a social planner. 42 
41This claim has recently been made by Banks and Sundaram (1998). 
42 One motivation for this is due to the well known problem of preference aggregation. indeed, 
in our model, all citizens have identical preferences over outcomes in any period (a choice of office- 
holder and an effort level for this office-holder). However, as the "good" of office is indivisible, any 
outcome must be horizontally inequitable, and so the social planner faces the problem of preference 
aggregation. 
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An outcome here is defined as: (1) a choice of office-holder in each period; and 
(2) a level of effort by the office-holder in each period, conditional on his informa- 
tion about his type. With symmetric incomplete information, outcomes (1) and (2) 
are described by Proposition 4.4, and 4.5 for the partial and representative democ- 
racy cases respectively. 43 With asymmetric information, outcomes (1) and (2) are 
described by Propositions 4.7 and 4.8 for the partial and representative democracy 
cases respectively. 44 
One widely used benchmark is what could be achieved by a social planner with 
complete information (i. e. knowing the ability vector of all citizens (al E {OH, OL} , ..., 
On E {OH, OL}), and the effort level of the office-holder) who can choose the identity 
and effort of the office-holder, and a full set of economic instruments (i. e. can make 
unrestricted transfers of some numeraire good between citizens). 
Say that democracy with endogenous entry is unconstrained efficient if the social 
planner of this type (the unconstrained social planner) cannot choose a feasible out- 
come that makes every citizen better-off. Assume for convenience that citizen utilities 
are linear in the numeraire good. As the social planner can make unrestricted trans- 
fers between agents, democracy (with or without endogenous entry) is unconstrained 
efficient if and only if it selects the same conditional actions in each period, and the 
same choice of office-holder, as does the social planner. 
It is then clear that democracy cannot be unconstrained efficient. First, clearly, 
the social planner will always select a high-type office-holder; if the office-holder i is 
43Proposition 4.3 describe the outcome for the appointment case under symmetric incomplete 
information. 
44Under asymmetric information, for the appointment case, the randomly drawn office-holder has 
an expected ability of p, and for t=1,2 chooses a myopic effort level, contingent on her ability 
(e* (a), aE {OH) OL}). 
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a low-type, all voters, except i are better-off if a high-type is made office-holder, and 
the gainers can clearly compensate i. Also, as there are n citizens, each of whom 
gets utility g from a level of the public good g, the social planner will choose e to 
maximize the expected value of ng minus c(e), conditional on a high-type being in 
office, i. e. it solves 
n(µ + (1 - µ)9H) = c'(e) (4.39) 
Let the solution to (4.39) be e**(1), consistently with previous notation. Comparing 
these outcomes to the equilibrium ones that occur either under symmetric incom- 
plete information (Propositions 4.4, and 4.5), or asymmetric information (Proposi- 
tions 4.7, and 4.8), it is clear that equilibrium outcomes with democracy are never 
unconstrained efficient. 
So, not surprisingly, all democratic institutions45 studied in this chapter are in- 
efficient relative to this benchmark. The weakness of the unconstrained efficiency 
benchmark is of course that the social planner is given superior information and 
more economic instruments than the office-holder. Consider now a constrained social 
planner who has the same information as the citizens (i. e. only knows the distribu- 
tion of aE {OH, OL} initially), and has the same powers as citizens, i. e. can "fire" 
the incumbent if performance falls below some cutoff value (i. e. no ability to redis- 
tribute the numeraire good). Say that democracy (with or without endogenous entry) 
is constrained efficient if this social planner cannot choose a feasible outcome that 
makes every citizen better off. Constrained efficiency is a much weaker test for any 
institution. So, another, more appropriate, question to ask is whether a constrained 
social planner can achieve a better (Pareto-superior) outcome than democracy. We 
"It is also easy to see that the appointment regime is also never unconstrained efficient. 
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turn to this issue by first looking at the symmetric incomplete information case, and 
then by examining the asymmetric information structure. 
(i) Symmetric Incomplete Information Case 
This is certainly the case with symmetric incomplete information, as it can be 
shown (Proposition 4.10 below) that the appointment case, i. e. a random selection 
of office-holder, may Pareto-dominate democracy, and the former is certainly imple- 
mentable by such a social planner. 
We can now turn to the proof that one of the conclusion of the literature (c. f. 
point (ii) of the Introduction) is not robust. Indeed, it is easy to see that the only 
feasible actions for the constrained social planner are; (i) random selection of an 
office-holder in the first period; (ii) replacement of the initial office-holder by another 
citizen selected at random if the only publicly observable indicator of the incumbent's 
performance, gl, falls into some "unacceptable" set U. From the assumption of 
the MLRC, the social planner can do no better than to set U= {gl Igl < gi }, i. e. 
follow a cutoff rule. Obviously, if g* = -oo, this is simply appointment, and if 
gi = gl, democracy. Nevertheless, in the presence of an experimentation motive 
(p < 1), democracy may not even be constrained efficient. Indeed, we can state: 
Proposition 4.10. Assume Assumptions 4.0-4.2. With symmetric incomplete in- 
formation, democracy (with or without endogenous candidate entry) is constrained 
efficient if the technology is additive (µ = 1) and in addition (i) the sufficient con- 
dition (4.27) for uniqueness of ePD holds; (ii) R> c(e*) + p(OH - OL). However, 
with (partly) multiplicative technology (µ < 1), there are parameter values for which 
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"appointment ", i. e. gi = -oo, may Pareto-dominate democracy, in which case 
democracy is not even constrained efficient. 
The key idea is that with a linear technology, there is never unanimity about 
changing gi from gl; the initial office-holder will always prefer gi = -oo, effectively 
making him an appointee, but all citizens who never hold office always prefer (ex 
ante) a gi higher than gl, in order to motivate the initial office-holder to supply more 
effort. This argument breaks down when the technology becomes multiplicative, as 
then (due to the experimentation effect) the initial office-holder may be motivated46 
by lowering the cutoff gi , as then 
he captures more of the gains from experimenting. 
So then, everybody may gain from a lowering of g;. 
To conclude, under symmetric incomplete information, and under the realistic 
assumption that a social planner possesses the same information and instruments as 
citizens (i. e. a constrained social planner), a constrained social planer can certainly 
implement a Pareto improving regime whereby office-holders are appointed on a long- 
term basis (appointment of a bureaucrat case) . 
In this case, a (constrained) social 
planner chooses at random a citizen, makes a payment R-6- c(e* (p)) for being in 
office - this payment being approximately zero. Note that this Pareto improvement 
(compared to democracy) arises in our model even though effort is unobservable, and 
g is uncontractible. 
(ii) Asymmetric Information Case 
We now analyse whether a constrained social planner can achieve a Pareto- 
46This also requires that the career concerns effect will be small, i. e. that the "prize" for winning 
the election (R - c(e* (p))) is approximately zero. 
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superior outcome than democracy in the asymmetric information case. It is easy 
to see that this is not the case as welfare is unambiguously lower in the appointment 
case compared to either kind of democracy. Indeed, we can state 
Proposition 4.11. Assume Assumptions 4.0-4.2. With asymmetric information, 
democracy is constrained efficient whichever equilibrium prevails. 
The proof is immediate. Under a representative democracy we know the following 
points. First, suppose that the revealing equilibrium prevails under a representative 
democracy. Here, voter utility is unambiguously lower in the appointment case. This 
is because; (1) effort conditional on type is the same as it is with appointment ; (2) 
the average quality of the office-holder is higher in both periods. Second, suppose that 
the non-revealing equilibrium prevails. Again, voter utility is unambiguously lower 
in the appointment case. This is because; (1) effort conditional on type is higher (in 
the first period) than with appointment ; (2) the average quality of the office-holder 
is higher in the second period. The same qualitative result also applies to partial 
democracy. So, appointment never Pareto-dominates democracy. 0 
So, in our setting, the "Chicago view" that democracy is efficient is (partially) 
confirmed when politicians have private information. This results differs from the 
one obtained, in an asymmetric information agency model, by Coate and Morris 
(1995). In Coate and Morris's model, the two possible types of office-holders are 
equally efficient in producing public goods, only one type accepts bribes while the 
other does not. Coate and Morris do not consider endogenous candidate entry. 
We can also compare welfare across the two democratic institutions in the Normal- 
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quadratic case. We find the following results (see Appendix C. 2). Ceteris paribus, 
welfare in the partial democratic case (exogenous entry) or under a representative 
democracy with a non revealing equilibrium is higher than in a representative democ- 
racy with a revealing equilibrium: (i) the larger the ego rent R, and the smaller the 
cost of entry 6 (ii) the larger a, the standard deviation of e, (iii) the more additive 
the technology is (i. e. the closer is p to 1) (iv) and the higher the prior belief (p), and 
(v) the higher is the competency difference (OH - OL). These results are intuitive: the 
larger the career concerns effects (which occur solely under exogenous entry or a non 
revealing equilibrium), the higher equilibrium effort, and, ceteris paribus, the higher 
the welfare level. As our numerical results (stated in Appendix C. 2.4) show that for 
any pair of equilibria El, E2, it is possible to find parameter values such that either 
El Pareto-dominates E2 or vice versa. 47 
To conclude, under asymmetric information, although a social planner cannot 
implement a Pareto-improving appointment regime, given our maintained assumption 
that citizens have full information on the model's parameters, a social planner can 
certainly implement a Pareto-improving (representative) democracy by, for instance, 
varying the cost of entry S so that either a revealing or a non revealing equilibrium 
obtains. Given this result, the observed wide variation across countries regarding 
the treatment of candidates campaign contributions (e. g. publicly funded or not, 
refunded if a certain threshold of votes is attained, upper limits, etc. ) highlights 
the role these entry cost could have in shaping policy outcomes and welfare. This 
47Strictly speaking, revealing and non-revealing equilibria with asymmetric information cannot 
coexist at the same parameter values (c. f. Proposition 4.8). However, we ask the following question. 
Suppose that 6=v,, (0) - e, so that initially only a revealing equilibrium exists. Then change 6 to 
6= vo (0) + e, so that now only a non-revealing equilibrium exists. Can we find an e and other fixed 
parameter values such that everyone is better-off (or worse off) in the first equilibrium rather than 
the second? The meaning of this exercise is that by changing 6 slightly, a social planner could bring 
about a Pareto-improvement. 
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interesting legal treatment of cost of candidate entry and the potential this could 
have in shaping the fiscal policy of incumbent politician is left for future empirical 
research. 
We now turn to the question of whether the equilibria (democracy with endoge- 
nous entry) under different information structures can be Pareto-ranked. There 
are three equilibria of interest (equilibrium with symmetric information, 48 the non- 
revealing and revealing equilibria under asymmetric information). Our numerical 
results (stated in Appendix C. 2.4) show that for any pair of equilibria El, E2, it is 
possible to find parameter values such that either El Pareto-dominates E2 or vice 
versa. 
It is perhaps not so surprising that the asymmetric equilibria may dominate the 
symmetric equilibrium; as in the former, the office-holder is better-informed. It is 
more surprising that the reverse is the case. The reason is when the technology is 
multiplicative, with symmetry, the level of effort is raised due to experimentation, and 
this more than offsets the loss in efficiency of not being able to condition actions on 
types. Under asymmetric information, the result that either the revealing equilibrium 
can Pareto-dominate the non revealing equilibrium is less surprising. Indeed, in 
this case, we know (Proposition 4.8) that these cases trade-off increased efficiency 
on office-holders' ability (revealing equilibrium) against increased efficiency on effort 
(non revealing equilibrium). 
"In all our numerical simulations, this was unique, as discussed above. 
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4.8 Extensions 
4.8.1 Office-Holder Altruism (< > 0) 
The assumptions of the model generate a very strong form of underprovision of effort; 
as effort is non-contractible, the office-holder only has 1/n of the correct incentive to 
provide effort. Consequently, (at least for large n), the higher equilibrium effort, the 
more efficient the effort is. This strong result can be refined by the (admittedly, ad 
hoc) device of supposing that the position of office has some psychological impact on 
the office-holder, making him or her more altruistic. 49 If (>0, the positive analysis 
of the chapter is qualitatively unchanged, except that the total ego-rent from office is 
now R+c(n-1)g, i. e. the ego-rent depends on performance while in office. Of course 
the efficiency analysis will be different: in particular, for ( close to 1, equilibrium effort 
levels much above the myopic may be inefficiently high. In theory, one should be able 
to find an optimal value of ( such that the first-best is achieved. 
4.8.2 Strategic Voting 
Our analysis has assumed that voters vote sincerely (i. e. for their most preferred 
candidate) at each election, no matter what the candidate set is. However, it is well- 
known that when there are three or more candidates, voting sincerely might not be 
49Holmström and Milgrom (1991) have such a type of assumption in their multitask agency model: 
they assume that not all work is unpleasant for an agent so that even without explicit incentives, 
the agent will supply effort on some tasks. Hess and Orphanides (2001b) also introduce a similar 
assumption; they introduce a parameter similar to ( and refer to it as the degree of selfishness of 
the office-holder. See Gill (1999) for a multi-disciplinary survey of the theory and evidence on the 
meaning of work beyond the economists' definition. The social psychology literature, for instance, 
emphasizes individuals' psychological need for work. These "needs are embedded in our social, 
ethical, and cultural structures". 
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the only Nash equilibrium strategy5° (see Besley and Coate, 1997; or Dhillon and 
Lockwood, 1999). For example, in our model, it is a Nash equilibrium for all voters 
to vote for the candidate with the lowest index (i. e. looks characteristic). This is 
because no single voter can change the outcome by deviating, and so it is a weak best 
response to vote this way. However, as looks are uncorrelated with competence, this 
would not change the equilibrium outcome described in Propositions 4.5 and 4.8 in 
any economically relevant way. 
4.9 Related Literature and Conclusion 
4.9.1 Related Literature 
The papers51 most closely related to this chapter are Ferejohn (1986), Austen-Smith 
and Banks (1989), Banks and Sundaram (1993,1998), and Persson and Tabellini 
(2000). In all these models, there is a moral hazard problem between office-holder 
and voters, and periodic elections unambiguously induce incumbent office-holders to 
supply more effort (or in the case of Persson and Tabellini (2000) extract less rent). 
In a classic article, Ferejohn (1986) proposed a simple and elegant moral hazard 
model of electoral control of office-holders. In equilibrium, voters follow a cutoff rule 
by voting for the incumbent only if his observed performance does not fall below a 
certain level, and the candidate chooses effort so that performance remains just at 
the cutoff. So, office-holder effort is higher than it would be without elections (there 
"There is also much empirical evidence that it occurs in single-seat elections by plurality rule 
(Cox, 1997). 
51Barro (1973) was the first to explicitly model electoral control of politicians. However, in his 
model, the actions of office-holders were always observable, and so if office-holders are infinitely 
lived, they can always be induced to take efficient actions, if discounting is sufficiently low (by a 
simple folk theorem argument). 
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is electoral control of the incumbent). 
As Ferejohn himself recognized (see p10 of his paper) his analysis relies" on the 
assumption that official may stay in office for ever (no term limits). With term limits, 
incumbents can never be induced to supply more than their myopic level of effort 
in the final period, and an "unravelling" argument then shows that incumbents can 
then never be induced to supply more than their myopic level of effort in any period 
of office. 53 
More recently, Banks and Sundaram (1998) have shown that with finite term 
limits, there can be electoral control of the incumbent if there is also an adverse 
selection ingredient to the model, namely, some ability parameter of the potential 
office-holder that is initially unobservable to the electorate. In this case, it is no 
longer ex post optimal to "fire" the incumbent in his last term of office if he has 
revealed himself to be of high enough quality. Indeed, under some very weak regularity 
conditions, the threat of (electoral)54 dismissal induces agents of all types to supply 
more effort than they would otherwise in their first term of office" (Proposition 3.3). 
Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 4.5), have a two-period model with both 
adverse selection and moral hazard, where, as in this chapter, initially the incumbent 
does not know his type. 56 Given an incumbent with competence 0, the technology 
52With term limits, Ferejohn's model can only exhibit electoral control in equilibrium if voters 
can precommit to a cutoff rule, a rather unattractive assumption. 
53For a formal statement of this result, see Banks and Sundaram (1998), Proposition 3.5. 
"Banks and Sundaram have a general model where the principal can only control the agent by 
dismissing him. This has an electoral interpretation, amongst others. 
15 See Besley and Case (1995a) for an empirical test of the effects of term limits on the behaviour 
of US State governors. 
56Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1997) have a paper where in the first period, the incumbent chooses an 
observable discrete project, but where the value of the project depends on the incumbent's ability 
(initially unknown to everybody) and a random shock. The paper focuses on the issue of whether 
undertaking the project is a good or bad signal to the electorate about the incumbent's ability. 
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for supplying the public good is 
gt = 9(T - rt) (4.40) 
where gt is output of the public good, T is exogenous tax revenue, and rt are rents 
misappropriated from tax revenues. So, incumbents transform tax revenues net of 
rents into public goods. Voters care only about the level of public good provision, 
and the office-holder in period t has payoff R+ rt, where R is an ego-rent, as in our 
model. 
Although Persson and Tabellini model rents in monetary terms, one (formally 
very similar) way of interpreting rent is to assume that it is the degree to which the 
official "slacks" from the first-best level of effort defined in (4.39), i. e. r= e** - e. In 
that case, we can write our production function, assuming µ=1, as 
gt=9(e"'-rt)+et (4.41) 
which is of course formally identical to (4.40) except that we now have a random 
productivity shock. 
Also, note that the payoffs to the office-holder in our model can be written R+ 
gt - c(e** - rt). So, the payoffs in Persson and Tabellini correspond to the special 
case where c (. ) is linear and the incumbent does not care about the public good. 57 
To conclude, the Persson and Tabellini career concerns model can be thought of as 
a "special case" of ours, 58 and moreover, one in which the experimentation effect 
57This last fact creates the modelling problem that, in the final period, the incumbent will supply 
no effort, i. e. extract maximum rent, whatever his type, implying that voters do not care about 
the types of the elected officials. Persson and Tabellini deal with this in a relatively ad hoc way by 
imposing an upper bound on the amount of rent that can be extracted. Given our representative 
democracy setting, this issue does not arise in our model since the agent attaches some weight on 
the principal's utility. 
58 Mathematically, it is not literally a special case, as in their model, 0 is continuously distributed. 
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is ruled out by construction. Of course, the merit of their model is that it is very 
simple and easily analysed, and so it very well-suited to an analysis of the way career 
concerns are affected by electoral rules (Persson and Tabellini (2000), Chapter 9.1). 
This would be much more difficult with a model such as ours. 
4.9.2 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a first step, using a general equilibrium electoral model, towards 
a formal analysis of the effect that career concerns can have in shaping incentives of 
elected policy makers while in office. We analyse the effect of these concerns under 
various institutional and informational regimes and, for each of these regimes, we 
study the ensuing equilibrium level of effort and quality of the office-holder's ability. 
Office-holders' performance is affected by both moral hazard and adverse selection 
issues. We find that these two issues can give rise to interesting strategic behaviour 
ahead of elections: career concerns and experimentation. This latter effect is new in 
the whole principal-agent literature (we should stress that this result is, as far as we 
know, not present in the very extensive literature focusing on the theory of the firm, 
nor is it in the political agency literature which is the specific focus of this chapter). 
Experimentation occurs when the incumbent deviates from the myopically optimal 
action that just maximizes the current payoff in order to improve the information 
content of his signal about his own ability, namely the output of the public good. 
Under symmetric incomplete information, we find that, even with appointment, 
effort may vary over time, due to experimentation, We find that experimentation 
occurs in the first period of our two-period setting if and only if effort and ability 
interact in the production of the public good, and that when it occurs, it unambigu- 
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ously induces the office-holder to put in more effort than the myopic level. One of 
our key result is that when we move from appointment to democracy, the incentive 
to experiment unambiguously falls, for the reason described above. Of course, in our 
model, as in others in the literature, elections also have a positive effect on equilibrium 
effort via career concerns effect; the better the observable performance while in office, 
the higher the probability of being re-elected and therefore the higher the expected 
payoff in the future. More generally, we can say that career concerns and experimen- 
tation, while both inducing the incumbent to increase effort, are substitutes under 
symmetric incomplete information: that is, democracy introduces career concerns, 
but also necessarily reduces the incentive to experiment. This substitutability is not 
present in other career concerns models because of simplifying assumptions which 
prevent experimentation from occurring (e. g. static models or additive technology). 
Contrarily to previous claims in the literature, we have shown in this chapter that 
it is possible that electoral control may demotivate the office-holder, or alternatively, 
too much electoral control induces the office-holder to have a short-term approach to 
"policy" issues. More specifically, the loss of the incentive to experiment may more 
than offset the career concerns effect, so that (conditional on ability) first-period 
equilibrium effort may be lower in democracy than with appointment. We argue that 
this effect (i. e. too much electoral control), or "too much democratic accountability" 
is not only a theoretical possibility but also a reality and a source of concern in 
US politics, and especially for House Representatives. House Representatives face 
elections every two years - the shortest term of office that any member of congress faces 
in any developed democracy. As argued by King (1997) in his recent treatise on the 
US political system, this very short-term of office makes Congressmen "run scared" 
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and results in acute short-termism. Because the speed with which the electorate 
comes to judge House Representatives, King argues that this prevents Congressmen 
from investing in actions whose payoffs are medium term (i. e. beyond the two-year 
term! ) but whose costs are short-term (i. e. borne within two years). This short- 
termism effect, argues King, can explain, inter alia, the massive surge of the Federal 
debt during the Reagan presidencies of the 1980s. We can note that the US House of 
Representatives is not the only important office with this especially short mandate. 
In some US states, governors are also elected for two years. Interestingly, although in 
1960,16 States had two-year terms of Gubernatorial office, 59 in 1998, only 2 States 
still have such short-terms; 60 all other states have four year terms. 
We believe that this short-termism result arising from reduced experimentation is 
however much more general and applies to other labour markets: as long as the agent 
has some positive probability of being "fired" by the principal, that the model is 
dynamic and the technology the agent uses is at least partly multiplicative in talent 
and effort then both career concerns and experimentation will be present. Short- 
termism should also arise in standard principal-agent models of the firm. Whether 
the negative effect of reduced experimentation due to short labour contracts can be 
muted or offset by proper incentives (e. g. financial) needs to be investigated. We 
believe this would be an especially worthwhile issue given the noted trend for CEOs' 
spell at the top of their corporation to be declining rapidly in the US. A phenomenon 
described as "CEO churning" by Bennis and O'Toole (2000). The general message 
is that the selection and retention process of an agent are important elements of job 
59These States are Arkansas, Arizona, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North 
Dakota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin. 
60These States are New Hampshire and Vermont. 
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design in agency relationships; in this chapter, we have highlighted a new strategic 
element; this element needs to be recognised by the principal to design an efficient 
incentive scheme. 
Under asymmetric information, career concerns are the only strategic effect that 
arises. This occurs solely under a democratic regime. Welfare is always unambigu- 
ously higher in a democratic regime than under appointment. This is because democ- 
racy is more efficient at selecting high-ability agents and also induces agents to supply 
at least as much effort on the job. An important, and novel, issue still arises under 
democracy as two types of equilibria are possible in a representative democracy: re- 
vealing and non revealing. Depending on parameter values, each of these types of 
equilibrium can Pareto dominate the other. A principal might therefore be interested 
in inducing one equilibria or the other depending on other structural parameters. 
This is the focus of our next chapter. Again, the general message of this section is 
that the selection (e. g. high cost of applying for the job) and retention process (e. g. 
job security such as tenure versus less job security) are key aspects that a principal 
has to consider in its mechanism design. 
We believe that extending our model to the case where the elected office-holder has 
to perform several tasks while in office should be worthwhile. Indeed, the multiplicity 
of tasks has been shown to have profound implications for job design (e. g. the choice 
of high versus low powered incentives). The joint analysis of the effects of the selection 
and retention process of an agent and the effects of a multiplicity of tasks that the 
agent has to perform should enable us to better understand agents' incentives within 
a more realistic agency environment. 
Chapter 5 
Candidate Entry, Screening and the 
Political Budget Cycle 
5.1 Introduction 
One of the main themes of the literature on political economy is that policy makers 
may be better informed than voters are about factors that affect their performance in 
office: ability, effort, honesty, the cost of producing public goods, etc. This asymmetry 
of information gives rise to problems of both adverse selection and moral hazard. For 
example, low-ability candidates may elected to office, and once there, may slack, or 
use the powers of office of personal enrichment (extreme cases might include, for 
instance, Marcos of the Philippines and Mobutu of Zaire). 
However, elections provide a mechanism for controlling these adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems arising from incomplete information. In particular, elections 
allow: (i) voters to replace "bad" office-holders with good ones (selection effect); (ii) 
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office-holders to signal or conceal information via choice of policy (incentive effect). 
Elections are suboptimal for two reasons: first, the reward of re-election is a crude 
way of rewarding performance relative to, for instance, performance-related pay, and 
second, voters cannot credibly commit ex ante (i. e. before incumbents choose policy), 
and this limits their ability to punish poor performance by incumbents. 
In the last two decades, a formal literature has grown showing how selection and 
incentive effects work in particular settings. First, there are a class of pure adverse 
selection models where potential office-holders differ only in ability. The seminal 
contributions here are Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990), and more recent 
work includes Harrington (1993), Hess and Orphanides (1995), Bartolini and Drazen 
(1997), and Drazen (2000b). Rogoff's work showed how selection and incentive effects 
interact: in his models, that ability is signalled though policy in equilibrium (the "po- 
litical budget cycle"), and thus voters condition their strategies on the performance 
of politicians while in office. ' A related class of models have potential office-holders 
that differ in honesty (Besley and Case, 1995a, b; Coate and Morris, 1995; Persson 
and Tabellini, 2000; Besley and Smart, 2001). 
A second class of models, initiated Barro (1973), and Ferejohn (1986) is pure 
moral hazard models, where office-holders have a cost of effort, and voters prefer 
higher (unobservable) effort. The moral hazard problem between the elected official 
and the electorate is therefore that, left to his own devices, the official will pursue 
his own interests, rather than those of the voters. Here, if voters could precommit 
to a voting rule conditional on performance, they would fire low-performing office- 
holders. However, this voting policy is not time-consistent, as ex post, it does not 
'There is also a large literature studying the implications of the fact that the preferences (rather 
than abilities) of policy makers may not be known by voters (e. g. Alesina and Cukierman, 1990). 
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pay to replace one incumbent with an identical replacement. This problem does 
not arise for the mixed moral hazard, adverse selection models studied by Austen- 
Smith and Banks (1989), Banks and Sundaram (1993,1998), and Besley and Case 
(1995a). In these models, office-holders choose an unobservable effort, and may be 
of different ability. Now voters will fire low-performing office-holders even without 
precommitment, as such office-holders (partially) reveal themselves to be low-ability. 
So, in this setting, pre-electoral changes in performance on the job are a sign of 
efficient "electoral control" of the incumbent. 
However, in our view, all this literature suffers from the serious problem that the 
incumbent office-holder and the agent who challenges the incumbent are assumed to 
be randomly drawn from some population; there is no candidate entry stage. To put 
it another way, although these models claim to model the interaction between the 
economy and the political process, they do so incompletely: elections are modelled, 
but the decisions by citizens to contest these elections (candidate entry) are not 
modelled. This chapter attempts to "complete the model" of the political process by 
modelling candidate entry explicitly, and analyses the implications of doing so for 
the "political business cycle". Our results also have a bearing on the more general 
debate between the Chicago and Virginia schools on the "efficiency" of democracy 
(see Coate and Morris, 1995, for a recent account of this debate). 
The approach that we take builds on the representative democracy or "citizen- 
candidate" approach of Besley and Coate (1997), and Osborne and Slivinski (1996). 
Specifically, we suppose that at the beginning of every period, there is a candidate 
entry stage, where any citizen can stand for election. At the entry stage, candidates 
can also decide how much to spend contesting the election; so we endogenise the 
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cost of entry, assumed fixed in Besley and Coate (1997). Elections then take place 
via plurality rule, and the winner becomes policy maker for that period. Candidates 
are privately informed about their ability (or other relevant characteristics) prior to 
entry. 2 
The first question we address, in a one period version of this model, is whether 
candidate entry decisions can reveal relevant (private) information about candidates 
to the electorate in equilibrium. To put some structure on this problem, we assume 
that potential candidates may be of two types, high-ability and low-ability when in 
office. All citizens - including the office-holders - get a higher payoff from policy if 
the office-holder is high-ability. However, the office-holders may also get rents from 
holding office, which are ego-rents, plus financial benefits of various kinds (Persson 
and Tabellini, 2000). These rents may differ by ability type. 
It turns out that the answer to our question depends on whether the preferences 
of voters and candidates are congruent, 3 in the sense that high-ability citizens have 
a greater incentive to seek office than low-ability citizens. Congruent preferences 
arise, for example, in Rogoff's (1990) model, where candidates for office only differ in 
ability; both types have the same ego-rent from office. Non-congruence will typically 
arise where there is an agency problem4 between office-holder and citizens (e. g. Coate 
and Morris 1995; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Besley and Smart, 2001), in which case 
dishonest candidates may have a greater incentive to gain office. As an illustrating 
2 We argue in Section 5.2 that this simple set-up captures the "stylized facts" of the US electoral 
system quite well; specifically, candidates for federal offices or for gubernatorial offices are not 
rigorously screened by political parties, and are responsible for financing their own campaign. 
3More precisely, congruency occurs where the policy payoff, plus the rent from office, is higher 
for the high ability type than for the low ability type. 
4That is, office-holders have the opportunity to take bribes, divert tax revenues to personal use, 
etc. 
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example, in this chapter we present a variant of Rogoff's model where candidates for 
office only differ in honesty (dishonest office-holders "steal" tax revenues) which has 
this property. 
Our key insight is the following; free candidate entry acts as a device to screen 
out candidates who have low-ability in office if and only if preferences are congruent. 
Specifically, with congruent preferences, the only perfect Bayesian equilibrium of our 
one-period model that is stable (in the sense that it satisfies the Cho and Kreps, 
1987, Intuitive Criterion) is a separating one, where only high-ability candidates 
enter. With non-congruent preferences, the only stable perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
is a pooling one, where both types of candidates enter. 
We then apply these results to Rogoff's well-known model of the political budget 
cycle. Specifically, we analyse a two-period version of his model, with elections in both 
periods, preceded by candidate entry in both periods. We find that the only stable 
perfect Bayesian equilibrium has separating at the entry stage of the first election; 
only high-ability candidates stand for office. In this case, of course the incumbent in 
the first period does not have to signal his ability, and so there will be no distortion in 
policy in the first period, i. e. no "political budget cycle". The outcome is in fact first- 
best efficient. The reason is that as remarked above, the Rogoff model has congruent 
preferences between office-holder and voters. We then study a different version of 
the Rogoff model, where candidates have an opportunity to divert tax revenues to 
their own personal benefit, and differ not in ability, but honesty. In this case, any 
equilibrium has pooling at the entry stage in period 1, so there is always an incentive 
for the honest type to try to signal his type though policy once in office. 
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Overall, our conclusion is that; 
is (i) with congruent preferences, compared to the benchmark of exogenous can- 
didate selection, free entry of candidates mitigates the political budget cycle; 
while 
" (ii) with non-congruent preferences, representative democracy leads to the same 
pattern of policy choice as with exogenous candidate selection. 
An important part of the chapter is then devoted to checking for the robustness 
of our (sharp) theoretical predictions. All the extensions that we analyse do confirm 
our above-mentioned conclusion. In particular, our results are unaffected so long as 
at least one able individual that can afford the high entry fee exists in the population. 
Whether the agency problem between citizens and office-holders also suffers from a 
moral hazard problem on top of the original adverse selection or not does not affect our 
screening mechanism. The introduction of a moral hazard problem however implies 
that screening at the candidate entry stage might not be welfare enhancing. The key 
issue is this case is whether the moral hazard or the adverse selection is more acute. 
Nevertheless, assuming some citizens have varying degree of Public Service Motivation 
(see the discussion of Section 5.7.3), it is theoretically possible to design an entry cost 
such that a revealing equilibrium is always desirable to a pooling (entry) equilibrium. 
Our conclusion is also robust to the introduction of heterogeneous preferences whereby 
some citizens prefer one type of public good (e. g. Education) and others prefer 
another type of public good (e. g. Defence). Similar results also obtain if we model 
political parties, and also if campaign costs are unobservable. 
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Finally, these conclusions are, in principle, testable. Our claim is that the politi- 
cal business cycle is smaller, ceteris paribus, when the degree of congruence between 
office-holders and the electorate is high. Moreover, (non)-congruence could be prox- 
ied empirically by measures of the rents from holding office. Interestingly, recent 
empirical studies do support this prediction. For instance, Shi and Svensson (2001) 
in an empirical investigation (of 123 countries over 21 years) that fits our theoretical 
modelling, find that political budget cycles are positively related to a proxy for the 
rents from holding office. 5 
Our results are also related to two other literatures. First, the one-period model 
we investigate in this chapter can be seen as extension of both the Besley and Coate 
(1997,1998) and the Osborne and Slivinski (1996) representative democracy models 
to a more general information structure. Indeed, both of these models assume that 
there is full information on preferences and ability of citizens. As Besley and Coate 
note in both of their papers' conclusion, extension of their modelling framework to 
cases of imperfect information is an important research issue. 
Second, this chapter is a contribution to the broader debate about the efficiency 
of democracy (Wittman, 1989; Coate and Morris, 1995; Persson and Tabellini 2000). 
For example, Wittman (1989) adopts the sanguine view that electoral competition 
will mitigate both problems of asymmetric information between voters and politicians, 
and agency problems (shirking, corruption, etc. ). By contrast, in a well-known for- 
mal model, Coate and Morris (1995) show that, with asymmetric information about 
candidates' honesty, in order to maintain a good reputation, dishonest politicians 
5Specifically, they proxy rents from office using the indicators from the International Country 
Risk Guide. This guide provides a measure of rent-seeking and protection of property rights and 
includes factors such as the "rule of law", "corruption in government", "quality of the bureaucracy", 
and "risk of expropriation of private investment". 
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may make inefficient transfers to special interests. This chapter enables to reconcile 
these apparently conflicting conclusions. Indeed, this chapter shows that free entry 
will reduce problems of asymmetric information between voters and politicians, but 
only when agency problems are relatively minor, in that politicians and voters have 
similar interests. 
Note that our one-period model is also related to a small literature on campaign 
expenditures as signalling devices (Austen-Smith, 1987; Prat, 1997 and 2000). In 
particular, our "money burning" role of campaign expenditures is similar to Prat's, 
although our model is much less sophisticated (no lobbies, candidates are indepen- 
dently wealthy). 
The layout of the rest of the chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 gives a brief overview 
of the US electoral system in relation to candidate entry. In Section 5.3, we construct 
a simple model to analyse screening effect of endogenous costly candidate entry. In 
Section 5.4, we briefly present a simplified version of Rogoff's model, and in Section 
5.5 we introduce endogenous candidate entry. Section 5.6 studies a version of Rogoff's 
model with agency costs. Some extensions and robustness checks are investigated in 
Section 5.7. These modifications of our baseline model are (i) the introduction of 
wealth constraints on some citizens (Section 5.7.1); (ii) the introduction of "looks" 
shock as in Rogoff's original model (Section 5.7.2); (iii) the introduction of moral 
hazard on top of the original adverse selection problem following Banks and Sundaram 
(1998) (Section 5.7.3); (iv) the introduction of heterogeneous preferences d la Alesina 
and Tabellini (1990) (Section 5.7.4); (v) the introduction of political parties, following 
Besley and Coate (2000), given that parties in most democracies pay for a large 
party of candidates campaign costs (Section 5.7.5); (vi) allowing, in Section 5.7.6, for 
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wealth heterogeneity leading to different fund-raising ability (or "burning" cost); (vii) 
allowing for unobservable cost of candidate entry (Section 5.7.6); and finally (viii), 
introducing several ability types (Section 5.7.8). Finally, Section 5.8 concludes. 
5.2 Some "Stylized Facts" About the US Electoral 
System 
The novelty of this chapter is to introduce a candidate entry stage into political 
agency models. In this section, we argue that our modelling of the entry stage 
fits particularly well the US electoral system. This makes us more sanguine about 
the sharp theoretical results that we obtain. Key elements of the citizen-candidate 
model, as we model it, are the following. First, citizens can stand for office directly, 
i. e. without having to be selected by a political party (although, as shown in Section 
5.7, parties can be introduced without affecting our results). Second, becoming a 
candidate is costly. To the very least, a minimum legal requirement has to be paid by 
the candidate (such as a filing fee), but more importantly, political campaigns are a 
costly enterprise. The amount that candidates can spend on campaigns has no upper 
bound. As this section explains, all these features are crucial elements of the US 
election system. Before turning to these points in details, the following quote from 
Maidment and McGrew (1991) is helpful in giving an overview of the US electoral 
system and in particular the paramount role that candidates, as opposed to parties, 
have. 
"To a considerable extent, candidates have replaced parties as the central 
influence in political campaigns. Candidates have become the principal 
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actors in the electoral process. Their abilities and personalities are now 
critically important factors in any American election. When they enter a 
Primary election, they must, if they wish to succeed, create their own cam- 
paign organization, they must raise the campaign finance through their 
own efforts and recruit volunteers on the back of their own enthusiasm. 
[... ] Candidates construct personal campaign organizations designed for 
their own electoral success. [... ] Of course, after the victory in the pri- 
mary election, the candidate becomes the official party nominee, though 
in a very real sense the nomination is merely a label. The nominees still 
have to rely on their own resources and organization. " (p. 128). 
Let us now review these points into more details. 
5.2.1 Weak Party Control Over Candidate Entry 
The major reason for the relative weakness of political parties in the United States 
is due to the widespread use of primary elections as a means to select candidate 
nominees. This characteristic is specific to the US. Primary elections have gradu- 
ally gained momentum since the 1950s and 1960s and nowadays account for close to 
100% of Republican and Democrat candidate nominations for Presidential, Federal 
or Gubernatorial offices. For instance, out of the 1996 to 1998 round of gubernatorial 
elections, of the 48 continental States, 46 candidates belonging to either the Demo- 
cratic or Republican party have been elected. These 46 winning candidates all won 
their party nomination through a primary election (the two other winning candidates 
were independent candidates). 
Also, in most states, any citizen can run in the primary if he/she makes a state- 
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ment of affiliation to the party they want to run for. Political parties cannot veto, 
screen would be primary candidates even if a candidate's ideology differs markedly 
from the party's political platform. A striking example of this phenomenon occurred 
in 1980 when a member of the Ku-Klux-Klan won the Democratic Party nomination 
for a seat in the House of Representative. Also, in some States (e. g. California) 
parties are even prohibited by law from endorsing a candidate in the primaries. A 
party's elite is therefore prevented to even express preferences about candidates that 
they think would better represent the party. 
In order to run for party nomination, candidates must raise campaign funds by 
themselves to run for the primary, only then can they market themselves to primary 
voters. As the next section reveals, these campaign cost have recently reached very 
high levels. 
5.2.2 Campaign expenditures 
Four main points need to be emphasized about campaign finances in the US. 
First, large amounts are spent. For example, the cost of the 2000 Federal and 
Presidential elections is estimated to be above 3 billion dollars; the average winning 
Houses campaign cost $636,000 ($4.90 per vote); and the average winning Senate 
campaigns cost $5.6 million ($6.07 per vote). George W. Bush is the first candidate 
to have crossed the 100 million dollar threshold for a primary election. George Bush 
was also the first major party nominee to have chosen to forgo Federal matching 
funds in order to be free to raise and spend unlimited amounts during his primary 
'Note that House Representatives are only elected for two years, so that every two years these 
amounts need to be raised. 
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campaign. Except for Presidential elections, there is no public financing of campaigns. 
Furthermore, the responsibility of raising these large amounts of funds rests with the 
candidate, not the party. This remains true even after a candidate has successfully 
won his party's nomination (which requires large amounts of funds in the first place). 
Officially, political parties are limited in amount of financial support they can give 
to a candidate. For instance, parties' direct contributions to candidates' campaign 
for election to the House and Senate are limited, by law, to $5,000 per candidate in 
each election cycle for the House, and $17,500 per candidate in each cycle for the 
Senate. These firmly limited contribution are called "hard money" to differentiate 
them with "soft money". To bypass the "hard money" limits, parties have recently 
(especially since 1996) had recourse to the use of "soft money". Federal Election law 
allows political parties to spend as much as they want as long as the money goes to 
These are funds that parties use, in principle, to "party building activities, " such 
as "get-out-the-vote" efforts and generic advertising, such as "issue" ads. In partic- 
ular, these funds cannot be used for "express advocacy", i. e. words like "vote for" 
or "vote against" cannot be used. Recently however it is widely acknowledged that 
the spirit of the Federal election law governing the use of soft money has been largely 
abused. Parties can spend as much as they want on congressional races as long as 
they act "independently" of the candidates. Soft money is also used by unions and 
advocacy groups. Soft money is largely unregulated. There is, in fact, no limit what- 
soever on the amount donors can give to a party as long as it goes into soft money 
accounts. Recent examples of the growing importance of these source of funds are the 
following. For the 2000 Federal Elections, the biggest donor of "soft money" in the 
campaign, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees gave 
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a total of 6.3 million dollars for the election cycle. The Republican Party spent $36 
million on television advertising supporting Bush from June 1 to Oct. 24, compared 
with $28 million by the Bush campaign itself.? 
This brings us to the second salient feature of the US system, namely that no 
limit exist on funds raised and spent in Federal elections, 8 and also no limit exists 
on the amount of own funds that a candidate can spend for his or her campaign. 
The fact that candidates can spend unlimited amounts of funds is due to the First 
Amendment (which is about the freedom of speech). As a key US Supreme Court 
case revealed (Buckley vs Valeo, 1976), no legislation can put some upper bound on 
the amount of funds that a candidate can spend since it would limit the candidate's 
constitutional right of freedom of speech. A recent illustration of this constitutional 
right to use unlimited amount of personal funds to campaign is by Jon Corzine. Mr 
Corzine, a former Managing Director of Goldman Sachs, raised an impressive 57 
million dollars for his 2000 New Jersey Senate campaign (which he eventually won). 
However, almost 55 of the 57 millions were from his own fortune. ' 
The third point to notice is that campaign funds are observable to the electorate. 
Indeed, the whole point of campaign expenditures is to get noticed by voters. A 
rising part of a campaign budget is now spent on media advertising. Besides this sheer 
visibility, legal requirement concur to improve transparency of candidates' finances. 
7See Bowles (1998) for more details on the US electoral system, the Federal Election Commission 
and the Center for Responsive Politics for US campaign finance data. 
'An exception to this concerns Presidential elections. For Presidential elections, public funding is 
available to candidates. Should they accept public (matching) funds, candidates have an upper limit 
on their campaign budget (e. g. 62 million dollars for the 2000 primary election). The availability of 
these public funds and limits is due to the Federal Election Campaign Finance (FECA) laws of the 
1970s which were in large part motivated by Nixon's Watergate scandal. 
9Interesting, as is often the case for very wealthy candidates, Mr Corzine did not raise a single 
dollar from the controversial Political Action Committees (PACs). PACs are in effect lobby groups. 
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For instance, for Federal elections candidates must file pre-election financial reports 
with the Federal Election Commission (FEC). These reports are available prior to 
elections on the FEC's web site and are often disseminated to the public through the 
media. Hence, voters know ahead of elections how much candidates have raised and 
spent on their campaign. 
We should also note that next to the large amounts being spent by candidates for 
their campaigns, in order to officially become a registered candidate for an election, 
some fixed compliance costs are imposed by the law (some qualifications are also 
required). These cost are of two types: (i) Filing fees; (ii) Petitions. These legal 
requirement vary from State to State; Some States impose only a filing fee, others 
only a petition, while others require both filing fee and petition to be submitted by 
a citizen willing to stand for office. Appendix D. 1. gives an overview of these costs 
for various US States. Filing fees can amount to a few thousand dollars. 
Finally, the following points are worth mentioning regarding the determinants of 
campaign spending. First, as is well established, the major determinant of campaign 
raising and spending is incumbency (e. g. Salmore and Salmore, 1985, Chapter 4). 
For instance, for the 2000 House elections, the average challenger raised $361,314, 
while the average incumbent raised $891,956.10 Given the important sums of money 
involved in US politics, and especially for winning candidates, " is candidates' wealth 
a significant factor in winning elections? Indeed, wealth is often described in the 
media (and in the political science literature) as giving an unfair advantage (in the 
US at least) to citizens well endowed with it. However, a serious econometric analysis 
"Source: The Center for Responsive Politics based on Federal Election Commission data. 
"For the same 2000 House elections as reported above, the average loser raised $308,837, while 
the average winner raised $917,867. 
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by Milyo and Groseclose (1999) reveals that wealthy incumbents do not raise or spend 
more campaign funds12 and do not win greater vote shares in their re-election bids, 
i. e. the so called "wealth effect" is not significant in helping rich candidates win 
a greater share of votes. Also important, is Milyo and Groseclose's finding that a 
wealthy incumbent candidate does not deter high-quality challengers either. 
5.3 Signalling via Candidate Entry 
Here, we develop our main arguments in the form of a simple one-period model. 
The model captures some of the stylized facts of the US system described in Section 
5.2: namely, that party control over candidates is weak (so parties cannot screen 
out bad candidates13), campaign expenditures are observable, and that there is some 
exogenously determined minimum level of expenditure. 
The economy is populated by a set of citizens iEN, #N =n>3. Only one 
citizen can be office-holder. Citizens in a subset KCN are of two types: high-ability 
in office (H) and low-ability in office (L). 14 Citizens not in K are unsuitable for office 
(e. g. they do not meet required qualifications such as those described in Appendix 
D. 1). We assume that preferences are identical in the sense that the choice of policy 
by a type a office-holder results in a payoff Wa for all citizens other than the office- 
holder, with WH > WL > 0. An office-holder of type a also gets an additional payoff 
of Ra from holding office. This may be interpreted as an ego-rent (as in Rogoff, 1990). 
"One explanation for this is that although wealthy candidates can easily raise funding via their 
own funds, non (or less) wealthy candidates are more likely to receive important funding from 
Political Action Committees (PACs funding now account for a large - and growing- share of total 
campaign funding). Indeed, these latter are less inclined to fund wealthy candidates since these 
latter are less dependent on PACs money and are therefore less pressurable. 
"Section 5.7 extends our analysis to the case where candidates are selected by political parties. 
"In Section 5.7.8, we extend the model to many ability types. 
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Alternatively, it may reflect the ability of the office-holder to divert resources to his 
own pocket (see Section 5.6 below). 
We will say the preferences of citizens and the office-holder are congruent if RH + 
WH > RL + WL, and non-congruent if RH + WH < RL + WL. So, congruence simply 
means that a candidate that is preferred by voters also has a greater incentive to 
stand for office. It turns out that this distinction is key to whether candidate entry 
can screen candidates. 
We will assume that a citizen in K of either type always prefers to hold office in 
place of someone else: 
Assumption 5.1. min{RH + WH, RL + WL} > max{WH, WL}. 
The order of events is as follows. 
1. Each citizen i privately observes her own ability a, which is a random draw 
from {H, L} with Pr(a = H) - p. 
2. All citizens in K can simultaneously decide whether to enter (stand for election) 
or not, and if they enter, how much to spend on campaigning. 
3. All citizens in N then vote simultaneously for a single candidate, and the 
winner is selected by plurality rule. Ties are broken fairly. 15 
4. The winner is then office-holder and chooses policy. 
In the event that nobody stands for election, a default policy is selected by the 
"That is, if k candidates get equal most numbers of votes, each is selected for office with proba- 
bility 1/k. 
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constitution, and we assume that in this event, all citizens have a zero payoff. 
This describes a simple game played between the set N of citizens. As it is a 
game with sequential moves and incomplete information, the equilibrium concept is 
perfect Bayesian. Although simple to describe, the game has a complex structure, 
and it is helpful to formalize it somewhat. At stage 2, all iEK take an action 
si E Si, where Si = {0} U {(1, S) JA <S< oo }, where 0 denotes no entry, 1 denotes 
entry, and S denotes campaign spending16 given entry. The minimum level S of 
spending will be determined by minimal fixed costs of campaign organization, plus 
legislative restrictions (see Appendix D. 1). Campaign expenditures are substracted 
from candidates pay-offs. 17 To rule out trivial equilibria where no-one enters, we 
assume 6< max{RH + WH, RL + WL}. 
So, an entry strategy at stage 2 for iEK is a map: ei : {H, L} -> Si. Then define 
C= {i EK Ise 0} to be the set of candidates who stand for election. So, at stage 
3, a pure action for a voter iEN is a choice of an element of C. In some equilibria, 
voters will be indifferent between candidates in (subsets of) C. To break these ties in 
a neutral manner, we will allow voters to randomize over C; let the set of probability 
distributions on C be 0(C). Then, a voting strategy for i0K is a map from every 
possible s= (Si, ..., sn), to 
0(C), i. e. vi : S-*i(C), where S= XZEKSi. Similarly, a 
voting strategy for iEK is a map vi : {H, L} x S- (C). We now solve the game 
backwards in the usual way. 
16Note that here, campaign spending plays no direct informational role (e. g. funding advertising, 
etc. ): it is purely a signalling device. 
17This assumes that all candidates have the same marginal utility of money (which may not be 
the case, for instance, if some candidates are wealthy). This assumption is relaxed in Section 5.7.6 
below. 
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5.3.1 Voting 
The first step in the analysis is to formalize beliefs of voters about the ability of 
candidates, given stage 2 actions. Beliefs can be described by the maps 7r2 :Kx 
S -+ [0,1], iEN, where 7ri (j, s) is the probability assessment on the part of i that 
candidate jEK, ji is high-ability, given actions s= (sl, ... On). 
Obviously, on 
the equilibrium path, these beliefs are given by Bayes' rule. Also, by the fact that 
agents observe their own type, iri(i, s) =1 if i is of type H and zero otherwise. 
We impose the following very weak assumption on beliefs at the voting stage; 
Assumption 5.2. ir3(i, s) _ lrk(i, s) all iEK, j, kEN, sES, kji. 
That is, any two citizens have the same posterior belief about the ability of a third, 
given the same information. This is certainly true on the equilibrium path, as any two 
agents have the same prior beliefs about a third, and so it seems natural to impose 
it also off-the-equilibrium path. Given Assumption 5.2, we can simplify our notation 
to irk (i, s) = ir(i, s), j i. Also, let ir(. ) = (ir(i, . 
))ZEK be a belief profile. 18 
Now we can turn to the analysis of the voting subgame. A voter is said to vote 
sincerely if he votes for (one of) his most preferred alternatives. By Assumption 5.1, 
for any iEC, i's most preferred alternative is that he gains office, i. e. i's most 
preferred alternative in C is i. Now let 
B(C) =IjEC jir(j, s) > ir(k, s), kEC1 (5.1) 
So, B(C) is the subset of candidates who are most preferred by all voters who are not 
18 Formally, a belief profile is a mapping ir :KxS -+ [0,1]. 
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themselves candidates. The following result tells us that the following sincere voting 
strategies constitute an undominated Nash equilibrium of the voting continuation 
game (i. e. a voting equilibrium in the terminology of Besley and Coate, 1997): 
Lemma 5.0. Assume k<n-1. Conditional some fixed belief profile ir(. ), and first- 
period actions s, the following sincere voting strategies constitute an undominated 
Nash equilibrium of the voting subgame: 
1. All j0C vote for each candidate in B(C) with probability 1/#B(C) 
2. All jcC vote for themselves. 
The equilibrium outcome is that every iE B(C) wins with probability 1/#B(C). 
Note that every citizen is voting sincerely except those who are in C but not in 
B(C), as by construction, these candidates cannot win, and so are happy to randomize 
over B(C). The following example illustrates this important point, and also why 
Lemma 5.0 does not hold when k=n. 
Example 5.1. n=5. Suppose that K=C= {1,2,3} and candidates 1,2 are 
believed to be high-ability but 3 is believed to be low-ability (ir(1, s) = 7r(2, s) _ 
1,7r(3, s) = 0). So, B(C) = {1,2}. Then the hypothesized equilibrium is where 1,2 
vote for themselves, and 3,4,5 randomize over 1,2. 
Now suppose that C= {1,2,3,4,5}, and beliefs are as above, plus 4,5 are believed to 
be low-ability. Then by Assumption 5.1, there is clearly an equilibrium where every 
candidate votes for herself, and wins with probability 1/5.11 
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In general, plurality voting games have many equilibria, 19 (Dhillon and Lockwood, 
1999), and this game is no exception. However, sincere voting equilibria (if they exist) 
have a natural appeal, and for this reason, we will assume throughout that this is 
the equilibrium of the voting subgame. We are also following Osborne and Slivinski 
(1996) in making this equilibrium selection. 
Finally, Lemma 5.0 gives us the next very useful intermediate result. Suppose 
that iE C/B(C). If i withdraws, it is clear from Lemma 5.0 that the outcome of 
the election is unchanged. So, the net gain to i from withdrawing is S. This cannot 
be an equilibrium strategy, so C= B(C). Formally: 
Lemma 5.1. Given the voting equilibrium described in Lemma 5.0, every iEC 
wins the election with probability 1/c. 
5.3.2 Entry 
Following Besley and Coate (1997), define a political equilibrium to be an equilibrium 
e* = (ei, ..., eZ) at the entry stage, given sincere equilibria 
(as described by Lemma 
5.0) in all the voting subgames induced by e*. Say that entry strategies are anony- 
mous if ez = e, all iEK. We will only consider political equilibria in anonymous 
entry strategies (the basic insights generalize to the case where strategies are non- 
anonymous in equilibrium). Note that are two types of anonymous entry strategy: 
pooling, where iEK stands for election (or does not stand) whatever his ability 
type, and separating, where iEK only stands if he is high-type (or low-type). Note 
"For example, the voting strategy profile where everybody votes for the entrant with the lowest 
value of the index i is an equilibrium. 
Signalling via Candidate Entry 197 
also that the voting strategies described in Lemma 5.0 are anonymous, 2° given that 
citizens in K follow anonymous entry strategies. At this stage, we need to separate 
out the analysis of congruent and non-congruent preferences. 
Congruent Preferences 
Let x be distributed Binomially with parameters p, k-1; this random variable is 
the number of entrants other than some iEK, if all citizens in K follow the separating 
strategy of only entering if they are high-type. Let p= E[+1], and ). = 1- (1-p)ý`-1. 
It is then easy to show: 
Proposition 5.1. Assume k<n-1. Then, if 6< 6P) there exist belief profiles for 
which an anonymous pooling (political) equilibrium exists, where every iEK enters 
with probability 1, and spends some b<<6, where Sp = [RL - P(WH - WL)]" 
Also, if S<,, there exist belief profiles for which an anonymous separating equi- 
librium exists where every iEK enters only if he is a high-type, and spends 
max{S, Se} <S< S9f where Ss = . WH + pRH, ö8 = µ(WL + RL) + (I\ - µ)WH. 
There are no other anonymous equilibria. 
Note three points. First, there cannot be separating equilibria where only low- 
ability types enter; this is because - from Lemma 5.1 - all entrants win with probability 
1/c, and also high-ability types get a bigger payoff from winning. 
Second, as the proof of Proposition 5.1 shows, there are a range of campaign 
spending levels in both pooling and separating equilibria: the belief profiles that 
20To see this, note that as all entrants are following the same strategy, ir(i, s) = 7r(j, s), all i, jEC, 
so then B(C) = C. But then, all voters not in C randomise over C, and all voters in C vote for 
themselves. 
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support these equilibria "punish" non-equilibrium behaviour; if some citizen decides 
to deviate by spending 6' # ö, all other citizens assign probability 0 to the event that 
he is high-ability, and so will not vote for him. 
Third, ex ante, all citizens prefer the separating equilibrium to the pooling equi- 
librium if k is large enough. 21 Is there any way that S could be set ex ante at some 
constitutional stage to ensure that only the separating equilibrium could occur? The 
answer is yes. In fact, by definition, p= E[1/(x + 1)] > 1/k, as x+1<k, so by 
inspection, S8 > Sp. But then if S is set so that S8 >S> 6p, only the separating 
equilibrium will occur. 
Non-Congruent Preferences 
Let x be distributed Binomially with parameters 1-p, k-1; this random variable is 
the number of entrants other than some iEK, if all citizens in K follow the separating 
strategy of only entering if they are of type L. Let p= E[x+l], and A=1- pk-1. 
Proposition 5.2. Assume k<n-1. Then, if 6< 6p, there exist belief pro- 
files for which an anonymous pooling (political) equilibrium exists, where every 
iEK enters with probability 1, and spends some ö<ö< Sp, where bp = 
k [RH + (1 - p)(WH - WL)]. There exist belief profiles for which a separating equi- 
librium exists where every iEK enters only if he is a low type iff S8 >ö> Se, where 
69 = µ(WH + RH) + (A - µ)WL, S8 = AWL + yRL, in which case every entrant spends 
S. There are no other anonymous equilibria. 
2' If k is small, A may be large, so the loss from having the default policy may outweigh the gain 
from screening out low-ability candidates. 
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Again, the key result from our point of view is that there is no separating equilib- 
rium where only high-ability candidates enter, i. e. with non-congruent preferences, 
the electoral process cannot screen out low-ability candidates. The intuition is sim- 
ple: if there were such an equilibrium, low-ability candidates would find it profitable 
to imitate high-ability ones. The two types of candidates can only be sorted by 
high-ability candidates not entering. 
Note also the fact that the pooling equilibria have the same structure in the 
two cases, whereas the structure of the separating equilibria is rather different. In 
particular, there can be at most one separating equilibrium in the non-congruent 
case, whereas in the congruent case, there are a continuum of them. The reason for 
this asymmetry is that in the congruent case, deviators can be "punished" by a loss 
of reputation (i. e. the assignment to them of zero probability that they are able). In 
the non-congruent case, by contrast, in the separating equilibrium, entrants already 
have no reputation in this sense, and hence cannot be punished in this way if they 
choose lower campaign expenditures. This drives down equilibrium expenditures to 
the minimum, S; if this level is insufficient to deter entry by high-types, there is no 
separating equilibrium. 
Note also that of the two possible kinds of equilibria, it is now the separating 
equilibrium that is undesirable from the voters' point of view. Suppose that there is 
a prior constitutional design stage where a level of ö could be set, say by majority 
voting. Now, to be able to set S to eliminate the separating equilibrium, but not 
the pooling equilibrium, they need to set S< min{68, S, }. In what follows, we will 
assume that 6 is set in this way. 
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5.3.3 Equilibrium Selection via Stability 
Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 indicate that in both cases, there are multiple equilibria, and 
moreover, in the congruent case, there may be both pooling and separating equilibria. 
We show here that requiring equilibrium to satisfy a stability condition related to the 
Cho-Kreps Intuitive Criterion (IC) in fact rules out all equilibria except one in each 
case, giving us a unique equilibrium selection. 
First, we adapt the formal definition of the IC to our game, which has many 
"senders" and "receivers", and where we are assuming particular play (conditional 
on beliefs) at the voting stage. Let ua, (s, 1, ir) be the expected payoff to iEK 
from an action sE Si given that i is of type a=H, L, given that voting takes 
place as described in Lemma 5.0, and given a belief profile (I, *) that assigns 1 
to the probability that i is a high-type, and * are beliefs about the type of any 
jEK, ji generated by equilibrium play22 by all jEK, j i. Also, let 
üa, be the equilibrium payoff for an iEK of type a. Then say that action s is 
equilibrium dominated23 at that equilibrium for i if üa, > ua(s, 1, *). That is, an 
action is dominated for i if he prefers his equilibrium payoff to taking it, even though 
voters would respond to the action as if he were high-ability with probability 1. 
Now define the set of types for which action s is dominated at equilibrium; 
J(S) = {a E {H, L} l üa > Ua(S, 1i*) } 
22Formally, in the congruent case, *= 7r(j, (1, ö)) =p if the equilibrium is pooling, and if the 
equilibrium is separating, it = 7r(j, (1, b)) = 1, *= ir(j, 0) = 0, and similarly in the non-congruent 
case. 
23This concept of equilibrium dominance is weaker than in the original IC, where the receiver (the 
voters) are assumed to respond with their undominated action that is best for the sender. However, 
in the pooling equilibrium, this makes no difference to the "bite" of the criterion, as in either case, 
all voters would vote for i. 
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Then, define the out-of-equilibrium beliefs O(J(s)) as: 
0(0) = O(H, L) = p, O(H) = 0, O(L) = 1. 
This says (for example) that voters will attach probability zero to the event that i is 
of type H if the observed action s is dominated at equilibrium for H but not type 
L, and vice-versa, but if it is dominated for both (or neither), voters will not update 
their priors. This function fully specifies out-of-equilibrium beliefs. 
The equilibrium denoted by "hats" fails the intuitive criterion (IC) if for some 
sE Si there exists a type a=H, L such that 
üa < ua(s, cb(J(s)), *) 
That is, there exists a "sender" i of type a who would prefer to deviate from his 
equilibrium action by choosing s, given that by doing so, it could credibly signal to 
the voters that he was of type a. We can now show: 
Proposition 5.3. Assume that preferences are congruent. Then, all pooling equi- 
libria fail the IC, as does any separating equilibrium with campaign expenditure 
6> max{ö8,6}. 
The intuition is clear. Starting at the pooling equilibrium, a high-type will always 
be willing to "pay more" via greater campaign spending to signal that he is a high- 
type than the low-type is willing to do, and this allows him to signal credibly and 
break the pooling equilibrium. Starting at a separating equilibrium with b> SS, any 
high type can cut his expenditure bye to e> öe, and still credibly signal that he 
is a high-type. 
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We can apply this refinement to the pooling equilibria in the non-congruent case. 
Proposition 5.4. Assume that preferences are non-congruent. Any pooling equilib- 
rium with 6>6 fails the IC. 
So, in either case, there is an unique equilibrium that passes the (modified) intu- 
itive criterion: 
9 In the congruent case, a separating equilibrium where only H-types enter and 
spend max{ö9, b}. 
9 In the non-congruent case, a pooling equilibrium where both types enter and 
spend S. 
5.4 The Rogoff Model 
We now turn to apply Section 5.3 to a simplified version of Rogoff's (1990) Equilib- 
rium Political Budget Cycle model. The two simplifications are: (i) we assume two 
periods, rather than the T-period setting of Rogoff; (ii) we assume away the "looks" 
shocks, which in Rogoff (1990), serve only as a technical device to eliminate pooling 
equilibrium. 24 These simplifications do not change the structure of the undominated 
separating equilibrium studied by Rogoff, but allow us to focus on our main argument 
with the minimum of complexity. 
24 We discuss how the introduction of looks shocks would affect the equilibrium with endogenous 
candidate entry in Section 5.7.2 below. 
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5.4.1 Elements of the Model 
The economy is populated by a set N of citizens with #N =n>3 and evolves 
over two time periods, t=1,2. In each time period, there is one office-holder, whose 
responsibility is to raise taxes and produce public goods. The possible institutions 
by which the office-holder is selected from the citizens are described in Section 5.4.2. 
There are two types of publicly provided goods, 25 a consumption good and an 
investment good whose levels of consumption in periods t=1,2 are denoted by gt and 
kt respectively. The investment good is produced in the period before it is consumed, 
so kl - 0. All citizens also derive utility from the consumption of a private numeraire 
good, ct. Preferences of citizens over (cl, gl, k2, c2) 92) are given by 
u(ci, 9i)+v(k2)+u(c2,92) (5.2) 
where u, v are strictly increasing in their arguments and strictly concave. The office- 
holder also benefits from an ego-rent of R when in office. 
The budget constraint of the representative citizen for period t is: 
Ct=y - Tt (5.3) 
where, y is the exogenous, per period, endowment of a non-storable good, and rt is 
a tax in period t. 
The public good production function for period 1 and 2 respectively is given by: 
25Rogoff (1990) implicitly assumes that these goods are technically private, i. e. rivalrous in 
consumption. This seems a reasonable assumption for most public goods and services (education, 
health) and so we adopt this assumption here also. 
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9i+k2= 71 +0,9z=T2+0 (5.4) 
where 0 measures the ability of the office-holder in transforming the private good 
(tax revenue) into public goods. We suppose that26 the ability types of the citizens 
are indexed by aE {OH, OL}, with BH > 0L > 0, and the type of any citizen is 
determined by a random draw from {OH, 9L} with probabilities p- Pr(O = OH) and 
(1 - p) - Pr(O = OL) at the beginning of period 0. 
5.4.2 Information Structure and Order of Events 
We consider two institutions by which candidates are selected and elections are ar- 
ranged. The first is that studied by Rogoff. 
1. Partial Democracy (i. e. with Exogenous Candidate Selection) 
Then, at the beginning of period 1, a citizen is selected at random from the pop- 
ulation to be office-holder. Conditional" on her own ability, she then sets gl, Ti and 
k2. Next, at the beginning of period 2, a challenger j is randomly selected from the 
remaining citizens to contest the election against i. All citizens then vote for i or j 
having observed g1,7r1 but not k2 (or 0 given that ability is private information). The 
candidate with most votes wins, and then chooses g2, r2. We will also assume through- 
out that voters have a lexicographic second preference for the incumbent, i. e. if a 
voter believes that both challenger and incumbent are high-ability with the same 
probability, then the voter strictly prefers the incumbent. 
26Note that because of the assumption of two periods, we can simply assume that 9 is constant 
for the two periods of the game, rather than following a moving-average process as in Rogoff (1990). 
27Note that we are not allowing the choice of policy to depend on the name (index) of the office- 
holder, i. e. strategies are anonymous, as in the above one-period game. 
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2. Representative Democracy (i. e. with Endogenous Candidate Entry) 
At the beginning of period 1, each citizen i privately observes her own 0. Then 
there is an election, which is characterized by two steps, as in Section 5.3 above. That 
is, first, all citizens in KCN can simultaneously decide whether to enter (stand for 
election) or not, and if they enter, how much to spend on campaigning (6 is the cost 
of campaigning). Second, all voters then vote simultaneously for a single candidate, 
and the winner is selected by plurality rule. Ties are broken fairly. 28 Let the resulting 
set of candidates be C1. All voters then vote29 for a single candidate in C1, and the 
winner is selected by plurality rule. The winner is then office-holder and sets gl, rrl 
and k2. 
A the beginning of period 2, an election identical to that in period 1 occurs. Let 
the resulting set of candidates be C2. All voters then vote for a single candidate in 
C2, and the winner is selected by plurality rule. The winner is then office-holder and 
sets g2,72. In both elections, voters vote sincerely, i. e. as described in Lemma 5.0. 
5.4.3 The Efficient Benchmark 
Suppose that there were no elections. Then an incumbent of type a would choose 
policy to maximize (5.2) subject to (5.3) and (5.4). The first-order conditions to this 
problem can be written 
uc(y - Ti, 9i) = u9(y - Ti, 9i) (5.5) 
uc(y-T2, T2+ea) = Ug(Y-T2, T2+Ba) (5.6) 
28Here, the default option is zero supply of both public goods. We assume without loss of generality 
that v(O) = u(y, 0) = 0, so the default option gives all citizens a zero payoff. 
29As in the one-period model, we allow voters to randomise. 
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u9(y - Ti, gi) = v'(T1 +B- gi) (5.7) 
in obvious notation. That is, (5.5) and (5.6) say that the marginal utility from private 
and public consumption goods must be the same in both periods, and (5.7) says that 
the marginal utility from the first-period public consumption good and public invest- 
ment good must be equal. Let the solution to this problem be ('ri (6a), gi (Ba), T2(9a)). 
As all citizens have the same preferences, this solution is efficient conditional on the 
ability of the incumbent, Oa. So, we refer to (Ti (Ba), 91(0a), 1(0a)) as the condition- 
ally efficient policy. This solution is only efficient overall, of course, if a= BH 
i. e. an efficient incumbent is selected. So, we refer to (Ti(OH), gi (BH), r (BH)) as the 
first-best efficient policy. 
5.4.4 Equilibrium with Partial Democracy 
Rogoff (1990) shows that there is a unique "separating" perfect Bayesian equilibrium 30 
(PBE) of the above model under a reasonable assumption (minimal sophistication) 
on voters' beliefs, described below. We briefly describe this equilibrium below and 
also, for intuitive purposes, use the diagrams in Rogoff (1990). 
In period 2, once elected, an office-holder of type aE {9H, 9L} chooses 92 to 
maximize u(c2i g2) subject to the second-period private budget constraint, c2 =y- 
'r2, and the government budget constraint, 92 = T2 + ea. In period 2, once elected, 
an office-holder of type aE {OH, OL} chooses 72 to maximize u(c2i 92) subject to 
c2 =y- T2,92 = T2 + 9a; i. e. 
T2(Ba) = arg max u(y - T2,72 + 9a) (5.8) 
30He also shows that there may be a pooling equilibrium, but that this pooling equilibrium fails 
the Cho-Kreps Intuitive Criterion. So, we will focus - as Rogoff does - on the separating equilibrium 
in what follows. 
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Note that second-period policy is always conditionally efficient. Let Va - u(y-T2(Ba), 
T2(Oa) + Ba) be the payoff to any voter from a second-period office-holder of type a. 
Now consider voter behaviour at the beginning of period 2. Let fr = ir(gl, rrl) be 
the probability belief that the incumbent is high-ability, given first-period actions 
gl, -r1. Then, assuming that the incumbent is i, and the challenger j, the pay-offs to 
all k#i, j from voting for i or j are 
WH +(1-9? )VL, PVH+(1-P)VL (5.9) 
respectively. So, k i, j will vote for the incumbent if ft > p, and for the challenger 
otherwise. As n>3, voters k i, j are decisive, so i will win the election if *>p. So, 
a first-period incumbent of type a has a second-period continuation payoff of 
V2(ß) __ 
Va, +R if ?>p (5.10) 
pVH+(1-p)VL if 7? <p 
Now consider the first period. The present-value payoff of the incumbent, condi- 
tional on first-period policy and *, is: 
V 1(91, r1, *) = u(y - 'x1,91) + v(T1 + Oa -_q1) + V2(*), ae {OH, OL} (5.11) 
So, in perfect Bayesian equilibrium, (T1(9a), gl(Ba)) must maximize (5.11) given 
*= ir(Ti, gl), and ir(ri, gi) must satisfies Bayes' rule. 
In general, the form of this equilibrium will depend on off-the-equilibrium. path be- 
liefs. We follow Rogoff in constraining these beliefs. Now define the credible signalling 
sets SH, SLC R+ as follows: 
Sa = {(gi, ri) IV1 (ri, 91,1) >_ U1 (Ti(0a), 9i(ea), 0)}, aE {OH, OL} (5.12 
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For example, SH is the set of first-period policies (gl, T1) that a high-type incumbent 
prefers to his conditionally efficient first-period policy, given that in the first case, 
voters believe he is a high-type with probability 1, whereas in the second, voters 
believe he is a high-type with probability 0. SH, SLC R1 measure the (maximum) 
extent to which incumbents are willing to distort first-period policy away from the 
conditionally efficient level in order to signal to the electorate that they are a high- 
type (and therefore increase their probability of re-election). Note that Sa is a convex 
set containing the type-a's bliss point Ba = (Ti (0a), gi (9a) ), as shown in Figure 5.1. 
Also, note that for Sa to be non-empty, a type-a incumbent must suffer a utility loss 
from losing power. This is always the case for high-types, but for low-types, this 
requires the following assumption: 
gý(BL) g '( 
0, ) 
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Assumption 5.3. R> p(VH - VL) 
Assumption 5.3 says that the ego-rent exceeds the expected gain (from more efficient 
supply of the public good) to a low-type from standing down and conceding office to a 
randomly selected challenger. In fact, Assumption 5.3 is the analogue of Assumption 
5.1 above. 
Our constraint on out-of-equilibrium beliefs is now as follows. Say that voters' 
beliefs are sophisticated if: 
x(91, rrl) =1 if (91, rrl) E SHn R+/SL=Q (5.13) 
That is, voters believe that (gi, r1) signals a high-type if (gl, rrl) is in SH but not in 
SL. This is a reasonable restriction, because if (gl, -rl) ý SL, a low-type would never 
want to choose (gi, T1), even if by doing so he could convince the voters that he 
was a high-type. Finally, say that a PBE is separating if first-period policy (g1, r1) 
depends non-trivially on 0, and pooling otherwise. Then, summarizing various results 
of Section IV of Rogoff (1990), we have: 
Proposition 5.5 (Rogoff, 1990). Assume Assumption 5.3. If voters' beliefs are 
sophisticated, then there exists a unique separating equilibrium. In this equilib- 
rium, first-period policy of the low type is conditionally efficient (T1(OL), g1(OL) _ 
71(OL), 91* (BL)). On the other hand, 'Fl (OH), 9-1 (OH) maximizes u(y-Tl, gl)+v(r1+BH- 
gl) subject to (gi, 7-1) E Q. If the constraint in this problem is binding, the first-period 
policy of the high-type is distorted byasignalling motive, i. e. (T1 (OH) <r (OH), and 
91(OH) > 9i(Bx))" 
For completeness, this result is proved in Appendix D. 2. This result says that 
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there will be policy distortion by the high-type if he cannot signal his type just by 
choosing his most desired first-period policy, i. e. the constraint that (gl, Tl) EQ 
is binding. The latter can occur under plausible conditions. 31 In this event, the 
first-period policy choice of the competent type is distorted in the direction of higher 
consumption good than is optimal, and a lower tax than is optimal. This of course 
implies, via the production function (5.4), that the provision of the investment good 
k2 is suboptimally low. 
This equilibrium can be illustrated via the following figure (Figure 5.2), which is 
adapted from Figure 2 of Rogoff (1990). The shaded area is the set Q. As drawn, 
the constraint (gl, 'rl) EQ is binding, i. e. the most preferred policy of the high-type, 
BH = (Ti (9H)) gi (9H)), is in the credible signalling set of the low-type, SL. Also, the 
line DD is the locus of points for which efficiency condition (5.5) holds. As Rogoff 
shows, T1(OH), gl(OH) satisfies this efficiency condition, and so the equilibrium E 
must be that point on DD on the boundary of Q closest to BH, i. e. as shown. 
5.5 Representative Democracy in the Rogoff Model 
In this section we analyse the Rogoff model" under the alternative, and more realistic, 
institution of a representative democracy (i. e. where candidate entry is endogenised). 
The resulting model essentially is a twice-repeated version of the model of Section 
5.3, with the additional complication that the winner of the first-period election (the 
31 When R is large, or when 9H - 0L is small. See Rogoff (1990), p28. 
32In this section, we will assume that utility is quasi-linear in the private good, i. e. u(c, g) 
c+ u(g). Otherwise, as Rogoff observed, "A fee tends to distort a (selfish) leader's choice of tax 
policy, because it gives him a different trade-off between private and public goods expenditure than 
the representative voter. " (p. 33). Of course, if this effect is small, then our results carry over 
approximately to the more general case. 
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incumbent) can signal his ability via first-period policy choice. Nevertheless, we will 
find that the analysis of Section 5.3 will give us a powerful guide for our analysis. In 
particular, note that in the Rogoff model, using the notation of Section 5.3, RH = 
RL = R, so preferences are always congruent. We solve the model backwards. 
Second Period: t=2 
First, we need a formalization of off-the-equilibrium path beliefs as in Section 
5.3. Let ir(j, h), ji be the probability assessment on the part of all i#j that 
candidate jEK is high-ability, given a public history33 of play h. Generally, h is a 
list of all past candidate entry and campaign expenditure decisions by iEK, and 
voting decisions by iEN, plus choice of first-period policy gl, rr1 by the first-period 
33Voters can condition their actions on the public history, plus observation of their own 0. 
91 (O ) gl (OH) g1 (OH ) 
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incumbent, denoted 1. This formulation embodies Assumption 5.2 of Section 5.3, 
i. e. that given the same information, citizens for the same beliefs. For example, at 
the beginning of period 2, h= (s1, vl, 1, gl, rr1), where sl ES are first-period entry 
decisions, vz, 1 E Cl is a voting decision by iEN, and vl = (vZ, l)iEN, and finally 
gl, rrl is a policy choice by the (first-period) incumbent 1. 
Optimal policy choice by the office-holder of ability a at period 2 gives payoff Va to 
all citizens, with VH > VL, and the office-holder gets an ego-rent of R. Now consider 
the voting equilibrium, given a candidate set C2. The equilibrium strategies are 
exactly as in Lemma 5.0. However, note now34 that the lexicographic preference for 
the incumbent means that the set B(C2) needs to be slightly redefined. If 10 C2, it is 
as above in (5.1). If lE C2, and 7r (l, h) > 7r (j, h), all jE C2, then B(C2) _ {l}. Then, 
the following result is immediate. 
Lemma 5.2. Assume that ir(l, h) =1 at history h= (sl, vl, 1, gl, T1), and that 
voting at t=2 is as described by Lemma 5.0. Then, the only possible perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium of the game in period t=2 is where only 1 enters and chooses 
minimum campaign spending (81,2 = (1, S), sm, 2 = 0, mEK, m# 1) and where 1 is 
elected. 
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that some mEK, m 54 1 enters in equilibrium. Clearly, 
if ir(l, h) = 1, then all i0 N/K will vote for 1. So, m cannot win and so entry cannot 
be optimal, a contradiction. Q 
34The other complicating factor is that possibly ir(l, h) = 0. In this case, if 1 chooses an s that 
only H-types choose in equilibrium, we have an impossible event, and Bayesian updating does not 
apply. We assume that in this case, ir(l, h) =0 remains unchanged. 
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First period: t=1 
Interpret WH, WL as the continuation pay-offs of type H, L office-holders, condi- 
tional on being elected at period 1. Then, we can define the first period candidate 
entry game conditional on WH, WL to be the game where at period 1, all iEK 
make their entry and campaign expenditure decisions, and all iEN then vote. From 
Proposition 5.3, it is immediate that: 
Lemma 5.3. Given any fixed continuation pay-offs WH > WL, the only symmetric 
perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the first period candidate entry game which satisfies 
the IC is where every iEK enters if Bi = BH. 
Say that the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the Rogoff model with endoge- 
nous entry is intuitive if the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the first period candidate 
entry game satisfies IC, conditional on any fixed continuation pay-offs WH, WL. We 
now have one of our key results of this chapter. 
Proposition 5.6. Assume Assumption 5.3. There is a unique intuitive PBE of the 
Rogoff model with endogenous entry. This equilibrium has the following structure. 
At t=1, every iEK enters if and only if 9' = 9H, and all entrants are elected with 
probability 1/c. The office-holder I chooses the efficient fiscal policy in period 1, i. e. 
91, 'r1 = 91* (GH), Ti (OH). Then, at t=2, only l enters, and is elected again. Once in 
office, he chooses the efficient fiscal policy in period 2, i. e. r1 = 72(6H). 
Proof. (a) Existence. This follows directly from Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, as long as 
WH > WL, given the equilibrium policy choices of high and low-types. But, in any 
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PBE, a high-type who wins office in period 1 must have a higher continuation payoff 
than a low-type. First, the payoff from period 1 policy choice is strictly higher, as 
the high-type is more able. Second, second-period continuation pay-offs must be at 
least as high, as the high-type can always follow the pooling strategy of imitating the 
low-type. 
(b) Uniqueness. Suppose that there were another intuitive equilibrium. In this 
other equilibrium, WH > WL by the argument in (a). But then, by Proposition 5.3, 
this other equilibrium must have the same first-period equilibrium entry strategies 
as the one described in Proposition 5.6. But then, ir(h, 1) =1 at the beginning of 
the second period, so the equilibrium in the second period must also be the same as 
described in Proposition 5.6. So, there cannot be another equilibrium. Q 
In this equilibrium, candidates fully signal their ability at the candidate entry 
stage, so the ability of the office-holder is fully known, and so there is no need to 
signal to the electorate via policy. That is, the entry decision is a substitute, and 
a more efficient one at that, for signalling via policy. So, in equilibrium, there is no 
distortionary signalling (fiscal policy) activity by the incumbent, in contrast to the 
case with exogenous candidate selection. In fact, the equilibrium of Proposition 5.6 
is first-best efficient; icient; a competent type is selected for office in each period, and he 
does not signal. 
5.6 The Rogoff Model with an Agency Problem 
We now consider a different version of the Rogoff model, where politicians differ 
not in ability, but in the extent to which they wish to appropriate tax revenues for 
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their own personal or party benefit (alternatively we can assume, as in Coate and 
Morris, 1995, that all candidates are equally able and only differ in their honesty). 
Formally, we model this as follows. We start with our two-period version of the 
Rogoff model outlined in Section 5.4, and normalize the ability parameter of all 
office-holders to zero, i. e. 9=0. So, the public good production function for period 
1 and 2 respectively is given by: 
9i + k2 = T1 - ri, 92 = 72 - r2 (5.14) 
Here, r1, r2 are the amounts of tax revenues taken in the form of rents by politicians. 
This modelling of the agency problem follows Persson and Tabellini (2000), Chapter 
4. 
So, citizen's preferences over policy outcomes (including r1, r2) in the two time 
periods are 
uc(7-1,9i, ri, r2,7'2) =u(y-Ti, 9i)+v(T1 -91 -7'1)+u(y-T2, T2-r2) 
Citizens eligible for office have preferences over policy outcomes identical to citizens, 
except that they value rents: 
Uo = uc(T1,91) ri, r2, T2) +V [O(ri) + 0(r2)], vE {vH, VL}, vL > vH =0 
where 0 is a strictly increasing, strictly concave function with limT, 0 i'(r) = oo. So, 
here v measures the honesty of the politician, rather than ability. So, in the agency 
case, H, L stand for high and low honesty respectively. As above, we suppose that the 
honesty type of a citizen is determined by random draw at the beginning of period 
1, and p- Pr(v = vH). The order of events is exactly as in Section 5.4.2 except 
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that once policy has been chosen in any period t=1,2, the politician may choose 
rt. Also, voters do not observe rl, r2 directly, as they do not observe 6 in the base 
Rogoff model. 35 
5.6.1 Partial Democracy 
We begin by the analysis of the partial democracy case. The exposition follows that 
of Section 5.4 as closely as possible. Once elected at t=2, the office-holder of type 
a=H, L (where a now denotes honesty rather than ability) solves the problem of 
choosing 7-2i r2 to maximize u (y - T2, ) + vaO(r2). The first-order conditions for this 
are 
uc(y - r2,72 - r2) = u9(y - 7-2172 - r2) 
u9(y - T2, T2 - r2) = La('(r2) 
Let the solution to this problem be r (v. ), r2(va, ). It is easily checked that at the 
end of the second period, a type-L office-holder will take a positive amount of rent 
(r2(vL) > 0), whereas the honest type will take zero rent (r2(vH) = 0). So, following 
the notation of the previous section, the second-period continuation pay-offs of non- 
office holders are 
Va = (y - T2(Va), T2(va) - r2(va)) 
in the event that a type a=H, L citizen is office-holder, with VH > VL. Also, 
note that the continuation pay-offs of the office-holder of type a may be written as 
Ra + Va, where Ra =R+ vaq(r2 (va) ), so that the ego-rent now includes the pay-offs 
Sb Of course, the voter can infer rl in period 2 from the levels of rl, gl, k but by then it is too late. 
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from rents. By the envelope theorem, it is easy to see36 that RL + VL > RH + VH, 
so the continuation pay-offs of the office-holders are non-congruent with those of 
citizens. Now consider the election at t=2. Clearly, the incumbent will be elected 
iff 7r(gi, 71) > p, where lr(gi, T1) has the same interpretation as above, i. e. it is the 
posterior belief by voters that a=H, given observable period 1 policy. 
We can now define the signalling sets much as in the base model. Consider the 
first-order conditions to the problem of maximizing the first-period policy of the 
office-holder, ignoring the effect this choice may have on the probability that he wins 
the election. The first-order conditions are, in the case where there is an interior 
solution: 
uc(y - Ti, 9i) = u9(y - r1,9i) (5.15) 
us(Y - Ti, 9i) = v'(T1 - 9i - ri) (5.16) 
V'(71 - 9i - ri) = Va ('(T1) (5.17) 
In the case that the politician is honest, there is a corner solution for rl with rl = 0. 
Denote these solutions by (ri(v0)) gi (va), r2(va)) and call them first-period myopically 
optimal policies. Note by comparison of (5.15)-(5.17) to (5.5)-(5.7) that this policy is 
first-best efficient when a=H, but inefficient when a=L. Moreover, the direction of 
the inefficiency is the same as in the base Rogoff model: r*(VH) < rJ*(VL), gi(BH) > 
gi (Bi). So, then we can define the signalling sets SH, SL as in Section 5.4.4, and it 
is easily checked that they have the same properties as in the base case, i. e. Sa, is 
a convex set containing the type-a's bliss point Ba = (r (9a))gi(0a)), as shown in 
Figure 5.1 above. We can also define sophisticated beliefs as above. Then, by an 
36To see this, note that R+V- maxr2, r2 u(y - Tz) T2 - r2) + VOh), and so by the envelope 
theorem, R+V is increasing in v. 
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argument identical to that of Section 5.4 above, we have: 
Proposition 5.7. If voters' beliefs are sophisticated, then there exists a unique sepa- 
rating equilibrium. In this equilibrium, first-period (observable) policy of the dishon- 
est type is first-period myopically optimal, i. e. (T1(vL)) gl(ut), = r (vL), gi(vL)). On 
the other hand, T1(VH), g1(vH) maximizes u(y-Tl, gl)+v(T1-gl) subject to (gi, -rl) E 
Q, and r1(VH) = 0. If the constraint in this problem is binding, the first-period pol- 
icy of the high-type is distorted by a signalling motive, i. e. (T1(VH) < -r*l (1"H), and 
g1(vH) > gi(vx))" 
So, we see that in the version of this model with partial democracy, we have a 
political budget cycle in fiscal policy with the same structure as in the base Rogoff 
model. Moreover, as in that model, signalling is welfare reducing, in that it distorts 
the policy of the good type (here, the honest type) away from the first-best. 
5.6.2 Representative Democracy 
In this section, we analyse the Rogoff model with an agency problem under the 
alternative, and more realistic, institution of a representative democracy. As in the 
base Rogoff case, the resulting model essentially is a twice-repeated version of the 
model of Section 5.3, with the additional complication that the winner of the first- 
period election (the incumbent) can signal his ability via first-period policy choice. 
We solve the model backwards. 
Second Period: t=2 
First, as above in the case of partial democracy, optimal policy choice by the 
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office-holder of ability a at period 2 gives payoff Va, to all citizens, with VH > VL, and 
the office-holder gets an ego-rent of Ra. Next, we will formalize off-the-equilibrium 
path beliefs as in Section 5.5, i. e. 7r(j, h), ji is the probability assessment on the 
part of all ij that candidate jEK is high-ability, given a public history of play 
h. Note that Lemma 5.2 above obviously applies to this case also. 
First period: t=1 
Define WH, WL as the pay-offs of type H, L office-holders (excluding ego-rents), 
conditional on being elected at period 1. Then, we can define the first period candidate 
entry game conditional on RH, RL, WH, WL to be the game where at period 1, all 
iEK make their entry and campaign expenditure decisions, and all iEN then vote. 
From Proposition 5.4, it is immediate that: 
Lemma 5.4. Given any fixed continuation pay-offs RH + WH < RL + WL, in any 
symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the first period candidate entry game, 
every iEK enters, whatever their type. 
Now say that voter beliefs are sophisticated" at the stage of choice of policy 
in period 1, if voters believe that the incumbent is of type H with probability 1 if 
(gl, rrl) E Q, given that he has not previously revealed himself to be of type L. We 
now have another of our key results. 
Proposition 5.8. Assume Assumption 5.3 and that voter beliefs are sophisticated 
at the stage of choice of policy in period 1. There is always a PBE of the (modi- 
"In the notation of this section, this requires that for all h=( sl, vl, l) such that ir(h, l) > 0, if 
h= (si, v1,1, g1, Ti), ir(h, l) =1 when (91,71) E Q. 
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lied) Rogoff model with endogenous entry with the following structure. At t=1, 
every iEK enters, and all entrants are elected with probability 1/k. The office- 
holder l chooses fiscal policy in period 1 as in the game with partial democracy, i. e. 
(91) 71) = (91(OH), T1(OH)), if his type is H, and (gl, rrl) = (91* (OL)) T*1 (OL)) if his 
type is L. Then, at t=2, if l is type H, only 1 enters, and is elected again. Once in 
office, he chooses the efficient fiscal policy in period 2, i. e. Tl = T2(OH). Otherwise, 
only iE K/{l} enter. Each is elected with probability 1/(k - 1), and once in office, 
chooses second-period optimal policy. Moreover, this is the only equilibrium where 
there is signalling via policy in period 1. 
Proof. (a) Existence. From Lemma 5.2, if 1 can signal that he is a type-H, he 
will win the election with probability 1. So, given the associated continuation pay- 
offs, and the sophisticated off-the-equilibrium path beliefs, an argument as in the 
proof of Proposition 5.6 implies that the policy choices g1(OH), T1(9H)1 91* (Bz. ), Ti(OL) 
constitute an equilibrium, given that 1 has not revealed his type at the candidate 
entry stage at t=1. But by Lemma 5.4, there must be a pooling equilibrium at the 
candidate entry stage at t=1, as long as RH + WH < RL + WL. But, in any PBE, 
a L-type who wins office in period 1 must have a higher continuation payoff than a 
H-type, as he gets a payoff from rent that the other type cannot. 
(b) Uniqueness. By the argument of (a), there must always be a pooling equi- 
librium at the candidate entry stage at t=1. But then, with sophisticated off-the- 
equilibrium path beliefs, the only separating equilibrium at the policy stage at t=1 
is as in the Proposition (any other gl, rrl in Q is suboptimal for the H type: c. f. 
Rogoff, 1990). 0 
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In this equilibrium, candidates cannot signal their ability at the candidate entry 
stage, so there is still a need to signal to the electorate via policy. That is, the entry 
decision does not substitute for signalling via policy. This is obviously in contrast to 
the representative democracy Rogoff model with congruent preferences, and is being 
driven by the fact that here, citizen and office-holder preferences are non-congruent. 
We would expect to find similar conclusions if candidate entry were introduced into 
other models where office-holders differ in honesty, e. g. Coate and Morris (1995). 
5.7 Extensions and Robustness Checks 
5.7.1 Wealth Constraints 
As remarked in the introduction, Rogoff considered a number of institutional mech- 
anisms for eliminating the signalling distortion in his model, and found them all 
wanting. The one closest to our analysis is one he called "self-denial", i. e. signalling 
via the destruction of part of the endowment of the private consumption good. In 
one version of this mechanism, he proposes that society could enforce self-denial by 
requiring any incumbent who runs for re-election to pay a fee. Rogoff remarks "It is 
easily shown that such a scheme can be welfare-improving, but not by enough to attain 
the full-information equilibrium [... ] the most conspicuous drawback to this approach 
is that it would be very difficult in practice to find a rule for setting the fee, since 
incumbents differ greatly in wealth and future earning power". (p. 33) 
To illustrate, suppose this fee were S, and suppose that utility is quasi-linear in 
the private good, i. e. u(c, g) =c+ u(g). Then if the fee were set at 
R+(1-P)(WH-WL)>ö>R-P(WH-WL) 
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then only a high-ability incumbent would prefer to run against the challenger (even 
if a low-ability type were to win, he would prefer not to take office, but allow the 
challenger to be elected unopposed). So, this mechanism would implement the first- 
best. Now suppose that a fraction Aa of ability type a do not have sufficient wealth 
to pay the fee. Then, the mechanism becomes inefficient, as with probability AH, an 
efficient incumbent is not re-elected. 
However, by contrast, given the very weak assumption that at least one high- 
ability type can afford the entry fee, our analysis of the Rogoff model with repre- 
sentative democracy is unaffected by wealth constraints. So, endogenous entry as a 
screening mechanism is not subject to the problem that the "fee mechanism" analysed 
by Rogoff (1990) and discussed above suffers from: namely, it inefficiently excludes 
high-ability low-wealth incumbents from re-election. The source of difference, is of 
course, that under a representative democracy in which candidate entry is endoge- 
nous, candidates can self-select on the basis of wealth, as well as ability. 
To see this, note first that when 6> WL + R, no low-competence citizen will stand 
for election in equilibrium, even if she can afford the entry fee 6. Conversely, provided 
there is at least one high-ability type that can afford the entry fee, then an equilibrium 
similar to Proposition 5.6, without a Political Budget Cycle, will exist. Specifically, 
Proposition 5.6 continues to hold with the difference that a= max{i E NH}, where 
NN is the intersection of NH with the subset of citizens that can afford the entry fee 
6. 
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5.7.2 "Looks" Shocks 
In Rogoff's model, voters preferences over candidates were also determined by "looks" 
shocks, random variables qi, rqj realized after candidate selection but before elections 
(so they should more accurately be called campaign shocks). The variables qi, r7j 
are i. i. d., mean zero and are publicly observed. The interpretation of qj is that it is 
the additional utility that any voter k ,Ei, j gets from i's performance during the 
"campaign" prior to the election. All citizens then vote for i or j having observed 
gl,, rl, rji, 71j but not k2. 
The purpose of those "looks" shocks is technical: they ensure that the pooling 
equilibrium of Rogoff's model could be eliminated by appeal to the Cho and Kreps 
(1987) Intuitive Criterion. However, it does not really matter for our analysis that 
they are dropped, in the sense that even if the pooling (in policy) equilibrium prevails 
in the Rogoff model, there is still a fiscal distortion before the election. Our arguments 
still apply to show that there is a separating (at the entry stage) equilibrium, where 
such distortion is eliminated. This separating (at the entry stage) equilibrium is first- 
best efficient and is therefore preferable to either a pooling or separating equilibrium 
at the policy stage. 
5.7.3 Moral Hazard 
As mentioned in the Introduction, there is an important literature, starting with 
Barro (1973), on electoral control which, unlike the Rogoff model, allows for moral 
hazard and conflicting interests. We briefly sketch how our arguments apply to this 
case. We shall use the model analysed in Chapter 4. The model is (for the case of 
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partial democracy) in the class of models studied by Banks and Sundaram (1998). 
There is only one type of public good, whose levels of consumption in periods t= 
1,2 are denoted by gt. Citizen's pay-offs in period t are u(ct) + gt. The office-holder 
also benefits from an ego-rent of R when in office, and incurs a cost of effort c(e), 
where eE R+ is the level of effort, c(. ) is strictly increasing and strictly convex, and 
c(0) = 0, c'(0) < 1.38 
The budget constraint of the representative citizen for period t is as before, i. e. 
(5.3). The public good production function for period t is given by: 
9t = (Tt + pet + O)et, t= 112 (5.18) 
where 0 is fixed ability, as before, but where now et E [0, oo) is effort, and et is 
a random shock. As before, 0E {BH, 0L}, 0H > BL > 0, p- Pr(O = OH) and 
(1 - p) - Pr(O = OL). Also, -rt is an input of the numeraire private good, obtained by 
a (lump-sum) tax on citizens. Following Chapter 4.5 of Persson and Tabellini (2000), 
we assume that 'rt, t=1,2 is fixed at T. Also, el, e2 are identically and independently 
distributed random shocks whose distribution satisfies some regularity conditions. In 
either period, the office-holder has to decide on an effort level e before observing et. 
The efficient benchmark level of effort in both periods, e*, maximizes ngt - 
c(et) subject to (5.18), which implies c'(e*) = nµ, for t=1,2, i. e. that the marginal 
cost of effort must be equated to marginal social benefit, nµ. That is, effort is a 
public good; a small increment will increase the quantity of publicly provided goods 
available for all. 
38The last condition c'(0) <1 ensures that the myopic equilibrium effort level is positive. 
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In the case of partial democracy (exogenous candidate selection), the order of 
events is the same as in the Rogoff model, except that the office-holder chooses 
effort et in each period t, and then et and therefore gt is realized. So, at the time of 
voting, voters have observed gt but not et. Similar remarks apply to the representative 
democracy case. 
Whether candidate selection is by exogenous or by endogenous entry, in the second 
period, office-holders of both types cannot be motivated via elections, and so choose 
the same (myopic) level of effort e2 < e*. With exogenous selection, there is an 
equilibrium where in the first period, there are positive "electoral effects" (denoted 
as "career concerns" effects in Chapter 4) on the incumbent's equilibrium effort level, 
i. e. el(9a) > e2, aE {OH , 
OL}. 39 In this case, each type of incumbent is raising his 
effort in order to increase the posterior belief of the voters that he is a high-ability 
type, and thus win the election. Note that in contrast to the Rogoff model, the 
"distortion" of effort may be welfare-improving, because absent elections, effort is 
too low (e2 < e*); the latter is of course, the moral hazard problem. In particular, if 
n is large, the moral hazard problem will be severe and we will have e* > e1 (OH), and 
el(BL) > e2. We assume that this is the case in what follows (consistently with the 
existing literature). 
With endogenous entry, our positive results are very similar to Proposition 5.6, i. e. 
there is a unique equilibrium with separating at the entry stage. The key difference 
with the Rogoff model is normative. In the Rogoff model, where adverse selection 
is the only problem, equilibrium with separation at the entry stage is fully Pareto- 
39Note that in contrast to Proposition 5.5, both the high and low-ability agents act strategically 
in the first period to try to manipulate the electoral outcome. In Rogoff (1990), the low-type does 
not signal; only the high-type does. 
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efficient. In the case with both adverse selection and moral hazard, things are not so 
straightforward. From the above discussion, it is clear that screening of candidates 
at the entry stage has two conflicting effects on efficiency. On the one hand, the 
average quality of the office-holder is higher in the revealing equilibrium. On the 
other, the first-period effort of the office-holder, conditional on type, is higher in 
the non-revealing equilibrium. So, whether endogenous candidate entry leads to 
a welfare improvement will naturally depend on whether the moral hazard or the 
adverse selection problem dominates. If the former is a more acute problem, then a 
non-revealing equilibrium is optimal (thus 6 should be set to zero); however, if the 
latter problem is more acute, then a revealing equilibrium can completely eliminate 
this adverse selection problem (6 needs to be sufficiently high for this to happen). 
5.7.4 Heterogeneous Preferences 
So far, we have limited our analysis to the case where citizens have homogenous 
preferences with regard to public goods. In this section, we check the robustness of 
our result to the case were citizens have heterogeneous preferences (and preferences 
are congruent with regard to ability). Following Alesina and Tabellini (1990), we 
introduce preference heterogeneity in a simple and symmetric way to the Rogoff 
model by assuming that there are two preference types (Democrats and Republicans), 
and two public goods, 40 e. g. education and defence. Democrats (Republicans) only 
get utility from education (defence). So, each preference type prefers a low-ability 
candidate with the same preference to a high-ability type with a different preference. 
In this context, we show that a key result of this chapter stills holds, i. e. with 
40Not counting the investment good that allows the incumbent to conceal his type in the Rogoff 
model. 
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congruent preferences, an optimal cost of entry always exists such that only high- 
ability citizens will ever want to stand for office. A revealing equilibrium therefore 
occurs at the entry stage so that no policy distortion arises. 
We focus on the Rogoff model, but the moral hazard model of the previous section 
can also be extended in this way. Our modelling of heterogeneity follows Alesina and 
Tabellini (1990). Assume two preference types in the population, democrats (D- 
types) and republicans (R-types). We denote an unspecified preference type by p, q, 
to distinguish it from an unspecified competency type a. So, the (unconditional) 
type of a citizen is a pair (a, p) E {L, H} x {D, R}. There are nD, nR of D-types 
and R-types respectively. To make the model completely symmetric with respect to 
preference types, i. e. so that the behaviour of the incumbent does not depend on his 
type, we assume that n, D = nR = n/2. 
There are also two types of publicly supplied consumption goods, D- and R-goods 
(e. g. education and defence). Let gp be the supply of a type-p good at time t. The 
payoff of a type-p citizen is 
u (cl, gi) +v (k2) +u (c2, g2) (5.19) 
where u, v are strictly increasing in their arguments and strictly concave. So, a 
type-p citizen only gets utility from his "own" type of publicly supplied consumption 
good. As before, the office-holder also benefits from an ego-rent of R when in office. 
The budget constraint of the representative citizen for period t is as before, and 
the public good production function is now 
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gD+gR-}-k2='rl-I-9,9D2 +g2 =r2+0 (5.20) 
where as before 0E {BH, BL} measures the ability of the office-holder in transforming 
the private good (tax revenue) into public goods. In all other respects, 41 the model 
is assumed to be the same as above. 
Of course, one can look for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in this extended model 
under either of the two assumptions: random selection of candidates, or endoge- 
nous candidate entry. In either case, the outcome depends critically on whether the 
identity of types is public knowledge or not. To focus on the new issues raised by pref- 
erence heterogeneity per se, and not by asymmetric information about heterogeneous 
preferences, we assume this information is public. 42 
Equilibrium with Partial Democracy 
Consider random selection of candidates first. In the second period, it is clear that 
if a type (a, p) candidate is elected, he will choose g2 = 0, q#p. Consequently, he 
chooses -r2 to solve the following problem; 
W (Ba)=T11aaX u(y-T2, T2+Oa) 
T2 
(5.21) 
Note that WPP(Oa, ) - W., where the latter is defined in (5.8) (c. f. Section 5.4.4). Let 
the solution to this problem be T2 (9a) . So, the payoff to a p-type citizen 
from a p-type 
office-holder of ability type a is just W. Also, the payoff to a q-type citizen from a 
"The exception is that (as we shall see) D-types prefer the default option of no public good to a 
type-R candidate. For this reason, we might want to allow them to abstain. Allowing abstention as 
a voting option makes no difference to the analysis. 
42Alesina and Cukierman (1990) have a partial democracy model in which parties' political plat- 
form is the private information of parties. 
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p-type office-holder is 
W'9(0a) =u (y - T2(0a), 0) (5.22) 
Clearly, WP(9) is increasing in B. Note also that as long as the private good is normal, 
T2(BH) < T2(9L), i. e. not all of the additional resources available to the high-ability 
incumbent are spent on the public good. So, a q-type always prefers a more able 
p-type office-holder, i. e. WP4(OH) > Wp4(BL), hence preferences are congruent in the 
sense of Section 5.3. Finally, note from (5.21), and (5.22) that 
W" 
(BH) =u 
(y 
- T21 0) < max u 
(y 
- 7-2,72 + GL) = W'(OL) (5.23) 
T2 
i. e. a type-p voter prefers a low-ability office-holder of his own type over a high-ability 
office-holder of the other preference type. 
Now consider voter behaviour at the beginning of period 2. There are two cases. 
The first is where both candidates, the incumbent i and the challenger j are alike 
(i. e. of type p), an event which happens with probability 
\nD/ 
nD -1+ (nHl nH - 1) _ 
n/2 -1 
n n-1 n/ 
(n-1 
n-1 
In this case, by assumption, all citizens prefer a competent office-holder to an incom- 
petent one. So, i will win the election if ýi(gl, r1) > p. 
The second case is where both candidates, the incumbent i and the challenger 
j are different, in which case assume, without loss of generality, that i is type-D and 
j is type-R. In this case, by (5.23), type-D voters will certainly vote for D, and type-R 
voters will certainly vote for R, whatever the perceived competence of the incumbent, 
p. In this event, the incumbent wins with probability 0.5, whatever his policy while 
in office. 
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So, a first-period incumbent of type (a, p) has a second-period continuation payoff 
of 
V 2(R) -{ýW 8H)e+)(1 
( 
P)W) (BL)] + (1 - ý)Z if ýr <p 
(5.24) 
where q p, 
Z=0.5WPP(Oa) + 0.5[pWQp(OH) + (1 - p)Wgp(OL)] 
Note that the continuation payoff is independent of the preference type; this is a 
consequence of the symmetry of the model in the preference dimension. 
As before, in equilibrium, the first-period incumbent of type (a, p) chooses (gi, irl) to 
maximize the sum of his payoff from first-period policy, plus his continuation payoff, 
V2, i. e. 
V1(9i, T1, P) =uýy-T1,91)-}-v(T1ý-Ba-91)+V2(P) (5.25) 
subject to the condition that p= ýi(rl, gl). Also, define the analogues of (5.12) in 
Section 5.4.4, i. e. 
Sd ={ (9i, Ti) 1 Vl ('ri, 91,1,0) ?V 1(Ti (0), 9i(0), 0,0) 1 (5.26) 
Now note the useful Lemma: 
Lemma 5.5. Sa C Sa, aE {6H, BL} . 
This says that, relative to the base case of homogenous preferences, an incumbent 
of a given type is less willing to distort his policy in exchange for convincing voters 
that he is a high-, rather than low-type. This is because with probability 1-e (the 
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probability that his challenger is a different preference type), manipulating the beliefs 
of the voters has no effect on the outcome. 
Otherwise, the analysis of the separating equilibrium is exactly the same as in 
Section 5.4. That is, voters' beliefs are defined to be minimally sophisticated if: 
ß(9i, Ti) =1 if (g1, r1) E SHfl R /St =Q (5.27) 
and Proposition 5.5 continues to hold if Q is replaced by Q. Moreover, we can easily 
compare the distortion in this case to the case with homogeneous preferences. Assume 
voters' beliefs are minimally sophisticated. Also, assume for the moment that there 
is a distortion in the homogenous preference case, i. e. BH E SL. Then, there are 
two possibilities. First, from Lemma 5.5, it is possible that BH ý SL so there is 
no distortion in the heterogeneous case. The second possibility is where there is 
some distortion in both cases, i. e. BH E SL. There, we have seen in Figure 5.2 that, 
with homogenous preferences, the first-period equilibrium policy for the high-type is 
at point E. But as SL C SL from Lemma 5.5, it follows that, with heterogeneous 
preferences, the first-period equilibrium policy for the high-type would be at point 
E', between BH and E on the line DD in Figure 5.2 (not represented but obvious). 
The following result summarizes this discussion. 
Proposition 5.9. If voters' beliefs are minimally sophisticated, then there exists 
a unique separating (policy) equilibrium, when preferences are heterogeneous. In 
this equilibrium, first-period policy of the low-type is always conditionally efficient. 
Moreover, the first-period policy of the high-type is less distorted in the case of 
heterogeneous preferences, i. e. 
'T1(OH) : 5T1(BH) C T1(OH), 910H) ! 91(BH) ! 91(BH) 
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where every inequality above can hold strictly. 
Equilibrium Under a Representative Democracy 
First, we study equilibria where there is no screening at the entry stage. We can con- 
struct such a "non revealing" equilibrium where the distortion in first-period policy 
for the high-type is larger than in the exogenous entry case. The intuition is simple. 
Let 
öl = Ol + 0.5 [Wpr'(OH) +R- P(2 - P)WgP(OH) - (1 - P)2Wqp (8L)] 
S2 = 0.5 [WPP(OH) +R- pWep(OH) - (1 - p)Wan(O )] 
where O1 is defined in the proof of Proposition 5.10. It is clear that S2 is the critical 
entry cost that will make a R-type just indifferent between running against a D-type 
who is believed to be competent with probability p and not entering (or vice versa). 
So, if ö> b2, no citizen of a different preference type will challenge the incumbent in 
period 2. öl has a similar interpretation. 
Also, let nD, nR be the maximal elements in ND, NR respectively, and let nD, nR 
be the maximal elements in ND/{nD}, NR/{nR} respectively. 4' Then, under some 
conditions, there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where only one citizen stands for 
election, and (if he is competent), signals his competence exactly as in the basic 
Rogoff model. 
Proposition 5.10. (Pooling at the candidate entry stage). Assume W"(9L) +R> 
6> max{öl, S2}. Then there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the following 
43By the assumption that n >_ 3, and the fact that n must be even, n >_ 4, so nL, nR, nL, nR exist 
without making further assumptions. 
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structure. At time t=1, only np, pE {D, R} stands for election and wins. If np is 
of ability type aE {OH, BL} , 
he chooses first-period policy as in Rogoff's separating 
equilibrium, i. e. T1(Ba, ), gl(Ba). At t=2, (i) if ýi(rrl, gl) > p, only np stands for 
election; (ii) if ? (r1, g1) < p, only n; stands for election. The only candidate is 
elected with probability 1. 
A basic corollary of Propositions 5.9 and 5.10 is that under some conditions, the 
political budget cycle is now bigger with endogenous (yet non revealing) entry. The 
intuition for this result is simple. With exogenous selection of candidates, with some 
positive probability, the incumbent is paired with a challenger of a different preference 
type in equilibrium, in which case there is no point in signalling his ability, if high. 
With endogenous entry, under some conditions, no citizen of a different preference 
type can ever credibly threaten to challenge the incumbent; only citizens with the 
same preference type can credibly challenge. So, in this case, the incumbent still has 
the "full" incentive (i. e. as in the original Rogoff model) to signal. So, we see that our 
result of previous sections, that endogenous entry either has no effect on the political 
budget cycle (PBC), or reduces it, does not generalize to the case of heterogeneous 
preferences. 
However, for 6 large enough, the basic insight of the previous sections - and a 
key result of this chapter - remains true, namely that the PBC may be eliminated 
in the equilibrium that survives. Let NH, D, NH, R be the sets of high-ability citizens 
with left- and right- preferences for the public good respectively. Then, we see that 
Proposition 5.6 generalizes in the following sense. 
Proposition 5.11. (Separating at the candidate entry stage). If 0.5[R+WPP(OH) - 
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Wrq(OH)] <S<R+ W'(OH), then there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the 
following structure. At t=1,2, some ct E NH stands for election, and is elected 
with probability 1. The office-holder chooses the conditionally efficient fiscal policy 
in period t=1,2. 
If 0.5R <6<0.5[R + WP'(OH) - WP (OH)], then there is a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium with the following structure. At t=1,2, some dt E NH, D and rt E 
NH, R stands for election, i. e. Ct = {dt, rt}. Each is elected with probability 0.5. The 
office-holder chooses the conditionally efficient fiscal policy in period t=1,2. 
So, the main conclusion is the same; for a range of entry costs, an equilibrium 
with separation (by ability levels) at the entry stage exists. However, note a new 
feature; if 6 is not too large, Duverger's Law holds, i. e. there are two entrants to the 
election. This is because the loss from withdrawing and allowing a suboptimal policy 
to be implemented (i. e. the other type's optimal policy) exceeds the cost saving of 
6. Of course, if S is large enough, then one candidate prefers to withdraw and allow 
the other to win (but the other then does not wish to withdraw). The proof of 
Proposition 5.11 is similar to that of Proposition 5.6 and is omitted. 
5.7.5 Political Parties 
The most obvious objection to the above analysis is that in many countries outside 
the United States, entry decisions are often tightly controlled by political parties, 
who also fund campaigns. For example, in the United Kingdom, all the three major 
political parties have rigorous candidate selection processes whereby constituency 
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parties short-list and interview (in some cases, several times) potential candidates. `` 
Here, we model these two activities of political parties in the simplest way possible, 
and show that the main results of the previous section are robust. The basic idea 
is that there is still asymmetric information about candidates' abilities, this time 
between political parties and the voters outside these parties, but nevertheless, entry 
costs still serve to screen out low-quality candidates. 
Following Besley and Coate (2000), we think of political parties simply as coali- 
tions of citizens of the same preference for public spending, who control access to 
entry to elections. So, we work with the extended model of the last section with 
heterogeneous preferences. 
There are two parties, D (for democrats), and R (for republicans), comprising m 
of the citizens each. Let the sets of party members be PD, PR. Prior to any election, 
the order of events is as follows. 
1. Any citizen who is a member of the p-party can apply to be a candidate for 
that party. 
2. All party members who apply can be tested at zero cost. A test is the receipt 
of a signal sE {0,1} of the candidates' ability, with Pr(s =1 10 = OH) = Pr(s = 
0 10 = BL) =19. The higher 19, the more accurate the signal is. 
3. The p-party can select a candidate from those who have been tested, who is 
entered for the election, or can choose not to field a candidate. 
44 See King (1997) for a comparative analysis of selection processes and the importance of campaign 
finances in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. 
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The costs and benefits of this process are allocated as follows. All party members 
pay equal shares 5/m of the cost of entry. If a candidate wins the election, he receives 
some ego-rent R, and other party members get surrogate ego-rents R' <R if their 
candidate wins. Also, we assume that initially, individual citizens do not observe their 
abilities. "' We make this assumption to show that the basic screening mechanism 
studied in this chapter can work at the level of the party, not the individual. 
We wish to show that with this new, more complex structure, it is still possible 
to find a range of values of 6 for which only a separating equilibrium (at the entry 
stage) exists. For convenience, we assume p=0.5. This implies that the probability 
of observing either signal is 0.5 also. 
Proposition 5.12. There is a non-empty range of values of 6 for which the 
following is an equilibrium at t=1,2. First every member of both political parties 
applies to be a candidate. Second, each political party selects some pt from the set of 
applicants who have received a positive signal at time t, At, i. e. Ct = {dt, rt}. Each 
is elected with probability 0.5. The office-holder chooses the conditionally efficient 
fiscal policy in period t=1,2. 
5.7.6 Heterogeneous Wealth and Fund-Raising Ability/Burning 
Cost 
So far, we have assumed that spending an amount 6 during the campaign is equally 
costly for all candidates. However, the "ability to spend" during a campaign will 
45In fact, we will assume that office-holders do not observe their abilities until the second public 
good is delivered at t=2. This means that in equilibrium, the incumbent at t=1 has the same 
information about his ability as the electorate, and so there is no scope for signalling. Also, we will 
assume (for convenience only) that delivery of the public good k2 takes place before the office-holder 
chooses 92 , T2, so that he can condition his choice 92 , 72 on his true ability. 
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depend both on the candidates' personal wealth and his fund-raising ability. In some 
cases, personal wealth clearly leads to greater spending and electoral success. 46 An 
extreme example is Jon Corzine, a former managing director of Goldman Sachs, with 
no experience of office, who spent $55 million of his own money contesting a seat in 
Senate representing New Jersey in 2000, and won. Rind-raising ability, on the other 
hand, may be related to the candidates own personal characteristics, as well as his 
political track record, and in particular, whether he is the incumbent. 47 Therefore, 
it seems desirable to test the robustness of our results to heterogeneity in the ability 
of candidates to spend. 
We model this as follows. Every candidate in K is now described by two charac- 
teristics: his ability, as before, and also his cost of "burning" money, b=H, L. So, 
a candidate who enters and spends S incurs a cost cobs, where bE {H, L} is his cost 
type, with (PH > 'PL > 0. Citizens can now be of four possible types: two ability 
types a, and two cost types b, i. e. (a, b) E {(H, H), (H, L), (L, H), (L, L)}. Let 
Pr (b = H) - w, and Pr (b = L) =1-w. We will show that as long as the cost differ- 
ence cOH - 'PL is not "too large", then the results of Section 5.3 go though effectively 
unchanged. Also, the upper bound on WH - cOL goes to infinity with the number of 
potential candidates, #K, so when there are a large number of potential candidates, 
our arguments of Section 5.3 are robust to even considerable cost differences among 
candidates. 
46Although wealth is often described in the media (and in the political science literature) as giving 
an unfair advantage in the US, a recent study (Milyo and Groseclose (1999)), exploiting a unique 
dataset on the wealth of House incumbents running in the 1992 race, reveals that on average, personal 
wealth does not matter: i. e. rich candidates did not spend more on average on their campaigns than 
poor ones, and were no more likely to win greater shares of the vote. 
47The major determinant of campaign raising and spending is incumbency (e. g. Salmore and 
Salmore, 1985, chapter 4). For instance, for the 2000 House elections, the average challenger raised 
$361,314, while the average incumbent raised $891,956. 
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Congruent Preferences 
In this new setting, we say that congruence occurs when types (H, H) , 
(H, L) place 
a higher value on office than (L, H), (L, L). A necessary condition for congruence is 
clearly WH + RH > WL + RL. But even if this inequality holds, congruence in our 
extended model will not occur when ö is very large, as then a low-ability, low-cost type 
(L, L) may prefer to enter, whereas a high-ability, high-cost type (H, H) may not. 48 
However, there is of course an upper bound on 6 in any anonymous equilibrium: this 
is49 the value of 6 which makes any iEK of type (H, L) indifferent between entering 
and not, given that all jEK only enter if they are of type (H, L). This value can be 
easily calculated to be50 
[AOWH + µoRH] (5.28) bet A 
where x0 is the number51 of candidates (other than some iE K) in this equilibrium, 
AO = Pr(xo = 0), and µo = E[1/(xo + 1)]. 
So, we can define candidate and voter preferences to be congruent if, given that 
6< Sst, (H, H) places a higher value on office than (L, L), i. e. 
WH + RH - ýPHast > WL + RL - (PL6st 
which using (5.28), reduces to the condition that the difference in burning costs be 
not too laxge, i. e. 
LPN -APL ý 
WH+RH - (WL + RL) (5.29) AOWH + µORH 
48Note that type (H, L) places a higher value on office than does (H, H), and type (L, L) places 
a higher value on office than does (L, H). 
49Type (H, L) is the one who has the most to gain from entering, and so will be willing to pay 
the most to signal. 
50The use of subscript on the 5's is the following is this section: "st" ("ws") refers to strongly 
(weakly) separating equilibria, and "se" refers to semi-separating equilibria. 
51xo is distributed Binomially with parameters k-1, po, where po = Pr((a, b) = (H, L)) = pw. 
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Note that if the candidate set K is large, i. e. k -> oo, AO, po -- 0, so the upper 
bound on the difference in costs becomes very large, and so congruence requires little 
more than it does in the base case. The intuition for this is simple: when there are 
many candidates, the probability of any one candidate winning is small, and so any 
potential candidate is only willing to spend a small amount in the campaign. But 
then it does not matter greatly if costs of "burning" money are heterogeneous. 
If preferences are congruent in the sense of (5.29), it is clear that there can be four 
types of anonymous equilibrium: (i) a pooling equilibrium where all types enter; (ii) 
separating (with respect to ability) equilibria where either only (H, L) types or (H, L) 
and (H, H) types enter; (iii) a mixed equilibrium where (H, L), (H, H) and (L, L) 
enter. The following Proposition gives precise existence conditions for each of these 
equilibria. 
Proposition 5.13. Assume congruent preferences in the sense of (5.29) and k< 
n-1. Then, if S< S', there exist belief profiles for which an anonymous pooling 
(political) equilibrium exists, where every iEK enters with probability 1, and spends 
some 6<S< S'r, where S'r =X [RL - p(WH - WL)]. Also, if 6< 
38e752 there 
exist belief profiles for which the following anonymous separating equilibria exist: (i) 
strong separating equilibrium: every iEK enters only if he is a high-ability, low- 
burning cost type, and spends max{ö, Set} <b< 88t, where bet is defined in (5.28), 
and Sgt = min{[po(WH+RH) +(A0-p0)WH]/cH, [µO(WL+RL) +(. \0-liO)WH]/coL}; 
(ii) weak separating equilibrium: every iEK enters only if he is a high-ability type 
(regardless of his burning cost), and spends max{S, S e} <S<L, where 
öw9 = 
52 Where Tae is defined below in the Proposition. 
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[. 1WH+1_L1RH]/coH, sws = [u1(WL+RL) +(A1-h i)WH]/PL, and xl is the number'` 
of candidates (other than some iE K) in this equilibrium, pj = E[1/(xi + 1)], 
and Al=1- (1 - pl) 
k-1; (iii) semi-separating equilibrium: every iEK enters 
except if he is a low-ability, high-cost type, and spends max{S, 6}<b< bse, 
where S3e = min{[µ2(RH+WH)+(A2-t2) ]/cH, [N'2(RL+WL)+(A2-µ2Nj1AOL}ý 
bse = [i2(WL+RL)+(i\2-t'2)`I`]I(PH, '1' = [(PW+p(1-W))WH +(1-p)(1-W)WL] 
/[1 - (1 - p)w], and x2 is the number54 of candidates 
(other than some iE K) in 
this equilibrium, P2 = E[1/(x2 + 1)], and A2 =1- (1 - P2 )k-1. There are no other 
anonymous equilibria. 
However, we are mostly interested in which of these equilibria pass the Intuitive 
Criterion (IC). Then we have: 
Proposition 5.14. Assume congruent preferences. Then the only anonymous equi- 
libria to pass the Intuitive Criterion are the strongly separating equilibrium with 
campaign expenditure min{Set, ö} and the weakly separating equilibrium with 
campaign expenditure min{&, s, 
S}, where Sst, L>0 are defined in Proposition 
5.13. 
So, we see that when preferences are congruent, the result is essentially the same 
as in the base case: candidate entry screens out low-ability candidates. 
Non Congruent Preferences 
We now turn to the non-congruent case. Generally, non-congruence occurs when 
53x1 is distributed Binomially with parameters pl, k-1, where pl = p(1 - pw(1 - w)). 
54x2 is distributed Binomially with parameters p2, k-1, where P2 =1-w- p(1 - 2w) +p2(1 + 
w)(w - 1)2 -wp3(w - 1)2. 
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types (H, H) , 
(H, L) place a lower value on office than (L, H) , 
(L, L) 
.A necessary 
condition for non-congruence is WH + RH < WL + RL. Similar arguments to above 
show that the necessary and sufficient condition for non-congruence is 
ýPH - ýPL 
WL + RL - (WH + RH) (5.30) HOWL + IORL 
where xo is the number55 of candidates (other than some iE K) in the anonymous 
equilibrium where only (L, L) types enter, and A0 = Pr(xo = 0), and µo = E[1/(xo + 
1)]. As before, note that if the candidate set K is large, i. e. k -+ oc, A0, µ0 -º 0, so 
the upper bound on the difference in costs becomes very large, and so non-congruence 
requires little more than it does in the base case. 56 
In this case, there are only two possible types of equilibrium; a pooling equilibrium, 
and a "mixed" equilibrium (which we call semi-separating) where all types except 
(H, H) enter. Precise conditions under which these equilibria exist are available in 
the following Proposition: 
Proposition 5.15. Assume non congruent preferences in the sense of (5.30) and 
k<n-1. Then, if ö< S'p, there exist belief profiles for which an anonymous 
pooling (political) equilibrium exists, where every iEK enters with probability 1, 
and spends some ö<S< Sr, where Sp = [RH + (1 - p)(WH - WL)] /(kcpH). Also, if 
S< Sse, there exist belief profiles for which the following anonymous semi separating 
equilibrium exist: every iEK enters except if he is a high-ability, high-cost type, 
and spends max{ö, S e} <S<L, where 
88e = min{[µ2(RL + WL) + ('2 - /2)'I/'PH, 
[a2(RH + WH) + (A2 - %l2)1]/PL}, e= 
[µ2(WH + RH) + (A2 - /12)W]NH, 41 = 
55where, to parallel the notation of the congruent case, xo is now redefined in the following way. 
xo is distributed Binomially with parameters k-1, po, where po = Pr((a, b) = (L, L)). 56So, when #K is large, almost all parameter configurations will exhibit either congruence or 
non-congruence. 
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[(pw + p(1 - w))WL +(1 - p)(1 - w)WH] /[1 - (1 - p)w], and x2 is the number i7 
of candidates (other than some iE K) in this equilibrium, µ2 = E[1/(x2 + 1)], and 
A2 =1- P2-1. There are no other anonymous equilibria. 
Note that, contrarily to the strongly and weakly separating equilibria, in a semi 
separating equilibrium, equilibrium entrants are believed to be of high-ability with 
a strictly positive probability. As a result, non-equilibrium strategies can be pun- 
ished by voters by assigning a probability zero to the deviant - which prevents such 
plays. Punishment is not possible when only low-ability types enter (strong and weak 
separating equilibria) since voters already assign a zero probability to entrants being 
high-types. In these cases, as Proposition 5.2 showed, only equilibria where campaign 
expenditures are set to their minimum is possible. However, given that these equilib- 
ria are undesirable for voters, we assume that b is sufficiently low that it pays for at 
least a type (H, L) to enter so that strongly and weakly separating equilibria cannot 
occur (see proof of Proposition 5.15). 
The only equilibria of Proposition 5.15, that pass the IC are the following: 
Proposition 5.16. Assume that preferences are non-congruent. The only equilibria 
that pass the IC are the pooling equilibrium with 6, and the semi-separating 
equilibrium with ö> max{S, S8e}. 
So, we see that in this case, some screening is possible with non-congruence; high- 
ability, high-cost types are screened out. However, if these types are small in number, 
i. e. Pr(H, H) - 0, then there is effectively no screening via entry. When preferences 
57 X2 is distributed Binomially with parameters 1- p2, k -1, where 1- P2 =1-w- (1- p)(1- 2w) 
+(1 - p)2(1 + w)(w - 1)2 -w(1 - p)3(w - 1)2. 
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are congruent, as in Section 5.3, we have shown that candidate entry continues to 
act as a screening mechanism even when citizens have differing cost of burning (e. g. 
because of differing degrees of wealth). 
5.7.7 Unobservable Cost of Entry 
In this section, we check whether our result regarding screening via candidate entry 
would still hold in the case where campaign spending is not observable to voters 
prior to the election (this arises under congruent preferences). Although, as argued 
in Section 5.2, this is not the case for the US electoral system, the case of unobservable 
entry might apply to countries with less transparency on campaign finances. In this 
section we revisit the simple one period model of Section 5.3 (we limit our analysis 
to the case where preferences are congruent) with the modification that 6 is now only 
observed by the candidate itself, not by voters. The rest of the model of Section 
5.3 is unchanged. It is easy to see that this modification is not going to alter the 
analysis very much. In particular, as shown below, our key result still holds, namely 
that with representative democracy there exists a critical cost of candidate entry such 
that only high-ability citizens will ever want to stand for office. As the analysis is 
almost identical to that of Section 5.3, we turn directly to the key results of this 
section. 
We have the following proposition: 
Proposition 5.17. Assume congruent preferences, that campaign spending is not 
observable and k<n-1. Then, if 6< Sp, there exist belief profiles for which 
a pooling equilibrium with c<k candidates exists, where bi =R+ WL, bp = 
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[R - p(WH - WL)] ,c>1. 
Also, if Si, there exist belief profiles for which 
a separating equilibrium with c<k candidates exists, where 6=R+ WH, S' _ 
R/c, c>1. Finally, if c=k, then whatever the belief profile, there exists a pooling 
equilibrium if 6<k [R - p(WH - WL)], and a separating equilibrium if 6< R/k. 
Again, the belief profiles that support these equilibria "punish" non-equilibrium 
entrants; if some citizen decides to deviate by entering, all other citizens assign proba- 
bility 0 to the event that he is high-ability, and so will not vote for him. Consequently, 
he loses S by entering, and so will not deviate by entering. The upper bounds on S 
in the Proposition simply ensure that no candidate who is standing in equilibrium 
wishes to withdraw. Note also that in the case with k entrants, these equilibria exist 
whatever the beliefs. 
Using our adaptation of the formal definition of the Intuitive Criterion to our 
game, which has many "senders" and "receivers", and where we are assuming partic- 
ular play (conditional on beliefs) at the voting stage (see Section 5.3.3) we can show 
that by appropriate choice of b, the equilibria with unobservable campaign spending 
may fail the intuitive criterion. For example, consider a pooling equilibrium with 
c<k candidates. Suppose iýC deviates by entering, and R+ (1 - p)(WL - WH) > 
S>R- p(WL - WH). First, we check whether this action is equilibrium dominated. 
Initially, i was getting pWH + (1 - p)WL in equilibrium. But now, ua((1,6), 1, fr-i) = 
R+ Wa -b as by construction, voters assign probability 1 to the deviant being 
able, so all will vote for him. Then, for 6 in the specified range, it is easy to check 
that entering is equilibrium dominated only for the low-type, i. e. uH((1,6), 1, it-i) > 
PWH + (1 - P) WL > UL((1,6)) 1, fr-'). So, iýC can enter and credibly signal his 
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type simply by entering. By construction, his net gain to entry is positive. A similar 
argument implies that if R/(c + 1) >S> (R - WH + WL)/(c + 1), the separat- 
ing equilibrium with c candidates fails the Intuitive Criterion. Finally, note that for 
S>R- p(WL - WH), from Proposition 5.17, a pooling equilibrium with k candidates 
is also impossible. So, we have proved: 
Proposition 5.18. Assume that candidate spending is unobservable. Then if R+ 
(1 - p) (WL - WH) >ö>R- p(WL - WH), no pooling equilibrium exists that passes 
the Intuitive Criterion. Also, if R/(c+l) >b> (R-WH+WL)/(c+l), the separating 
equilibrium with c candidates fails the Intuitive Criterion. 
Now suppose that minimum entry cost 6 can be chosen at some constitutional 
stage. Again, we assume (realistically) that campaign costs are real resource costs, 
not transfers from entrants to non-entrants. In this case, a social planner would wish 
to maximize the sum of expected pay-offs (prior to the ability draw by nature), net of 
entry costs. In the pooling equilibrium, this sum is R +n(pWH + (1- p)WL) - EiEc öi, 
whereas in the separating equilibrium, this sum is R+ nWH - Ejec Si. So, given 
a fixed set of entrants, it is clearly desirable to induce a separating equilibrium. 
With unobservable campaign costs, this can be achieved at least cost as follows. 
If R- p(WH - WL) > R/2, then by setting S as close to R- p(WH - WL) as 
possible, all pooling equilibria are eliminated, and we are left with the one-candidate 
separating equilibrium. If R/3 <R- p(WH - WL) on the other hand, setting 
S ^-, R- p(WH - WL) will eliminate the one-candidate separating equilibrium, and 
we are left with the two-candidate separating equilibrium, implying that costs will 
be 2(R - p(WH - WL)), so it is always cheaper to set 6= R/2. So, we see that the 
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optimal choice is 6= max{R/2, R- p(WH - WL)} 
This therefore confirms that screening through an appropriate choice of 6 is fea- 
sible even when S is unobservable to voters. Although we have only analysed this in 
a variant of the one period model of Section 5.3, it is easy to check that this result 
would hold in a dynamic setting such as the Rogoff model of Sections 5.4 and 5.5. 
Hence, with congruent preferences, representative democracy can always be designed 
(via an appropriate cost of candidate entry) such that only high-ability citizens ever 
hold elected offices. 
5.7.8 Several Ability Types 
In this section, we check whether the strong result obtained in this chapter still holds 
in the case where several ability types exist rather than the two assumed so far, i. e. 
we check whether, with congruent preferences, candidate entry can always screen all 
but the highest ability types out of office. In this section we prove that this is indeed 
the case. 
We revisit the simple one period model of Section 5.3 (congruent preference case) 
and extend it to the case where there is now m potential ability types, i. e. a= 
{ 1, ..., m}, where we 
have the following ordering: al < ... < a,,,. 
The most able 
citizen is of type-m, the second most able is of type-(m - 1), and so on. In this 
section, pi - Pr (a = i), where i=1, ..., m. 
Given that we aim to check whether 
candidate entry can still screen all but the highest ability types, we limit our analysis 
to the case of congruent preferences, where we now define congruence as the case 
"Recall from Section 5.3 (congruent case), that with observable campaign costs, assuming that the 
equilibria that fail the Intuitive Criterion do not occur, a separating equilibrium with k candidates, 
and aggregate campaign costs Ei, =-c 
6 between Rand zero is the unique outcome. 
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where Wm + RR,,,, > WL_1 + Rt_1 > ... > Wl + R1. It is useful to regroup all types 
except type-m citizens into the category of L-types, for lower ability types. 
Since our analysis of Section 5.3 readily extends to this case, we directly turn to 
the analogous of Propositions 5.1 and 5.3, pertaining to equilibria in the congruent 
case, i. e. 
Proposition 5.19. Assume congruent preferences and k<n-1. Then, if S< 
S', there exist belief profiles for which an anonymous pooling (political) equilibrium 
exists, where every iEK enters with probability 1, and spends some ö<ö< bp", 
where SP = [R1 + Wl - Em 1 p2W2]. Also, if S<a, there exist belief profiles for 
which the following anonymous separating equilibria exist: (1) separating equilibrium: 
every iEK enters only if he is of highest ability and spends max{S, ö8e} <S< bse, 
where &e = i\mWm + jL,,, Rm, and bse = µm(Wm-i + Rin-1) + (Am - µm)Wm; (ii) 
(many) semi-separating equilibrium: every iEK enters except if he is below a given 
ability type-z, and spends max{S, S93} <S<., where S98 = /2z(Wý,, _z + 
Rm_z) 
+(A, - ii) >=z PZW2, bs= µz(Wm_z_i + Rm_z_i) +(A - µ. z) 
E 
j', PAW=. There 
are no other anonymous equilibria. 
Proposition 5.20. Assume that preferences are congruent. All pooling and all 
semi-separating equilibria fail the IC. Also, any separating equilibrium with campaign 
expenditure S> max{Sg97 S} fail the IC. 
Hence, as claimed, our screening result is robust to the case where several ability 
types are introduced. 
Conclusions 
5.8 Conclusions 
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This chapter shows that candidate entry may reveal valuable information (e. g. abil- 
ity), even in an environment where information is asymmetric between citizens and 
office-holders. For a revealing equilibrium to occur at the candidate entry stage, it is 
necessary that voters and candidates have common interests. If this is not the case 
so that office-holders' preferences differ from those of voters (e. g. if office-holders are 
corrupt), then representative democracy cannot screen out candidates less preferred 
by voters. Extensive extensions of our base model reveal that these strong results are 
robust to the introduction of more complex/realistic features. 
A first important conclusion of this chapter is therefore that, with congruent 
preferences between voters and office-holders, (representative) democracy is a more 
efficient institution than what the current political agency literature finds. We have 
illustrated this using Rogoff's seminal Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles model and 
showed that, with endogenous candidate entry, only high-ability citizens ever stand 
for election and are elected. As a result, once in office, a policy maker does not 
need to signal enhanced ability through distortionary fiscal policy, hence the political 
business cycle disappears. 
We should however note that this result is much more general than the current 
context which we have used to illustrate it. It applies to a general class of asymmet- 
ric information games in which an agent has an informational advantage (e. g. cost, 
ability, etc. ) and preferences are congruent between office-holders and the electorate. 
For instance, our result also applies to many asymmetric information games in mon- 
etary policy (e. g. Vickers, 1986; Barro, 1986; Rogoff, 1987,1989; Cukierman and 
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Meltzer, 1986b; Cukierman and Liviathan, 1991) and to recent models that have ex- 
tended these work (e. g. Bartolini and Drazen, 1997,1998; Cukierman and Tommasi, 
1998). 5° 
A second finding is that, whether (representative) democracy is an efficient mech- 
anism or not (a key debate between the Virginia and the Chicago schools60), crucially 
depends on whether voters and candidates have common or conflicting interests, and 
not on whether information is complete or not. We illustrated this point using a 
variant of the Rogoff model where citizens differ in honesty so that interests are con- 
flicting between the principal and the agent. In this case, the political business cycle 
can persist in equilibrium. 
An interesting issue which we have not addressed in this chapter is whether rep- 
resentative democracy is efficient in the Pareto sense of Besley and Coate (1998). 
Rather, in this chapter we have taken a more narrow view of efficiency, namely 
whether democracy can select high-ability candidates to hold office. On this effi- 
ciency criteria, Besley and Case (1997) show that, in a static model, representative 
democracy can fail to select high-ability policy makers when the electorate has het- 
erogeneous preferences. This chapter shows that this type of inefficiency can also arise 
in a model with homogenous preferences but in which information about candidates' 
ability is imperfect. 
Finally, our results have interesting policy implications. For instance, our model 
could help rationalize the very high cost of campaign contributions that is currently 
59See Drazen (2000a) for a graduate textbook exposition of many of these asymmetric information 
games in macroeconomics, and Drazen (2000b) for a recent review of the latest research on Political 
Business Cycles. 
60See Coate and Morris (1995) for a recent account of this debate. 
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observed in many democracies. This is especially true in the United States where, 
for instance, the 2000 campaign finance of George W. Bush is estimated to be over 
$180 millions; Jon Corzine, a successful Senate candidate raised $55m, almost $53m 
of which were from his own private fortune. One view of these campaign funds is 
that they are grounds for lobby group to "buy/capture" the attention of the running 
candidate for the lobby's interest. Contrarily to this view, this chapter shows that 
these costs of standing for election could be an efficient way for democracy to screen 
high-ability versus low-ability candidates as only the most able candidate can expect 
to recoup his campaign costs. Our model therefore gives a radically different policy 
conclusion on the current (and recurrent) debate in the US about campaign finance 
reform. Interestingly, on close inspection, the latest campaign finance reform bill (led 
by Senators McCain and Feingold) can be seen as vindicating both approaches to 
campaign finance. The aim of this proposed bill is to eliminate "soft money" (i. e. 
money which cannot be used for "express advocacy" purposes). The main source 
of these funds comes from Political Action Committees (PACs) which are effectively 
lobby groups. However, the McCain-Feingold legislation does not intend to limit the 
amount of funds that a candidate can use for his/her campaign. " In fact, according 
to the US Constitution's First Amendment (freedom of speech), it is unconstitutional 
to limit the amount of private funds that a candidate wants to spend towards her 
campaign. Besides from guaranteeing free speech, in our model, the First Amendment 
guarantees that the institutional mechanism highlighted in this chapter can always 
be applied. Nevertheless, our second key result of this chapter indicates that in 
61 As highlighted in Section 5.2, the source of a candidate's campaign funds can be classified into 
four categories. Funds received from PACs, funds received from individuals (each individual is 
limited in the amount he/she can give to a specific candidate), funds committed by the candidate 
himself/herself, and other miscellaneous funds. 
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countries in which corruption is endemic, these barriers to political participation 
and competition for office are clearly not desirable since, in this case, only dishonest 
citizens would ever stand for office. Although this prediction of our model needs to 
be tested directly, existing empirical evidence from democracies with varying degree 
of corruption support both of our key results: that the political business cycle is 
smaller, ceteris paribus, when the degree of congruence between office-holders and 
the electorate is high (e. g. Shi and Svensson, 2001). 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
During the 1990s, important institutional changes have taken place in the domain of 
monetary and fiscal policy. On the monetary front, there has been a growing trend to- 
wards increasing central bank independence. This heightened independence occurred 
not only in OECD countries, and especially in the current European Monetary Union 
member countries, but also in countries such as the former communist countries of 
Eastern Europe (Cukierman, 1992,1998). In the fiscal domain, these institutional 
changes have taken the form of fiscal constraints. These limit the discretionary power 
of elected governments. Possibly the most notorious early fiscal constraints are those 
contained in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which imposes conditions for European 
countries aiming to join the European Monetary Union. Among the Maastricht crite- 
ria, two were concerned with fiscal variables. One required that countries do not run 
budget deficits of more than 3 per cent of GDP, and the other required that the debt- 
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to-GDP ratio of a country be lower than 60 per cent. ' A common argument in favour 
of the introduction of fiscal constraints is that, left to their own device, office-holding 
politicians exhibit a tendency towards budget deficits. Fiscal constraints, by limiting 
"excessive" fiscal outcomes, can curb politically-induced excesses of governments. 
In the first part of the thesis, we analysed the effects (in terms of incentives and 
welfare) of various institutional designs aimed at curbing politically-induced budget 
deficits. Numerous empirical evidence indeed find political variables to be a signif- 
icant and important determinant of fiscal outcomes, and especially budget deficits 
(e. g. Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen, 1997; Shi and Svensson, 2001). Given that fiscal 
constraints have only recently been introduced at the national or federal level, an 
empirical investigation of these issues is not possible. In this thesis, we therefore 
analysed these issues from a theoretical viewpoint. The empirical findings on the 
specific political factors that give rise to political budget cycles and budget deficits 
informed our choice of a political agency model. 
As detailed in Chapter 2, the most appropriate model for the purpose of studying 
the endogenous incentive effects that alternative fiscal constraints have on policy 
makers is the model of Rogoff (1990). For our purpose, one limitation of the Rogoff 
model is that it assumes that the government's budget is balanced in every period; no 
debt can be issued by policy makers. Budget deficits being prohibited by assumption, 
there is therefore no possibility of analysing the effect of fiscal constraints on budget 
deficits. 
'The fiscal criteria of the Maastricht Treaty are not as strict as this. They contain some room 
for interpretation. For instance, a country can still qualify for entry into EMU even if its debt-to- 
GDP ratio is over the 60 per cent threshold provided its debt has been declining sufficiently (see De 
Grauwe (1997) for details). 
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Focusing on the study of politically-motivated budget deficits, in Chapter 2 we 
extend Rogoff's (1990) Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles model to one where 
deficit financing is possible, i. e. we introduce debt as a state variable. Using this 
extended fiscal policy model, we found the following key results. First, as in Rogoff's 
original model, on average an electoral fiscal cycle arises. A new finding is that, 
on average, electoral concerns induce policy makers to increase the budget deficit in 
the period prior to the election, and reduce the deficit in the post-election period. 
Second, we are able to show that high-ability office-holders run lower (ex post) budget 
deficits than low-ability ones. This might warrant the use of fiscal constraints on high 
budget deficits since only low-ability policy makers would create such deficits. We 
show however that a trade-off arises in the model. On the one hand, citizens' welfare 
is increased, ceteris paribus, when high-ability agents are in office; also, when in 
office, a high-type agent reveals himself by producing a lower budget deficit than a 
low-ability counterpart. On the other hand, in order to signal to the electorate that 
he is of high-ability, a high-type agent distorts fiscal policy away from its first-best 
equilibrium. Hence, from a welfare point of view, it is not clear a priori whether 
and, if so, what type of fiscal constraint should be imposed on office-motivated policy 
makers. A careful analysis is therefore warranted. We address these issues in Chapter 
3. 
Before turning to Chapter 3, we should note that the model constructed in Chapter 
2 is especially suited to a comparative analysis of various fiscal constraints for two 
reasons others than the ones highlighted above. First, the model explicitly separates 
public consumption expenditures from public investment outlays. These two key 
fiscal components have different consequences for the future of the fiscal position. 
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Hence, several countries have tended to discriminate between the two components 
when introducing fiscal constraints. 2 Second, the microfounded nature of the model 
enables us to study both the endogenous reaction of office-holders to the introduction 
of fiscal constraints, and the welfare consequences of the introduction of these fiscal 
constraints. Indeed, of the few research papers that investigated the effect of fiscal 
constraints on politically-motivated governments, all have based their formal analysis 
on ad hoc models, i. e. models that are not microfounded. For instance, the key result 
of Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), namely that fiscal constraints such as those of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, are desirable is fully driven by the arbitrary assumption 
that governments and citizens have a different discount factor. Given the assumption 
that governments are myopic, it is not very surprising that their chosen policy is 
sub-optimal and that a constraint can improve upon this. A key positive result of 
our chapter is to show that fiscal constraints can indeed be desirable (although this is 
not necessarily the case) in a fully microfounded model in which the initial political 
distortion is derived rather than assumed. 
More specifically, building on the model of Chapter 2, in Chapter 3 we analyse 
the effects of imposing various types of constitutional fiscal constraints on sovereign 
states. The following fiscal constraints are investigated: (i) the ceilings approach of 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) for European Monetary Union countries; (ii) 
the "Golden Rule" of public investment of the Code for Fiscal Stability for the United 
Kingdom (which states that the issuance of public debt should be strictly limited to 
the financing of public investment, and not public consumption expenditures); and 
(iii) a Balanced-Budget-Rule such as the one recently considered by the US Congress. 
2For instance, the United Kingdom's Code for Fiscal Stability places limits on public consumption 
expenditures but not on public investment. 
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The main results of Chapter 3 are the following. We first showed that an important 
distinction has to be made between two types of budget deficits: (i) incompetency- 
generated "excessive" budget deficits which arise when the office-holder has low- 
ability; and (ii) politically-generated "excessive" budget deficits which arise when the 
high-ability office-holder distorts fiscal policy away from the first-best in order to 
signal her enhanced ability. The former type of deficit is conditionally efficient in the 
sense that, given the ability type of the office-holder, fiscal policy is set optimally. 
However, it is inefficient since citizens would be better-off with a high-ability office- 
holder pursuing his first-best policy. The latter type of deficits is inefficient due to 
the signalling distortion arising in election periods (however, in off-election periods 
an efficient policy is pursued). 
We find that fiscal constraints aiming to reduce incompetency-generated budget 
deficits (i. e. the absolute deficit level) do provide effective incentives for politicians in 
office to limit budget deficits. However, we showed that all instruments available to 
policy makers should be taken into account when designing fiscal constraints. Indeed, 
if only a subset of (fiscal) instruments is restrained, then politician will substitute re- 
stricted with unrestricted instruments and still create a political fiscal cycle. When 
constraints aim to limit politically-generated deficits and cycles, we find that only 
a Golden Rule of public investment can be welfare improving compared to a fully 
discretionary policy set by office-motivated politicians. We show that an "optimal" 
constraint that mixes elements of the UK Golden Rule (i. e. the timing of the con- 
straint) with the ceilings approach of the SGP performs best in our model, despite 
still not achieving the first-best. Hence, one key positive achievement of Chapter 
3 is that we have provided a rational for some type of fiscal constraints to be intro- 
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duced in a one-country framework without having recourse to ad hoc assumptions 
(e. g. Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999) or to fiscal externalities in multi-jurisdictions (e. g. 
Chari and Kehoe, 1998). This, to the best of our knowledge, does not exist in the 
literature. 
In the second part of the thesis (Chapters 4 and 5), we investigate the robustness 
of the political agency literature. In particular, in Chapter 4, we revisit a "standard" 
political agency model that can feature both adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems (e. g. based on the recent work of Banks and Sundaram, 1998) and assess 
the robustness of key results to changes in (i) the information structure assumed, and 
(ii) the modelling of the electoral process. We find that two apparently robust results 
of the literature are in fact critically dependent on modelling assumptions. 
The first result of the literature is that, by following a cutoff rule (i. e. to re- 
elect the incumbent policy maker if his observed performance in office is above a 
certain critical level), voters can always motivate the office-holder (to supply more 
effort, extract less rent, etc. ). We show that in a dynamic model with symmetric 
incomplete information (rather than asymmetric information as is often assumed in 
the literature) and a multiplicative technology (in ability and effort), elections can in 
fact demotivate the office-holder. 3 This new result in the political agency literature 
is due to an experimentation effect. ' (As far as we know this experimentation result 
does not appear in the much more extensive agency literature focusing on the theory 
of the firm either). Hence, too much electoral control can lead to increased short- 
terrnism from office-holders. The short-termism of politicians, especially in the US 
3That is, conditional on ability, first-period equilibrium effort may be lower in democracy than 
with appointment/dictatorship. 
4i. e. the fact that the incumbent deviates from the myopically optimal action that just maximizes 
the current payoff in order to improve the information content of his signal about his own ability. 
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for the House of Representatives with its two-year mandates, is well recognised in the 
Political Science literature (e. g. King's 1997 treatise on the subject). 
The second important result in the literature that we challenge is that voters fol- 
lowing a cutoff rule (on observable performance in office) for re-appointing an office- 
holder is an optimal mechanism in providing incentives to politicians. We showed 
that this result arises in the literature since the electoral process is modelled in an 
incomplete, partial equilibrium way. Indeed, extending the Representative Democ- 
racy/Citizen Candidate models of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate 
(1997) to an environment of asymmetric information, we can show that a better in- 
centive mechanism than the cutoff rule on observable policy variables can be designed 
depending on whether adverse selection or moral hazard dominates as the agency is- 
sue. This is because, with a representative democracy, we can show that two types 
of equilibria are possible: revealing, where candidate entry screens out all but high- 
ability citizens from office, and non revealing, where screening does not occur and 
both high and low-ability politicians can be in office. In this latter case, which is 
akin to the partial democracy modelling present in the literature, a cutoff rule is then 
desirable. However, in the former case, if moral hazard is not an important problem, 
then a properly designed electoral system, whereby the cost of standing for election 
is set at a constitutional stage sufficiently high, can be Pareto improving compared 
to the policy cutoff rule. ' The general message of this chapter is that the selection 
and retention process of an agent are important elements of job design in agency 
relationships. 
In Chapter 5, we investigate further the robustness of the political agency lit- 
'Indeed, as we show later in Chapter 5, if moral hazard problems axe not present (as in Rogoff's 
1990 model) then a revealing equilibrium at the entry stage leads to a first-best outcome. 
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erature in an environment of asymmetric information. In particular we investigate 
whether introducing a general equilibrium citizen-candidate model ä la Besley and 
Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996) can affect the results found in partial 
equilibrium electoral games. We are able to show that candidate entry may reveal 
valuable private information (such as ability). This revealing equilibrium can only 
arise if citizens and candidates have common preferences. If this is not the case, for 
instance because office-holding politicians are corrupt, then representative democracy 
cannot screen out candidates less preferred by voters. An application of this result to 
Rogoff's (1990) Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles model shows that this leads to 
sharp, and novel, results. With endogenous candidate entry, only high-ability citizens 
ever stand for election and are elected. This eliminates the need for distortionary sig- 
nalling through policy by office-holders (no Political Budget Cycles). A first-best is 
achieved. In a modified version of Rogoff's model where politicians and voters have 
non congruent preferences, we are however able to show that a political budget cycle 
still arises. 
We conjecture that these sharp results would arise in a general class of asymmet- 
ric information games in which an agent has an informational advantage (e. g. cost, 
ability, etc. ) and is randomly selected in the first-period of office. An important liter- 
ature in monetary economics used such asymmetric information games (e. g. Backus 
and Driflill, 1985; Vickers, 1986; Barro, 1986; Rogoff, 1987 and 1989; Cukierman and 
Meltzer, 1986b; Cukierman and Liviathan, 1991). 
Chapter 5 also sheds some light on the (long) debate between the Virginia and 
the Chicago schools about whether democracy is an efficient mechanism or not. In- 
deed, we can show that the efficiency result crucially depends on whether voters and 
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candidates have common or conflicting interests, and not on whether information is 
complete or not as has often been claimed in the literature. 6 
Our results obtained in Chapter 5 also have important bearing on our theoretical 
analysis of Part I of the thesis. Indeed, given that Chapters 2 and 3 build on the 
model of Rogoff (1990), our screening result would apply directly to them. Hence, 
as in Chapter 5, a Pareto-improvement leading to the first-best can be designed at 
a constitutional stage by optimally setting the cost of standing for election. Applied 
to our analysis of fiscal constraints in Chapter 3, an important policy conclusion 
would therefore be that improving the electoral process and strengthening the demo- 
cratic regime of a country could be preferable to the introduction of fiscal constraints 
in reducing political distortions such as politically-induced business or fiscal cycles. 
However, as another key result of Chapter 5 showed, elections can only perform as a 
screening mechanism if politicians and citizens have congruent preferences. If this is 
not the case, then clearly, our analysis of and results on fiscal constraints in Chapter 3 
(and also our model of Chapter 2) would still hold (this can be seen by re-interpreting 
the model along the lines of our "Rogoff Model with an Agency Problem" in Section 
5.6 (where office-holders aim to extract economic rent)). 
Finally, we believe that, in the light of our results in this thesis, several avenues for 
future research would be worth investigating. The most important one, we believe, 
would be to test the theoretical predictions of Chapter 5, since these predictions 
obtained are precise enough to be directly tested and also given the strong theoretical 
results obtained. Indeed, as we argued in the conclusion of Chapter 5, our results 
potentially have important policy implications. Empirically testing the validity of 
6See Coate and Morris (1995) for a recent account of this debate. 
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our theory is therefore highly desirable. An empirical approach that follows Besley 
and Case's (1995a) econometric analysis of the interaction between US Gubernatorial 
elections and economic outcomes could be appropriate to, for instance, test whether 
high cost of candidate entry (e. g. high campaign costs) reduce politically-induced 
cycles. As detailed in Chapter 5, the empirical results of Shi and Svensson (2001) 
already corroborate our theory. More precise tests are desirable. 
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Appendix A 
Appendix to Chapter 2 
A. 1 Proof of Proposition 2.1 
Using the definition of Z, we have 
1(g1,7-1, b) 1 Z(91,7-1, b, 1i 8H)-Z[9H"TH, bH, 0+OH] ýý0J 
f (9i, Ti, b) I0< u* (ci, 9i) -u (ci, 9i) b=S+ [v* 
l(OH) v 
(OH) + U* (C21 92i OH) -U 
(C2, g2, OH)] G OH {7r[()] - 7r[111 
and 
lL 
A- {(91, T1, b) I 6kL7r [11 +W (OL) - 
LL7f [01 
- 
WL < 0} 
(gi, 71, b) I u* (c1,91) -u (c,, gi) b . ýQ =S+ [v* (OL) - V(OL) + u* (C2) 92) OL) -u (c2) 927 BL)] ý OL {7r [11 - 7r [0l} >0 
Thus given that AH > OL and v" < 0, the intersection of the two sets is nonempty. 
O 
A. 2 Proof of Proposition 2.2 
After rearranging equation (2.23) 
A __ 
f (g1, T1, b) 1 OL7T (0) + WL* - OL1r 
(1) 
- u(y - T1 - b, g1) (A. 1) ll 
-v 
[T1 + BL - 91 +b-f 
(T1) ]-J (b, OL) >- 01 
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Given the Inada conditions on u and v, any solution to equation (2.26) must have 
g1, ri, b>0. 
The Lagrangian is given by 
L= u(y-, rl-b, gi)+v[T1+BH-gl+b-f(7-1)]+J(b, 9H) (A. 2) 
+A{tco-u(y-T1-b, 91)-v[T1+19L-91+b-f(rl)]-J(b, OL)} 
where ro - OL [7r (0) -7 (1)] + WL. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions reduce to: 
f'(7-0, (= 0 if y- r1 (A)3) 
ug - v'' -A [u9 - vL] < 0, (= 0 if gl > 0) (A. 4) 
ue - v1 +r f'(Ta)u9(c2,92) -A 
VL [ 
+r f'(r2)u (c2,9a) 
]<0, 
(= 0 if cl > 0) (A. 5) 
Ko -u(. ) -v(. ) -J (b, BL) > 0, (= 0 if X> 0) (A. 6) 
Given the Inada conditions, (A. 3) to (A. 5) imply that 1_ f1 (T1) uc(cl, gl) = uc(cl, gl)+ 
r f' (r2) Ug(c2) 92) = u9(cl, gl). This equation governs the downward sloping income 
extension path gl =0 (b) in Figure 2.2. We are able to determinate uniquely gl, 
rrl, and b thanks to the introduction of distortionary taxes in the first period. (A. 6) 
is the constraint (gl, 'rl, b) E A, the set of points on or outside the dashed sphere. 
Assume that \>0 so that (A. 6) is binding. Equations (A. 3)-(A. 5) are then satis- 
fled at exactly two distinct points. At point H8(A < 1; 1_ fl(T1)uC(cl, gl) = uc(cl, gl) + 
rf' (72) u9(c2,92) = us(c1,9i) < v'r) and at point F(A > 1; uC(cl, 9i) = uc(ci, 9i)+ 
r f' (72) u9(c2i 92) = u9(cl, gl) > vj). To check the second order conditions at points 
H3 and F, we form the bordered Hessian 
Proof of Proposition 2.3 
0 GT G9 Gb 
Cr LTT LTg LTb 
B= _ Gg Lgr Lgg L9b 
Gb Lb, Lb9 Lbb 
where 
Ci no -u(y-T1-b, gl)-v[T1+8L-g1+b- 
f (Ti)]-J(b, OL) 
IBl1 _ _G2 <0 
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B21 - -G? 1L9191 + 
2GT1G91LT1s1 - GTILTITI 
= 
(1 
- 
A) [2u, 
191 - 
ug1J1 - UT1T1} ßu91 - 7i1)2 
Since all goods are normal, this means that 2ur191 - u91s1 - u, 1T1 > 0. For the second 
order condition to hold, I B21 must be strictly positive. This can only occur for A<1. 
Therefore point F cannot be a maximum. For point H8 to be a maximum, we need 
1B31 < 0, which we assume is satisfied. 0 
A. 3 Proof of Proposition 2.3 
Suppose (g7, Ti, bz) is any point selected with positive probability by both types in a 
pooling equilibria. Let 
XI (gl, rrl, b) - Z(gl, 7-1, b, 1,0') - Z[gi, Ti, bz, p(gi, -ri, bZ), 91 ], where the incumbent 
I can be of ability aE {H, L}. 
Select [gl, ý(gl, b), ý(T1i gl)] such that 
(a) 
ýYýg1 
6) + ýýT1 91ý - 91 < Tg + bH - gi , and 
(b) X, ' 1, ß(9i, b), ý(Ti, 9i)) = 0. 
Given that v (0) = -oo and ir(1) > ir(p), such a combination exists and is feasible. 
Note that 0(g1, b) + 0(ýrl, gl) - gl <r+ bz - gi since u[y - 0(gl, b) - ß(-r1, gl), g1] 
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> u[y-Ti-bz, gi] if «(gl, b)+0(Tl, gl)-gl = Ti+bz-gi. Then since v" < 0, it follows 
that XL [gl, ý(gl, b) + ý(rl, gl)] < 0. Thus by the continuity of XI, kk >0 such that 
XH>0 and XL [9i - C, 0(9i, b) < 0. 
The geometric intuition is that there must always exist some point on 0 (rrl, b) 
sufficiently far southeast of H in the (gi, T i) and (gl, b) planes, and southwest in the 
(b, 7-1) plane in Figure 2.2 such that both (2.28) and (2.29) hold. 0 
A. 4 Proof of Proposition 2.4 
This derives directly from observation of equations (2.11)-(2.13). 
Consider the case where distortionaxy taxes are excluded. In this case the system 
(2.11)-(2.13) becomes: 
T1dW = 0: u, <v (71 i0) 
7-1 
dW 
91 dgl =0: u9 =V 
' (9i > 0) 
b 
db 
= 0: u, <v' (b>0) 
That is, we obtain a system of two equations out of which only two variables can be 
unknown. In this system we can only determine gl and (r1 + b). Only the sum of 
first-period taxes and debt is defined, the composition between the two is irrelevant. 
Introducing distortionary taxes enables us to have a system of three equation in three 
unknown (rj, gl, b) thereby breaking the Ricardian Equivalence proposition. 0 
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A. 5 Proof of Proposition 2.7 
We want to prove that 9H8 -TH-1 +f (THS) -OH < 9L -TL+ f (TL) -OL for a sufficiently 
high level of "ego rent", i. e. that (gj - Tj-js +f (TH8))-(ge - TL +f (TL)) < OH-BL 
in the undominated separating equilibria of Section 2.3. 
We will prove this by using a revealed preference argument. Let us construct a 
hypothetical allocation in which half of the competency advantage of the high-type 
(i. e. 2(OH - 
OL)) is spent on increasing first-period government consumption goods 
(gl), and the other half is spent on reducing first period taxes. Denote by a "hat" 
this hypothetical allocation, so we have gH = gL +2 (8H - 
OL), TH = TL +2 (OH - 
BL) 
CH - CL, k2, H = k2, L, bH = bL. If this allocation is feasible (i. e. if (gH, 'rH) bH) E A) 
then given that cl, gl, k2 are normal goods, using a revealed preference argument, 
we know that (gH8 - THe +f 
(TH')) 
- 
(gL 
- TL +f 
(TL)) < OH - 
BL is satisfied, i. e. 
a competent incumbent would strictly prefer to allocate her competency advantage 
across the various goods. 
For (gH, TH) 6H) EA, we need 
o-U(y-T1-b'91) -V 
[Tl 
+ OL - §1+b- 
f (r1)] -, J(b, 
OL) %0 
where Ko - OL [7r (0) - it (1)] + WW, and OL -R+ WL - W°, with W° - pWH + 
(1 - P) WL. 
This is equivalent to 
IGp - u(y - 
bL, 9L +VH- /Lý >0 
1 -v[OH-9L+bL] - J(bi, 9L) 
} 
OL [7r (0) - 7r 
(1)] + u(y - bL, gL) 
1.8. to +v [9L - 9L + b*L] +J 
(bi) OL) 
- u(y - 
bL, 9L + BH - OL) %0 
-v[ H- gL+bL] - J(bi, 
BL) 
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This inequality will hold the higher the "ego rent" (R) of incumbent policy makers. 
We assume that the ego rent is sufficiently high so that the inequality is satisfied. O 
Appendix B 
Appendix to Chapter 3 
B. 1 Proof of Proposition 3.2 
Using the definition of Z, we have 
{ (9i, Ti, b) 1 Z(9i, Ti, b, 1, 
OH) 
- Z[gH, r 
,, bH, 0,9H] > 0} 
r (9i, Ti, b) 10< u*(ci, 9i) - u(ci, 91) 5+ [v* (OH) 
- v(GH) + u*(C2,92, 
BH) 
- u(c2,92, OH)]C 
OH 17r[01 
- 7r(111 
and 
Aemu = 1(91, T1, 
b)I OLenU (ir [11 - it 
[01) +W (OL, WDu, We u) - 
W**(OL, pD uý ýje u` Ol 
b , 
Qemu =J 
(g1, T1, b) I u**(ci gi) - u(c1,91) 
=1+ [V**(OL) 
- VOL) + U**(C2192i 
OL) 
- u(c2,92, 
OL)] ! OLnmu 17r[11 -77r[O] 
}>0 
where a star superscript refer to the full information equilibrium (no constraints), 
and two superscripted stars refer to the full information equilibrium obtained when 
fiscal constraints are binding. We know that OH > OL. From the definition of the 
surplus from winning, it is clear that LL >' Lemu. Thus given that OH > AL. mu and 
u", v" < 0, the intersection of the sets B and Alu is nonempty. Q 
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B. 2 Proof of Proposition 3.3 
For a low-type, we problem is to (recall that for a high-type the constraints are not 
binding) 
emu emu y-T2+rb, T2-BBL-rb-max{TDu(b-b), 0} m 
7*2 
1 
ax J(b, BL, ýD , 4`B 
)=U 
-max {q'B 
u(9i - T1 - 
BL + 
,f 
(Ti) 
- d), 01 
The Lagrangian is 
L= u(y-T1 -b, gi)+v[r1+°H -gl+b- f (Ti)]+J(b, OH) 
+A{Kp - u(y - Tl - 
b, 91) -V 
[T1 + OL - gi +b-f 
(T1)] 
-J[y - 72 + Tb, T2+OL - rb -Te u(b - b) - wB 
U(gl 
- Ti - BL +f 
(T 
l) - d)ý I 
where co - LL[1t(0) - ir (1)] +W *(9L). 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
-U, + (1 - fý) tiH +A [u, - (1 - f') v'L - (1 - f')`I'B uJLl _0 (B. 1) 
u9-41H+A[-u9+ 'UL-i-WB u41 =0 (B. 2) 
-iL, -i-vH-ý%l11, -vL-I-11 D"fiý -0 
(B. 3) 
r. o -u-v-J (b, OL, lYB ") ý, D ") >0 (B. 4) 
(=0 ifA>0) 
The Inada conditions insure an interior solution. Hence (B. 1) to (B. 3) imply: (1 - 
f/)-lug-A(1-, \)-lqjý uJL = YLy-ý(1-ý)-1ýý uýL = 1lC-ýi1(1-A)-1JPe D 
uJL. (B. 4) 
is the constraint (gl, T1, b) E Ae71U, the set of points on or outside the dashed circles 
in Figure 3.3. Assume that \>0 so that (B. 4) is binding. The first-order conditions 
are then satisfied at exactly two distinct points. At point Hemu(A < 1; (1 - fl)-1uc - 
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A(1 - A)-iq, B uJi = u9 - A(1 - A)-lTe u JJ = uc + \(1 - A)-llpe uJL < v]) and 
at point Femu(A > 1; (1 - f')-iu, - A(1 - A)-lw "JL = u9 - A(1 - a)-i, I, B uff' = 
uc + A(1 - A) -' WY Du JL > v'1) . To check the second order conditions at points Hem u 
and Fe 'U, we form the bordered Hessian: 
0 GT G9 Gb 
B= 
GT LTT LT9 LTb 
_ Gg Lgr Lgg L9b 
Gb LbT Lbg Lbb 
where 
G tco-u(y-T1-b, gi)-v['r1+OL-gl+b- f(Ti)] 
-J (Y - T2 + rb, T2+9L - rb - xP " 
(b - b) - ýä 
u (91 
- T1 - 
BL + 
,f 
(TO 
- dl ) D 
and 
= -GTl <0 J BI J 
B21 _ -G 2l L9ýs, + 2G71 Gg1 Lr191 - GTl LTITl 
//// emv / 2/ // 1 emu 2 /i 
-- 
[uT1 
- ll - 
f) vL - ll -f 
ýýB JF 
\1 - 
)) [U9igi + vl - 
\(l 
- 
\) ýýB 
`ILý 
L/+ 
Wemu /I + 11 LB 'ýL +2 
[u1 
- 
(1 
- 
f/)' 
- 
(vL/1 
- 
f/)TBemu'E/I [-u9, 
*{-(1-A) [u"m+(1-f')vi -A(1-A)-1(1- f')(WB ")2J"]} 
i'i emu i 2/ Urlrl 
+ (1 - 
f')2Y11 
- 
ýu 
- 
(1 
-f 
)vL 
- 
(1 
-f 
)pB 
'JL](1 ý)-1(1 - 
f')2(' 
B 
u)2JL 
For the second order condition to hold, IB21 must be strictly positive. Given our 
assumptions regarding the utility functions (cf. Section 2.3.1) and the fact that we 
have normal goods, the first and third terms of I B21 are strictly positive if and only 
if A<2.1 The second term of I B21 is also strictly positive. The reason being that 
1 Note that: 
slim 
(1 aa) = oo, Ali 
m 
(1-A )=0, 
=1 for A=1, 
slim 
()= 
-0c), 
lim (laa) _ -1. 
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the two square brackets are equal and therefore have the same sign (from (3.3)). The 
curly bracket is strictly positive provided that A<1. Thus, point Fmu which occurs 
when occur for A>1 cannot be a maximum. For point Hem' to be a maximum, we 
need I B31 < 0, which we assume is satisfied. Q 
B. 3 Proof of Proposition 3.4 
We first prove that gHemu - THemu - 
8H +, f (T jjemu) < 
j. 
We know from Proposition 2.7 that it is possible to design a budget deficit ceiling such 
that: gHe -THe -BH+ 
f (THs) <d< gL-TL-9L+ f (TL). Given that gHemu < 9H", and 
that THemu > THa it is clear that introducing a constraint that originally binds only 
on the low-type also reduces the budget deficit of the high-type leader (because the 
latter needs to undertake less signalling because the constraint further disadvantages 
the former). 
Proving that bHemu <6 is satisfied is immediate given that we have found that 
bHemu < bHa and that originally the debt ceiling was such that bHa < b. Q 
B. 4 Proof of Proposition 3.5 
Note that we have 
ßu' = {(91, Ti, b) 1 Z(gl, 7-1, b, 1, OH _Z 91*'(eHýTýBHý 
)e 2(j ö e; s' X28)' > a} 
and 
** us ue * us us 
Aua 
-1 
(91, Tl, b) 1 Z(91, T1, b, 1, OL) -Z 
gl eLi ýl e 
ý2 ýýT1 BL, ý1 
e 
ý2 ýý 
5O} 
Proof of Proposition 3.5 
A- Under full information, the Lagrangian is 
L= u(y - , rl - b, gl) + v[-rl + BI -gi +b- f (7-1) - `I'i9(g1 - 7-1 + 
f(7-1))] 
+J[y-7r2+rb, r2+BI -rb-W28(9i --ri - B, + f (Ti))] 
The first-order conditions are 
dL 
=0: u, = (1 + eis)(1 - f')v'I + W29J' dT lI 
dL 
= 0u9=(1+tpis)vI+ý28Jr dgl 
dL 
db = 
O: u, =yr 
Hence we obtain 
1T us 1 %F ua 
_i __ 
2i 
+ is)uc 1+ usJI 1 +-, i u9 l+ %Fus Uc = v1 
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B- Under asymmetric information (high-type only), the Lagrangian is the fol- 
lowing 
L u(y-rr1-b, gi)+v[T1+OH -gl+b-f (7ri)-Wff(gi-Ti+f(Ti))] 
+JH[y - 7-2 + rb, 7»2 + 9H - rb - IP2(9i - 7-1 - BH +f (Ti)] 
+AfKo -u(y - Tl - 
b, 91) -'IL[Y-T2+rb, r2+BL-rb-xP28(91-T1 -BL+f(T1))] 
-v[Ti+OL-gi+b- 
f (T1) 
-W18(g1-T1+f(T1))]l 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are 
dL I -ul + f')(1 + ýie)vH T1=0: 
+ (1 - f')428J'N 0 (B) 
dri +A [u, - (1 - f')(1 + %F )vL (1 f')'y2eJi1 
}=. 
5 
dL u9-(1+T18)v'N- ý2 91 _0 (B. 6) d91 
0 [-ug+(1+ 18)v' +2SJJ] 
}- 
bldb = 0: -u+v' +A[u, -v'L] =0 (B. 7) 
i 
dL 
_ did 
0: I£p -u-v 
(Wie) 
-JL 
(b, 9L, W 
28) 
!0 (B. 8) 
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where no - OL [ir (0) - 7r (1)] +W**(OL, 'Plus, `yes) 
The Inada conditions ensure an interior solution. Hence equations (B. 5) to (B. 7) im- 
ply R1 -fß)(1 + 
Tus)] -1 uC-4129(1+ 4JUS) JL = (1+W18)-lug-ý23(1+ýis)-1 JL = 
u, = v'' . 
(B. 8) is the constraint (g1, r1, b) E Aus, the set of points on or outside the 
dashed circles in Figure 3.3. Assume that A>0 so that (B. 8) is binding. The first- 
order conditions are then satisfied at exactly two distinct points. At point HT9(A < 1; 
[(1 
- 
f')(1 + 19)]-1 uC - 'I'(1 + 
Wig)-1 JG = (1 + Pj18)-lug - 
W8(1 + %Pus) -1 JL = 
uc < vr) and at point Fus(A > 1; [(1 - f')(1 +'Pi')]-1 Ur - 'I' (1 + ßy18)-1J'L = 
(1 + Iris)-lug -x, 29(1 + ß, i9)-1 JJ = uc > v''1). To check the second order conditions 
at points HUs and Fu', we form a bordered Hessian IBI (see proof of Proposition 3.3). 
In this bordered Hessian, 
G= ico - u(y - T1 - b, gi) - v[rl + 9L - gl +b-f (Ti) - Ji9(gl - Ti + f(T1))] 
-JL[y-T2+rb, T2+OL -rb-W28(g1 -T1 -BL+, 
f(T1))] 
<0 r, 
IB1I = -G2 
IB21 _ -G2 T Ti 1L9i9i + 2GTiGg, L,, g, - G2 LTIT1 
-fß)(1 +W 8)v'L - (1 - f')WUBji ]2 (1 - , 1) 22 
(1+%p ua 2 ua 2 iL *ýu9191+ 1vI- (W2)Jý 
+2 [u71 - 
(1 
- 
f')(1 +'28)v' - 
(1 
- f')'28JG] 
[-u91 + (1 +'P 8)V + WusjL/ i 
[Urlgl + (1 - f')(1 +'P 
)2vl + (1 -f 
1)(W28)2J11 } 
- 
[ui, 
-+ -W28)vL - 
(1 
- fF)WU3JL]2 
For the second order condition to hold, I B21 must be strictly positive. Given our 
assumptions regarding the utility functions (cf. Section 2.3.1) and the fact that we 
Proof of Proposition 3.10 290 
have normal goods, the first and third terms of IB21 are strictly positive if and only 
if A<1. The second term of IB21 is also strictly positive. The reason being that the 
two square brackets are equal and therefore have the same sign. The curly bracket is 
strictly positive provided that A<1. Thus, point FL8 which occurs when occur for 
A>1 cannot be a maximum. For point H"s to be a maximum, we need I B31 < 0, 
which we assume is satisfied. Q 
Note that the derivations for the UK's Golden Rule are the same as for the US 
balanced-budget rule but for the replacement of wig by W and setting X28 to zero. 
They are therefore omitted. 
B. 5 Proof of Proposition 3.10 
Under asymmetric information (high-type only) 
li = u(y-T1-b, g1) +v[T1+OH -91+b- f(T1) - 
*(91-r1+f(T1) 
-d*)] 
+JH[y-72+rb, r2+OH -rb] +A{rp-u(y-T1-b, 91) 
-, JL[y-T2+rb, T2+OL-rb]-v[T1+OL -91 +b -f 
(7-1)1I 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are 
T1 
dT =0: -uc + (1 f')(1 + W*)v (9H) +A [uc - (1 - f')v'(OL)] =0 
dL 
9i- =0: u9 - (1 + W*)v'(OH) +X [-u9 + VI(OL)] =0 dgl 
b 
dL 
=0: -uc + v'(OH) +A [uo - VI (OL) 0 
dL 
_ O: Kp -u- J(OL) - v(OL) >0 A 
By analogy with the proofs of Propositions 3.3 and 3.5, it is easy (but cumbersome) 
to show that in the undominated separating equilibria we obtain [1 - f']-1 u« - (1 - 
Low-Type's Fbil Information Equilibrium Under the SGP Constraints 291 
f ý) [1 - A]-1 %*vH = u9 - 
[1 
- A]-1 W*v'H = u, < v'I. Q 
B. 6 Low-Type's Full Information Equilibrium Un- 
der the SGP Constraints 
The Lagrangian for the low-type incumbent is 
L=u(y-r1 -b, gi)+v[rri+0-gl+b-f (-ri)]+J(b, 0, WB, Wj) 
The first-order conditions are 
dL 
d=0: -uc+v'(1- 
f')+(1- f') BJ=0 
7-1 
dL 
= O: u9-v'-'PBJ=O dgl 
dL 
db = 
0: -uC+v'-WDJ=O 
Hence, the low-type's strategy is given by equation (3.3). Q 
Appendix C 
Appendix to Chapter 4 
C. 1 Proofs of Propositions 
C. 1.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1 
We show that the equilibrium described exists and is unique by backwards induction. 
First, it is clear that any iEN who is elected at period 2 chooses e*(xi). Next, 
consider the behaviour of the voters, given any candidate set C2. Let C2 H, C2 be the 
partition of C2 into high and low-ability types. All jE N/C2 will vote for their most- 
preferred candidate m(C2) = maxEC.. Now, by Assumption 4.1, v,, (0) > v, (1), i. e. 
every candidate's most preferred candidate is herself, so iE C2 will vote for herself. 
Now consider the candidate entry decision in period 2. 
Case 1. C2 # N. In this case, if mH enters the election, she will surely win, no 
matter who else stands. As v0(1) >6 from Assumption 4.1, mH will surely enter. 
But in this case any j$ mH who enters will surely lose ö, and so will not enter. So, 
C2 = {mH} . 
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Case 2. Cl = N. In this case, at the voting stage, every candidate votes for himself 
so and is elected to be office-holder with probability 1/n. The payoff to i from entry 
is thus is -1vo(xti) -6 which is negative for all agents by Assumption 4.2. On the other 
hand, any iEN can guarantee herself a positive payoff by not entering. So, this case 
is impossible in equilibrium. 
So we have demonstrated that in the second period, whatever happened in the 
first period, there is a unique equilibrium where only mH stands for election and is 
elected (by default, as abstentions are ruled out). 
Now consider the first period. The structure of the first period is exactly the 
same as the second, and there is no "state" variable that links the two periods (as 
information is complete). So, we have a twice-repeated game. It follows that the 
first-period equilibrium is unique and has the same structure as the second-period 
one. O 
C. 1.2 Proof of Proposition 4.5 
We show that the perfect Bayesian equilibrium described exists and is unique by 
backwards induction. First, it is clear that any iEN who is elected at period 2 
chooses e*(p) if he was not a first-period office-holder, and chooses e` (p'(gl)) if he 
was a first-period office-holder. 
Next, consider the behaviour of the voters, given any candidate set C2. The first 
case is where the incumbent (say i) is not in C2. Then, the voters in N/C2 will vote 
for their most preferred candidate in C2. By our assumption about beliefs, voters 
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believe that any member of C2 is a high-type with probability p. So, they prefer the 
one with the highest index, m(C2) = maxiEc2. Finally, by Assumption 4.1, every 
candidate will vote for herself. 
The second case is where the incumbent (say i) is in C2. Then, all voters know 
that i is high-ability with probability pc(gl), and believe that any jE C2/{i} is high- 
ability with probability p. So, if gl > gl, all voters in N/C2 will vote for i. Also, i 
will vote for herself by Assumption 4.1. The remaining voters, i. e. C2/ {i} will either 
vote for themselves or for i, as v,, (p) is greater or less than v, (pC (gl)). If gi < gl, 
all voters in N/C2 will vote for m(C2) = maxjEc2/{j} " 
Also, i will vote for herself or 
m' (C2) as vo (pC (gl)) is greater or less than v, (p). The remaining voters, i. e. C2/ {i} 
will either vote for themselves by Assumption 4.1. If gl = gl, all voters in N/C2 will 
vote for m(C2) = maxjEc2. The remaining voters, i. e. C2 will vote for themselves by 
Assumption 4.1. 
Now consider the candidate entry decision in period 2. 
Case 1. Cl N. If go > go, and the incumbent i enters the election, she will 
surely win, no matter who else stands. So, the incumbent will be the only entrant. 
Now let 
l-n 
if i <n (C1.1) 
n-1 ifi=n 
If gl < gl, if l enters the election, 1= m' (C2), so she will surely win, no matter 
who else stands (including the incumbent). So, l will be the only entrant. Finally, if 
gl = gl, if n enters the election, n=m (C2), so she will surely win, no matter who 
else stands (including the incumbent). So, n will be the only entrant. 
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Case 2. C2 = N. In this case, at the voting stage, every candidate votes for himself 
and is elected to be office-holder with probability 1/n. The payoff to any agent who is 
not the incumbent from entry is thus is nv,, (p) - 6, which is negative by Assumption 
4.2. On the other hand, any iEN can guarantee herself a positive payoff by not 
entering. So, this case is impossible in equilibrium. 
So we have demonstrated that given a first-period incumbent i, with output gl, in 
the second period, the unique equilibrium candidate set is 
{i}, 91 > 9i 
C2(i, 91) _ {l}, 9i < gi (C1.2) 
{n}, 91 = 9i 
Now consider the first period. Clearly, if iEN is elected, she rationally anticipates 
that she will stand for election next period (and win) if either (i) i=n, gl > gl, or 
(ii) i<n, gl > gl. In either case, given that e is absolutely continuous, she chooses 
el to solve problem (4.22) where R is replaced by R-ö. Moving to the voting stage, 
by previous arguments, all voters in N/Cl will vote for m(C1) = maxjecl, and all 
voters in Cl will vote for themselves. So, again by previous arguments, Cl = {n}. Q 
C. 1.3 Proof of Proposition 4.8 
(a) Existence of Non Revealing Equilibrium. We show that this is a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium (PBE). Consider period t=2. First, it is clear that any iEN who is 
elected at period 2 chooses e*(xi). Next, consider the behaviour of the voters, a given 
candidate set C2 that is either the equilibrium one or arises from unilateral deviations 
from equilibrium entry behaviour. Let 
_rn 
ifgi? i lt 
n-1 ifgl<gl 
C1.3 
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First, in equilibrium, C2 = 111. In this case, it is trivial the candidate l is elected. 
Now suppose that an additional candidate j enters, i. e. C2 = {l, j}. By Bayesian 
updating, voters kl know that 1 is high-ability with probability / (gl) if gi > 
1, and if l=n-1, we suppose that voters k1 conjecture that this candidate is 
high-ability with probability p. Also, we suppose that voters kj conjecture that 
j is high-ability with probability p. Then, it is easy to check that all voters k 54 1, j 
strictly prefer 1 to j and so will vote for 1. As n>3,1 will surely win the election. 
We now check that the entry decisions of potential candidates are mutual best 
responses. As v,, (x1) -6>0, by Assumption 4.2, the candidate I does not wish to 
withdraw. By the above argument, any j1 loses 6 if she enters. So, it is optimal 
for no other candidate to enter. 
Now go to period t=1. Assume that n wins the election. Rationally anticipating 
that he will only stand (and win) in the next period if gl > gl, his effort level 
solves problem (4.35). Next, consider the behaviour of the voters, given a candidate 
set Cl that is either the equilibrium one or arises from unilateral deviations from 
equilibrium entry behaviour. First, in equilibrium, Cl = {n}, so n will be elected. 
Now, suppose that an additional candidate j enters (i. e. Cl = in, j 1). Assume that 
voters ký Cl conjecture that any member of Cl is high-ability with probability 
p. Then, all voters k#n, j strictly prefer n to j, and so all k#n, j will vote for 
n. As n>3, n will surely win the election. Consequently, j will not enter. 
(b) Existence of Revealing Equilibrium. We show that this is an equilibrium supported 
by the following conjectures in each period : "any entrant with an index higher (lower) 
than the equilibrium candidate is low-ability with probability one (zero)". Consider 
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period t=2. First, it is clear that any iEN who is elected at period 2 chooses 
e*(xi). Next, consider the behaviour of the voters, given a candidate set C2 that is 
either the equilibrium one or arises from unilateral deviations from equilibrium entry 
behaviour. If C2 = {m}, it is trivial the candidate m is elected. As v0(1) -S> 
0> vo(0) -ö it is clear that m prefers to enter if mE NH. Now, suppose that 
an additional candidate j enters (i. e. Cl = {m, j 1). By the assumed conjectures, all 
voters k j4 n, j strictly prefer m to j, and so all k#n, j will vote for m. As n>3, 
m will surely win the election. Consequently, j will not enter. 
At the beginning of period 1, exactly the same argument applies, except that 
agents add to their pay-offs the equilibrium continuation pay-offs in period 2. But is 
it easily checked that this does not affect the arguments above. Q 
C. 1.4 Proof of Proposition 4.10 
(a) We prove first that with an additive technology, equilibrium with democracy is 
weakly efficient. To do this, it is sufficient to show that there does not exist a cutoff 
gi gl where all citizens are better-off than at the equilibrium cutoff. 
Let -y be an arbitrary cutoff. Without loss of generality, we can assume that 
the social planner chooses citizen n to be the first-period office holder, and n-1 
to replace him in the second period if his performance falls below -y. Let el (-Y) be 
the office-holder's first-period action given the cutoff. So, el (y) solves (4.26) with y 
replacing gl. Totally differentiating (4.26), we get 
el (-y) = 
A 
(C. 1) 
where A= [pfx ('Y, ei('Y)) + (1 - P) ft ('y, ei('Y))](R - c(e*)) 
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Also, c" > 0, and as (4.27) holds we have A>0, ry < gl. So, from (C. 1) we have 
0< ei(7) < 1, 'Y 9, (C. 2) 
We can first write down expected present value payoff of i=n conditional on this 
cutoff, given that the office-holder optimises his actions in both periods; 
00 
vn('Y) =B+ el ('Y) +R- c(el(-y)) +fv, (P(el ('Y), gi))h(gi, ei('Y))dgl (C. 3) 
'Y 
+H(ry, e1(7))vc(P) 
where B= pOH+(1-p)OL. Note first that from (C. 3) and the fact that el(ry) maximizes 
(4.26): 
vn('Y) = h('y, ei ('Y))[vo(P) - vo(P(ei('Y), y))] (C. 4) 
< h(y, ei('Y))[v, , 
(P) - vo(OL)l 
<o 
where the second line follows from the properties of v0, v, given in Section 4.3.6, and 
the third from the assumption that R> c(e*) + p(OH - OL), which is equivalent to 
vo(OL) > vc(p) when p=1. So, from (C. 4), n prefers the lowest possible ry = -oc (i. e. 
no election). 
So, the social planner cannot make everybody better-off by raising y from g1. Thus, 
to prove that the equilibrium is weakly efficient, it suffices to prove that some j 
n most prefers a cutoff at or above gl. For then, the social planner cannot make 
everybody better-off by lowering ry from gl, either. Note that for j<n-1: 
00 
vj('Y) =B+ el (^t) +fv, (P(ei('Y), 9i))h(9i, ei('Y))dgi + H('Y, ei('Y))vc(P) (C. 5) 
7 
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Now differentiating (C. 5), we have; 
(P) - vo(P(ei('Y), Y))ýý j<n-1 (C. 6) vjl (-y) = äelei(Y) + 
h('Y, ei(Y))wc 
Now, note from (4.10) that with a linear technology, p(e1(ry), ry) = p(ry - el (ry)), with 
p (. ) >0 by the MLRC. So, from this fact and the fact from (C. 2) that 'y - el(ry) is 
increasing in -y, from (C. 6), we have 
vo(P(ei(7), y)) vo(P(eiý9i)9i)), 'Y 9i (C. 7) 
Also, by previous definitions and results: 
vc(P) = va(P(ei(9i), 9i)) - (R - c(e*)) (C. 8) 
< voýPýeiý9i)ý9i)) 
< 'Y < 9l 
In the first line, we have used the definition of gl that p= p(e1(g1), j), and the 
definitions of v,, v0. In the second, we have used R> c(e*) from Assumption 4.1 
(note with linearity, the myopic action e* does not depend on p). In the third, we 
have used (C. 7). Therefore, from (C. 6), (C. 8), we see that 
vi ('Y) _v ei 9<n-1 (C. 9) 
Finally, it is obvious that ävß/äe1 > 0, as el is chosen optimally by the office-holder, 
n, but jn does not bear the cost of the action. So, from this fact, (C. 2) and (C. 9), 
we conclude that ve(ry) > 0, 'y < gj so j<n-1 most prefers a cutoff at least gl, as 
required. 
(b) An example with non-additive technology where appointment Pareto-dominates 
democracy can be constructed as follows. Without loss of generality, assume that the 
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incumbent is n and the challenger is n-1. Equilibrium pay-offs under (representa- 
tive') democracy, allowing µ 1, are: 
vnD - µ(e + eRD) + (1 - ýL)BeRD +R-6- c(eýD) +/ 
00 
[v0( (eRD, 91))h(el 91)d91 + 
9i 
H(91, el (91))v, (P) 
_ 00 vRD =B+ eRD(g1) +J vo(P(eRD(91)ý gl))h(91, eRD(g, ))dgl + H(91, eRD(91))vvo(P) 
9i 
00 
VRD =B+ eRDl91) +J vo(P(eRDl91)91))h(gl, eRD(91))d91 + H(91, eRD( ))vo(P), 
9i 
Also, under appointment of citizen i, the expected utilities axe 
vA = µ(B eA) + (1 - µ)BeA }R- c(ei) +f vo(P(ei , 9i))h(ei, 9i)dgi 
00 
vj + el +1 Be + vo p(el , 91))h eda 
A= µ( )(- µ) i(A (i , 9i)9i, 7 
The example is the following. First, e is Normal, with mean zero and a= 50, and 
c(e) = e2/2, and other parameters are: µ=0.5, p=0.55 ,R= 39.9,9H = 25, 
BL = 1,6 = 1. In this case, equilibrium pay-offs can be calculated using the above 
formulae as: 
vA = 156.3, vA = 152.1, ji 
vn = 148.4, VR D= 148.2, vRD = 143.6, j0n, n-1 
So, we see that maxiCN vRD < min vA, and so we can be sure that appointment 
Pareto-dominates the representative democracy regime. Q 
'Recall however that, under symmetric incomplete information, the qualitative results for both 
democratic results are the same. Hence, a similar example can be constructed by comparing ap- 
pointment against partial democracy. 
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C. 2 The Normal-Quadratic Case 
The example we use follows the specification of Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999). 
The cost of effort function is quadratic (specifically c (e) = e2/2 + de, with d>0, so 
that c'(0) > 0), and the error term e is Normally distributed with mean zero and 
variance . 2. We now analyse the different sections of the model under our specific 
assumptions. 
C. 2.1 Uniqueness 
We can now prove that when the technology is additive (i. e. µ= 1), a unique 
equilibrium arises. In the appointment case, this is immediate as in this case there 
is no experimentation. For the democratic cases, when µ=1, it is easy to calculate 
that 
___ 
Mg, [w(P)] 
= 
[R 
-b- de* (P) äe1 
I 
=1 
2 
iý 
-8ý (9L -0H )) + 
(o-%72- P) 
exp -1 (OH - BL)) xQ 27i exp 
C2 
2] 
ir 817 
2) 
('_ 
which is decreasing in e* (p). On the other hand, the marginal cost of effort is upward 
sloping. Hence a unique equilibrium exists. 
In the next two sub-sections we derive the equilibrium actions obtained under this 
Normal-Quadratic example. The simulations reported in the chapter are based on 
this special case. 
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C. 2.2 Symmetric Incomplete Information and Appointment 
The period 2 equilibrium effort is 
e2=e*(P)=µ+(1-µ)(POH+(1-p)BL)-d 
where, 
P(ei, 9i) =p 
p+(1-p)expL-aä (d -c 
)ý 
and ('i = gl - (1 - µ)Biel - p(BZ + el), with i=H, L. The period 1 equilibrium effort 
level is 
ei = [µ + (1 - µ)(P9H + (1 - p) BL) - d] + 
aE9ý Lvo(P(ei, 9i))] 
öel 
where, after noticing that vö (p) _ (1 - 11)2 (OH - OL)2, the experimentation term 
(4.16) can be written as 
äEg [vo(P)] 
__ 
p2 (1 - P)2 (1 µ)3 (OH - OL)4 
_ (9e, Q3 2ý 
[IL + (1 µ) ell 
+°° exp (2v ((H +' b L) 
) 
XJ 
1- ex p+ ex -1 23 
dg, 
ý( p) p (2Q LP p(Q CH)J 
C. 2.3 Symmetric Incomplete Information and Democracy with 
Exogenous Entry 
Note that PC(91) = p, so 91 =2 
[(l 
- µ) 
(OH + OL) ei +µ (OH + BL + 2ei)] . 
The first-order condition to the office-holder's first period problem is 
µ+(1-A)(POH+(1-P)9L)-d+__ 
_wöe(ei, 9i))_ 
_ei 
where 
ÖE9i [w(P)] 
_ 
p2 (1 - p)2 
(1 
- 11)3 (OH - 
BL)4 
3el Q3 27r 
[, g + (1 - µ) ei] 
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22 
x 
ý+ý exp (2 \(H +bL)) d91 
J9o 1- ex -1 
2+ 
ex 1 13 p) P(o ýLý P Pý Q (2H 
)1 
(el)2 aH(91, el) 87)0 (P 01, el)) 
+ R-S- 2 -del 
(- 
öel 
)+P(1-P)(1-µ) 
\P 
x 
exp [-aä (9i - (1 - P)OHel - µ(9H + ei))2] 
ý 2ýr 
aH(91, el) 
=p [µ + (1 - µ) OH] 
exp [ (9i - (1 - µ)Bxei - µ(GH + ei))2] 
0e1 Q 27 
[ 
20 - 
(9i - (1 - µ)BLei - µ(O + _1»2] + (1 - p) [µ + (1 - µ) OL] 
exP 
Q 27r 
which is strictly positive as long as µ<1, and 
övo (P (9i, ei)) 
ap =µ(OH-9L)(3-2µ)+(1-µ)2(0HP+6L9H(1-2p)-B2(1- p)) 
which is also strictly positive as long as µ<1.0 
C. 2.4 Examples of Pareto-Ranked Equilibria with Democ- 
racy and Endogenous Entry 
With asymmetric information, in a "revealing" equilibrium (representative democracy 
case), office-holder i citizens j0n have expected pay-offs 
v2D'R =2 [I (OH + ei(Bx) + (1 - µ)exei(ex) +R-6-c (e* (ex))] 
vRD'R =2 [µ(OH + ei(OH)) + 
(1 
- µ)OHel(OH)] 
Under a representative democracy in which the equilibrium is "non revealing", citizens 
n, n-1, and j0n-1, n have expected pay-offs 
vR 
n 
D, NR 
- PvnD'NR (OH) + (1 - P)vnD, 
NR (OL) 
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vR 
D, NR 
= pvRD, 
NR (OH) + (1 - p)VRD, 
NR (? L) n-1 n-1 n-1 
RD, NR 
= PO (OH, e1(OH)) + (1 - P)» (BL, e1(OL)) 7 
+p [1 - FH (9i, ei (OH))] 
0 
(OH, e*(OH)) + (1 - P) [1 - FL ffi, ei 
(OL))] 0 (On, ea*(OL)) 
+ [PO (OH, e*(OH)) + (1 - P) 0 
(OL, e*(OL))] {PF'H (9i, ei (OH)) + (1 - p) FL (9i, ei 
(O ))] 
where 0 (ai, el(a1)) = µ(ai + el(a1)) + (1 - µ)aiel(ai), and ai E {OH, BL}, and 
vnD, NR (a2) =0 (as, ei(az)) + [1 - Fi (9i, ei (ai))] [O (a1, e* (a=)) +R-b-c (e` (ai))] 
+R -6-c (e* (aj)) + Fz (9i, ei (a2)) IPA(BH, e*(OH)) + (1 - P) 0 (BL, e`(OL))] 
RD NR 
V ,, -j 
(a2) = PO (ex, ei(OH)) + (1 - P)O (BL, ei(OL)) 
-ý p [1 - FH (9i, ei (OH))] 0 (OH e*(OH)) + (1 - P) [1 - FL (1, ei (OL))] 0 (BG, e*(Bj )) 
+ ýý (az, e* (a2)) +R-6-c (e* (at))] [PFH (9i' ei (BH)) + (1 - P) FL (9i, ei (OLO))] 
Let us denote by ER the "revealing" equilibrium, by ENR the "non revealing" 
equilibrium, and by ES the democratic equilibrium under symmetric information. We 
now present examples in which each of the three equilibrium can Pareto-dominate 
any of the other two depending on parameter values. In all examples, e is Normal, 
with mean zero and u= 50, and c(e) = X(e2/2), µ=0.5,0H = 25,0L = 1. 
(i) Example: ER Pareto-dominates ENR which itself Pareto-dominates Es. 
Other parameters are X=1, p=0.5, and R= 606. In this case, equilibrium pay-offs 
are: 
v, 
R°" (asym) = 598, vRD'R(asym) = 363,5 = 405 
vRD, NR(asym) = 444.1, vn 
°'NR(asym) 
= 320.6, vRD, 
NR(asym) 
= 240.9,6 = 404 
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vRD(sym) = 369.2, vRD (sym) = 227.7, vRD(sym) = 139,6 = 405 
S RD, NR vRD o, we see that maxiCN Vi (asym) < max 'R(asym), that maxiEN vRD(sym) < 
max vRD" (asym), and also that max, 'EN vRD(sym) < max vR°'NR(asym). Hence, we 
can be sure that ER can Pareto-dominate both ENR and Es, and also that ENR can 
Pareto-dominate Es. 
(ii) Example: ES Pareto-dominates ENR which itself Pareto-dominates ER. 
Other parameters are x=0.01, p=0.99. In this case, equilibrium pay-offs are, with 
R= 300, and 6= 50, 
vn"(sym) = 890.8, vn° (sym) = 407.9, vRD(sym) = 400.4 
vRD, NR(asym) = 886.5, vRD'NR(asym) = 401.4, vRD, 
NR(asym) = 395.0 
So, we see that maxzEN vRD'NR(asym) < max vRD(sym), so we can be sure that Es 
can Pareto-dominate ENR. Next, replacing R and 6 with R= 753, and 6= 503, 
equilibrium pay-offs become 
vnD(sym) = 890.8, vRD (sym) = 407.9, vRD(sym) = 400.4 
V 
D, R(asym) = 861.3, vRD'R(asym) = 363 
So, we can see that max, EN vR°'R(asym) < max vRD(sym), so we can be sure that ES 
can Pareto-dominate ER. Decreasing 6 to 6= 502.9,2 equilibrium pay-offs become 
vn 
D' " (asym) 
= 886.7, Vn-RD, 
NR 
l 
(asym) 
= 401.4, v" 
(asym) 
= 395.0, j#n, n-1 
As we can see, maxiEN v 'R(asym) < max vRD'NR(asym), and so we can be sure 
that ENR can Pareto-dominate ER. 
2 So that the economy switches from a revealing to a non revealing equilibrium. 
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C. 3 Derivations 
C. 3.1 Derivation of (4.16) 
(Adapted from the proof of Proposition 2 of Mirman et al., 1993). Before turning to 
the derivation of equation (4.16) itself, the following results are useful 
dP (9i, ei) 
=P 
(1 - P) 
dgl [PfH + (1 - P) fL]2 
(fLf-fHf) 
ý: 0 (C3.1) 
where fH=f(91-(1-FL)OHe1 µ(OH+e1)), andfL=f(91-(1-/i)e el-µ(OL+el)) 
(f 
LfH-fHf L) >0 
follows from the MLR property. 
dP (9i, ei) dP 
_P 
(1 - P) (1 - µ) (OH - BL) 
=- [µ +i- OH] 2 fHfG C3.2) del - µ) dgl [PfH + (1 - P) fL] 
dP P(1-P)(1-µ)(OH-OL) 
_- Cµ + Cl - µ) BG] -2 fLfH(C3.3) dgl IPfH +Ci- P) IL] 
We can now evaluate (4.16). Notice that Eglvo [p (g', el)] =f ±00 v,, [P (gl, el)] h (gi, el) dgi, 
where h (g i, el) =P fH + (1 - P) fL. Thus 
dE91v° [P (gi, ei)] (C3.4) 
del 
=f VJ 
LP 
[PfH + (1 - P) fL] dgl -J v° 
P (µ + (1 - µ) ex) fH ]d91 
°de, +(1 -P)(11+(1 - M)OH)fL 
Integrating by parts the second term of (C3.4) and then rearranging with the first 
term gives 
dp 
v° del + 
(µ + (1- µ) OH) 
dp 
dgl Pfxd9i 
(C3.5) 
v° 
(id'e 
+ (µ + (1 - µ) BL) d9) 
(1 P) fLd9i +f -LP 
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Using (C3.2) and (C3.3), expression (C3.5) becomes 
_IV' 
P(1-P)(1-µ) rý 
LPfx + (1 - P) fL]a 
(OH - eL) fxfLPfxd9i (C3.6) 
leH - 
BL) fHfL (1 - P) fcd9i - voP(1-P)(1-µ) LPfH + (L - P) fL]2 
( 
Because P= Phil [Pfx + (1 - p) fL] and (1 - p) = (1 - p) fLl [pfH + (1 - p) fL], 
equation (C3.6) becomes 
r=-(OH-AL){fv2(1 -p)(1-z)fdg1 +J vo(1-P)2P(1-µ)ffd9i 
(C3.7) 
Using the fact that (1 - p) 
2= (1 - p) -p (1 - p), we can rewrite (C3.7) as 
r=- (OH - OL) 
f vo (1 - µ) PýýP (1 - P) 
fL 
- (1 -P) Pfx] dgl (C3.8) 
{ 
+fvo(1-µ)(1-P)Pffdgi 
} 
Rearranging the posterior belief p, we have p [pfH + (1 - p) fL] =p fH, which, after 
differentiating with respect to gl gives (after rearranging) 
fjP (1 - P) - ffP (1 - P) = dgl [Pfx + (1 - P) fL] (C3.9) 
Inserting (C3.9) in (C3.8) yields, 
(f vo (1 - µ) Pä Pfxdgl +f va (1 - µ) Pd (1 - p) fLdgl r=(eH-eL){ 
_ fvo(1-a)(1-P)Pfxdgi l 
(C3.10) 
From the p expression, we have fL (1 - p) p=fHp (1 - p), so (C3.10) becomes 
r= (OH - OL) 
U 
vo (1 - p) dg Pfxdgl -f 
va (1 - µ) (1 - P) Pfxd9l (C3.11) 
Now we integrate the second term in (C3.11) by parts. This yields, 
(1 - µ) Pf vo (1 - P) fxdgi =- (1 - µ) Pf vo (1 - p) d9ifHdgi 
(C3.12) 
f- (1 - µ) Pf vo rig fxdgi 
Inserting (C3.12) in (C3.11) gives (4.16). 0 
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C. 3.2 Derivation of equation (4.24) 
The derivation is similar to that of equation (4.16). First, note that E91 [w (p (gl, el))] 
can be written 
_ 
+00 
E91 [w (P (9i, ei))] = (vc(P) - vo(P))H (9i, ei) +f (vo(P(9i, ei)) - vo(P))h (9i, e1) dgl 
91 
= [e(e*(P)) - R]H (9i, ei) +f 0»(9i, ei))h (9i, ei) dgl 
91 
where O(P(g1, ei)) = vo(P(9i, ei)) - vo(P), so ei)= 0, (= v. So, 
r_ 
dE., [w*d(P (9i, ei»] 
= (V, (p) - va(P)) 
(-aH ( l' el)) (C3.13) 
+O° 
. 
dP 
\ 
+ 
fýi 
0 de [PfH + (1 - p) fL] dgl 
1 
-f 
+ýý[P(µ+(1-µ)OH)fx+(1-P)(µ+(1-µ)et)fc 
dgl 
9i 
Integrating by parts the third term of (C3.13) and then rearranging with the first 
two terms gives 
-LP r= 
+00 
O' 
(de 
+ (µ + (1 - µ) OH) dg 
) 
pfHdgl (C3.14) 
9i 
+oo 
+ 
ýde 
++ (1 - µ) BL) dgi (1 - P) fLd9i 
9i 
+ [R - e(e`(P))] \-OH 
( el) 
/ öe l 
After using similar manipulations as for the derivation of equation (4.16), we obtain 
^ /'+oo 
r= (OH - OL) 
+oo {I 
iii 
(1 - µ) 
dd91 
Pfxdgl (1 - P) Pfrdgi 
9i 
1 
+ [R - c(e* (P) )] (- 
OH (lei)) 
(C3.14) 
Oel 
Now we integrate the second term in (C3.14) by parts. This yields, 
(1-µ)PJ+oop)fxd9ý _ -(1-µ)P+oo ý11dP (1-P)fxdgl(C3.15) C dgl 9 9i 
Tables 
µ) P ql 
dP 
fxdg1 - +(1 - 
J+OO 
1 
dgl 
_ 
do (P (9i, e1)) (1 -p (9i, ei)) P (1 - µ) fx (9i) dp 
309 
Inserting (C3.15) in (C3.14), and using ¢' = v(), and finally evaluating at el = ei (and 
recalling p (i', el) = p) gives equation (4.24). 0 
C. 4 Tables 
Sources for the Tables of this Section: 
(a) For the United States of America: The Internet Public Library, POTUS (Presi- 
dents of the United States) (http: //www. ipl. org/ref/POTUS/) and authors' calcula- 
tions 
(b) For the United Kingdom: Whitaker's Almanack (various years) and authors' 
calculations. 
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Table C. 1 Share of Cabinet Secretaries with Prior Cabinet Experience, USA 1789-2001 
Date 
1997-2001 William Jefferson (Bill) Clinton (D) 56.2 
1993-97 William Jefferson (Bill) Clinton (D) 0.0 
1989-93 George Herbert Walker Bush (R) 37.5 
1981-89 Ronald Wilson Reagan (R) 13.3 
1977-81 James Earl (Jimmy) Carter (D) 6.7 
1974-77 Gerald Rudolph Ford (R) 85.7 
1969-74 Richard Milhous Nixon (R) 13.3 
1963-69 Lyndon Baines Johnson (D) 80.0 
1961-63 John Fitzgerald Kennedy (D) 0.0 
1953-61 Dwight David Eisenhower (R) 0.0 
1945-53 Harry S. Truman (D) 92.3 
1933-45 Franklin Delano Roosevelt (D) 0.0 
1929-33 Herbert Clark Hoover (R) 30.8 
1923-29 Calvin Coolidge (R) 92.3 
1921-23 Warren Gamaliel Harding (R) 0.0 
1913-21 Woodrow Wilson (D) 7.7 
1909-13 William Howard Taft (R) 41.7 
1901-09 Theodore Roosevelt (R) 75.0 
1897-1901 William McKinley (R) 18.2 
1893-97 Grover Cleveland (D) 27.3 
1889-93 Benjamin Harrison (R) 18.2 
1885-89 Grover Cleveland (D) 0.0 
1881-85 Chester Alan Arthur (R) 100.0 
1881 James Abram Garfield (R) 0.0 
1877-81 Rutherford Birchard Hayes (R) 11.1 
1869-77 Ulysses Simpson Grant (R) 0.0 
1865-69 Andrew Johnson (D) 100.0 
1861-65 Abraham Lincoln (R) 0.0 
1857-61 James Buchanan (D) 33.3 
1853-57 Franklin Pierce (D) 11.1 
1850-53 Millard Fillmore (Whig) 100.0 
1849-50 Zachary Taylor (Whig) 11.1 
1845-49 James Knox Polk (D) 12.5 
1841-45 John Tyler (Whig) 100.0 
1841 William Henry Harrison (Whig) 0.0 
1837-41 Martin Van Buren (D) 75.0 
1829-37 Andrew Jackson (D) 12.5 
1825-29 John Quincy Adams (D-R) 71.4 
1817-25 James Monroe (D-R) 57.1 
1809-17 James Madison (D-R) 71.4 
1801-09 Thomas Jefferson (D-R) 42.9 
1797-1801 John Adams (Federalist) 85.7 
1789-97 George Washington (Federalist) 0.0 
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Table C. 2 Share of Cabinet Secretaries with Prior Cabinet Experience, United Kingdom 
Date Government Experience (%) 
1997-2001 Anthony C. L. (Tony) Blair (L) 0.00 
1990-97 John Roy Major (C) 86.4 
1979-90 Margaret Hilda Thatcher (C) 34.6 
1976-79 (Leonard) James Callaghan (L) 69.2 
1974-76 (James) Harold Wilson (L) 60.9 
1970-74 Edward Richard George Heath (C) 57.9 
1964-70 (James) Harold Wilson (L) 15.4 
1963-64 Alexander (Alec) Douglas-Home (C) 87.0 
1957-63 (Maurice) Harold Macmillan (C) 52.2 
1955-57 (Robert) Anthony Eden (C) 81.3 
1951-55 Winston Spencer Churchill (C) 33.3 
1945-51 Clement Richard Attlee (L) 28.6 
1945 Winston Spencer Churchill (C) 56.2 
1940-45 Winston Spencer Churchill (Coal) 73.7 
1937-40 N. Chamberlain (Coal) 64.7 
1937 N. Chamberlain (Coal) 85.7 
1935-37 S. Baldwin (Coal) 80.0 
1935 S. Baldwin (Coal) 73.3 
1931-35 J. R. MacDonald (Coal) 80.0 
1929-31 J. R. MacDonald (L) 46.7 
1924-29 S. Baldwin (C) 73.3 
1924 J. R. MacDonald (L) 7.1 
1923-24 S. Baldwin (C) 100.0 
1922-23 A. Bonar Law (C) 66.7 
1916-22 D. Lloyd-George (Coal) 33.3 
1915-16 H. H. Asquith (Coal) 66.7 
1908-15 H. H. Asquith (Lib) 83.3 
1905-08 Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman (Lib) 16.7 
1902-05 A. J. Balfour (C) 75.0 
1895-1902 Marquess of Salisbury (C) 54.5 
1894-95 Earl of Rosebery (Lib) 90.9 
1892-94 W. E. Gladstone (Lib) 81.8 
1886-92 Marquess of Salisbury (C) 54.5 
1886 W. E. Gladstone (Lib) 66.7 
1885-86 Marquess of Salisbury (C) 72.7 
1880-85 W. E. Gladstone (Lib) 63.6 
1874-80 Benjamin Disraeli (C) 81.8 
1868-74 W. E. Gladstone (Lib) 33.3 
1868 Benjamin Disraeli (Lib) 83.3 
1866-68 Earl of Derby (C) 58.3 
1865-66 Earl Russell (Lib) 100.0 
1859-65 Viscount Palmerston (Lib) 75.0 
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Table C. 3 Percentage Share of Cabinet with Prior Cabinet Experience by Frequency 
0-10% 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80 80-90 90-100 
US 30.2 20.9 2.3 7.0 4.7 4.7 0.0 11.6 4.7 13.9 
UK 4.8 4.8 2.4 9.5 2.4 14.3 19.0 16.7 19.0 7.1 
Table C. 4 Percentage Share of Cabinet with Prior Cabinet Experience by Deciles 
122.5 345677.5 89 10 
US 0.0 0.0 3.3 9.7 12.5 18.2 38.3 62.8 73.2 78.0 92.3 100.0 
UK 29.1 37.0 52.8 55.0 62.0 66.7 73.3 78.5 81.0 81.8 86.3 100.0 
Appendix D 
Appendix to Chapter 5 
D. 1 Qualifications and Requirements for Candi- 
dacy: The US Example 
In this Appendix, ' we highlight some of the qualifications and requirements, including 
financial ones that citizens have to pay in order to be officially registered as candidate 
and stand for election in the United States. As can be seen below, the requirements 
validate the assumptions made in modelling the representative democracy regime 
used in Chapter 5 (and also in Chapter 4). At a minimum, in all the States, citizens 
can only stand for office if they satisfy some age requirement, and either pay a filing 
fee or submit a petition with a specified number of signatures. Both of these features 
validate our assumptions that (1) candidates can only come from a subset of the 
population, and (2) that standing for election is costly. This is true even when citizens 
only need to submit a petition to become candidates: to collect the required number 
of signatures is costly - at least in terms of leisure foregone. This can be verified 
I Sources for this Appendix: web site of the different States' appropriate authority (often Elections 
Division of the Secretary of State). The Federal Election Commission's web site (www. fec. gov) 
provides a listing of each States' appropriate authority. 
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by looking at States (e. g. California, Idaho) that give candidates the choice between 
paying a filing fee (amounting to a few thousand dollars) or to collect signatures. In 
these States, a substantial fraction of candidates opt for paying the fee. ' 
In the State of Alaska, the filing fees are as follows: office of governor, lieutenant 
governor, United States senator, and United States representative is $100.00; office 
of state senator and state representative is $30.00. 
In Arkansas the filing fees structure is as follows: if a candidate files as a party 
candidate he pays a filing fee to the party set by the party; If a candidate files 
as a write-in they do so by a letter to the Secretary of State and to each county 
involved in their district; If a candidate files as an independent then they meet the 
filing requirements by submitting petitions signed by the voters in their district. The 
amount of signatures required is 3% of the voters that voted in the last election. 
In the State of California, the qualifications for the Office of the US Senator are: 
be at least 30 years of age, a US citizen for nine years, and a resident of California 
when elected. The requirements are twofold: (1) pay a filing fee or collect signatures 
in lieu of filing fee. The filing fee that the candidate must pay is equal to 2% of the 
first year's salary. Currently (as of year 2000), the fee for a Senatorial candidate is 
$2,734.00. In lieu of a filing fee, a candidate can submit a minimum of 10,000 valid 
signatures on petitions. 
In the State of Colorado, only candidates running for the US Presidency have to 
pay a "fee for ballot access" (of $500). 
2Private correspondance with the Elections Division, Secretary of State, California, reveals that 
their office does "not track the number of candidates who submit signatures in lieu of filing fees. 
However, on average 800 candidates file for state-level office for statewide elections. Experience tells 
us that approximately 1/3 to 1/2 of them submit signatures to defray all or part of the filing fee. " 
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In the State of Connecticut, no filing fees exist for candidates. 
In the District of Columbia, the filing of a nominating petition containing the 
signatures of registered voters is the only way a candidate can get his or her name 
on the ballot. The number of signatures required varies by the type of office and the 
political party registration. 
In Georgia, the qualifying fee for any office is 3% of the salaried office. If not a 
salaried office, a reasonable fee shall be set by the governing authority of the mu- 
nicipality or not more than $35.00. The qualifying fees are shown on the schedule 
below. 
Table D. 1 Filing Fees in the State of Georgia 
Office 
Presidential Elector 
U. S. Representative 
Public Service Commissioner 
Justice of the Supreme Court 
Judge of the Court of Appeals 
Judge of Superior Court 
District Attorney 
Salary Filing Fee (% of salary) Filing Fee 
$50.00 3% $1.50 
$136,700.00 3% $4,101.00 
$99,554.00 3% $2,986.62 
$143,601.00 3% $4,308.03 
$142,713.00 3% $4,281.39 
$102,852.00 3% $3,085.56 
$91,294.00 3% $2,738.82 
In Idaho, the state candidate filing requirements are the following. Partisan and 
judicial candidates have two options to be placed on the ballot: (1) file a declaration of 
candidacy and pay the filing fee; or (2) in lieu of paying the filing fee, file a nominating 
petition, with a certain number of verified signatures and a declaration of candidacy. 
Independent candidates do not have the two options. An independent candidate 
must file the declaration and petition. Independent candidates do not pay a filing 
fee. Independent candidate residency, age and disclosure requirements for federal and 
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all statewide offices are the same as the requirements for partisan candidates. 
Table D. 2 Filing Fees and Qualifications in the State of Idaho 
Office 
U. S. Senator 
U. S. Representative 
Governor 
Lieutenant Governor 
Secretary of State 
State Controller 
State Treasurer 
Attorney General 
Supt. of Public Instruction 
State Senator 
State Representative 
Supreme Court 
Appellate Court 
District Judge 
Fee ($) Signatures Age Residency 
$500 1,000 30 a 
$300 500 from cong. dist. 25 a 
$300 1,000 30 b 
$200 1,000 30 b 
$200 1,000 25 b 
$200 1,000 25 b 
$200 1,000 25 b 
$200 1,000 30 b, c 
$200 1,000 25 b, d 
$30 50 within leg. dist. 21 e 
$30 50 within leg. dist. 21 e 
$300 1,000 30 f, g 
$300 1,000 30 f, g 
$150 200 within judl. dist. 30 h 
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Notes: a=reside within state at time of general election; b=reside within state 2 years 
preceding general election; c=admitted to practice of law within the state; d=Bachelor's 
degree from an accredited college or university; e=elector 1 year within legislative district 
preceding general election; f=2 years within state preceding election; g=admitted to the 
practice of law for at least 10 years prior to taking office, admitted to the practice of law 
within Idaho; h=1 year within judicial district preceding election, admitted to the practice 
of law within Idaho. 
In the State of Illinois, only a petition is required; In Indiana, a declaration of 
candidacy and a petition of nomination are required; In Iowa, an affidavit and a 
petition are required. 
In Kentucky, the filing fee schedule is represented in the Table below for Party 
candidates. For write-in candidates, the requirements and fees are, depending of the 
jurisdiction/district that one applies for: (a) file a declaration of intent for office other 
than municipal office in a city of the fifth or sixth class (and pay a filing fee of $50.00); 
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or (b) file a declaration of intent for municipal office in a city of the fifth or sixth 
class (and pay a filing fee of $20.00). 
Table D. 3 Filing Fees in the State of Kentucky 
Candidates for: Filing Fee 
statewide elected state office or the congress $500.00 
commonwealth's attorney, the general assembly, the district court $200.00 
the circuit court, the court of appeals or the supreme court $200.00 
office in cities of the fifth or sixth class $20.00 
county and independent boards of education $20.00 
soil and water conservation districts $20.00 
All other candidates who file with the secretary of state and/or county clerk $50.00 
In the State of Maine, a citizen becomes officially a candidate if any one or a 
combination of the following points is satisfied: 
Table D. 4 Running for Office: Qualifications and Requirements in the State of Maine 
1. A person who has filed a petition and has qualified to be nominated by Primary 
Election as a party candidate; 
2. A person who has filed a petition and has qualified as a "non-party" candidate; 
3. A person who has filed a declaration with the Secretary of State as a Write-In 
candidate; 
4. A person who has received contributions or made expenditures with the intent 
of qualifying as a candidate; or 
5. A person who has given his or her consent to any other person to receive contri- 
butions or make expenditures with the intent of qualifying as a candidate. 
In New York State, most candidates get on the ballot by filing a petition containing 
a specified number of signatures. The required amount varies, depending on the 
office sought and whether the candidate is seeking a party nomination or a spot on 
the ballot as an independent. Only enrolled party members may sign petitions for 
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candidates who seek their party's nomination. However, any registered voter living 
within the appropriate district may sign a petition for a candidate seeking to run 
as an independent in the general election as long as s/he has not already signed on 
behalf of another candidate. 
Table D. 5 Running for Office: Requirements to Hold Federal and State Offices in New 
York State 
Office 
President of the United States 
U. S. Senator 
NYS Governor/Lt. Governor 
Representative in Congress 
NYS Senator 
NYS Assembly 
Citizenship Age Residency 
Born a citizen 35 14 years in country 
Citizen 9 years 30 Resident of state when elected 
Citizen 30 (b) 
Citizen 7 years 25 Resident of state when elected 
Citizen 18 Resident of state for 5 years and (a) 
Citizen 18 Resident of state for 5 years and (a) 
Notes: (a)=resident of district for 12 months immediately preceding election; (b)=Resident 
of state 5 years immediately preceding election. 
In the State of Massachusetts, the requirements for US Representative, State 
Senator, State Representative are shown in the Table below. 
Table D. 6 Running for Office: Requirements to Hold Federal and State Offices in 
Massachusetts 
Office Citizenship Age Residency Signatures 
US Representative Citizen 7 years 25 Resident of state when elected; (a) 2000 
State Senator Citizen 18 Resident of state for 5 years, (a), (b) 300 
State Representative Citizen 18 Resident of state for 1 year, (a) (b) 150 
Notes: (a)=Must be a registered voter; (b)=habitant of the district. 
In the State of Maryland, the qualifications required for candidacy are the follow- 
ing: 
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Table D. 7 Qualifications and Requirements to Hold Elected Offices in Maryland 
Office 
Governor - Lt. Governor 
Comptroller 
Attorney General 
U. S. Senator 
U. S. Congress 
State Senator 
House of Delegates 
Judge of the Circuit Court 
County Executive 
County Council 
County Commissioners 
County Treasurer 
State Attorney 
Clerk of the Circuit Court 
Register of Wills 
Judge of the Orphans' Court 
Sheriff 
Board of Education: 
For each County 
Qualifications & Residency Filing Fee 
Registered voter, 30 years old; (a) (b) $290 (each) 
Registered voter $290 
Qualified voter; (r), (c) $290 
Registered Voter (*), 30 years old; (d) (r) $290 
Registered Voter (*), 25 years old; (e) (r) $100 
Registered voter, 25 years old, (r) (f) (g) $50 
Registered voter, 21 years old, (r) (f) (g) $50 
Qualified Voter, 30 years old; (j) (h) (i) (k) 
Registered voter, (1) $25 
Registered voter, (1) $25 
Registered voter, (n) $25 
Registered voter, (m), (n) $25 
Registered Voter, (o) (j) (p) 
Registered Voter, Resident of the County (p) 
Registered Voter, Resident of the County (p) 
Registered Voter, (r) (f) (p) 
Registered Voter, 25 years old, (b) (f) (p) 
$25 
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Notes: (a)= Has not served 2 immediately preceding elective terms; (b)=resident of the 
State 5 years immediately preceding election; (c)=Resided and practiced law in the State for 
10 years; (*)=The registration requirement only applies to candidates seeking nomination 
by Primary Election. Candidates for federal office seeking nomination by petition need not 
be registered, but must meet the other listed criteria; (d)=Citizen of United States for 9 
years; (e)=Citizen of United States for 7 years; (f)=Resident at least 1 year preceding the 
day of the election; (g)=Resident of legislative district at least 6 months; (h)=Resident of 
the State at least 5 years; (i)=Resident of the judicial circuit for which he/she is seeking 
election at least 6 months prior to election; (j) Member of Maryland Bar; (k)=Circuits 1-7: 
$50, Circuit 8: $300 (fees based on candidates cross-filing); (1) =Qualifications specified in 
local charters; (m)=applies only to candidates seeking nomination by Primary Election. 
Candidates seeking nomination by petition need not be registered voters unless required by 
the County Charter, but must meet any other qualifications; (n) =Qualifications specified 
in public local law; (o)=Resident of the county for at least 2 years; (p)=Counties: $25, 
Baltimore City: $150; (q)=For Calvert County: Resident of County or district (if a district 
seat) 2 years prior to the date of beginning of term of office, and (a); (r)=Citizen of 
Maryland; (s)=Qualified voter and Resident of County for at least 3 years. 
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Finally, to conclude this Appendix, it should be noted that, although the legal 
financial requirements can amount to a few thousand dollars depending on the State 
and the office candidates are competing for, these costs are only a very small fraction 
of the financing resources that candidates spend in US elections. The legal require- 
ments however have to be paid directly by candidates, while the campaign funds are 
mostly (but not necessarily) raised outside of the candidates' personal funds. Section 
5.2 gives a brief overview of the role that campaign funds play in US politics. 
D. 2 Proofs of Propositions 
D. 2.1 Proof of Lemma 5.0 
Say that i is pivotal for P; CC if given the realizations of the voting strategies of 
j i, Pi is the set of alternative that gets x or x-1 votes, where x is the maximum 
number of votes of any kEC. Then i can affect the probability of winning of only 
candidates in Pi. Now, given the random voting strategies of the other players, there 
are m possible sets Pzl, , 
P' for which i is pivotal, with probabilities ý1, , ým 
(a) Consider first iE NC = N/C. We show first that Ph C B, all h=1, ..., m. 
First, given the strategies of j#i described in the Lemma, some jEB will get at 
least two votes. (To see this, note that every jEB gets j's vote, and also n-b-1 
additional votes are distributed randomly among members of B, where b= #B. As 
n-b-1>n-c-1>n-k-1> 1, wherec=#C, atleastonej EB must 
get an additional vote). Also, all j0B get zero votes. So, no j0B can ever be in 
Ph. So, j is indifferent between all candidates between whom he can ever be pivotal 
(Uh 11 C B). So, it obviously is a best response for i to randomize over B. 
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(b) Now consider iEB. By Assumption 5.1, i most prefers to vote for himself. Then, 
he is indifferent between all other members of B, and finally ranks all C/B last. By 
a similar argument to (a) above, Ph C B, all h=1, ..., in. 
So, with some positive 
probability ,i will 
be pivotal between himself and other member(s) of B, and with 
probability , 
he will only be pivotal between other members of B. Given this, it is 
clear that i's unique best response is to vote for himself. 
(c) Now consider iE C/B. By Assumption 5.1, i most prefers to vote for himself. 
Then, he is indifferent between all other members of B, and finally ranks all C/B 
last. By a similar argument to (a) above, Ph C B, all h=1, ..., m. 
So, i is never 
pivotal between himself and member(s) of B; he is only pivotal between members of 
B. So, it obviously is a best response for i to randomize over B. Q 
D. 2.2 Proof of Proposition 5.1 
(a) Pooling Equilibrium 
We assume the following off-the-equilibrium path beliefs: 7ri(j, s) = 0, jEC, all 
6 6. Given these beliefs, no jEK will wish to stand for election and spend less 
(or more) than ö, as she anticipates that she will win with probability 0 if bj < ö. We 
now derive the condition under which it is a best response for every iEK to stand 
for election and spend S, given that all jEK, j 3k i are following this strategy. The 
critical case is where i is type L. If iEK is type-L, si = (1,8) it is a best response 
if 
1 (RL + WL) +k1 [PWH + (1 - P)WLI - Ö: PWg + (1 - P)WL 
where the left-hand-side is the expected payoff to entering and being elected with 
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probability 1/k, and the right-hand-side is the expected payoff to not entering. Re- 
arranging, this gives 
RL - P(WH - WL) 
k_ 6p 
This must clearly hold in equilibrium. 
(b) Separating Equilibrium 
We assume the following off-the-equilibrium path beliefs: lri (j, s) = 0, jEC, all 
6 j4 S. Given these beliefs, no jEK will wish to stand for election and spend less 
(or more) than E, as she anticipates that she will win with probability 0 if 63 < S. We 
now derive conditions under which e(H) = (1, S), e(L) =0 is a best response for i to 
this same strategy by all jEK, j#i. Suppose that all jEK, ji are following 
e(H) = (1, S), e(L) = 0. Then, from i's point of view, the number of entrants other 
than i is c, where c is distributed Binomially with parameters p, k-1. Let E[1], 
and A= 1- (1- p)'C-1. But then if i does not enter, his payoff will be (1- A)WH, no 
matter what his type, and if he does enter, his payoff will be 1L (W.. +R4)+(1-µ)WH-b 
if his type is a. So, we need 
µ(WH+RH)+(1-µ)WH-S> (1-A)WH>µ(WL+RL)+(1-µ)WH-b 
or, rearranging 
AWH+µRH > b> µ(WL+RL)+(A-µ)WH 
as required. 
(c) No other equilibria 
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There cannot be an equilibrium where nobody enters, i. e. e(a) = 0, a=H, L. 
For suppose there were: then some iEK could deviate by entering and spending 
6. Moreover, such a deviant will be elected, as all voters prefer even a low-ability 
office-holder to none at all. Such a deviation is profitable as long as RH + WH > S. 
Also, there cannot be an equilibrium where iEK enters only if he is a low-type, 
i. e. e(L) 6), e(H) = 0, as by Lemma 5.1, if iEK is type H, he benefits by 
'(WH - WL) more from entry than if he is type L. Q 
D. 2.3 Proof of Proposition 5.2 
(a) Pooling Equilibrium 
The argument here is the same as in the proof of Proposition 5.1, except that now 
the critical condition is for a type H. For this type to wish to stand and spend S, it 
must be that 
1(RH+WH) +k 
_1 
[/)WH+(1-P)WLI-Ö ipWH+(1-P)WL 
Rearranging, this gives 
S<Sp= RH + (1 - P)(WH - WL) 
k 
(b) Separating Equilibrium 
First, note that a necessary condition for a separating equilibrium where only low- 
types enter is that E is such that high-types do not want to enter but low ones do. 
An argument similar to the proof of Proposition 5.1 (except that p,, \ are redefined, 
<ö< and the subscripts H, L transposed) establishes that this is the case when ö. 
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L, where bs, Ss, are defined in Proposition 5.2. But now suppose that S< beat a 
separating equilibrium, some iEK deviates to (1, ö'), S' < S8 < ö. By making this 
deviation, he cannot lower the belief (on the part of voters) that he is aH type, as 
it is already zero. So, his probability of election cannot fall, and he is spending less, 
so he must profit from this deviation. So, no separating equilibrium can exist. This 
argument fails if 6> ös; then, there can exist a separating equilibrium with ö= 68. 
(c) No other equilibria 
As in the proof of Proposition 5.1. Q 
D. 2.4 Proof of Proposition 5.3 
(a) Assume that the equilibrium is pooling. Then *(j, (1, ö)) = p, jEK, so 
ua, ((1,6), 1, *) = Ro, + W. - 6, Moreover, equilibrium pay-offs are 
ia= 
1(Ra+Wa)+k 1[PWH+(1-p)WLJ-b, 
a=H, L 
So, simple computation gives J(1,5) = {L} if x<6<y where x= (k1) (WL + 
RL) + A, y= (k') (WH + RH) + A, A=S -(k k1) [pWH + (1 - p)WL]. So, then 
0(J(1, S)) =1 if 6E (x, y]. But then 
ux((1,6), ß(J(1,6)), *) = RH + WH E (x, y] 
So fore small, 
üH = 
1(RH 
+ WH) -A1 
k- 
< T(RH+WH)-A+( kl)(RH+WH-WL-RL)- 
= RH+WH - 
(k 
- 
1) 
(WL+RL) -A-e 
Proofs of Propositions 
= RH+WH - 
(x+E) 
= 
so the equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion, as claimed. 
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(b) Assume that the equilibrium is separating. Also, assume without loss of generality 
that S< Ss. Then ir(j, (1, b)) = 1, jEK, so ua((1,6), 1, *) = µ(Ra + Wa. ) + (1 - 
µ)WH - S. So, UH((1) S), 1, ir) = üH +S-S. So, (1, b) is dominated for H if and only 
if ö> Moreover, (1, S) is dominated for L as long as ö>6.. So, for Se <S< 
Hý J(1,6) = {L}, so ß(J(1,6)) = 1, Se <6<S. But then by construction, 
ftH < IH +S-6= UHl(l, b), O(J(1, b)), 7f), b, <6<Ö 
So, as long as S9 < b, the separating equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion. Ob- 
viously, if Ss = S, this argument does not apply, and so this separating equilibrium 
passes the Intuitive Criterion. Q 
D. 2.5 Proof of Proposition 5.4 
Assume that the equilibrium is pooling. Then *(j, (1, S)) = p, jEK, so ua((1,6), 1, fr) = 
Ro, + Wa, - S. Moreover, equilibrium pay-offs are: 
üa= 
1(Ra+W.. )+k- 1 [PWH+(1-p)WL]-b, a=H, L 
So, if RL + WL -6> UL, RH + WH -6> UH, action (1,6) is dominated for neither 
type. Simple computation tells us that this occurs when 6<x=b+ Oil) [RH + 
(1 - p)(WH - WL)]. So, then J(1,6) = {0}, 6<x. But as ß(J(1, b)) = p, we have: 
ua((16), O(J(1,6)), *) =k (R. + Wa) +kk1 [pWH + (1 - p)WL] - 6ý 6<x 
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Now, <x by construction. So, it follows that for any 6>6>b, 
ýaýýl, b), «(A1,6)), *) = Üa +S-6> ua 
so that the equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion. Obviously, when ö=b, this 
cannot happen, so the pooling equilibrium where b=6 passes the Intuitive Criterion. 
0 
D. 2.6 Proof of Proposition 5.5 
There are then two cases. First, BH E Q. In this case, with sophisticated beliefs, 
ir(BH) = 1, so BH clearly solves maximization problem (i), implying (T1(Ba, ), gl (0a)) _ 
BH - (gi (BH), Ti (9H)). Second, BH 0 Q. Then, there are two candidate solutions 
to (i); (T1(0a), gl(0a, )) as defined in the Proposition, and (gi(OH)r*l (OH)). They give 
pay-offs V. 1 (T1(Ba), gl (Ba, ), 1) and V 1(Ti (Ba), gi (0a), 0) respectively. Moreover, T1(0. ), 
gl(9a) is in the interior of Sa. So, by construction of S0, V1(T1(9a), gl(0a), 1) > 
V'(Tri(0,, ), gi(O ), 0). This establishes Proposition 5.5. Q 
D. 2.7 Proof of Lemma 5.5 
Note first that from (5.24), 
V2(1) = e[R+Wal + (1 - Z)Z, 
j ä2(o) 
- 
EPWH + (1 - P)WLI + 
(1 
- E)Z 
where Z= [0.5WPP(Ba) + 0.5[pWgp(OH) + (1 - p)W9P(OL)JJ, and we have used WPP(O0) = 
Wa. So, by direct calculation, 
Sa = {(91)71)Iu(y-71,91)+v(71+9a-91) _b} 
Sa = {(91, T1)Iu(y'T1,91)+v(Tj+Oa-91)>_ý} 
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where 
b= u(y - 7'1(0a)) gl (ea)) + v(Ti (Oa) + Oa - gl (Oa)) - eLa 
b= u(y - Ti(ea) 7 91(ea)) + v(Tl(ea) + 
Oa - 91(ea)) - La 
and 
La = Wa +R- pWH - (1 - p)WL, aE {OH, OL} 
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is the loss of utility from losing power at the beginning of the second period. Now, 
by assumption, Lo, > 0. So, b>b.. It follows immediately from the concavity of u, v 
that Sa C Sa, as required. 0 
D. 2.8 Proof of Proposition 5.10 
We show that the equilibrium described is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Consider 
period t=2. It is clear that any iEN of type (a, p) who is elected at period 1 chooses 
92 = -r2(8a), 92 = 0. Next, consider the behaviour of the voters, given candidate 
set C2 that is either the equilibrium one or arises from unilateral deviations from 
equilibrium entry behaviour. Suppose, without loss of generality, that the incumbent 
= 71'D" Let 
d_ nD 
if *> p 
nD if fr <p 
(A3) 
First, in equilibrium, C2 = {d}. In this case, it is trivial the candidate d is elected. 
Now suppose that an additional candidate j enters, i. e. Cl = {d, j }. The first case 
is where jE ND. If d= nD, by Bayesian updating, voters k# d know that d is high- 
ability with probability *, and if d= nD, we suppose that voters kd conjecture 
that this candidate is high-ability with probability p. Also, we suppose that voters 
kj conjecture that j is high-ability with probability p. Then, it is easy to check 
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that all voters k d, j strictly prefer d to j and so will vote for d. As n>3, d will 
surely win the election. 
The second case is where jE NR. In this case, by the arguments of the partial 
democracy case of Section 5.7.4, voters will vote according to type, and so both d and 
j will win with probability 0.5. 
We now check that the entry decisions of potential candidates are mutual best 
responses. As WPP(OL) +R-ö>0, the candidate d does not wish to withdraw. By 
the above argument, any j 54 d, jE ND loses b if she enters. So, it is optimal for 
no other candidate jE ND to enter. Finally, if j#d, jE NR does not enter, she 
expects payoff 
PWDR(BH) + (1 _ P`WDR(BL) = 
where p= fr if d= nD, andp =p if d= nD. On the other hand, if she enters, she 
expects payoff 0.5(WRR(9') + R) + 0.5Vi - 6. So, it is optimal not to enter if 
6 >O. 5(WRR(O)+R-0) 
As p>p, 0' < BH, it is sufficient for this to hold that 
S>O. 5(WRR(OH) +R_ PWDR(OH` _ 
(1 
_ p)WDR(OL)) = 
s2 
Now go to period t=1. Assume that nD wins the election. Rationally anticipating 
that he will only stand (and win) in the next period if *>p, his first-period policy 
maximizes V1(gl, , rl, fr(gl, T1)) as defined in (5.25), where a is nD's ability type. So, 
the type-a chooses (gl(Ba), 'rl(Ba)), aE {BH3 8L} . 
Next, consider the behaviour of the voters, given a candidate set Cl that is ei- 
ther the equilibrium one or arises from unilateral deviations from equilibrium entry 
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behaviour. First, in equilibrium, Cl = {nD}, so nD will be elected. Now, suppose 
that an additional candidate j enters (i. e. Cl = {no, j}). The first case is where 
jE ND. In this case, we assume that voters k0 Cl conjecture that any member of 
Cl is high-ability with probability p. Then, all voters k nD, j strictly prefer nD to 
j, and so all k nD, j will vote for nD. As n>3, nD will surely win the election. 
Consequently, j will not enter. 
The second case is where jE NR. In this case, voters vote according to type. If 
j does not enter, he can expect a payoff in the two periods of 
VNE = P[u(y-T1(BH), O)+V( 1(OH)'+'OH-g1(OH» +WDR(OH)] 
+(1 - p) 
[U(y 
- T1(OL), O) + v(T 1(OL) + 
BL 
- 91(OL)) + pWDR(OH) + 
(1 
_ p)WDR(OL)] 
This can be explained as follows. With probability p, nD is competent, so he stays in 
power for two periods, but with probability 1-p, nD is incompetent, so loses power 
(as the equilibrium is revealing) at the beginning of the second period. 
If j enters, he can expect a payoff in the two periods of at most 0.5V +0.5VNE - 6, 
(assuming he is competent), where 
V= u(y - 'r1(OH) 11 (OH)) 
+V(T1(OH) + 9H - 91(OH)) +R+ 
(WRR(9H) + R) 
So, he will not enter if b>0.5(V - VNE) = öl. Let 
u(y -T 1(OH)1 91(OH)) + v(T 1(BH) + BH - 91_(9H)) +R 
O1 - 0.5 -P [u(y - T'1(OH), 0) + v(T1(OH) + OH -1(OH))] 
-(1 - P) 
[u(y 
- Tl(BL), 0) + v(T1(OL) + 
OL - 9'1(9L))] 
We can conclude that for this to be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we need 
R+W (BL) > max{S1, S2}. 0 
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D. 2.9 Proof of Proposition 5.12 
Consider period t=2. First, it is clear that any iEN of type a, p who is elected at 
period 1 chooses g2 = T2(Ba). Next, note that from Bayes' rule, the probability that 
a candidate has high-ability given a signal s is 
P(O=OHJs=1)=29, P(O=9HJs=1)=1-19 
So, the payoff to a p-voter from a type-p office-holder who has a good or bad signal 
S is 
Wl = 19WPP(OH) + (1 - 19)WPP(BL) 
Wo = (1 -19)W (OH) + 19WPP(OL) 
Now consider the behaviour of the voters, given a candidate set C2 that is either the 
equilibrium one or arises from unilateral deviations from equilibrium entry behaviour. 
By hypothesis, C2 = {d2i r2}. Then, voting will be according to type, so each 
will win with probability 0.5. The payoff to members of the p-party from entering a 
candidate of "type" s is therefore 
0.5(W3 + R') + 0.5 [79Wqp(OH) + (1 -19)Wqp(O )J -6 
On the other hand, if no candidate is entered, the payoff is 
19Wqp(8H) + (1 - 19)Wqp(BL) 
So, we require it to be desirable to enter for a candidate iff he is "type" s=1. For 
this, we need 
0.5(Wl + R') -m>0.5 [19Wgp(OH) + (1 -19)W`ý(OL)] > 0.5(W0 + R') -6 m 
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But this condition reduces to the one in the Proposition. At the beginning of 
period 1, exactly the same argument applies, except that agents add to their pay-offs 
the equilibrium continuation pay-offs in period 2. But is it easily checked that this 
does not affect the arguments above. Q 
D. 2.10 Proof of Proposition 5.13 
We assume the following off-the-equilibrium path beliefs: lri (j, s) = 0, jEC, all 
6 S. Given these beliefs, no jEK will wish to stand for election and spend less 
(or more) than S, as she anticipates that she will win with probability 0 if 5<S. 
(a) Pooling Equilibrium. We now derive the condition under which it is a best 
response for every iEK to stand for election and spend ö, given that all jEK, j#i 
are following this strategy. The critical case is where i is of type (a, b) _ (L, H). If 
iEK is a low-ability type and has a high cost of campaign spending, s= = (1, S) it is 
a best response if 
1(RL+WL)+k 
- 
1(PWH+(1-P)WL)-coHö>PWH+(1-p)WL 
where the LHS is the expected payoff to entering and being elected with probability 
1/k, and the RHS is the expected payoff to not entering. Rearranging, this gives 
< 
RL - P(WH - WL) = 
bp 
=ö' kWH WH p 
This must clearly hold in equilibrium. 
(b) Separating Equilibrium. Throughout, we use the following notation: e(a, b). 
Part (i), i. e. strongly separating equilibrium. We derive conditions under which 
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e(H, H) ö), e(H, L) = e(L, L) = e(L, H) =0 is a best response for i to this 
same strategy by all jEK, j#i. Suppose that all jEK, ji are following 
e(H, H) = (1, S), e(H, L) = e(L, L) = e(L, H) = 0. Then, from i's point of view, 
the number of entrants other than i is x0, where xo is distributed Binomially with 
parameters po, k-1, where po = pw. Let µo = E[x +1], and . 10 = 1- (1- po)/C-1. But 
then if i does not enter, his payoff will be (1 - A0)WH, no matter what his type is, 
and if he does enter, his payoff will be yo(W,, + Ra) + (1 - µo)WH - SObb if his ability 
type is a and his burning cost is b. So, we need 
µ0(WH+RH)+(1-µ0)WH-(PLS > 
(L-iý0)WH > min 
N'o(WH + RH) + (1 - µ0)WH - SOHb, 
µo(WL + RL) + (1 - µo)WH - ýPd 
or, rearranging 
AOWH + µoRH 
µo(WH+RH)+01-141)WH 
BGH b9t 
VL 
>> min uo(WL+RL)+(ao-µo)WH = uet 
PL 
Inspection of the above inequalities reveals that these are satisfied only when c 
is not too large compared to cPL. 3 If this is not the case, then Set > Set, in which case 
we cannot have a separating equilibrium. 
Part (ii), i. e. weakly separating equilibrium. We derive conditions under which 
e(a = H, b) = (1, 
ö), e(a = L, b) = 0, b=H, L is a best response for i to this 
same strategy by all jEK, j#i. Suppose that all jEK, ji are following 
e(a = H, b) = (1, ö), e(a = L, b) = 0. Then, from i's point of view, the number 
of entrants other than i is x1, where xl is distributed Binomially with parameters 
Pi, k-1, where pi = P(1 - pw(1 - w)). Let 1L1 = E[x, +i], and Al pj)k-i 
But then if i does not enter, his payoff will be (1 - A1)WH, no matter what his type 
3 We have defined in (5.29) the maximum spread between cpH and 'pr. 
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is, and if he does enter, his payoff will be pl (W,,, + Ra) + (1 - µl )WH - cpbS- So, we 
need 
µ1(WH+RH)+(1-µ1)WH-ýoHS >- (1-A1)WH > p1(WL+RL)+(1-AI)WH-WLý 
or, rearranging 
A1WH+µ1RH 
>> µi(WG+RG)+(Ai-µi)WH _ bwa 
sw8 = 
KPH DPG 
= 
Inspection of the above inequalities reveals that these are satisfied only when VH 
is not too large compared to VL. 4 If this is not the case, then Sv, B > 
bt1Je 
f in which 
case we cannot have a separating equilibrium. 
Part (iii), i. e. semi-separating equilibrium. We derive conditions under which 
e(H, L) =e (H, H) =e (L, L) = (1, ö), and e(L, H) =0 is a best response for i to 
this same strategy by all jcK, j#i. Suppose that all jEK, j 54 i are following 
e(H, L) =e (H, H) =e (L, L) = (1, ö), e(L, H) = 0. Then, from i's point of view, 
the number of entrants other than i is x2, where x2 is distributed Binomially with 
parameters P2, k-1, and P2 =1-w -p(1 - 2w) +p2(1 + w)(w - 1)2 -wp3(w - 1)2. 
Let µ2 = E[X2+1], and A2 =1- (1 - P2)k-1. But then if i does not enter, his payoff 
will be (1 -. 2)[(pw+ p(1 - w))WH+ (1 - p)(1 - w)WL] /[1 - (1 - p)w], no matter 
what his type is, and if he does enter, his payoff will be µ2(Wa + Ra) +(1 - µ2) 
[(Pw + P(1 - w))WH +(1 - P)(1 - w)WL] /[1 - (1 - P)w] -(Pbö. So, we need 
min 
{p2(WL+RL)+(1-µ2)*-WA 
µ2(WH+RH)+(1-µ2)i-(PHb} 
ý (1 - 
A2)"Iý> 112(WL + RL)+ (1 - I"2)1"- VHý 
4 We have defined in (5.29) the maximum spread between WH and APL. 
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where W= [(pw + p(1 - w)) WH + (1 - p)(1 -w)WL]/[1 - (1 - p)w]. After rearranging 
we obtain 
µ2(RH+WH)+(, \2-µ2)`i` 
µ2(wL + RL) + (A2 
Gý{ 1 S9e =min 112(RL+WL1+02-112)T' 
S> 
WH 
- 
bae 
WL 
Again, inspection of the above inequalities reveals that these are satisfied only when 
VH is not too large compared to cp,, (where we have defined in (5.29) the maximum 
spread between cpH and WL). If this is not the case, then 6, > ,,,, in which case we 
cannot have a separating equilibrium. Q 
D. 2.11 Proof of Proposition 5.14 
(a) Assume that the equilibrium is pooling. Then i(j, (1, S)) = p, jEK, so 
U, ((1, S), 1, *) = R. + Wa - cpbS, Moreover, equilibrium pay-offs are 
zla= 
k(Ra+Wa)+ k 
1(PWH+(1-P)WL)-VA 
a=H, L, b=H, L 
Let x' = [(AL-k 
1) (WL + RL) + AL]/(PL, y' = [Vkl) (WH + RH) + AH]/(PH, Ab = 
cpb6 - (kk1) [pWH + (1 - p)WL], where b=H, L. Again, as in Proposition 5.13, and 
contrarily to the proof of Proposition 5.3, we can see that now two cases are possible 
depending on whether cpH - cpL is "too large" or not (where we have defined in (5.29) 
the maximum spread between WWH and cpL). 
(i) Case 1: cPH - c°L is small enough. In this case, simple computation give 
{L} if x' <6< y'. So, then O(J(1, S)) =1 if 6E (x', y']. But then 
UH(l11 6) 1 
O(J(1,5))9 1r)= RH + WH - WA 
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So fore small, 
uH = 
1(RH+WH) 
-AH 
< 
1(RH+WH) 
-AL-e, since AH > AL 
<I (RH + WH) 
AL 
E since WL >1 
<+ (RH+WH) 
A 
RH 
+WH APL \kk 
1/ 
APL \kk1 
)(WL+RL)-e 
1= 
RH + WH 
AL \k 
k 
1) 
(WL + RL) + AL] -E 
= RH + WH - (x' + 6) 
= 
335 
where we have used the fact that RH + WH - WL - RL >0 since we are in the 
congruence case. And therefore (") (RH + WH) -L (k 1) (WL + RL) >0 since 
PPL > 1. So the pooling equilibrium fails the IC, as claimed. 
(ii) Case 2: co - cpL is large enough. In this case, simple computation gives 
J(1, ö) = {H} if y' <6< x'. So, then O(J(1,6)) =0 if 6E (y', x']. Therefore, any 
citizens that deviates from the equilibrium strategy is believed to be a low-type with 
probability one, and will therefore never be elected but will lose the entry cost S, i. e. 
UL((1, b), «(J(1, S)), 1T) = PWH + 
(1 
- P)WL - IPL6,6 E (y', x'J 
This obviously is a dominated strategy since the equilibrium payoff is 
uL =1 (RL + WL) - 
AL 
_1 (RL + WL) + 
(k- 
k 
1) 
(PWH + (I - P)WL) - ALS 
> (RL+WL)+1 
k1J6PWH+(1-P)WL)-ýPLa 
> PWH + (1 - P)W\L - ý0LS = ýUL1(le 
a), «J(1) 6)), fr) 
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were we have used Assumption 5.1: i. e. RL + WL > WH, and the fact that 6E 
(y', x'] >S by construction. So the pooling equilibrium does not fails the IC when 
(PH - VL is large enough. 
(b) (i) Assume that the equilibrium is strongly separating (as defined in part (i) 
of Proposition 5.13) and that c°H -'PL is not "too large" so that 68t < L. Also, 
assume w. l. o. g. that S< Sst. Then -(j, (1, S)) = 1, jEK, and Ua((l, b), 1, *) = 
µo(Ra + Wa) + (1 - ILO) WH - cPnb. Thus, UH((1,6)) 1, ir) = uH + (, aLb - PLS. SO, 
(1, S) is dominated for (a, b) _ (H, L) if S>ö. Moreover, (1, ö) is dominated for 
a types (a, b) _ {(H, H), (L, L), (L, H)} as long as ö>6, t. So, for be, <6<S, 
(H, L) V J(1,6) _ {(H, H), (L, L), (L, H)}, so ß(J(1, S)) = 1, for öet <ö<b. But 
then by construction, 
UH < UH +'PLS - WL6 = UH 
((l) 6) 
1 
O(J(1,6)) 
, 7r), 
ý8t <6<6 
So, as long as &t < S, the separating equilibrium fails the IC. Obviously, if bet = S, 
this argument does not apply, and so this separating equilibrium passes the IC. 
(ii) Assume that the equilibrium is weakly separating (as defined in part (ii) of 
Proposition 5.13) and that cpH - cpL is not "too large" so that öti, e < 6W8. Also, 
assume w. 1. o. g. that S< 6W,. Then *(j, (1, S)) = 1, jEK, and ua, ((1,6), 1, *) _ 
µi(Ra + Wa) + (1 - µ1)WH - c65. Thus, UHb((1, S), 1,7) = UH +'Pb(b - b). So, 
(1,6) is dominated for a=H only if S>ö. Moreover, (1,6) is dominated for a low- 
ability type (regardless of its burning cost) as long as 6> b1L8. So, for öw, <6<S, 
a=Hý J(1, S) = {a = L}, so ß(J(1, S)) = 1, for öw, <6<b. But then by 
construction, 
2UH < 2lH +(Pd -6) = UHL((1, a), O(J(1, a)), 1r), 
Aw3 <6<Ö 
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So, as long as 6w9 < S, the separating equilibrium fails the IC. Obviously, if b... = b, 
this argument does not apply, and so this separating equilibrium passes the IC. 
(iii) Assume that the equilibrium is semi separating (as defined in part (iii) of 
Proposition 5.13) and that c°H - cps is not "too large" so that 5e< See, and x2 < 
6< y2. Also, assume w. 1. o. g. that 6<be. Then *(j, (1, ö)) = P2 > 0,5 jEK, so 
ua((l, 6), 1,7r) = Ra + W. - cPb5, and 
Üa=µ2(Wa+Ra)+(1-N-2)ý-'Pbs 
UH=ll2(WH+RH) +(1-µ2W -Pb5 
where, from the proof of Proposition 5.13, W_ 
(a"'+P(1-w))Wy+(1-p)(1-w)WL So, simple 
computation give J(1, S) {L} if x2 <ö< y2, where x2 =1 (RL + WL - W) + ö, 
and y2 =1 (RH + WH -') + ö. So, then ß(J(1, ö)) =1 if 6E (x2i y2]. But then 
UH((l1 a)) O \1L 
6)), 1r) = RH + WH - (PA 
6E (x2) y2] 
So, fore small, 
uH - 112(WH+RH)+(1 -112)*-ýPLb 
< RH +WH -(1-µ2) 
(RL+WL) +(1-11241 -ýod WLE, /12<1 
= RH+WH-cpL[1-il2 l(RL+WL-W)+öl -coLE 
WL J 
= RH + WH - WL 
(X2 + 6) 
= UH((1, x2 + E), O(J(1, x2 + e)), 7*) 
So the semi-separating equilibrium fails the IC, as claimed. 11 
5where p2 =1-w- p(1 - 2w) +p2(1 + w)(w - 1)2 -wp3(w -1)2 (c. f. proof of Proposition 13). 
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D. 2.12 Proof of Proposition 5.15 
(a) Pooling Equilibrium. The argument here is the same as in the proof of Proposition 
5.13, except that now the critical condition is for a high-ability and low cost type (i. e. 
(a, b) = (H, H)). For this type to wish to stand and spend b, it must be that 
(RH + WH) +k- 
1(PWH 
+ (1 - P)WL) - VHb ? PWH + (1 - P)WL 
Rearranging, this gives 
<_ öý = 
bp 
= 
RH + (1 - P)(WH - WL) 
p KPH ýpHJC 
(b) Semi Separating Equilibrium. We assume the following off-the-equilibrium 
path beliefs: lri (j, s) = 0, jEC, all 6 S. Given these beliefs, no jEK will wish to 
stand for election and spend less (or more) than b, as she anticipates that she will win 
with probability 0 if bj < 
ö. A necessary condition for a semi separating equilibrium 
where only the following types enter: (a, b) = {(L, L), (L, H), (H, L)}, is that b is 
such that type (a, b) = (H, H) do not want to enter. An argument similar to the 
proof of Proposition 5.13 (except that u2, A2 are redefined, and the ability subscripts 
a=H, L transposed) establishes that this is the case when 68e <S< bee provided 
that PH - c°L is not too large, and where 6m, 69e, are defined in Proposition 5.15.6 
(c) No other equilibria. It is easy to see that, following the argument of the proof 
of Proposition 5.2 part (b) and applying it directly from the proof of Proposition 
5.13 (except that the µ's and the A's need to be redefined, and the ability subscripts 
a=H, L transposed), both a strongly (and a weakly) separating equilibrium cannot 
6Similar to the proof of Proposition 5.13, if ýpK - cpL becomes sufficiently large, then we will have 
5se > öSe, in which case a semi separating equilibrium is not possible. 
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exist when S> bst (and S> 57119) (where Sgt and 6 are appropriately redefined). 
However, both a strongly and a weakly separating equilibrium are possible if ö= 69e 
and S= Sws respectively. As in Section 5.3.2, given that in the non congruent case 
the strongly and weakly separating equilibria are undesirable from voters point of 
view, we assume that S< min {S_P, S9t, Sw8} so that both the strongly and weakly 
separating equilibria are eliminated. 0 
D. 2.13 Proof of Proposition 5.16 
(i) Assume that the equilibrium is pooling. Then *(j, (1, b)) = p, jEK, so 
fr) = R. + Wa - l4- Moreover, equilibrium pay-offs are: 
üa = (Ra + Wa) +k1 [PWH + (1 - P)WL] - cpbS, a=H, L; b=H, L 
So, if RL + WL - cOH6 > iLL, RH + WH - cpH6 > üH, action (1, ö) is dominated for 
neither ability type. Simple computation tells us that this occurs when 6< x' = 
H 
ýý 1) [RH + (1 - p)(WH - WL)]. So, then J(1,6) _ {0}, 6< x'. But as 
ß(J(1, b)) = p, we have: 
ßa((1, s)> ß(J(1, s)), ý) _ (Ra + Wa) +k1 [PWH + (1 - p)WL] - (Pbb, 6< xi 
Now, E< x' by construction. So, it follows that for any b>6>S, 
uaýýlý 5), «(J(1,6)), *) - ua + cObb - cPb6 > 'La 
so that the equilibrium fails the IC. Obviously, when 6=ö, this cannot happen, so 
the pooling equilibrium where S=6 passes the IC. 
(ii) Assume that the equilibrium is semi separating and that c0H - (PL is not "too 
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large". Then *(j, (1, S)) = p2i jEK, so ua, ((1, S), 1, *) = R. + Wa - ccb(, and 
Üa - µ2(Wa 
+ Ra) + (1 µ2) 41 wb5 
where, from the proof of Proposition 5.15, 'F = [(pw + p(1 - w))WL + (1 - p) (1 - 
w)WH]/[1-(1-p)w]. So, if RL+WL-ICHS ý PUL, RH+WH-VL5 ! UH, action (1,6) is 
dominated for neither ability type. Simple computation give J(1,6) _ {0} if 6< x0, 
where xo _ (1 - /-12) [WH + RH - W]/cpL + b. So, then ß(J(1,6)) =0 if 6< x0. But as 
ß(J(1) S)) = p2, then 
ýaýýl, 6), ß(J(1,6)), *) = P2(Wa + Ra) + (1 - µ2)`i' - ýPnb, 6< xe 
But we know that S< xm by construction. So, it follows that for any ö>6>ö, 
uaýýlý 6) 1 
0(J(1,6)), *) = 2ba + lPbý - cp0 > fla 
so that the equilibrium fails the IC. Obviously, when S= max{b, S8e}, this cannot 
happen, so the pooling equilibrium where 6= max{b, b8e} passes the IC. El 
D. 2.14 Proof of Proposition 5.17 
(a) Pooling Equilibrium 
We assume the following off-the-equilibrium path beliefs: ir(j, e) =0 if j0C. We 
first derive conditions under which it is a best response for every iEK to stand for 
election. The critical case is where i is a type-L citizen. If c=1, as there is only one 
candidate, i will surely be elected, and so will get R+ WL - ö. If he does not stand, 
the default option is implemented. So iEK prefers to stand if R+ WL -6>0, or 
6<R+WL=6. If c>1, if iEC is a type-L citizen, it is a best response to stand 
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for election iff 
1(R+WL)+c 1 [PWH+(1-p)WL]-ö>PWH+(1-P)WL 
where the left hand side of the inequality is the expected payoff to entering and being 
elected with probability 1/c, and the right hand side is the expected payoff to not 
entering. Rearranging, this gives 
S<R P(WH - 
WL) 
-Ö CC 
This must clearly hold in equilibrium. 
Given the above off-the-equilibrium path beliefs, no jEC will wish to stand for 
election and spend less at least E as she anticipates that she will win with probability 
0. The reason being that, by Bayes' rule, all voters (other than i) believe iEC to be 
high-ability with probability p. However, by the assumption on off-the-equilibrium 
path beliefs, all voters (other than j) believe j to be high-ability with probability 0. 
So, j will lose if he enters and forfeit at least S; consequently, he will not enter. 
(b) Separating Equilibrium 
We assume the following off-the-equilibrium path beliefs; ir(j, s) =0 if jýC. We 
first derive conditions under which it is a best response for every iEC to stand for 
election. If c=1, as there is only one candidate, i will surely be elected, and so will 
get R+ WH - ö. If he does not stand, the default option is implemented. So iEN 
prefers to stand ifi R+ WH -6>0, or 6<R+ WH = Si. 
If c>1, it is a best response to stand for election iff 
(R+WH)+C 
- 
1WH-ö>WH 
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where the left hand side of the inequality is the expected payoff to entering and being 
elected with probability 1/c, and the right hand side is the expected payoff to not 
entering. Rearranging, this gives 6<R=6, which must clearly hold in equilibrium. 
As in case (a) above, suppose now that j stands against C. By Bayes' rule, all 
voters (other than i) believe iEC to be high-ability with probability 1. But by the 
assumption on off-the-equilibrium path beliefs, all voters (other than j) believe j to 
be high-ability with probability 0. So, j will lose if he enters and forfeit at least 6; 
consequently, he will not enter. 
(c) No other equilibria 
There cannot be an equilibrium where nobody enters, i. e. e(a) = 0, a=H, L. 
The proof follows that of part (c) of the proof of Proposition 5.1. Q 
D. 2.15 Proof of Proposition 5.19 
We assume the following off-the-equilibrium path beliefs: lri(j, s) = 0, jcC, all 
64S. Given these beliefs, no jEK will wish to stand for election and spend less 
(or more) than S, as she anticipates that she will win with probability 0 if Sý < b. 
(a) Pooling Equilibrium. We now derive the condition under which it is a best 
response for every iEK to stand for election and spend S, given that all jEK, ji 
are following this strategy. The critical case is where i is for type-1. If iEK is type-1, 
si = (1, S) it is a best response if 
ß(R1+W1)+k 1m 
PiW= 
m 
-býýPiw 
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where the LHS is the expected payoff to entering and being elected with probability 
l/k, and the RHS is the expected payoff to not entering. Rearranging, this gives 
R1+W1-Em1PiW 11 
k =6p 
This must clearly hold in equilibrium. 
(b) Separating Equilibrium. We now derive conditions under which e(m) = (1, ö), 
e(L) =0 is a best response for i to this same strategy by all jEK, j i. Suppose 
that all jEK, ji are following e(m) = (1, E), e(L) = 0. Then, from i's point of 
view, the number of entrants other than i is Xm, where xm is distributed Binomially 
with parameters pm, k-1. Let µm = E[xm+l], and 'm =1- (1 But then 
if i does not enter, his payoff will be (1 - Am)Wm, no matter what his type, and if he 
does enter, his payoff will be µm(Wa, + Ra) + (1 - pm)Wm -ö if his type is a. So, we 
need 
pm(Wm+Rm)+(1-fµm)Wm-b > (1-Am)Wm > NmýWm-1+Rm-1J+C1-µmýWm-b 
or, rearranging 
)tmWm + µ, r. 
' m>S> NmýWm-1 + 
Rm-1ý ý%ým - NmýWm 
as required. 
(c) Semi-separating equilibria. With many ability types, there is a multitude of 
semi-separating equilibria, where only a subset Z of high-types enter (i. e. types above 
and including type-(m - z), so Z=m-z, m-z+1, ..., m-1, m), and those below 
these ability types do not enter. We now derive conditions under which e(Z) 
e(Z) =0 (where 1, ..., m-z- 1) is a best response 
for i to this same strategy 
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by all jEK, j i. Suppose that all jEK, ji are following e(Z) _ (1, b), 
e(Z) = 0. Then, from i's point of view, the number of entrants other than i is x, z, 
where xz is distributed Binomially with parameters p, k-1. Let pz = E[Xs+l], and 
Az = 1- (1-pz)k-1. But then if i does not enter, his payoff will be (1-, \, z) 
>m 
Z piWi, 
and if he does enter, his payoff will be p., (W,, + Ro, ) + (1 - pz) Emz piWi -ö if his 
type is a. So, we need 
mm 
µz(Wm-z ýlwn-z)ý 
(1-ýdz) E piWi-Ö i (1-A. ) 
E 
piWi> I +(1 
W 
µz) 
=P 
Wi 
1)a 
J i=z i=z L 
or, rearranging 
mm 
pz(Wm-z+Rm-z)+(Az-µz) 
E piWi !b> µz(Wm-z-1+Rm. -z-1)+(Az-µz) 
E 
p: Wi 
i=z i=z 
as required. Q 
D. 2.16 Proof of Proposition 5.20 
(a) Assume that the equilibrium is pooling. Then fr(j, (1, b)) = pl, jEK, so 
ua((1, S), 1, ý) = Ra + Wa - 6, Moreover, equilibrium pay-offs are 
m 
üa = k(Ra +Wa) +k_1 
EPiWi 
i=1 
So, simple computation gives J(1, S) = {L} (where L now regroup all types a= 
{1, 
..., m- 
1} except the highest ability type-m agent) if x# <S< y# where 
x# _ (ß`k1)(W,, n-, +Rm-i)+A#, y# = 
(k')(Wm+R, 
n)+A#, A# = 
S- 
(k-1) E" 
1 p2W2. 
So, then q5(J(1, S)) =1 if 6E (x#, y#]. But then k i= 
uß. ((1, S), O(J(1, s)), *) = R, + Wm - Si ÖE (x#, y#] 
So for e small, 
_ 
1(R, 
n, +Wm)-A# 
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< (Rm+Wem, )-A#+(kk1)(Rºn, +Wm-Wm- -R -ý)-E 
k1\ 
\ 
= Rý + Wm, -kf (Wm-, + Rm-1) - A# -E 
= +Wem,, -(x#+E)) 
= um((1, x# + E), O(JJ(l, x# + E)), fr) 
so the equilibrium fails the IC, as claimed. 
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(b) Assume that the equilibrium is separating. Also, assume w. l. o. g. that 6 
b 
e. 
Then fr(j, (1, S)) = 1, jEK, so ua((1, S), 1, *) = µ(R,, + Wa, ) + (1 - µ)Wß - S. 
So, u, ((1, S), 1, ýr) = Üm + 6. So, (1,6) is dominated for m if b>b. Moreover, 
(1,6) is dominated for L as long as 6>6. So, for b8e <6<5, mý J(1,6) = {L}, 
SO O(J(1,6)) = 1,69e <6<S. But then by construction, 
im, < fl" +ý-6=U,, 6), O(J(1,6)), *), Sae <6<Ö 
So, as long as S9e < ö, the separating equilibrium fails the IC. Obviously, if 6=S, 
this argument does not apply, and so this separating equilibrium passes the IC. 
(c) Assume that the equilibrium is semi separating. Also, assume w. 1. o. g. that 
S< 539. Then *(j, (1, ö)) = pz, jEK, so ua((1, ö), 1, fr) = R. + W. - 6, and 
üo, = µz(WQ + Ra) + (1 - µz) >m z pi 
WW - b. So, simple computation give J(1,6) = 
{L} if x, z <6< yz, where x, z = 
(1 - µ, )(W,,, -1 + 
Rm-1 - Emz p2W2) +., and 
yZ = (1 - µz) (W, + Rm - Ei m-, p2W2) + S. So, then ß(J(1,6)) =1 if 6E (xz, y,. ]. But 
then 
um«l, 6), O(J(1, b», i') = Rm + Wm, - 6,6 E (x, yz] 
Proofs of Propositions 
So, for e small, 
m 
üm =R (Wm i-S 
i=z 
m 
< Rm +Wm, - (1 - pz) (Rm-1 + Wm-1) + (1 - µz) 
E 
piWi -Ö-e, N'z<1 
i=z 
m 
= Rm+Wm-(1-pz) Rm-1+Wm-1-EpiWi -S-e 
i=z 
= Rm, +W, n, -(x, z+e) 
= um((l' xz + e), q5(J(1, xz + e)), fr) 
346 
So the semi-separating equilibrium fails the IC, as claimed. Q 
